@article {PD:embed, title = {Nice Embedding in Classical Logic}, journal = {Studia Logica}, year = {2016}, pages = {47-78}, abstract = {

It is shown that a set of semi-recursive logics, including many fragments of CL (Classical Logic), can be embedded within CL in an interesting way. A logic belongs
to the set iff it has a certain type of semantics, called nice semantics. The set includes
many logics presented in the literature. The embedding reveals structural properties of the embedded logic. The embedding turns finite premise sets into finite premise sets. The partial decision methods for CL that are goal directed with respect to CL are turned into partial decision methods that are goal directed with respect to the embedded logics.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11225-015-9622-3}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter and Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:nds, title = {Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology.}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {185{\textendash}209}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {

Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @incollection {D:eial, title = {The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology}, booktitle = {Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {459{\textendash}485}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Symons, John and Gabbay, Dov M. and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {D:nhpc1, title = {Natural Heuristics for Proof Construction. {P}art {I}: Classical Propositional Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {32}, number = {127-128}, year = {1989}, note = {Appeared 1992}, pages = {337{\textendash}363}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:NRctt, title = {Nicholas {R}escher{\textquoteright}s coherence theory of truth}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {16}, number = {63-63}, year = {1973}, pages = {393{\textendash}411}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }