@incollection {4443651,
	title = {Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences},
	booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {45-57},
	publisher = {Springer},
	author = {Gervais, Raoul},
	editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke}
}
@incollection {J:ep\&aal,
	title = {Empirical Progress and Ampliative Adaptive Logics},
	booktitle = {Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers. Vol. 1},
	series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities},
	volume = {83},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {193{\textendash}217},
	publisher = {Rodopi},
	address = {Amsterdam/New York},
	author = {Meheus, Joke},
	editor = {Festa, Roberto and Aliseda, Atocha and Peijnenburg, Jeanne}
}
@incollection {J:ana,
	title = {An Extremely Rich Paraconsistent Logic and the Adaptive Logic Based on It},
	booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic},
	year = {2000},
	pages = {189{\textendash}201},
	publisher = {Research Studies Press},
	address = {Baldock, UK},
	author = {Meheus, Joke},
	editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}
}
@article {J:earlypos,
	title = {The early positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery},
	journal = {Philosophica},
	volume = {64},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {81{\textendash}108},
	abstract = {<p>In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the "positivists" (logical positivists and their immediate forerunners) have been criticised for their (alleged) neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the {\textquoteright}friends of discovery{\textquoteright} seem to have forgotten. Contrary to what is generally accepted, I shall also show that there is no reason at all why the positivists should have ignored discovery.</p>},
	author = {Meheus, Joke}
}
@article {J:eaip,
	title = {Erotetic arguments from inconsistent premises},
	journal = {Logique et Analyse},
	volume = {42},
	number = {165-166},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {49{\textendash}80},
	abstract = {<p>The aim of this paper is to generalize two basic concepts of Wisniewski{\textquoteright}s theory of questions, namely question evocation and question generation, to the inconsistent case. For both concepts, I shall present three alternative definitions. Each of these is based on a prioritized adaptive logic. I shall show that, for the consistent case, each of the alternative definitions leads to the same results as the original ones, and that, for inconsistent case, no other changes are introduced than those required for the sensible handling of inconsistencies. I shall also show that, in the generalized case, a new kind of question evocation can be defined (here called stong evocation). I shall demonstrate that if a question is strongly evoked by some inconsistent set of premmises, then each of its direct answers provides guidance on how the inconsistencies should be resolved.</p>},
	author = {Meheus, Joke}
}
@incollection {J:nvfb,
	title = {Elk wetenschapper zijn onderzoeksprogramma?},
	booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {61{\textendash}67},
	publisher = {VUB-Pers},
	author = {Meheus, Joke},
	editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf}
}
