@article {D:devisingOmega, title = {Devising the Set of Abnormalities for a Given Defeasible Rule}, journal = {Logicheskie Issledovaniya / Logical Investigations}, volume = {26}, number = {1 [To the memory of Prof.\ Alexander Karpenko]}, year = {2020}, note = {https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en}, pages = {9{\textendash}35}, abstract = {

Devising adaptive logics usually starts with a set of abnormalities and a deductive logic. Where the adaptive logic is ampliative, the deductive logic is the lower limit logic, the rules of which are unconditionally valid. Where the adaptive logic is corrective, the deductive logic is the upper limit logic, the rules of which are valid in case the premises do not require any abnormalities to be true. In some cases, the idea for devising an adaptive logic does not relate to a set of abnormalities, but to one or more defeasible rules, and perhaps also to one of the deductive logics. Defeasible rules are not universally valid, but are valid in {\textquoteleft}normal situations{\textquoteright} or for unproblematic parts of premise set.\  Where the idea is such, the set of abnormalities has to be delineated in view of the rules. The way in which this task may be tackled is by no means obvious and is the main topic studied in the present paper. The outcome is an extremely simple and transparent recipe. It is shown that, except for very special cases, the recipe leads to an adequate result.

}, doi = {10.21146/2074-1472-2020-26-1-9-35}, url = {https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:vddiag, title = {A Diagrammatic Proof Search Procedure as Part of a Formal Approach to Problem Solving}, booktitle = {Model Based Reasoning in Science and Engineering. {C}ognitive Science, Epistemology, Logic}, year = {2006}, pages = {265{\textendash}284}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, abstract = {

This paper aims at describing a goal-directed and diagrammatic method for proof search. The method (and one of the logics obtained by it) is particularly interesting in the context of formal problem solving. A typical property is that it consists of attempts to justify so-called bottom boxes by means of premise elements (diagrammatic elements obtained from premises) and logical elements. Premises are not preprocessed, whence most premises lead to a variety of premise elements.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo} } @article {DT:ddp, title = {Direct Dynamic Proofs For the {R}escher{\textendash}{M}anor Consequence Relations: The Flat Case}, journal = {Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics}, volume = {12}, year = {2002}, pages = {63{\textendash}84}, abstract = {

It was shown in \cite{D:unific} that the flat Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations{\textendash}-the Free, Strong, Argued, C-Based, and Weak consequence relation{\textendash}-are all characterized by special applications of inconsistency-adaptive logics defined from the paraconsistent logic CLuN. As as result, these consequence relations are provided with a dynamic proof theory. In the present paper we show that the detour via an inconsistency-adaptive logic is not necessary. We present a direct dynamic proof theory, formulated in the language of Classical Logic, and prove its adequacy.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Vermeir, Timothy} } @article {D:Rpijl, title = {A Dynamic Characterization of the Pure Logic of Relevant Implication}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {30}, year = {2001}, pages = {267-280}, abstract = {

This paper spells out a dynamic proof format for the pure logic of relevant implication. (A proof is dynamic if a formula derived at some stage need not be derived at a later stage.) The paper illustrates three interesting points. (i)\ A set of properties that characterizes an inference relation on the (very natural) dynamic proof interpretation, need not characterize the same inference relation (or even any inference relation) on the usual set-theoretical interpretation. (ii)\ A proof format may display an internal dynamics (defeasible conclusions) in the absence of an external dynamics (non-monotonicity). (iii)\ A monotonic logic may have a non-monotonic characterization.

Keywords: dynamic proofs, relevant implication, non-monotonicity.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:zinLAar, title = {De zin van Leo Apostels athe{\"\i}stische religiositeit. {E}en kennistheoretisch commentaar. {W}oord vooraf}, booktitle = {Athe{\"\i}stische Spiritualiteit}, year = {1998}, pages = {9{\textendash}21}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:dynsem, title = {Dynamic Semantics Applied to Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logical Investigations}, volume = {5}, year = {1998}, pages = {74{\textendash}85}, address = {Moscow, {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}NAUKA{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:dsial, title = {A Dynamic Semantics for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Bulletin of the Section of Logic}, volume = {27}, year = {1998}, pages = {15{\textendash}18}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:determinisme, title = {Determinisme en indeterminisme}, booktitle = {Verwijdering of ontmoeting?}, year = {1994}, pages = {183{\textendash}202}, publisher = {Pelckmans}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Verbeure, Frans and Apostel, Leo} } @incollection {D:ialddl, title = {De inconsistentie-adaptieve logica {D}{D}{L}}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {39{\textendash}45}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {D:hier, title = {Do we need a hierarchical model of science?}, booktitle = {Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations. {E}ssays in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1992}, pages = {199{\textendash}215}, publisher = {University of California Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Earman, John} } @incollection {D:dyn, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistent Logic. {E}ssays on the Inconsistent}, year = {1989}, pages = {187{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Philosophica Verlag}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Priest, Graham and Routley, Richard and Norman, Jean} } @article {D:ddfl, title = {Dialectical dynamics within formal logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {29}, number = {114}, year = {1986}, pages = {161{\textendash}173}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:tool, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics as a Tool to Deal with and Partly Eliminate Unexpected Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {The Logic of Discovery and the Logic of Discourse}, year = {1985}, pages = {263{\textendash}271}, publisher = {Plenum Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Hintikka, Jaakko and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D:d\&ci, title = {Deduction and contextual information}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {8}, year = {1975}, pages = {243{\textendash}277}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:rofidk, title = {De rol van ontische factoren in de kennisverzameling}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {6}, year = {1973}, pages = {51{\textendash}69}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }