@incollection {Wieland2014, title = {Internalism Does Entail Scepticism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, series = {Logic, Argumentation \& Reasoning}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {247-260}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philie’s solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.

}, keywords = {Internalism, Knowledge, Regress, Rule, Scepticism}, isbn = {978-94-017-9010-9}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_13}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {MCJ:iadlnc, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {42}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {285{\textendash}315}, abstract = {

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}-rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:i\&ds, title = {Inconsistencies and the Dynamics of Science}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {129{\textendash}148}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {D:defprog, title = {In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {129{\textendash}150}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:clau2, title = {Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. {C}lausius{\textquoteright}s Remarkable Derivation of {C}arnot{\textquoteright}s Theorem}, booktitle = {History of Modern Physics. {A}cta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Brepols}, address = {Turnhout (Belgium)}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Krach, Helghe and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {152589, title = {Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, series = {Origins}, volume = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhn’s own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.

}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {DJ:real, title = {In-world realism vs. reflective realism.}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {35{\textendash}53}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} }