@incollection {D:paradoxenVM, title = {Paradoxen in de vrijmetselarij en de relatie met waarden}, booktitle = {Kappen aan de ruwe steen}, year = {2017}, pages = {319{\textendash}336}, publisher = {Academic and Scientific Publishers}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rik Pinxten and Jean Swings} } @article {D:NoBigDeal, title = {Pluralism In Scientific Problem Solving. Why Inconsistency Is No Big Deal}, journal = {Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {32}, year = {2017}, pages = {149{\textendash}177}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:pcr, title = {Propositional Logic Extended With A Pedagogically Useful Relevant Implication}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {245{\textendash}276}, abstract = {

First and foremost, this paper concerns the combination of classical propositional logic with a relevant implication. The proposed combination is simple and transparent from a proof theoretic point of view and at the same time extremely useful for relating formal logic to natural language sentences. A specific system will be presented and studied, also from a semantic point of view. The last sections of the paper contain more general considerations on combining classical propositional logic with a relevant logic that has all classical theorems as theorems.

}, doi = {10.12775/LLP.2013.024}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:rescher, title = {On Possibilities and Thought Experiments}, booktitle = {Rescher Studies. {A} Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of {N}icholas {R}escher}, year = {2008}, pages = {29{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Ontos Verlag}, address = {Frankfurt}, abstract = {

This paper concerns two related recent books by Nicholas Rescher, Imagining Irreality on possibilities and What If? on thought experiments. Apart from an expository part, the present contribution consist on the one hand of some proposed elaborations, especially of two technical points, and on the other hand of some discussion concerning points where I am in doubt about Rescher{\textquoteright}s precise stand and of some suggestions for further research.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Almeder, Robert} } @article {D:pcfdial, title = {A Procedural Criterion for Final Derivability in Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {221{\textendash}250}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a (prospective) goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, the procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a \emph{criterion} for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:ppp_cl, title = {A Paraconsistent Proof Procedure Based on Classical Logic}, year = {2003}, abstract = {

Apparently Ex Falso Quodlibet (or Explosion) cannot be isolated within CL (Classical Logic); if Explosion has to go, then so have other inference rules, for example either Addition or Disjunctive Syllogism. This cer- tainly holds according to the standard abstract view on logic. However, as I shall show, it does not hold if a logic is defined by a procedure-a set of instructions to obtain a proof (if there is one) of a given conclusion from a given premise set. In this paper I present a procedure pCL{\textexclamdown} that defines a logic CL{\textexclamdown}|a function assigning a consequence set to any premise set. Anything deriv- able by CL from a consistent premise set {\textexclamdown} is derivable from {\textexclamdown} by CL{\textexclamdown}. If {\textexclamdown} is (CL-)inconsistent, pCL{\textexclamdown} enables one to demonstrate this (by de- riving a contradiction from {\textexclamdown}). The logic CL{\textexclamdown} validates applications of Disjunctive Syllogism as well as applications of Addition. Nevertheless, this logic is paraconsistent as well as (in a specific sense) relevant. pCL{\textexclamdown} derives from an intuitively attractive proof search procedure. A characteristic semantics for CL{\textexclamdown} will be presented and the central prop- erties of the logic will be mentioned. CL{\textexclamdown} shows that (and clarifies how) adherents of CL may obtain non-trivial consequence sets for inconsistent theories.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:pdmdp, title = {On a Partial Decision Method for Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {P{C}{L} 2002. Paraconsistent Computational Logic}, volume = {95}, year = {2002}, note = {

Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at \texttt{http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html}

}, pages = {91{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Roskilde University}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, it forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0207090}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Dekker, Hendrik and Villadsen, Jorgen and Waragai, Toshiharu} } @article {DDa:vd1, title = {Pushing the Search Paths in the Proofs. {A} Study in Proof Heuristics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {113{\textendash}134}, abstract = {

Introducing techniques deriving from dynamic proofs in proofs for propositional classical logic is shown to lead to a proof format that enables one to push search paths into the proofs themselves. The resulting goal directed proof format is shown to provide a decision method for A1, ..., An vdash B and a positive test for Gamma vdash A.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {D:pwv, title = {Paraconsistency and its Relation to Worldviews}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {259{\textendash}283}, abstract = {

The paper highlights the import of the paraconsistent movement, list some motivations for its origin, and distinguishes some stands with respect to paraconsistency. It then discusses some sources of inconsistency that are specific for worldviews, and the import of the paraconsistent turn for the worldviews enterprise.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:p\&rl, title = {Paraconsistente en relevante logica{\textquoteright}s}, journal = {Wijsgerig perspectief op maatschappij en wetenschap}, volume = {32/2}, year = {1992}, pages = {53{\textendash}59}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:prps, title = {Progress, rationality and the philosophy of science}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor de studie van de Verlichting en het Vrije denken}, volume = {8{\textendash}9}, year = {1981}, pages = {83{\textendash}102}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:pepl, title = {Paraconsistent extensional propositional logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {23}, number = {90-91}, year = {1980}, pages = {195{\textendash}234}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:poc, title = {The paradoxes of confirmation}, journal = {Revue internationale de philosophie}, volume = {95{\textendash}96}, year = {1971}, pages = {101{\textendash}118}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }