@article {Meheus2014, title = {Deontic Reasoning on the Basis of Consistency Considerations}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

Deonticconflictsposeanimportantchallengetodeonticlogicians. The standard account —standard deontic logic, SDL— is not apt for addressing this challenge since it trivializes con flicts. Two main stratagems for gaining conflict-tolerance have been proposed: to weaken SDL in various ways, and to contextualize the reign of SDL to consistent subsets of the premise set. The latter began with the work of van Fraassen and has been further developed by Horty. In this paper we characterize this second approach in general terms. We also study three basic ways to contextualize SDL and supplement each of these with a dynamic proof theory in the framework of adaptive logics.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Aleks Knoks} } @incollection {2020, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, volume = {2}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {College Publications}, edition = {1}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @article {JMFC:iadl, title = {Non-Adjunctive Deontic Logics That Validate Aggregation as Much as Possible}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, year = {In Press}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {2068, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics: A Survey}, journal = {IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications}, volume = {6}, number = {3}, year = {2019}, pages = {523-608}, chapter = {523}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00032.pdf}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @proceedings {2050, title = {How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference}, year = {2018}, pages = {317-335}, publisher = {College Publications}, type = {submitted}, address = {London}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Frijters, Stef and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Condoravdi, Cleo and Nair, Shyam and Pigozzi, Gabriella} } @article {Meheus2013, title = {Which Style of Reasoning to Choose in the Face of Conflicting Information?}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2016}, pages = {361--380}, abstract = {

In the context of non-monotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The strong consequences are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The weak consequences follow from some maximal consistent subset. The free consequences follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {provijn2014bloody, title = {Bloody analogical reasoning}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {217{\textendash}232}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper I will study some of William Harvey’s applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic ‘action’ of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens’ contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian ‘natural philosophy interpretation’ of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_11}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {5673678, title = {Data-driven induction in scientific discovery: a critical assessment based on Kepler{\textquoteright}s discoveries}, booktitle = {Logic, reasoning, and rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {59{\textendash}76}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Motivated by the renewed interest in knowledge discovery from data (KDD) by the artificial intelligence community, this paper provides a critical assessment of the model of data-driven induction for scientific discovery. The most influential research program using this model is developed by the BACON team. Two of the main claims by this research program, the descriptive and constructive power of data-driven induction, are evaluated by means of two historical cases studies: the discovery of the sine law of refraction in optics and Kepler{\textquoteright}s third law of planetary motion. I will provide evidence that the data used by the BACON program{\textendash}-despite the claims being made{\textendash}-does not correspond with the historical data available to Kepler and his contemporaries. Secondly, it is shown that for the two cases the method by which the general law was arrived at did not involve data-driven induction. Finally, the value of the data-driven induction as a general model for scientific discovery is being questioned.

}, isbn = {9789401790109}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6\_4}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {4443651, title = {Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {45-57}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {Wieland2014, title = {Internalism Does Entail Scepticism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, series = {Logic, Argumentation \& Reasoning}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {247-260}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philie’s solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.

}, keywords = {Internalism, Knowledge, Regress, Rule, Scepticism}, isbn = {978-94-017-9010-9}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_13}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {MCJ:iadlnc, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {42}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {285{\textendash}315}, abstract = {

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}-rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke} } @article {CJM:demi, title = {Tolerating Deontic Conflicts by Adaptively Restricting Inheritance}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {219}, year = {2012}, pages = {477-506}, abstract = {

In order to deal with the possibility of deontic conflicts Lou Goble developed a group of logics DPM that are characterized by a restriction of the inheritance principle. While they approximate the deductive power of standard deontic logic, they do so only if the user adds certain statements to the premises. By adaptively strengthening the DPM logics, this paper presents logics that overcome this shortcoming. Furthermore, they are capable of modeling the dynamic and defeasible aspect of our normative reasoning by their dynamic proof theory. This way they enable us to have a better insight in the relations between obligations and thus to localize deontic conflicts.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {J:flash, title = {A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation}, year = {2011}, pages = {93{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Erik} } @conference {JMF:adera, title = {Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called \sys{P2.1}$^r$, that is based on Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e${\textendash}-a bimodal extension of Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{P} that invalidates aggregation for all \emph{prima facie} obligations. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ has several advantages with respect to \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}as much as possible{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ avoids Goble{\textquoteright}s criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the {\textquoteleft}toy examples{\textquoteright} from the literature as well as more complex ones.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14183-6\_12}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik}, editor = {Governatori, Guido and Sartor, Giovanni} } @incollection {JK:gdt, title = {Goal-Directed Tableaux}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {241{\textendash}256}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This paper contains a new format for analytic tableaux, called goal-directed tableaux. Their main interest lies in the fact that the search for a closed tableau proceeds in a highly constrained way. The goal-directed tableaux do not form a complete decision method for propositional classical logic (because they do not sustain Ex Falso Quodlibet). For consistent sets of premises, however, they lead to the same results as the usual analytic tableaux for classical logic.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {680715, title = {Yes Fellows, Most Human Reasoning is Complex}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {166}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {113{\textendash}131}, abstract = {

This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 41-60). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9268-4}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Verd{\'e}e, Peter and Meheus, Joke} } @conference {GiJ:aavc, title = {Adaptive arbitration by variant counting on commutative bases with weights}, booktitle = {Fusion 2008: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Fusion}, year = {2008}, publisher = {IEEE}, organization = {IEEE}, abstract = {

In this paper a new logical arbitration protocol for fusion of inconsistent information is designed. It defines a selection of models of a premise set in a multi-modal logic that uses the standard format of adaptive logics. The selected models are obtained by a counting procedure on the derivable data conflicting among the various sources. Peculiar of this approach is the definition of weights for commutative bases, in terms of the distinction between partially and fully supported information. The results obtained are compared to standard arbitration protocols and they extend previous work on the adaptive majority protocol.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICIF.2008.4632371}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke} } @article {GiJ:mmac, title = {Majority Merging by Adaptive Counting}, journal = {Synthese (KRA Serie)}, volume = {165}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {203{\textendash}223}, abstract = {

The present paper introduces a belief merging procedure by majority using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the logic ADM(c) (Adaptive Doxastic Merging by Counting) consists in the formulation of the conflicts arising from the belief bases of the agents involved in the procedure. A strategy is then defined both semantically and proof-theoretically which selects the consistent contents answering to a majority principle. The results obtained are proven to be equivalent to a standard majority operator for bases with partial support.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9370-2}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke} } @conference {GiJ:qmpa, title = {Quasi-merging and Pure-arbitration on Information for the family of Adaptive Logics ADM}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic and Intelligent Interaction}, year = {2008}, abstract = {

The present paper introduces two new information merging protocols for the family of adaptive logics ADM, for which majority merging has been defined in [19]. The new adaptive operators re ect the negotiation processes of quasi-merging and pure arbitration, known from the Integrity Constraints framework introduced in [13]. The Adaptive Variant Counting selection provides a result equivalent to the GMax family of merging operators: it selects a collective model for a multi-set of belief bases based on the number of disagreements verified by the various models according to a leximax function. The Adaptive Minimax Counting selection is a quasi-merging operator which applies a minimax function and it obtains a larger spectrum of possibilities than the previous selection: it simulates the behaviour of the Max family of operators from the Integrity Con- straints framework, avoiding some of its counterintuitive results.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Pacuit, Eric} } @article {JDa:gda, title = {Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction through Goal-Directed Proofs}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {22/3}, number = {60}, year = {2007}, pages = {295{\textendash}304}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/12751}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @incollection {J:ala, title = {Adaptive Logics for Abduction and the Explication of Explanation-Seeking Processes}, booktitle = {Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {97{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da U. de Lisboa}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {

In this paper, I illustrate the main characteristics of abductive reasoning processes by means of an example from the history of the sciences. The example is taken from the history of chemistry and concerns a very small episode from Lavoisier’s struggle with the ‘air’ obtained from mercury oxide. Eventually, this struggle would lead to the discovery of oxygen. I also show that Lavoisier’s reasoning process can be explicated by means of a particular formal logic, namely the adaptive logic LAr. An important property of LAr is that it not only nicely integrates deductive and abductive steps, but that it moreover has a decent proof theory. This proof theory is dynamic, but warrants that the conclusions derived at a given stage are justified in view of the insight in the premises at that stage. Another advantage of the presented logic is that, as compared to other existing systems for abductive reasoning, it is very close to natural reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @article {DJDa:signed, title = {An Adaptive Characterization of Signed Systems for Paraconsistent Reasoning}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from \cite{B\&S:sspr} in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {J:AJ, title = {An Adaptive Logic Based on {J}a{\'s}kowski{\textquoteright}s Approach to Paraconsistency}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {35}, year = {2006}, pages = {539{\textendash}567}, abstract = {

In this paper, I present the modal adaptive logic AJ r (based on S5) as well as the discussive logic Dr2 that is defined from it. Dr2 is a (non-monotonic) alternative for Jaskowski’s paraconsistent system D 2 . Like D 2 , Dr2 validates all single-premise rules of Classical Logic. However, for formulas that behave consistently, D2 moreover validates all multiple-premise rules of Classical Logic. Importantly, and unlike in the case of D2 , this does not require the introduction of discussive connectives. It is argued that this has clear advantages with respect to one of the main application contexts of discussive logics, namely the interpretation of discussions.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:Jerzy, title = {Discussive Adaptive Logics: {H}andling Internal and External Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, series = {Pozna{\'n} Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {211-223}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {JD:cogsci, title = {A Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {221{\textendash}236}, abstract = {

This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/5210}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {J:ep\&aal, title = {Empirical Progress and Ampliative Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers. Vol. 1}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {83}, year = {2005}, pages = {193{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Festa, Roberto and Aliseda, Atocha and Peijnenburg, Jeanne} } @incollection {J:al_iid, title = {Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and Deduction}, booktitle = {Induction and Deduction in the Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {93{\textendash}120}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Stadler, Friedrich} } @article {JDa:ddp_cc, title = {Direct Dynamic Proofs for Classical Compatibility}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {305{\textendash}317}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @incollection {J:pcsr, title = {Do We Need Paraconsistency in Commonsense Reasoning?}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {135{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentina}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {J:i\&ds, title = {Inconsistencies and the Dynamics of Science}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {129{\textendash}148}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:parcomp, title = {Paraconsistent Compatibility}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {251{\textendash}287}, abstract = {

In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent com-patibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are com-patible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical com-patibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsistent compatibility cannot be defined with respect to a monotonic paraconsistent logic, but only with respect to an inconsistency-adaptive logic. The paper contains modal versions of two well-studied inconsistency-adaptive logics. These modal versions form the basis for the logics for paraconsistent compatibility, but are also interesting with respect to other applications.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {DJDaL:diag, title = {Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {39{\textendash}65}, abstract = {

A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar and Verhoeven, Liza} } @incollection {J:alpt, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Pragmatic Truth}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {167{\textendash}185}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper presents the new adaptive logic APT. APT has the peculiar property that it enables one to interpret a (possibly inconsistent) theory Gamma {\textquoteright}as pragmatically as possible{\textquoteright}. The aim is to capture the idea of a partial structure (in the sense of da Costa and associates) that adequately models a (possibly inconsistent) set of beliefs Gamma. What this comes to is that APT localizes the {\textquoteright}consistent core{\textquoteright} of Gamma, and that it delivers all sentences that are compatible with this core. For the core itself, APT is just as rich as Classical Logic. APT is defined from a modal adaptive logic APV that is based itself on two other adaptive logics. I present the semantics of all three systems, as well as their dynamic proof theory. The dynamic proof theory for APV is unusual (even within the adaptive logic programme) in that it incorporates two different kinds of dynamics.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {JLMDa:abd, title = {Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, year = {2002}, pages = {39{\textendash}71}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.
We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, CP1 and CP2. CP1 enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. CP2 moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to CP1 and CP2 that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Verhoeven, Liza and Van Dyck, Maarten and Provijn, Dagmar} } @incollection {D:defprog, title = {In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {129{\textendash}150}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:clau2, title = {Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. {C}lausius{\textquoteright}s Remarkable Derivation of {C}arnot{\textquoteright}s Theorem}, booktitle = {History of Modern Physics. {A}cta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Brepols}, address = {Turnhout (Belgium)}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Krach, Helghe and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {152589, title = {Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, series = {Origins}, volume = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhn’s own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.

}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {152663, title = {Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in science}, year = {2002}, pages = {165{\textendash}184}, publisher = {Kluwer}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_10}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:alqe, title = {Adaptive logics for question evocation}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {135{\textendash}164}, abstract = {

In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for Wisniewki{\textquoteright}s notion of question evocation. The first is based on an erotetic extension of Classical Logic, the second on an erotetic extension of S5. For both logics, I present the semantics and the dynamic proof theory. The latter is especially important in view of the fact that question evocation is a non-monotonic relation for which there is no positive test. Thanks to its dynamical character, the proof theory moreover solves the logical omniscience problem to which Wisniewski{\textquoteright}s static definition of question evocation leads.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {DJ:lpe, title = {On the Logic and Pragmatics of the Process of Explanation}, booktitle = {Explanatory Connections. {E}lectronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen}, year = {2001}, note = {

22\ pp.

}, publisher = {University of Helsinki}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an \emph{explanandum} and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain.

}, url = {http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/matti/}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Kiikeri, Mika and Ylikoski, Petri} } @article {DJ:tabl2, title = {Shortcuts and Dynamic Marking in the Tableau Method for Adaptive logics}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {69}, year = {2001}, pages = {221{\textendash}248}, abstract = {

Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In \cite{DJ:tabl1}, we presented a tableau method for two inconsistency-adaptive logics. In the present paper, we first describe these methods (without repeating the meta-theoretic proofs). Next, we present several ways to increase the efficiency of the methods. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision{\textendash}-the conclusion follows or does not follow{\textendash}-in a very economical way.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:psic, title = {On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent Constraints}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2000}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters when solving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meet these difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one to derive as many (interesting) consequences as possible, but that at the same time allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I show that the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {DJ:compat, title = {The Adaptive Logic of Compatibility}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {66}, year = {2000}, pages = {327{\textendash}348}, abstract = {

This paper describes the adaptive logic of compatibility and its dynamic proof theory. The results derive from insights in inconsistency-adaptive logic, but are themselves very simple and philosophically unobjectionable. In the absence of a positive test, dynamic proof theories lead, in the long run, to correct results and, in the short run, sometimes to final decisions but always to sensible estimates. The paper contains a new and natural kind of semantics for S5 from which it follows that a specific subset of the standard worlds-models is characteristic for S5.

Keywords: compatibility, adaptive logic, ampliative reasoning, S5-semantics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:analog, title = {Analogical Reasoning in Creative Problem Solving Processes: Logico-Philosophical Perspectives}, booktitle = {Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {17{\textendash}34}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Hallyn, Fernand} } @incollection {J:ana, title = {An Extremely Rich Paraconsistent Logic and the Adaptive Logic Based on It}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {189{\textendash}201}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {DJ:tabl1, title = {A Tableau Method for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods}, series = {Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence}, volume = {1847}, year = {2000}, pages = {127{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

We present a tableau method for inconsistency-adaptive logics and illustrate it in terms of the two best studied systems. The method is new in that adaptive logics require a more complex structure of the tableaus and of some rules and conditions. As there is no positive test for derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics, the tableau method is important for providing criteria for derivability.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dyckhoff, Roy} } @article {J:clau3, title = {Clausius{\textquoteright} discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. {A} paradigm of reasoning from inconsistencies}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {63}, year = {1999}, pages = {89{\textendash}117}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:d\&aal, title = {Deductive and Ampliative Adaptive Logics as Tools in the Study of Creativity}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {4}, year = {1999}, pages = {325{\textendash}336}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that logic has an important role to play in the methodological study of creativity. I also argue, however, that only special kinds of logic enable one to understand the reasoning involved in creative processes. I show that deductive and ampliative adaptive logics are appropriate tools in this respect.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:earlypos, title = {The early positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, pages = {81{\textendash}108}, abstract = {

In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the "positivists" (logical positivists and their immediate forerunners) have been criticised for their (alleged) neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the {\textquoteright}friends of discovery{\textquoteright} seem to have forgotten. Contrary to what is generally accepted, I shall also show that there is no reason at all why the positivists should have ignored discovery.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:eaip, title = {Erotetic arguments from inconsistent premises}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, pages = {49{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to generalize two basic concepts of Wisniewski{\textquoteright}s theory of questions, namely question evocation and question generation, to the inconsistent case. For both concepts, I shall present three alternative definitions. Each of these is based on a prioritized adaptive logic. I shall show that, for the consistent case, each of the alternative definitions leads to the same results as the original ones, and that, for inconsistent case, no other changes are introduced than those required for the sensible handling of inconsistencies. I shall also show that, in the generalized case, a new kind of question evocation can be defined (here called stong evocation). I shall demonstrate that if a question is strongly evoked by some inconsistent set of premmises, then each of its direct answers provides guidance on how the inconsistencies should be resolved.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:mbr, title = {Model-Based Reasoning in Creative Processes}, booktitle = {Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery}, year = {1999}, pages = {199{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Kluwer/Plenum}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (non-standard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of model-based reasoning in creative processes. I argue that model-based reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve model-based reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Nersessian, Nancy and Thagard, Paul} } @article {DJ:gw, title = {Over het (vermeende) conflict tussen godsgeloof en de wetenschappen}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {42}, year = {1997}, pages = {401{\textendash}415}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @phdthesis {J:thesis, title = {Wetenschappelijke ontdekking en creativiteit. {E}en poging tot theorievorming op basis van een conceptuele, methodologische en logische studie}, year = {1997}, month = {March 12}, publisher = {Universiteit Gent (Belgium)}, type = {phd}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {DJ:real, title = {In-world realism vs. reflective realism.}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {35{\textendash}53}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} } @article {JD:steering, title = {Steering Problem Solving Between Cliff Incoherence and Cliff Solitude}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {58}, year = {1996}, note = {Appeared 1998}, pages = {153{\textendash}187}, abstract = {

Starting from Nickles{\textquoteright} constraint-inclusion model, we present five challenges that any rational problem solving model should meet, but that seem to lead to an inextricable riddle. We then introduce the contextual model and show, step by step, that it meets all the challenges and resolves the riddle. This results in a strong argument for the concept of rationality that underlies the model.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Batens, Diderik} } @article {J:np, title = {Nieuwe perspectieven voor het begrijpen en bevorderen van creativiteit}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {40}, year = {1995}, pages = {164{\textendash}178}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:nvfb, title = {Elk wetenschapper zijn onderzoeksprogramma?}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}67}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @article {J:clau1, title = {Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of {C}lausius}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {36}, number = {143-144}, year = {1993}, pages = {359{\textendash}389}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:nvfd, title = {De rationaliteit van persoonlijke inperkingen}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {33{\textendash}38}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {J:ocwm, title = {Ontdekking en creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek}, booktitle = {Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen}, year = {1993}, pages = {41{\textendash}52}, publisher = {Nationaal Comit{\'e} voor Logica, Geschiedenis en Filosofie van de Wetenschappen}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Halleux, Robert and Bern{\'e}s, Anne-Cath{\'e}rine} } @incollection {J:nvfl, title = {Recente ontwikkelingen in onze opvatting over creativiteit}, booktitle = {Gehelen en fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1993}, pages = {259{\textendash}261}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @incollection {DJE:aoc, title = {Aspecten van ontdekking en creativiteit}, booktitle = {Gehelen en Fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1992}, month = {Leuven, September}, pages = {59}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} }