@article {verdee2013degrees, title = {Degrees of inconsistency. Carefully combining classical and paraconsistent negation.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

This paper is devoted to combining the negation of Classical Logic (CL) and the negation of Graham Priest{\textquoteright}s LP in a way that is faithful to central properties of the combined logics. We give a number of desiderata for a logic L which combines both negations. These desiderata include the following: (a) L should be truth functional, (b) L should be strictly non-explosive for the paraconsisent negation \~{} (i.e. if A and \~{}A both have a non-trivial set of consequences, then this should also be the case for the set containing both) and (c) L should be a conservative extension of CL and of LP. The desiderata are motivated by a particular property-theoretic perspective on paraconsistency. Next we devise the logic CLP. We present an axiomatization of this logic and three semantical characterizations (a non-deterministic semantics, an in nitely valued set-theoretic semantics and an in nitely valued semantics with integer numbers as values). We prove that CLP is the only logic satisfying all postulated desiderata. The in nitely valued semantics of CLP can be seen as giving rise to an interpretation in which inconsistencies and inconsistent properties come in degrees: not every sentence which involves inconsistencies is equally inconsistent.

}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @unpublished {2085, title = {Original position arguments: an axiomatic characterization}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Thijs De Coninck and Frederik Van De Putte} } @unpublished {2070, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Semantics, Expressivity, and Applications}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @unpublished {2069, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Semantics, Expressivity, and Applications}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

We study classical modal logics with pooling modalities, i.e. unary modal operators that allow one to express properties of sets obtained by the pointwise intersection of neighbourhoods. We discuss salient properties of these modalities, situate the logics in the broader area of modal logics (with a particular focus on relational semantics), establish key properties concerning their expressive power, and discuss their application to epistemic/doxastic logic, the logic of evidence-based belief, deontic logic, and logics of agency and ability.

}, keywords = {classical modal logics, coalition logic, distributed belief, multi-agent systems, pointwise intersection, pooling modalities}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte}, editor = {Klein, Dominik} } @incollection {2020, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, volume = {2}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {College Publications}, edition = {1}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @article {2015, title = {Coarse Deontic Logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, year = {In Press}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @incollection {HA_DuAlJ, title = {Dutch Algebra and Arithmetic in Japan before the Meiji Restoration}, booktitle = {Navigating across Mathematical Cultures and Times: Exploring the Diversity of Discoveries and Proofs}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Co.}, abstract = {

This paper gives an overview of the scarce occasions in which Japan came into contact with Western arithmetic and algebra before the Meiji restoration of 1868. After the refutation of persistent claims on the influence through Japanese students at Leiden during the seventeenth century, it concentrates on the reception of Dutch works during the last decades of the Tokugawa shogunate and the motivations to study and translate these books. While some studies based on Japanese sources have already been published on this period,2 this paper draws from Dutch sources and in particular on witness accounts from Dutch officers at the Nagasaki naval school, responsible for the instruction of mathematics to selected samurai and rangakusha. Two Japanese textbooks on arithmetic from that period are viewed within the context of this naval training school.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Vandoulakis, I.M. and Dun, Liu} } @article {BeirlaenForthcoming-BEIALF, title = {A Logic for the Discovery of Deterministic Causal Regularities}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {In Press}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, author = {Mathieu Beirlaen and Bert Leuridan and Frederik Van De Putte} } @article {JMFC:iadl, title = {Non-Adjunctive Deontic Logics That Validate Aggregation as Much as Possible}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, year = {In Press}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @proceedings {4443830, title = {Rethinking the explanatory power of extended cognition}, year = {In Press}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {8678415, title = {{Classical term-modal logics}}, journal = {{JOURNAL OF LOGIC AND COMPUTATION}}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2021}, pages = {1026-1054}, abstract = {

{We introduce classical term-modal logics and argue that they are useful for modelling agent-relative notions of obligation, evidence and abilities, and their interaction with properties of and relations between the agents in question. We spell out the semantics of these logics in terms of neighborhood models, provide sound and strongly complete axiomatizations and establish the decidability of specific (agent-finite) variants.}

}, keywords = {Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), CHOICE}, Hardware and Architecture, logic, Software, {Theoretical Computer Science}, issn = {{0955-792X}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa053}}, author = {Frijters, Stef and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2074, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Axiomatization and Decidability}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {online first}, year = {2020}, abstract = {

We establish completeness and the finite model property for logics featuring the pooling modalities that were introduced in Van De\ Putte and Klein (Pooling modalities and pointwise intersection: semantics, expressivity, and applications). The definition of our canonical models combines standard techniques with a so-called {\textquotedblleft}puzzle piece construction{\textquotedblright}, which we first illustrate informally. After that, we apply it to the weakest classical logics with pooling modalities and investigate the technique{\textquoteright}s potential for the axiomatization of stronger logics, obtained by imposing well-known frame conditions on the models.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @article {2068, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics: A Survey}, journal = {IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications}, volume = {6}, number = {3}, year = {2019}, pages = {523-608}, chapter = {523}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00032.pdf}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @article {8543197, title = {Do mechanism-based social explanations make a case for methodological individualism?}, journal = {JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {50}, number = {2}, year = {2019}, pages = {263{\textendash}282}, abstract = {

In the recent philosophy of social science literature, we notice an increasing support for mechanism-based social explanations. Earlier pleas for social mechanisms were often closely linked to defenses of methodological individualism. However, more recent contributions by, e.g. Daniel Little and Petri Ylikoski, seem to be loosening that link and develop a more sophisticated account-ascribing a less important role to microfoundations. In this paper, we want to review the impact of the social mechanisms-approach on methodological individualism and draw more radical conclusions with regard to the individualism/holism debate, severing the link between the social mechanisms-approach and individualism. Four steps will be taken in severing the link: (a) there are more than two levels of social explanation; (b) levels of explanation are perspectival, thus neither absolute, nor unique; (c) seeking microfoundations has a heuristic value, but so has seeking macrofoundations; (d) there are no general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations. In conclusion, the answer to the title question is that the social mechanisms approach does not strengthen the case for methodological individualism.

}, keywords = {Methodological individualism, PLURALISM, REDUCTION, Scientific explanation, Social explanations, Social mechanisms}, issn = {0925-4560}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09446-w}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @unpublished {2053, title = {The best we can do (extended abstract, submitted to LOFT)}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Tamminga, Allard and Duijf, Hein} } @article {2052, title = {Choosing the right concept of "right choices" (technical report)}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @proceedings {2050, title = {How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference}, year = {2018}, pages = {317-335}, publisher = {College Publications}, type = {submitted}, address = {London}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Frijters, Stef and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Condoravdi, Cleo and Nair, Shyam and Pigozzi, Gabriella} } @incollection {D:JP65, title = {Kennissystemen selectief wieden}, booktitle = {Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem}, year = {2018}, pages = {227{\textendash}244}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent, Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {978-94-014-5589-3}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Ducheyne, Steffen and Allo, Patrick} } @unpublished {2051, title = {Pointwise intersection in neighbourhood modal logic}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @article {8535753, title = {Beyond consensus? A reply to Alan Irwin}, journal = {SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY REVIEW AND REPLY COLLECTIVE}, volume = {6}, number = {10}, year = {2017}, pages = {48{\textendash}53}, keywords = {democracy, disclosure, meta-consensus, public participation in science, scientific consensus}, issn = {2471-9560}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Van Oudheusden, Michiel} } @conference {2016, title = {Doing Without Nature}, booktitle = {Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI)}, number = {VI}, year = {2017}, month = {9-11/7/2017}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Sapporro}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Tamminga, Allard and Duijf, Hein} } @incollection {2021, title = {Free Choice Permission in STIT}, booktitle = {Logica Yearbook 2016}, year = {2017}, pages = {289--303}, publisher = {College Publications}, edition = {Pavel Arazim and Tom{\'a}{\v s} L{\'a}vi{\v c}ka}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2071, title = {Participation beyond consensus? Technology assessments, consensus conferences and democratic modulation. }, journal = {Social Epistemology}, volume = {31 (6)}, year = {2017}, chapter = {497}, abstract = {

In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats
that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus
conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how
these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong
appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and
informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies,
we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including
dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy.
Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between
four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and
agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides
opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and
democratic modulation{\textemdash}three aspirations that are at the heart of most
pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses
of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should
therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and
process in science and technology.

}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Van Oudheusden, Michiel} } @article {VanDePutte2017-VANTWD-2, title = {That will do: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, year = {2017}, pages = {473{\textendash}511}, abstract = {
We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36{\textendash}41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of {\textquotedblleft}obligation as weakest permission{\textquotedblright} from Anglberger et al. :807{\textendash}827, 2015).
}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte} } @article {strasser2014dynamic, title = {Adaptive Logic Characterizations of Input/output Logic}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {104}, year = {2016}, pages = {869-916}, chapter = {869}, abstract = {

We translate the unconstrained and constrained input/output-logics from [17, 18] to reflexive modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has various advantages. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our modal framework gives naturally rise to useful variants. Finally, the modal logics display a gain in expressive power over their original counterparts in the input/output framework.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {doi:10.1093/logcom/exu044, title = {Adaptive strategies and finite-conditional premise sets}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {5}, year = {2016}, pages = {1517-1539}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exu044}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exu044}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @conference {8122661, title = {Coarse Deontic Logic (short version)}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {PD:embed, title = {Nice Embedding in Classical Logic}, journal = {Studia Logica}, year = {2016}, pages = {47-78}, abstract = {

It is shown that a set of semi-recursive logics, including many fragments of CL (Classical Logic), can be embedded within CL in an interesting way. A logic belongs
to the set iff it has a certain type of semantics, called nice semantics. The set includes
many logics presented in the literature. The embedding reveals structural properties of the embedded logic. The embedding turns finite premise sets into finite premise sets. The partial decision methods for CL that are goal directed with respect to CL are turned into partial decision methods that are goal directed with respect to the embedded logics.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11225-015-9622-3}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter and Batens, Diderik} } @article {Putte2016ObligationAW, title = {Obligation as Weakest Permission: a Strongly Complete Axiomatization}, journal = {Rew. Symb. Logic}, volume = {9}, year = {2016}, pages = {370-379}, abstract = {

In (Anglberger et al., 2015, Section 4.1), a deontic logic is proposed which explicates the idea that a formula φ is obligatory if and only if it is (semantically speaking) the weakest permission. We give a sound and strongly complete, Hilbert style axiomatization for this logic. As a corollary, it is compact, contradicting earlier claims from Anglberger et al. (2015). In addition, we prove that our axiomatization is equivalent to Anglberger et al.{\textquoteright}s infinitary proof system, and show that our results are robust w.r.t. certain changes in the underlying semantics.

}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte} } @article {4443718, title = {Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {21 (1)}, year = {2016}, abstract = {

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9372-0}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {van2012splitting, title = {Splitting and Relevance: Broadening the Scope of Parikh{\textquoteright}s Concepts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {59}, year = {2016}, pages = {173 -205}, chapter = {173 }, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {Meheus2013, title = {Which Style of Reasoning to Choose in the Face of Conflicting Information?}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2016}, pages = {361--380}, abstract = {

In the context of non-monotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The strong consequences are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The weak consequences follow from some maximal consistent subset. The free consequences follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {4346560, title = {Explicating ways of consensus-making in science and society: distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {71{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty \& Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) – as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @article {4443682, title = {The {\textquoteright}green cheese{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}red herring{\textquoteright} problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, year = {2015}, pages = {433-455}, author = {Weber, Erik and Gervais, Raoul and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {DeBal2006, title = {A new approach to classical relevance.}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {82}, year = {2015}, pages = {1{\textendash}31}, abstract = {

n this paper we present a logic that determines when implications in a classical logic context express a relevant connection between antecedent and consequent. In contrast with logics in the relevance logic literature, we leave classical negation intact - in the sense that the law of non-contradiction can be used to obtain relevantly implications, as long as there is a connection between antecedent and consequent. On the other hand, we give up the requirement that our theory of relevance can define a new standard of deduction. We present and argue for a list of requirements that such a logical theory of classical relevance needs to meet and go on to formulate a system that respects each of these requirements. The presented system is a monotonic and transitive logic that extends the relevance logic ℜ with a richer relevant implication that allows for Disjunctive Syllogism and similar rules. This is achieved by interpreting the logical symbols in the antecedents in a stronger way than the logical symbols in consequents. A proof theory and an algebraic semantics are formulated and interesting metatheorems (soundness, completeness and the fact that it satisfies the requirements for classical relevance) are proven. Finally we give a philosophical motivation for our non-standard relevant implication and the asymmetric interpretation of antecedents and consequents.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {4188922, title = {Towards democratic models of science: exploring the case of scientific pluralism}, journal = {Perspectives on science}, volume = {23}, number = {2}, year = {2015}, pages = {149{\textendash}172}, abstract = {

Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined.

}, issn = {1063-6145}, doi = {10.1162/POSC_a_00165}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzu017, title = {Adaptive logics: a parametric approach}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {22}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, pages = {905-932}, chapter = {905}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {D:JP, title = {The Consistency of {P}eano {A}rithmetic. {A} Defeasible Perspective}, booktitle = {Modestly Radical or Radically Modest. Festschrift for Jean Paul Van Bendegem on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday}, year = {2014}, pages = {11{\textendash}59}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

This paper proposes to replace \sys{PA}, Peano Arithmetic, by a theory \sys{APA} defined in terms of (i)\ a set of axioms that is classically equivalent to the Peano axioms and (ii)\ a defeasible logic that minimizes inconsistency, viz.\ an inconsistency-adaptive logic. If \sys{PA} is consistent, its set of theorems coincides with the set of \sys{APA}-theorems. If \sys{PA} is inconsistent, \sys{APA} is non-trivial and has the following remarkable property: there is a unique non-standard number that is its own successor and every {\textquoteleft}desirable{\textquoteright} \sys{PA}-theorem is retained if restricted to the other numbers. The restriction can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. And there is much more.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Allo, Patrick and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @incollection {3120783, title = {Explanatory strategies beyond the individualism/holism debate}, booktitle = {Rethinking the individualism-holism debate}, volume = {372}, year = {2014}, pages = {153{\textendash}175}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Starting from the plurality of explanatory strategies in the actual practice of socialscientists, I introduce a framework for explanatory pluralism – a normative endorsement of the plurality of forms and levels of explanation used by social scientists. Equipped with thisframework, central issues in the individualism/holism debate are revisited, namely emergence,reduction and the idea of microfoundations. Discussing these issues, we notice that in recentcontributions the focus has been shifting towards relationism, pluralism and interaction, awayfrom dichotomous individualism/holism thinking and a winner-takes-all approach. Then, thechallenge of the debate is no longer to develop the ultimate individualistic approach ordefending the holist approach, but rather how to be combine individualism and holism; howcan they co-exist, interact, be integrated or develop some division of labour, while making thebest out of the strengths and limitations of the respective explanatory strategies of holists andindividualists? Thus, the debate shifts to how exactly pluralism should be understood as thenext leading question, going beyond the current individualism/holism debate. The paper endswith a discussion and evaluation of different understandings of explanatory pluralismdefended in the literature.

}, isbn = {9783319053431}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8_9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Finn, Collin and Zahle, Julie} } @article {4443818, title = {Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {79}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, month = {February}, pages = {1367{\textendash}1389}, abstract = {

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-{\`a}-vis functional explanations.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10670-014-9605-1}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {4090467, title = {Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry}, booktitle = {New directions in the philosophy of science}, year = {2014}, pages = {104{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner{\textquoteright}s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism {\textendash} different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry {\textendash} namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the {\textquotedblleft}genuine dialogue{\textquotedblright} or shape {\textquotedblleft}the pluralistic attitude{\textquotedblright} Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.

}, isbn = {9783319043814}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_8}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @article {vanreconciling, title = {Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, month = {Aug}, pages = {5{\textendash}22}, abstract = {

In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world (ontic aim) in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings (epistemic aim). Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illari’s account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10516-014-9243-x}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {4443828, title = {Validating function-based design methods: an explanationist perspective}, journal = {Philosophy and Technology}, year = {2014}, pages = {511 - 531}, abstract = {

Analysis of the adequacy of engineering design methods, as well as analysis of the utility of concepts of function often invoked in these methods, is a neglected topic in both philosophy of technology and in engineering proper. In this paper, I present an approach—dubbed an explanationist perspective—for assessing the adequacy of function-based design methods. Engineering design is often intertwined with explanation, for instance, in reverse engineering and subsequent redesign, knowledge base-assisted designing, and diagnostic reasoning. I argue that the presented approach is useful for validating function-based design methods with respect to their explanatory elements and that it supports assessment of the explanatory and design utility of “function”, and the different conceptualizations thereof, as used in such engineering design methods. I deploy two key desiderata from the explanation literature to assess the viability of function-based design methods: explanatorily relevant difference-making factors and counterfactual understanding defined in terms of what-if-things-had-been-different questions. I explicate the approach and its merits in terms of two case studies drawn from the engineering functional modeling literature: reverse engineering and redesign and malfunction analysis. I close the paper by discussing ramifications of the presented approach for the philosophy of design and the philosophy of explanation.

}, doi = {10.1007/s13347-014-0168-5}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @incollection {3258356, title = {{\textquoteright}Argumentandi modus huius scientiae maxim{\`e} proprius: {\textquoteright} {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s mechanics and the question of mathematical principles}, booktitle = {Guidobaldo del {M}onte (1545-1607) : theory and practice of the mathematical disciplines from {U}rbino to {E}urope}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}34}, publisher = {Edition Open Access}, isbn = {9783844242836}, url = {http://www.edition-open-access.de/media/proceedings/4/Proceedings4.pdf}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Becchi, Antonio and Bertoloni Meli, Domenico and Gamba, Enrico} } @article {3143178, title = {The conceptual elusiveness of engineering functions: a philosophical analysis}, journal = {Philosophy and Technology}, volume = {26}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {159-185}, abstract = {

In this paper, we describe the conceptual elusiveness of the notion of function as used in engineering practice. We argue that it should be accepted as an ambiguous notion, and then review philosophical argumentations in which engineering functions occur in order to identify the consequences of this ambiguity. Function is a key notion in engineering, yet is used by engineers systematically in a variety of meanings. First, we demonstrate that this ambiguous use is rational for engineers by considering the role of functions in design methods and by analysing the ambiguity in terms of Kuhn’s notion of methodological incommensurability. Second, we discuss ontological and mereological analyses of engineering functions and describe a proof that subfunctions cannot formally be taken as parts of the functions they decompose. Engineering functions figure sometimes in philosophical work and are then typically taken as having an unambiguous, well-defined meaning. Finally, we therefore revisit work in philosophy of technology on the dual nature of technical artefacts, in philosophy of science on functional and mechanistic explanations, and in philosophy of biology on biological functions, and explore the consequences of the fact that engineering function is an ambiguous notion. It is argued that one of these consequences may be that also the notion of biological function has an ambiguous meaning

}, issn = {2210-5441}, doi = {10.1007/s13347-012-0096-1}, author = {Vermaas, Pieter and van Eck, Dingmar and Kroes, Peter} } @article {VanDePutte2013a, title = {Default Assumptions and Selection Functions: A Generic Framework for Non-monotonic Logics}, journal = {Proceedings of MICAI2013, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence}, volume = {8264}, year = {2013}, pages = {54-67}, abstract = {

We investigate a generalization of so-called default-assumption consequence relations, obtained by replacing the consequence relation of classical logic with an arbitrary supraclassical, compact Tarski-logic, and using arbitrary selection functions on sets of sets of defaults. Both generalizations are inspired by various approaches in non-monotonic logic and belief revision. We establish some meta-theoretic properties of the resulting systems. In addition, we compare them with two other frameworks from the literature on non-monotonic logic, viz. adaptive logics and selection semantics.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-45114-0_5}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @incollection {weber2013study, title = {How to Study Scientific Explanation?}, booktitle = {Scientific Explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {25{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3134040, title = {The ICE-theory of technical functions}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {23{\textendash}44}, issn = {0815-0796}, doi = {10.1007/s11016-012-9642-9}, author = {Weber, Erik and Reydon, Thomas and Boon, Mieke and Houkes, Wybo and Vermaas, Pieter} } @article {4443727, title = {Induction from a single instance: {I}ncomplete frames}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {641{\textendash}653}, abstract = {

In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9295-6}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {verdee2013non, title = {Non-monotonic set theory as a pragmatic foundation of mathematics}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {655{\textendash}680}, abstract = {

In this paper I propose a new approach to the foundation of mathematics: non-monotonic set theory. I present two completely different methods to develop set theories based on adaptive logics. For both theories there is a finitistic non-triviality proof and both theories contain (a subtle version of) the comprehension axiom schema. The first theory contains only a maximal selection of instances of the comprehension schema that do not lead to inconsistencies. The second allows for all the instances, also the inconsistent ones, but restricts the conclusions one can draw from them in order to avoid triviality. The theories have enough expressive power to form a justification/explication for most of the established results of classical mathematics. They are therefore not limited by G{\"o}del’s incompleteness theorems. This remarkable result is possible because of the non-recursive character of the final proofs of theorems of non-monotonic theories. I shall argue that, precisely because of the computational complexity of these final proofs, we cannot claim that non-monotonic theories are ideal foundations for mathematics. Nevertheless, thanks to their strength, first order language and the recursive dynamic (defeasible) proofs of theorems of the theory, the non-monotonic theories form (what I call) interesting pragmatic foundations.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10699-012-9296-5}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {van2013preferential, title = {Preferential Semantics using Non-smooth Preference Relations}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {43}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {903{\textendash}942}, abstract = {

This paper studies the properties of eight semantic consequence relations defined from a Tarski-logic L and a preference relation \&\#8826;. They are equivalent to Shoham’s so-called preferential entailment for smooth model structures, but avoid certain problems of the latter in non-smooth configurations. Each of the logics can be characterized in terms of what we call multi-selection semantics. After discussing this type of semantics, we focus on some concrete proposals from the literature, checking a number of meta-theoretic properties and elaborating on their intuitive motivation. As it turns out, many of their meta-properties only hold in case \&\#8826; is transitive. To tackle this problem, we propose slight modifications of each of the systems, showing the resulting logics to behave better at the intuitive level and in metatheoretic terms, for arbitrary \&\#8826;.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {van2013prime, title = {Prime implicates and relevant belief revision}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {109{\textendash}119}, abstract = {

This article discusses Parikh’s axiom of relevance in belief revision, and recalls some results from Kourousias and Makinson (2007, J. Symbolic Logic, 72, 994–1002) in this context. The crucial distinction is emphasized between the uniqueness of the finest splitting of K and the fact that K has several normal forms associated with that finest splitting. The main new result of this article is a new proof for the theorem that the set of prime implicates of K is a normal form for the finest splitting of K. It is explained how this proof avoids a mistake in an earlier proof from Wu and Zhang (2010, Knowledge-Based Syst., 23, 70–76). As a corollary, relevance can be re-defined without reference to the finest splitting, using the notion of path-relevance from Makinson (2009, J. Appl. Logic, 7, 377–387). Finally, a weak yet sufficient condition for irrelevance is presented.

}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exr040}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @book {3259615, title = {Scientific explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {93}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.

}, isbn = {9789400764453}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {Verdee01022013, title = {Strong, universal and provably non-trivial set theory by means of adaptive logic}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {108-125}, abstract = {

In this article, I present a non-trivial but inconsistent set theory based on unrestricted comprehension. The theory is provably non-trivial and strong enough for most of the applications of regular mathematics. This is realized by distinguishing between strong and weak set membership and allowing for the derivation of strong membership from weak membership whenever this is not problematic (it does not lead to paradoxes). This idea of applying rules whenever unproblematic is formalized by means of an adaptive logic.

}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzs025}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {3152459, title = {Three formats of prioritized adaptive logics: a comparative study}, journal = {Logic journal of the IGPL}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {127{\textendash}159}, abstract = {

A broad range of defeasible reasoning forms has been explicated by prioritized adaptive logics. However, the relative lack in meta-theory of many of these logics stands in sharp contrast to the frequency of their application. This article presents the first comparative study of a large group of prioritized adaptive logics. Three formats of such logics are discussed: superpositions of adaptive logics, hierarchic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte (2011, Log. J. IGPL, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzr025) and lexicographic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte and C. Stra\&\#223;er (2012, Log. Anal., forthcoming). We restrict the scope to logics that use the strategy Minimal Abnormality. It is shown that the semantic characterizations of these systems are equivalent and that they are all sound with respect to either of these characterizations. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for the completeness and equivalence of the consequence relations of the three formats are established. Some attractive properties, including Fixed Point and the Deduction Theorem, are shown to hold whenever these conditions are obeyed.

}, issn = {1367-0751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzs004}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3099682, title = {Abduction of generalizations}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {345{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Abduction of generalizations is the process in which explanatory hypotheses are formed for generalizations such as “pineapples taste sweet” or “rainbows appear when the sun breaks through the rain”. This phenomenon has received little attention in formal logic and philosophy of science. The current paper remedies this lacuna by first giving an overview of some general characteristics of this process, elaborating on its ubiquity in scientific and everyday reasoning. Second, the adaptive logic LA \&\#8704; is presented to explicate this process formally

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {VanDePutte2012, title = {The Dynamics of Relevance: Adaptive Belief Revision}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {187}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, month = {May}, pages = {1-42}, abstract = {

This paper presents eight (previously unpublished) adaptive logics for belief revision, each of which define a belief revision operation in the sense of the AGM framework. All these revision operations are shown to satisfy the six basic AGM postulates for belief revision, and Parikh’s axiom of Relevance. Using one of these logics as an example, we show how their proof theory gives a more dynamic flavor to belief revision than existing approaches. It is argued that this turns belief revision (that obeys Relevance) into a more natural undertaking, where analytic steps are performed only as soon as they turn out to be necessary in order to uphold certain beliefs.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-012-0116-9}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {van2012extending, title = {Extending the standard format of adaptive logics to the prioritized case}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {220}, year = {2012}, pages = {601{\textendash}641}, abstract = {

This paper introduces a new format for reasoning with prioritized stan- dards of normality. It is applicable in a broad variety of contexts, e.g. dealing with (possibly conflicting) prioritized belief bases or combining different reasoning methods in a prioritized way. The format is a gener- alization of the standard format of adaptive logics (see [4]). Every logic that is formulated within it has a straightforward semantics in the style of Shoham’s selection semantics (see [22]) and a dynamic proof theory. Fur- thermore, it can count on a rich meta-theory that inherits the attractive features of the standard format, such as soundness and completeness, re- flexivity, idempotence, cautious monotonicity, and many other properties.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @phdthesis {PhD_Frederik, title = {Generic Formats for Prioritized Adaptive Logics. With Applications in Deontic Logic, Abduction and Belief Revision}, year = {2012}, month = {May 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {1859590, title = {Modelling defeasible reasoning by means of adaptive logic games}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {417{\textendash}437}, abstract = {

In this article, I present a dynamic logic game for defeasible reasoning. I argue that, as far as defeasible reasoning is concerned, one should distinguish between practical and ideal rationality. Starting from the adaptive logic framework, I formalize both rationality notions by means of logic games. The presented adaptive logic games are based on (i) standard logic games on the one hand and (ii) dynamic proof procedures for adaptive logic on the other hand. The games are similar to standard logic games, but have the extra property that some moves are revisable. This is handled by means of a main control game, which starts different standard logic games. I argue that the adaptive logic games form intuitive reasoning models for rationality in defeasible reasoning contexts. Moreover, I will also demonstrate that the games give a good insight in the computational complexity of defeasible reasoning forms.

}, issn = {1367-0751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzq060}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {Gervais2012, title = {Pragmatic approaches to explanation applied to the cognitive sciences: two types of explanation-seeking questions compared}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {131{\textendash}137}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {Verdee30112012, title = {A proof procedure for adaptive logics}, journal = {Logic Journal of IGPL}, volume = {21}, year = {2012}, pages = {743-766}, abstract = {

In this article, I present a procedure that generates proofs for finally derivable adaptive logic consequences. A proof procedure for the inconsistency adaptive logic CLuNr is already presented in [7]. In this article a procedure for CLuNm is presented and the results for both logics are generalized to all adaptive logics, on the presupposition that there exists a proof procedure for the lower limit logic. The generated proofs are so called goal-directed proofs, i.e. proofs that (i) start with the formula (the goal) of which one wants to know whether it is a consequence of a certain premise set and (ii) only consist of lines that may potentially be useful for proving or disproving the goal. The goal-directed proofs form good explications of actual problem-solving reasoning processes.

}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzs046}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {Strasser2012, title = {Proof Theories for Superpositions of Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, year = {2012}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, abstract = {

The standard format for adaptive logics offers a generic and unifying formal framework for defeasible reasoning forms. One of its main distinguishing features is a dynamic proof theory by means of which it is able to explicate actual reasoning. In many applications it has proven very useful to superpose sequences of adaptive logics, such that each logic treats the consequence set of its predecessor as premise set. Although attempts have been made to define dynamic proof theories for some of the resulting logics, no generic proof theory is available yet. Moreover, the existing proof theories for concrete superpositions are suboptimal in various respects: the derivability relations characterized by these proposals are often not adequate with respect to the consequence relation of the superposed adaptive logics and in some cases they even trivialize premise sets. An adequate and generic proof theory is needed in order to meet the requirement of explicating defeasible reasoning in terms of superpositions of adaptive logics. This paper presents two generic proof theories for superpositions of adaptive logics in standard format. By means of simple examples, the basic ideas behind these proof theories are illustrated and it is shown how the older proposals are inadequate.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {3063631, title = {Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {83{\textendash}99}, abstract = {

What happens if one applies the "evaluation methodology" of The Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the "problem solving methodology" of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers{\textquoteright} methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan{\textquoteright}s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutins to these problems.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @proceedings {1856691, title = {The role of unification in explanations of facts}, journal = {EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009}, year = {2012}, pages = {403-413}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

}, isbn = {9789400724037}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4\_33}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Lefevere, Merel}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Okasha, Samir and Hartmann, Stephan} } @incollection {Beirlaen2012a, title = {Towards More Conflict-Tolerant Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {1-8}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, abstract = {

In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of ought. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams’ characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams’ solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of ought is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of ought, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that" oughtimplies can."

}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {1890996, title = {What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? {E}xploring the contours of epistemic democracy}, booktitle = {Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science}, volume = {11}, year = {2012}, pages = {35{\textendash}48}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator{\textquoteright}s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.

}, isbn = {9789400720817}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Le Roy, Frederik and Stalpaert, Christel and Aerts, Diederik} } @incollection {VanBouwel2011, title = {An atlas for the social world: what should it (not) look like? {I}nterdisciplinarity and pluralism in the social sciences}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Worlds, Cultures and Society.}, series = {Worldviews, science and us : interdisciplinary perspectives on worlds, cultures and society}, year = {2011}, pages = {43{\textendash}72}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in section 1, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in section 2, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory-, method-, metaphysics-, and question-driven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with actual proposals made by, inter alia, World-Systems Analysis, Critical Realism and Economics Imperialism. Building on the framework of explanatory pluralism I have been developing before, I will make a case for question-driven interdisciplinarity in section 3. My argument for question-driven interdisciplinarity will be illustrated in section 4 by discussing recent developments in economics (i.e., the debate between the orthodoxy and heterodox theories, the pleas for pluralism, and the impact of globalisation {\textendash}and related institutional developments- on economics as a discipline). In conclusion, the contours of an adequate atlas for the social world should become clearer; when to use the different maps, how to activate the dialogue between social scientific disciplines in order to draw the different maps, and the risks of globalisation for social science (and adequate map making).

}, isbn = {9789814355056}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Pinxten, Rik and Wallerstein, Immanuel} } @incollection {1998274, title = {On the curious historical coincidence of algebra and double-entry bookkeeping}, booktitle = {Foundations of the formal sciences VII : bringing together philosophy and sociology of science}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {32}, year = {2011}, pages = {109{\textendash}130}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {9781848900493}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/logic/?00021}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @incollection {1853233, title = {Explanation in the social sciences}, booktitle = {The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {632{\textendash}646}, publisher = {Sage Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This chapter gives an overview of the philosophical debates concerning explanation in the social sciences.

}, isbn = {9781847874009}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Jarvie, Ian and Zamora-Bonilla, Jesus} } @article {1854795, title = {Hierarchic adaptive logics}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {45{\textendash}72}, abstract = {

This article discusses the proof theory, semantics and meta-theory of a class of adaptive logics, called hierarchic adaptive logics. Their specific characteristics are illustrated throughout the article with the use of one exemplary logic HKx, an explicans for reasoning with prioritized belief bases. A generic proof theory for these systems is defined, together with a less complex proof theory for a subclass of them. Soundness and a restricted form of completeness are established with respect to a non-redundant semantics. It is shown that all hierarchic adaptive logics are reflexive, have the strong reassurance property and that a subclass of them is a fixed point for a broad class of premise sets. Finally, they are compared to a different yet related class of adaptive logics.

}, issn = {1367-0751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzr025}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {3144317, title = {Incommensurability and rationality in engineering design: the case of functional decomposition}, journal = {SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY \& TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL}, volume = {15}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {118{\textendash}136}, issn = {1091-8264}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {1890961, title = {Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction {\textendash} traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism {\textendash} can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {1104693, title = {The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, {\textquoteleft}academic{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}non-academic consensus{\textquoteright}, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of {\textquoteleft}consensus{\textquoteright} when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {de2011looking, title = {Looking for busy beavers. A socio-philosophical study of a computer-assisted proof}, booktitle = {Foundations of the Formal Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}90}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

"Young man, in mathematics you don{\textquoteright}t understand things, you just get used to them" John von Neumann

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @proceedings {1861627, title = {A paraconsistent multi-agent framework for dealing with normative conflicts}, journal = {12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XII)}, year = {2011}, pages = {312-329}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra- and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms {\textquoteright}as consistently as possible{\textquoteright}.

}, isbn = {9783642223587}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Leite, Joao and Torroni, Paolo and Agotnes, Thomas and Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leon} } @conference {1859548, title = {Strong paraconsistency by separating composition and decomposition in classical logic}, booktitle = {WoLLIC 2011 Proceedings LNAI Series}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper I elaborate a proof system that is able to prove all classical first order logic consequences of consistent premise sets, without proving trivial consequences of inconsistent premises (as in A, {\textlnot}A\,\unmatched{22a2}\,B). Essentially this result is obtained by formally distinguishing consequences that are the result of merely decomposing the premises into their subformulas from consequences that may be the result of also composing {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright}, more complex formulas. I require that, whenever {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright} formulas are derived, they are to be preceded by a special +-symbol and these +-preceded formulas are not to be decomposed. By doing this, the proofs are separated into a decomposition phase followed by a composition phase. The proofs are recursive, axiomatizable and, as they do not trivialize inconsistent premise sets, they define a very strong non-transitive paraconsistent logic, for which I also provide an adequate semantics.

}, isbn = {364220919X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20920-8\_26}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter}, editor = {Goebel, R} } @article {3144328, title = {Supporting design knowledge exchange by converting models of functional decomposition}, journal = {JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING DESIGN}, volume = {22}, number = {11-12}, year = {2011}, pages = {839{\textendash}858}, issn = {0954-4828}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09544828.2011.603692}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @conference {JMF:adera, title = {Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called \sys{P2.1}$^r$, that is based on Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e${\textendash}-a bimodal extension of Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{P} that invalidates aggregation for all \emph{prima facie} obligations. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ has several advantages with respect to \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}as much as possible{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ avoids Goble{\textquoteright}s criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the {\textquoteleft}toy examples{\textquoteright} from the literature as well as more complex ones.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14183-6\_12}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik}, editor = {Governatori, Guido and Sartor, Giovanni} } @incollection {939584, title = {Disentangling Causal Pluralism}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us. Studies of Analytical Metaphysics.}, year = {2010}, pages = {207{\textendash}223}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely out of the egg, the term {\textquoteleft}causal pluralism{\textquoteright} already covers diverse meanings. This creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible positions within them. In this paper, I argue for a general distinction between conceptual causal pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and epistemological-methodological causal pluralism. I mainly focus on metaphysical approaches to causation and discern herein four possible positions: metaphysical causal constructivism, metaphysical causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism, and strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Each of these positions are further related to their most obvious conceptual counterpart, specifically conceptual causal monism or conceptual causal pluralism.

}, isbn = {981-4295-81-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @conference {de_winter_distorted_2010, title = {The Distorted Research Agenda in the Health Sciences and James Robert Brown’s Policy Proposal.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_(2012)_-_Brown.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {1054981, title = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: theory and practice}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, volume = {31}, number = {5}, year = {2010}, pages = {371{\textendash}390}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

}, issn = {1386-7415}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9156-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {1043033, title = {From the second unknown to the symbolic equation}, booktitle = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {57{\textendash}102}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

The symbolic equation slowly emerged during the course of the sixteenth century as a new mathematical concept as well as a mathematical object on which new operations were made possible. Where historians have of- ten pointed at Francois Vi{\`e}te as the father of symbolic algebra, we would like to emphasize the foundations on which Vi{\`e}te could base his logistica speciosa. The period between Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae of 1539 and Gosselin’s De arte magna of 1577 has been crucial in providing the necessary build- ing blocks for the transformation of algebra from rules for problem solving to the study of equations. In this paper we argue that the so-called “second unknown” or the Regula quantitates steered the development of an adequate symbolism to deal with multiple unknowns and aggregates of equations. Dur- ing this process the very concept of a symbolic equation emerged separate from previous notions of what we call “co-equal polynomials”.

}, isbn = {978-1-84890-017-2}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @book {1042976, title = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {302}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, abstract = {

This book presents a selection of peer-reviewed papers which were presented on a conference organized in Ghent, Belgium, from 27 till 29 August, 2009. The conference was given the title Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early modern Science and Mathematics (PASR). For this book we selected papers which deal with the consequences for mathematics in particular, hence the omission of {\textquoteleft}science{\textquoteright} in the title of this book. Another selection, dealing with the understanding of nature and a broader range of topics, will appear in the journal Foundations of Science. The conference was sponsored by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) and Ghent University, which indirectly made this book possible. We also have to thank the other members of the programme committee Marco Panza, Chikara Sasaki, and Erik Weber and our keynote speakers Jens H{\o}yrup, Doug Jesseph, Eberhard Knobloch, Marco Panza, Mathias Schemmel and Michel Serfati. Five of their papers are included in this volume. Most of the papers benefited from valuable and sometimes substantive comments by our referees which must remain anonymous. Special thanks to Michael Barany who assisted in the editorial process.

}, isbn = {978-1-84890-017-2}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {909568, title = {What About Interdisciplinarity Within Philosophy?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and Its Implications For Our Perspectives on the World}, year = {2010}, pages = {10{\textendash}25}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik} } @conference {812480, title = {Why social emergence? {D}iscussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics}, year = {2010}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer{\textquoteright}s use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.

}, isbn = {9789814295819}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @incollection {DeMey2010, title = {William {H}arvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.}, booktitle = {Fascinerend Leven. {M}arkante Figuren en Idee{\"e}n uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.}, year = {2010}, note = {

In print

}, publisher = {Nieuwezijds}, address = {Amsterdam}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Van Speybroeck, Linda and Braeckman, Johan} } @article {862760, title = {Adaptive fuzzy logics for contextual hedge interpretation}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {333{\textendash}356}, abstract = {

The article presents several adaptive fuzzy hedge logics. These logics are designed to perform a specific kind of hedge detection. Given a premise set Γ that represents a series of communicated statements, the logics can check whether some predicate occurring in Γ may be interpreted as being (implicitly) hedged by technically, strictly speaking or loosely speaking, or simply non-hedged. The logics take into account both the logical constraints of the premise set as well as conceptual information concerning the meaning of potentially hedged predicates (stored in the memory of the interpreter in question). The proof theory of the logics is non-monotonic in order to enable the logics to deal with possible non-monotonic interpretation dynamics (this is illustrated by means of several concrete proofs). All the adaptive fuzzy hedge logics are also sound and strongly complete with respect to their [0,1]-semantics.

}, issn = {0925-8531}, doi = {10.1007/s10849-009-9084-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849-009-9084-y}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan} } @conference {605786, title = {The Adaptive Logics Approach to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in {B}elgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {680484, title = {Adaptive Logics using the Minimal Abnormality strategy are \${\textbackslash}Pi\^{ }1\_1\$-complex}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {167}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {93{\textendash}104}, abstract = {

In this article complexity results for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are presented. It is proven here that the consequence set of some recursive premise sets is Pi(1)(1)-complete. So, the complexity results in ( Horsten and Welch, Synthese 158: 41- 60, 2007) are mistaken for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9291-5}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {924987, title = {Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {301{\textendash}320}, abstract = {

Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.698}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {674351, title = {"Clear Moon, Frost soon". An introduction to the Study of Meteorological Practices in the Low Countries (1550-1850)}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Pieters, Eva}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {1019750, title = {Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {389{\textendash}400}, abstract = {

I show why Michael Friedman{\textquoteright}s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman{\textquoteright}s own terms.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {818474, title = {On the epistemological foundations of the law of the lever}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {315{\textendash}318}, abstract = {

In this paper I challenge Paolo Palmieri’s reading of the Mach-Vailati debate on Archimedes’s proof of the law of the lever. I argue that the actual import of the debate concerns the possible epistemic (as opposed to merely pragmatic) role of mathematical arguments in empirical physics, and that construed in this light Vailati carries the upper hand. This claim is defended by showing that Archimedes’s proof of the law of the lever is not a way of appealing to a non-empirical source of information, but a way of explicating the mathematical structure that can represent the empirical information at our disposal in the most general way.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.001}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {909570, title = {Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, Its Crisis and Challenge}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. {A} Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective}, year = {2009}, pages = {4{\textendash}9}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, isbn = {978-981-4295-81-9}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @book {689110, title = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Young Researchers Present their Work}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {678298, title = {Mathematics through man-computer interaction. A study of the early years of computing.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {WaartvanGulik2009, title = {Menselijke rationaliteit en identiteit.}, booktitle = {Humanismen}, year = {2009}, pages = {163-172}, publisher = {VUB Press}, abstract = {

Wat volgt is een aanzet tot een zuiver beschrijvende analyse van de relatie tussen de ontwikkeling van de menselijke identiteit en de drie sociaal- psychologische fenomenen xenofobie, etnocentrisme en tolerantie. Het werkkader voor deze analyse is een conceptueel, speculatief model van de menselijke rationaliteit.

}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Van den Bossche, M. and Vandemeulebroecke, R.} } @incollection {Urbaniak2009a, title = {Modal Logic and Philosophy. {A} case study.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {79-83}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Rostalska, Agnieszka}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {678587, title = {On the Nature and Origin of Algebraic Symbolism}, booktitle = {New Perspectives on Mathematical Practices. Essays in Philosophy and History of Mathematics.}, year = {2009}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing}, isbn = {978-981-281-222-3}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/etextbook/6810/6810\_chap01.pdf}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @conference {Primiero2009, title = {A note on constructive modalities for information}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {drouet2009probabilistic, title = {Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {68{\textendash}72}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {812461, title = {The problem with(out) consensus: {T}he scientific consensus, deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism.}, booktitle = {The social sciences and democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {121{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {978-0230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {Urbaniak2008, title = {Reasoning with dynamic conceptual frames.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {84-89}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {524726, title = {Trading off explanatory virtues}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

The paper draws on Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Van Paemel, Geert} } @article {DC\&P:tdl, title = {On the Transparency of Defeasible Logics: Equivalent Premise Sets, Equivalence of Their Extensions, and Maximality of the Lower Limit}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {281{\textendash}304}, abstract = {

For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms.
A related property of Tarski logics is that the extensions of equivalent premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets. This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion does.
We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic or identical to it. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {703844, title = {Understanding in political science: the plurality of epistemic interests}, booktitle = {Scientific Understanding. {P}hilosophical Perspectives}, year = {2009}, pages = {298{\textendash}313}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, isbn = {9780822943785}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Leonelli, Sabina and Eigner, Kai} } @incollection {924923, title = {Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {181{\textendash}194}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {9780230224391}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {812495, title = {Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet.}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}13}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {978-0230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {680715, title = {Yes Fellows, Most Human Reasoning is Complex}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {166}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {113{\textendash}131}, abstract = {

This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 41-60). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9268-4}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Verd{\'e}e, Peter and Meheus, Joke} } @article {446322, title = {De-ontologizing the debate on social explanations: a pragmatic approach based on epistemic interests.}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {423{\textendash}442}, abstract = {

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences-refining the conceptual tools of social scientists-and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.

}, issn = {0163-8548}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {397684, title = {Dispositions pace Armstrong.}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {127{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, isbn = {9789519264660}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {VanBouwel2008, title = {Explanatory Pluralism.}, booktitle = {Pluralist Economics}, year = {2008}, pages = {151-170}, publisher = {Zed Books}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Fullbrook, Edward} } @incollection {van2009fuzzy, title = {A Fuzzy Logic Approach to Non-Scalar Hedges}, booktitle = {Towards Mathematical Philosophy}, series = {Trends in Logic}, year = {2008}, pages = {233-247}, publisher = {Kluwer}, abstract = {

In (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 458–508, 1973), George Lakoff proposes a fuzzy semantics for the non-scalar hedges technically, strictly speaking, and loosely speaking. These hedges are able to modify the meaning of a predicate. However, Lakoff’s proposal is problematic. For example, his semantics only contains interpretations for hedged predicates using semantic information provided by selection functions. What kind of information these functions should provide for non-hedged predicates remains unspecified. This paper presents a solution for this deficit and other problems by means of a generic first-order fuzzy logic FLh . A wide range of fuzzy logics can be used as a basis for FLh . Next to a fully specified semantics, this solution also incorporates a proof theory for reasoning with these hedges. FLh makes use of a special set of selection functions. These functions collect the kind of information a reasoner can retrieve from concepts in his or her memory when interpreting a (non-)hedged predicate. Despite this non-standard element, FLh remains a conservative modification of its underlying fuzzy logic.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-1-4020-9084-4_12}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Makinson, David and Wansing, Heinrich} } @phdthesis {PhD_Peter, title = {Logische Bewijsdynamieken voor de Formele Explicatie van Wetenschappelijke Probleemoplossingsprocessen}, year = {2008}, month = {April 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {683245, title = {Middeleeuwse en Arabische Wijsbegeerte}, booktitle = {De rivier van Herakleitos: Een eigenzinnige visie op de wijsbegeere}, year = {2008}, pages = {93{\textendash}101}, publisher = {Houtekiet}, isbn = {978 90 8924 035 4}, url = {http://lib.ugent.be/catalog/pug01:683245}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Vermeersch, Etienne and Braeckman, Johan} } @article {428175, title = {Modeling sorites reasoning with adaptive fuzzy logic}, journal = {Fuzzy Sets and Systems}, volume = {159}, number = {14}, year = {2008}, pages = {1869{\textendash}1884}, abstract = {

We present and discuss a new solution for reasoning with sorites series and their related paradoxes.We argue that a suitable logic for sorites series should be able to apply specific classical logic rules like modus ponens until and unless it becomes apparent that these applications generate unacceptable results. When the latter happens, the logic should be able to retract those applications of classical logic rules that are problematic. The formal core of our solution consists of several adaptive logics based on a {\L}ukasiewicz fuzzy logic extended with the Baaz’ △-operator and a non-singleton interval of designated values. The natural dynamics characteristic of adaptive logics allows these logics to perform necessary retractions in an intuitive and elegant manner. {\textcopyright} 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

}, issn = {0165-0114}, doi = {10.1016/j.fss.2008.01.001}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {431737, title = {The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {298{\textendash}303}, issn = {0003-2638}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00756.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {415578, title = {A pragmatist defense of non-relativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social science.}, journal = {History and theory}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, month = {May}, pages = {168{\textendash}182}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Forland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.

}, issn = {0018-2656}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00445.x}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @conference {GiJ:qmpa, title = {Quasi-merging and Pure-arbitration on Information for the family of Adaptive Logics ADM}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic and Intelligent Interaction}, year = {2008}, abstract = {

The present paper introduces two new information merging protocols for the family of adaptive logics ADM, for which majority merging has been defined in [19]. The new adaptive operators re ect the negotiation processes of quasi-merging and pure arbitration, known from the Integrity Constraints framework introduced in [13]. The Adaptive Variant Counting selection provides a result equivalent to the GMax family of merging operators: it selects a collective model for a multi-set of belief bases based on the number of disagreements verified by the various models according to a leximax function. The Adaptive Minimax Counting selection is a quasi-merging operator which applies a minimax function and it obtains a larger spectrum of possibilities than the previous selection: it simulates the behaviour of the Max family of operators from the Integrity Con- straints framework, avoiding some of its counterintuitive results.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Pacuit, Eric} } @phdthesis {4333440, title = {Vage logica{\textquoteright}s, concepten en betekenistransformatoren.}, year = {2008}, month = {May 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, address = {Ghent}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan} } @conference {812549, title = {The ambiguity of unification in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {2e Congr{\`e}s de la Soci{\'e}t{\'e} de Philosophie des Sciences}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

In the social sciences, the dream of unity often recurs. One of these contemporary unifying projects is economics imperialism. Its goal is to increase the degree of unification by applying rational choice theory beyond its original (economic) home in other territories like political science, sociology, anthropology, history, etc. In this paper, I want to evaluate the benefits and feasibility of this project from the perspective of explanatory pluralism and demonstrate the ambiguity of unification and unity. Revisiting debates concerning rational choice theory in feminist economics and historical sociology, I will delimit the benefits and shortcomings of economics imperialism and the idea of unification, making use of a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism {\textendash} based on the erotetic model of explanation {\textendash} elaborated in my earlier work (cf. Weber and Van Bouwel, 2002). A thorough analysis of these debates will result in a nuanced view on unification and unity, with on the one hand, a plea for taking the plurality of epistemic and non-epistemic interests in social scientific theories and explanation into account {\textendash} with the evident implications this has for the unity of science project {\textendash} but, on the other hand, an attempt to carve out a well-defined place for unification and the benefits it might bring to social science theory and explanation. This last exercise might take away the worries sometimes uttered by social scientists concerning the unificationist endeavour of economics imperialism.

}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {Weber2007, title = {Assessing the explanatory power of causal explanations.}, booktitle = {Rethinking Explanation}, year = {2007}, pages = {109{\textendash}118}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, isbn = {978-1-4020-5580-5}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Persson, J. and Ylikoski, Petri} } @conference {376586, title = {Belief Merging based on Adaptive Interaction}, booktitle = {A Meeting of the Minds, proceedings of the workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction}, year = {2007}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, isbn = {978-1-904987-48-2}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Shier, Ju and Veltman, Frank} } @article {vancausality, title = {Causality and conservation. Elements of the new metaphysics behind the mathematization of nature in the seventeenth century}, year = {2007}, institution = {VUB}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {M:ConEmp, title = {Constructive Empiricism and the Argument from Underdetermination.}, booktitle = {Images of empiricism: Essays on science and stances, with a reply from {B}as van {F}raassen}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

It is argued that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Bas van Fraassen nowhere uses the argument from underdetermination in his argument for constructive empiricism. It is explained that van Fraassen’s use of the notion of empirical equivalence in The Scientific Image has been widely misunderstood. A reconstruction of the main arguments for constructive empiricism is offered, showing how the passages that have been taken to be part of an appeal to the argument from underdetermination should actually be interpreted.

}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Monton, Bradley} } @article {bb0d38ccf15f4c4eaa8ad14bcf81bd26, title = {Een maat en veel gewichten. Repliek op de proefvlucht van Buekens}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {99}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {211{\textendash}221}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Van de Vijver, Gertrudis} } @article {vanderbeeken2007endorsing, title = {Endorsing a pluralism between continental and analytic philosophy}, journal = {The Global Spiral}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {45{\textendash}58}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @conference {WaartvanGulik2007, title = {On the Implementation of Concept Structures in Fuzzy Logic.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

A procedure is presented which can modify a large number of fuzzy logics in such a way that the result integrates a logically meaningful representation of the family resemblance structure of fuzzy concepts. The most important aspect of this modification is the implementation of so-called ‘concept matrices’. The interpretation and construction of these new formal objects is based upon Fintan Costello’s ‘Diagnostic Evidence Model’ (2000), a contemporary cognitive scientific model of concept structure and concept combination. As a result, it becomes possible to formalize, explain and simulate new logical aspects of cognitive fuzziness such as meaning transformations by means of non-scalar hedges, and interpretational and inferential operations over non-intersective concept combinations.

}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Vosniadou, S. and Kayser, D. and Athanassios, P.} } @incollection {370857, title = {Learning concepts through the history of mathematics: the case of symbolic algebra.}, booktitle = {Philosophical dimensions in mathematics education}, year = {2007}, pages = {83{\textendash}103}, publisher = {Springer}, isbn = {978-0-387-71571-1}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {531096, title = {Naar een Pluralistisch Model van Onderzoeksfinanciering in de Humane Wetenschappen}, booktitle = {Welke Universiteit Willen We (Niet)?}, year = {2007}, pages = {205{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Het nieuwe Financieringsmodel voor het Hoger Onderwijs wordt vaak bekritiseerd vanuit argumentendie teruggaan op de eigenheid van de humane wetenschappen. Dit artikel poogt deze eigenheid preciezer teomschrijven en brengt de gevolgen voor de relatie tussen onderzoek en het tijdschriftenlandschap in kaart. Opbasis daarvan wordt de doelmatigheid betwist van het huidige voorstel, dat de effici{\"e}ntie van onderzoek wilverhogen door publicaties te wegen op basis van de tijdschriften waarin ze worden gepubliceerd. Dit betekentgeenszins dat een effici{\"e}ntere humane wetenschap onmogelijk is, alleen moet dat gebeuren op een manierwaarop haar pluralistische natuur niet wordt miskend. Hoe een dergelijk beleid er kan uitzien wordt daaromuitgewerkt in een aanzet naar een pluralististisch model van onderzoeksfinanciering in de humanewetenschappen.

}, isbn = {9789038211879}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/onderzoeksfinanciering.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Loobuyck, Patrick and Vanheeswijck, G. and Van Herck, W.} } @conference {1895032, title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory}, booktitle = {6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings}, year = {2007}, publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, abstract = {

One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.

}, url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20Langhe-SGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20-\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20-\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {368285, title = {The relevance of a relevantly assertable disjunction for material implication}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {36}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {339{\textendash}366}, abstract = {

In this paper Grice{\textquoteright}s requirements for assertability are imposed on the disjunction of Classical Logic. Defining material implication in terms of negation and disjunction supplemented by assertability conditions, results in the disappearance of the most important paradoxes of material implication. The resulting consequence relation displays a very strong resemblance to Schurz{\textquoteright}s conclusion-relevant consequence relation

}, issn = {0022-3611}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @phdthesis {PhD_Maarten, title = {An Archaeology of Galileo{\textquoteright}s Science}, year = {2006}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {397692, title = {Can intentional and functional explanations of actions coexist?}, booktitle = {Philosophical Antropology}, year = {2006}, pages = {135{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Philosophical Society of Turkey}, abstract = {

Do functional explanations eclipse the intentionality of human actions? Put differently, do intentional and functional explanations of actions conflict with each other? In this paper, I want to argue that both sorts of explanation, if conceived in a proper way, are compatible instruments. First, I will make a distinction between three kinds of explanatory pluralism of actions: a pluralism of theories of actions, a pluralism of sorts of explanations of actions, and a pluralism of methods for the explanation of actions. Intentional and functional explanations are sorts, not theories or methods, of explanation. Next, I will briefly distinguish intentional and functional explanations: intentional explanations refer to the beliefs and desires of an agent, and functional explanations refer to the function of a motive of an action (etiological functions), or to the function of a result of an action (system functions). Finally, I discuss possible conflicts between both sorts of explanation. In cases where real conflicts between functional and intentional explanations do arise, this is due to the lack of sufficient information or the misinterpretation of information of one or both explanations. Hence, such conflicts are not conflicts between sorts of explanations

}, isbn = {9757748404}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Voss, Stephen} } @article {365927, title = {De idee van emergentie in de sociologie: perspectieven en problemen}, journal = {Tijdschrijft voor sociologie}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {337{\textendash}350}, issn = {0777-883X}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {334986, title = {The division of labour in the social sciences versus the politics of metaphysics. {Q}uestioning Critical Realism{\textquoteright}s interdisciplinarity}, journal = {Graduate Journal of Social Science}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {32{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

Some scholars claim that Critical Realism promises well for the unification of the social sciences, e.g., Unifying social science: A critical realist approach in this volume. I will first show briefly how Critical Realism might unify social science. Secondly, I focus on the relation between the ontology and methodology of Critical Realism, and unveil the politics of metaphysics. Subsequently, it is argued that the division of labour between social scientific disciplines should not be metaphysics-driven, but rather question-driven. In conclusion, I will therefore defend a question-driven pluralism as a guide for interdisciplinarity.

}, issn = {1572-3763}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {415528, title = {Gravitating towards stability: {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s Aristotelian-Archimedean synthesis}, journal = {History of science}, volume = {44}, number = {146}, year = {2006}, pages = {373{\textendash}407}, issn = {0073-2753}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10929}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {VanBouwel2006, title = {The idea of social mechanisms in social scientific explanations.}, booktitle = {Progress in Social Psychology Research}, series = {Advances in social psychology research}, year = {2006}, pages = {83{\textendash}95}, publisher = {Nova Science}, isbn = {1594546584}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Arlsdale, John Z.} } @incollection {vanackere2006world, title = {A World of Experiences, an Adequate Language, and Self-Reference Revised}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, volume = {91}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {243{\textendash}256}, publisher = {Rodopi}, abstract = {

The paper presents a new, intuitive formal language, L E , that fits in with a world view in which experiences are central entities. It is shown how classical logic and an "objective making" adaptive logic can be applied to formulas of L E . The latter logic sheds an interesting light on the creation of theories about "the objective world". The paper also contains a small comment on sentences that are not translatable in L E . In the last section, I revise self-referring sentences by means of their translations in L E.

}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {334981, title = {Coping with inconsistencies: {E}xamples from the social sciences}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {89{\textendash}101}, abstract = {

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Liza, title = {De Disjunctie. Adaptief-Logische Formalisering van een aantal Griceaanse Implicaturen}, year = {2005}, month = {September 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {Verhoeven2005, title = {On the Exclusivity Implicature of {\textquoteleft}{O}r{\textquoteright} or on the Meaning of Eating Strawberries}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {19-24}, abstract = {

This paper is a contribution to the program of constructing formal representations of pragmatic aspects of human reasoning. We propose a formalization within the framework of Adaptive Logics of the exclusivity implicature governing the connective ‘or’.Keywords: exclusivity implicature, Adaptive Logics.

}, keywords = {Adaptive Logics, exclusivity implicature}, issn = {0039-3215}, doi = {10.1007/s11225-005-2767-8}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-005-2767-8}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza and Horsten, Leon} } @article {334983, title = {Forms of causal explanation}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2005}, pages = {437{\textendash}454}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {386239, title = {The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {33}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}16}, abstract = {

This paper deals with the "functions of intentional explanations" of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. "contrastive" and "descriptive", which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {334982, title = {Heeft er iemand een wetenschapsbeleid gezien? {O}ver wetenschap, democratie en de onderzoeksagenda}, journal = {Samenleving en politiek}, volume = {12}, number = {8}, year = {2005}, pages = {12{\textendash}18}, issn = {1372-0740}, url = {http://www.stichtinggerritkreveld.be/ECMS\_CLIENT/configuration/pages/artikel.php?aid=307}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {415526, title = {The paradox of conceptual novelty and {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s use of experiments}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {72}, number = {5}, year = {2005}, pages = {864{\textendash}875}, abstract = {

Starting with a discussion of what I call ‘Koyr{\'e}’s paradox of conceptual novelty’, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10928}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {360923, title = {Socratic proofs and paraconsistency: a case study}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {80}, number = {2-3}, year = {2005}, pages = {431{\textendash}466}, abstract = {

This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens{\textquoteright} weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Sch{\"u}tte{\textquoteright}s maximally paraconsistent logic Fv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.

}, issn = {0039-3215}, author = {Vanackere, Guido and Wisniewski, Andzrej and Leszczynska, Dorota} } @article {van2005towards, title = {Towards a framework for pluralisms in economics}, journal = {Post-Autistic Economics Review}, volume = {30}, year = {2005}, pages = {24{\textendash}27}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {vanweighing, title = {Weighing Falling Bodies. {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s Thought Experiment in the Development of his Dynamical Thinking.}, year = {2005}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {Vanackere2004, title = {Boekbespreking: "Jan Albert van Laar. The Dialectic of Ambiguity. A Contribution to the Study of Argumentation".}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing}, volume = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {248{\textendash}251}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {324232, title = {Cassirer{\textquoteright}s critical idealism: a comment on {T}homas {M}ormann.}, booktitle = {Laws and Models in Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {161{\textendash}171}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {0954300661}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Gillies, D.} } @conference {382092, title = {The consequences of scientific pluralism for science policy}, booktitle = {Proceedings of V Jornadas Latinoamericanas de estudios sociales de la ciencia y de la tecnolog{\'\i}a}, year = {2004}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {307815, title = {Explanatory pluralism in economics: {A}gainst the mainstream?}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {299{\textendash}315}, abstract = {

Recent pleas for more heterodoxy in explaining economic action have been defending a pluralism for economics. In this article, I analyse these defences by scrutinizing the pluralistic qualities in the work of one of the major voices of heterodoxy, Tony Lawson. This scrutiny will focus on Lawson{\textquoteright}s alternatives concerning ontology and explanation to mainstream economics. Subsequently, I will raise some doubts about Lawson{\textquoteright}s pluralism, and identify questions that will have to be addressed by heterodox economists in order to maintain the claim of pluralism.

}, issn = {1386-9795}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {307814, title = {Imperialistische tendensen in de economiebeoefening en politieke wetenschappen. {O}ver heterodoxie en pluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen}, journal = {Ethiek \& maatschappij}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {32{\textendash}45}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {397669, title = {Introduction: beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {197{\textendash}201}, issn = {1386-9795}, doi = {10.1080/1386979042000258303}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Cuypers, Stefaan} } @phdthesis {PhD_Guido, title = {Logica en het Waardevolle in de Wereld. De Rol van Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s bij de Constructie van Theorie{\"e}n}, year = {2004}, month = {May 12}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {397668, title = {Models of intentional explanation.}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {233{\textendash}247}, abstract = {

The controversy about intentional explanation of action concerns how these explanations work. What kind of model allows us to capture the dependency or relevance relation between the explanans, i.e. the beliefs and desires of the agent, and the explanandum, i.e. the action? In this paper, I argue that the causal mechanical model can do the job. Causal mechanical intentional explanations consist in a reference to the mechanisms of practical reasoning of the agent that motivated the agent to act, i.e. to a causally relevant set of beliefs and desires. Moreover, the causal mechanical model can provide in efficient and unproblematic applications, unlike action explanations using ceteris paribus laws or counterfactuals. The drawback of the latter models of explanation is their modal requirement: the explanans must mention or implies sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the explanandum. Such a requirement is too strong when it comes to intentional explanation of action.

}, issn = {1386-9795}, doi = {10.1080/1386979042000258330}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {Vanderbeeken2004, title = {Naar een pluralisme van verklaringen in mens- en natuurwetenschappen}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {60-69}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {D:eial, title = {The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology}, booktitle = {Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {459{\textendash}485}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Symons, John and Gabbay, Dov M. and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {307817, title = {Questioning structurism as a new standard for social scientific explanations}, journal = {Graduate Journal of Social Science}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, year = {2004}, pages = {204{\textendash}226}, abstract = {

As the literature on Critical Realism in the social sciences is growing, it is about time to analyse whether a new, acceptable standard for social scientific explanations is being introduced. In order to do so, I will discuss the work of Christopher Lloyd, who analysed contributions of social scientists that rely on (what he called) a structurist ontology and a structurist methodology, and advocated a third option in the methodological debate between individualism and holism. I will suggest modifications to three points of Lloyd{\textquoteright}s analysis, without abandoning Lloyd{\textquoteright}s intuitions completely. Firstly, the intuitions of the structurist ontology can be made explicit in a different way, without loosing the individual-society dualism. Secondly, opting for a structurist ontology does not necessarily imply opting for a structurist methodology. Ontology and methodology are related, but not as strongly as Lloyd supposes. Thirdly, the idea of a complete explanation, present in the structurist methodology, confuses causation and explanation while denying the pragmatics of explanation. A broader spectrum of explanatory forms can be defended. Criticizing Lloyd on these three points will lead me to the defence of an explanatory pluralism, which I relate to a minimal ontology. The intention of this reconceptualisation of structurism (and related Critical Realist applications) is to broaden possible perspectives on the explanatory praxis of the social scientist, and to question the reunification of the social sciences. It will also stipulate which form of interdisciplinarity is preferable for the social sciences.

}, issn = {1572-3763}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {322466, title = {Sieving Out Relevant and Efficient Questions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {189{\textendash}216}, abstract = {

Wisniewksi’s erotetic logic provides us with two slightly different semantic explications of the intuitive concept of “a question arises from a set of declarative premises”. Unfortunately, Wisniewski’s erotetic concepts suffer from the drawback that they allow for the raising of irrelevant and inefficient questions. The aim of this paper is to show that raising such questions can be avoided by changing the underlying logic. Several closely related logical approaches which enable us to eliminate irrelevant and inefficient questions, are presented.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {291501, title = {Change in individuals without a name. {C}ontextual indicators \& the free change-adaptive logic}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11}, year = {2003}, pages = {213{\textendash}230}, abstract = {

Proof theory and semantics of an adaptive logic that deals adequately with change in individuals with or without a name are presented. New logical constants are introduced, viz. indicators. Within a given context they function as names, predicates and quantifiers at the same time. The thus extended language (of classical logic) has a big expressive power and solvespartly — the (classical) non-logical presuppositions with respect to ‘the existence of individuals’. Nevertheless, from a purely logical point of view, the here pre - sented logic requires nothing but a very intuitive selection of classical models of the premises, viz. the minimally abnormal ones.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {291051, title = {Changing one{\textquoteright}s position in discussions - Some adaptive approaches}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {277{\textendash}297}, abstract = {

This paper contains different approaches to solve the problem how to construct the ultimate position out of one’s interventions in a discussion after possibly one or more position changes. In all approaches it is the aim to come as close as possible to human reasoning. Therefore all logics are adaptive logics. The first logic is an extension of an adaptive translation into S5 of the Rescher-Manor mechanisms. The second one is a dynamic proof theory based on a technique using indices. In the end a satisfactory solution is given by a dynamic proof theory expressing the idea of prioritized compatibility, i.e. compatibility step by step

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @phdthesis {PhD_Robrecht, title = {Een Pluralisme van Verklaringen van Acties}, year = {2003}, month = {March 14}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {597466, title = {A Procedure for Generating (Conditional) Answers in a Goal-Directed Way}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {57{\textendash}63}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, abstract = {

Two evolutionary games : collective action and prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilema / Jakson Alves de Aquino {\textendash} A formal approach to problem solving / Diderik Batens {\textendash} Application of mathematics and underdetermination / Ota\unmatched{0301}vio Bueno {\textendash} A framework for combining defeasible argumentation with labeled deduction / Carlos Iva\unmatched{0301}n Chesn\unmatched{0303}evar and Guillermo Ricardo Simari {\textendash} A procedure for generating (conditional) answers in a goal-directed way / Kristof De Clerq and Rob Vanderbeken {\textendash} Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning : a model for research programmes / Claudio Delrieux {\textendash} Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law : a quantitative computational model / Albrecht Heeffer {\textendash} Default models of rationality / Silvia Lerner {\textendash} Most inferences are defeasible / Jose\unmatched{0301} Carlos Loureiro Ralha and Ce\unmatched{0301}lia Ghedini Rahla {\textendash} Reasoning through doing : epistemic mediators in scientific reasoning / Lorenzo Magnani {\textendash} Do we need paraconsistency in commonsense reasoning? / Joke Meheus {\textendash} Descartes, a methodical elimination of paradoxes for (de)-ontology building / Jean Sallantin ... [et al.] {\textendash} Measuring coherence using LP-models / Carlos A. Oller {\textendash} What are multi-agent systems trying to accomplish? Towards pragmatic game-theoretical agenda / Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen {\textendash} Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility / Dagmar Provijn {\textendash} Semantic computations of truth, based on associations already learned / Patrick Suppes and Jean-Yves Be\unmatched{0301}ziau {\textendash} On the sense of eating strawberries, or, On the exclusivity implcature fo {\textquoteright}or{\textquoteright} / Liza Verhoeven and Leon Horsten {\textendash} A note on epistemology and logical afrificial intelligence / Gregory R. Wheeler and Lui\unmatched{0301}s Moniz Pereira.

}, isbn = {9879281896}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {319505, title = {Proof Theories for Some Prioritized Consequence Relations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {325{\textendash}344}, abstract = {

Handling a possibly inconsistent prioritized belief base can be done in terms of consistent subsets. Humans do not compute consistent subsets, they just start reasoning and when confronted with incon- sistencies in the course of their reasoning, they may adjust their interpretation of the information. In logics this behaviour corresponds to the mechanisms of dynamic proof theories. The aim of this paper is to transform known consequence relations for inconsistent prioritized belief bases in terms of consistent subsets, into dynamic proof theories that are a more faithful representation of human reasoning processes.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {324230, title = {The roles of one thought experiment in interpreting quantum mechanics: {W}erner {H}eisenberg meets {T}homas {K}uhn}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {72}, year = {2003}, pages = {79{\textendash}103}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {DJDaL:diag, title = {Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {39{\textendash}65}, abstract = {

A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {VanKerkhove2003, title = {Vagueness-Adaptive Logic: {A} Pragmatical Approach to Sorites Paradoxes}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, year = {2003}, pages = {383-411}, abstract = {

This paper defends a pragmatical approach to vagueness. The vagueness-adaptive logic VAL is a good reconstruction of and an excellent, instrument for human reasoning processes in which vague predicates are involved. Apart from its proof-theory and semantics, a Sorites-treating model based on it is presented, disarming the paradox. The paper opens perspectives with respect to the construction of theories by means of vague predicates.

}, keywords = {adaptive logic, construction of scientific theories, paraconsistent logic, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, Sorites paradox, vagueness}, issn = {0039-3215}, doi = {10.1023/B:STUD.0000009567.21578.0a}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B\%3ASTUD.0000009567.21578.0a}, author = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Vanackere, Guido} } @article {219578, title = {Verklaringspluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen}, journal = {Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis – {R}evue belge d’histoire}, volume = {33}, number = {1{\textendash}2}, year = {2003}, pages = {303{\textendash}311}, issn = {0035-0869}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Jeroen, title = {Verklaringspluralisme in de Sociale Wetenschappen. Een Wetenschapsfilosofische Verdediging met Toepassingen in de Geschiedbeoefening, de Theorie van Internationale Relaties en de Economische Wetenschappen}, year = {2003}, month = {January 31}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {219576, title = {When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. {O}n the contribution of critical realism to the social scientific explanatory practice}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {71}, year = {2003}, pages = {81{\textendash}98}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {JLMDa:abd, title = {Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, year = {2002}, pages = {39{\textendash}71}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.
We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, CP1 and CP2. CP1 enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. CP2 moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to CP1 and CP2 that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Verhoeven, Liza and Van Dyck, Maarten and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {DT:ddp, title = {Direct Dynamic Proofs For the {R}escher{\textendash}{M}anor Consequence Relations: The Flat Case}, journal = {Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics}, volume = {12}, year = {2002}, pages = {63{\textendash}84}, abstract = {

It was shown in \cite{D:unific} that the flat Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations{\textendash}-the Free, Strong, Argued, C-Based, and Weak consequence relation{\textendash}-are all characterized by special applications of inconsistency-adaptive logics defined from the paraconsistent logic CLuN. As as result, these consequence relations are provided with a dynamic proof theory. In the present paper we show that the detour via an inconsistency-adaptive logic is not necessary. We present a direct dynamic proof theory, formulated in the language of Classical Logic, and prove its adequacy.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Vermeir, Timothy} } @article {152619, title = {Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {30}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possiblecausal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring toa situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) byreferring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes adisposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositionalexplanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. Thedispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Weber, Erik} } @article {319503, title = {Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {45}, number = {179{\textendash}180}, year = {2002}, pages = {299{\textendash}307}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {Vermeir_fromwffs, title = {From Wffs to Clauses: Transforming Wffs in Clauses Without Loss of Meaning}, year = {2002}, abstract = {

This paper is the rst step into the research of inconsistency-adaptive logic programming. It will be shown here that a mapping can be dened for well formed formulas to logic programming clauses in a paraconsistent environment, and without loss of information. Furthermore, this mapping is a purely mechanical procedure that can be implemented with ease on a computer.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy} } @incollection {J:clau2, title = {Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. {C}lausius{\textquoteright}s Remarkable Derivation of {C}arnot{\textquoteright}s Theorem}, booktitle = {History of Modern Physics. {A}cta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Brepols}, address = {Turnhout (Belgium)}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Krach, Helghe and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {152589, title = {Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, series = {Origins}, volume = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhn’s own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.

}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {vermeir2002inconsistency, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Proof Procedure for Logic Programming}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {323-340}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

It is the goal of this paper to de ne a paraconsistent proof procedure that has the best of two mechanisms, in casu logic programming and inconsistency-adaptive logics. From logic programming we will maintain the ease of computing, and from adaptive logics their paraconsistency, dynamics and non-monotonicity. This will be done by combining the notion of competitor from logic programming together with the conditionallity that is common in all adaptive proofs.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {VanBouwel2002a, title = {The Living Apart Together Relationship between Causation and Explanation. {A} comment on {J}ean {L}achappelle.}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {32}, number = {4}, year = {2002}, pages = {560-569}, doi = {10.1177/004839302237837}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {402884, title = {Ontological causes of inconsistency and a change-adaptive, logical solution}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, volume = {228}, year = {2002}, pages = {151{\textendash}166}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, abstract = {

This paper reveals an implicit ontological assumption that is presupposed in common thought. This assumption results in the fact that people usually do not make any distinction between {\textquoteright}the object a{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}the object a at a given moment{\textquoteright}. This laziness causes many inconsistencies. Several attempts to solve these inconsistencies are studied, and the most natural one is elaborated, namely the one obtained by applying Classical Logic to an ontological correct domain. This solution has a drawback with respect to communication, which is solved by the change-adaptive logic CAL2. This non-monotonic, paraconsistent logic, belongs to the family of ambiguity-adaptive logics. It has the special characteristic that it solves inconsistencies by the introduction of more precise names for objects, more exactly names that refer to objects at a moment. The dynamics of the logic captures the change in objects. CAL2 has a nice proof theory, and an intuitive semantics. Interesting results and applications are commented upon, for instance those making use of the notion {\textquoteright}periods of invariance{\textquoteright}. Of course, the philosophical background is discussed.

}, isbn = {0824708059}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {D:pdmdp, title = {On a Partial Decision Method for Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {P{C}{L} 2002. Paraconsistent Computational Logic}, volume = {95}, year = {2002}, note = {

Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at \texttt{http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html}

}, pages = {91{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Roskilde University}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, it forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0207090}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Dekker, Hendrik and Villadsen, Jorgen and Waragai, Toshiharu} } @incollection {DeMey2002, title = {Qualia, spectruminversie en filosofische zombies.}, booktitle = {Het bewustzijn in de fysische wereld: Filosofische essays over materialisme en fenomenaal bewustzijn}, year = {2002}, pages = {171-194}, publisher = {Peeters}, address = {Leuven}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {J. Leilich, P. Reynaert and Veldeman, J.} } @article {VanBouwel2002, title = {Remote Causes, Bad Explanations?}, journal = {The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, volume = {32}, year = {2002}, pages = {437-449}, doi = {10.1111/1468-5914.00197}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {152596, title = {Subject ingebed? {O}ver het methodologisch individualisme in de sociale wetenschappen.}, booktitle = {De terugkeer van het subject? {R}ecente Ontwikkelingen binnen de filosofie}, year = {2002}, pages = {169{\textendash}179}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, isbn = {90-5867-237-9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Verdonck, Barbara}, editor = {Devos, Rob and Braeckman, Antoon} } @article {152660, title = {Symposium on Explanation and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts?}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {259{\textendash}275}, abstract = {

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

}, issn = {0266-2671}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {152661, title = {Unification and explanation - {A} comment on {H}alonen and {H}intikka, and {S}churz.}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {131}, number = {1}, year = {2002}, pages = {145{\textendash}154}, abstract = {

In this article we criticize two recent articles that examine the relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand, claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanation is unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem: explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation (e.g., causal explanation) are required; and none of these kinds is more fundamental.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {10.1023/A:1015005529380}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {EM:cle, title = {Adaptive Logic and Covering Law Explanations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {237{\textendash}254}, abstract = {

In his theory of explanation Hempel introduced two basic types of covering law explanations for particular events: deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical. In this article we argue that there is more than one reason why adaptive logics provide the right tools for analyzing the argument patterns involved in these covering law explanations. To this end we claim that in the case of inconsistent knowledge systems, neither classical logic, nor a paraconsistent logic suffice to capture the right class of permissible arguments that can make up a deductive-nomological explanation, whereas an adaptive logic gives just the right results. The arguments behind inductive-statistical explanations face the well-known problem of inductive ambiguities, which Hempel tried to solve by his requirement of maximal specifity. We show how this requirement can be nicely incorporated in a logic for these arguments, again using an adaptive logic (which we describe in some detail).

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {291776, title = {All premises are equal, but some are more equal than others.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {165{\textendash}188}, abstract = {

This paper proposes two adaptive approaches to inconsistent prioritized belief bases. Both approaches rely on a selection mechanism, that is not applied to the premises as they stand, but to the consequence sets of the belief levels. One is based on classical compatibility, the other on the modal logic T of Feys. For both approaches the two main strategies of inconsistency adaptive logics are formulated: the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy. All four systems are compared and found useful.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @incollection {weber2001pragmatic, title = {A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions}, booktitle = {Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium}, series = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Leske \& Budrich}, address = {Keulen}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Blasius, J{\"o}rg and Hox, J. and de Leeuw, E. and Schmidt, P.} } @article {291578, title = {Preferences as inconsistency-resolvers: an Inconsistency-adaptive Tool}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2001}, pages = {47{\textendash}63}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {291580, title = {The role of ambiguities in the construction of collective theories.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {189{\textendash}214}, abstract = {

The paper presents a formal model for theory development, based on a very intuitive ambiguity-adaptive logic. Apart from its simplicity, the model has some interesting features. (i) It allows for the construction of theories that cannot rely on observational data. (ii) It allows to construct a theory starting from zero, and using a small set of predicates. (iii) The model establishes that there is no real difference between the construction of scientific theories and the development of everyday knowledge.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {121607, title = {Alternative mathematics: the vague way.}, booktitle = {Festschrift in honor of {N}ewton {C}.{A}. da {C}osta on the occasion of his seventieth birthday}, volume = {125}, year = {2000}, pages = {19{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Krause, D{\'e}cio and French, Steven and Doria, Francisco A.} } @incollection {van2000analogy, title = {Analogy and metaphor as essential tools for the working mathematician}, booktitle = {Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {105{\textendash}123}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

It may perhaps sound strange if not bizarre to suggest that metaphors and analogies could and should play a role in the practice of mathematics, let alone to claim that they are essential in present-day mathematics. Yet, that will be precisely the claim I will defend in this paper. I do insist that present-day mathematics is the domain of investigation I have in mind. From a historical perspective, and as an example, no one seems to doubt that mathematics one way or another must have arisen out of a specific set of practices, usually referred to as counting and measuring, and that mathematical concepts are metaphorically related to these practices. That view of the matter, however, does not necessarily say anything about the situation today and, indeed, in most cases it does not.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-015-9442-4_7}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Hallyn, Fernand} } @incollection {J:ana, title = {An Extremely Rich Paraconsistent Logic and the Adaptive Logic Based on It}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {189{\textendash}201}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @book {D\&CMGPJpVB, title = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, series = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, organization = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {134996, title = {H{L}2, an inconsistency-adaptive and inconsistency-resolving logic for general statements that might have exceptions}, journal = {Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics}, volume = {10}, number = {3-4}, year = {2000}, pages = {317{\textendash}338}, abstract = {

The present paper offers a new approach to non-monotonic logics and their reconstruction in terms of inconsistency-adaptive logics. By applying a special technique, universally quantified formulas are assigned instances that, given the paraconsistent framework, do not cause triviality even if they conflict with knowledge deriving from other sources. From the special instances, the usual instances may be derived conditionally, viz. provided they are not contradicted by statements derived with a higher preference ranking.

}, issn = {1166-3081}, doi = {10.1080/11663081.2000.10511002}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {121604, title = {Human(istisch)e wiskunde of de mogelijkheid van een alternatieve wiskunde.}, booktitle = {De toekomst van het heden : zijn we op weg naar een menselijker samenleving?}, year = {2000}, pages = {127{\textendash}140}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, isbn = {9074174051}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {Vermeir_inconsistency-adaptivearithmetic, title = {Inconsistency-adaptive Arithmetic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {167-168}, year = {2000}, pages = {221-241}, abstract = {

In this article, it is shown that inconsistent arithmetic, as proposed by Jean Paul Van Bendegem and Graham Priest, does not have all the properties they claim the system has. The search for a system of inconsistent arithmetic that does have the intended properties, will lead us through different axiomatizations and different logics, the final result being inconsistency-adaptive arithmetic.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy} } @incollection {D:surv-ial, title = {A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {49{\textendash}73}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, abstract = {

This paper offers a systematic review of some central philosophical and technical results on adaptive logics. Quite a few of the results are still in print or forthcoming.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {135002, title = {The creative growth of mathematics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {63}, year = {1999}, pages = {119{\textendash}152}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {152579, title = {Minimizing Ambiguity and Paraconsistency.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, pages = {39{\textendash}160}, abstract = {

Ambiguity-adaptive logics offer a natural and rich formal solution to (possibly) inconsistent theories. Three views on ambiguities result in three different, intuitively correct ambiguity-adaptive logics with interesting applications. We present their semantics and proof theory, and illustrate that ambiguity-adaptive logics form an excellent alternative to paraconsistent logics that focus on the characteristics of the logical constants.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {VanBendegem1999, title = {Oorlog en vrede in wetenschapsland}, booktitle = {Denken als Openheid. {L}iber Amicorum {H}ubert {D}ethier}, year = {1999}, pages = {153-160}, publisher = {VUB}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Walraves, Else and Stuy, Johan} } @incollection {D:ra, title = {Radicaal Athe{\"\i}sme}, booktitle = {Wat met {G}od?}, year = {1999}, pages = {129{\textendash}162}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} } @article {van1998schoonheid, title = {Schoonheid in de wiskunde: Birkhoff Revisited}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {60}, year = {1998}, pages = {106{\textendash}130}, abstract = {

Everyone is familiar with the measure of beauty that has been proposed by Birkhoff, the famous formula M = O/C. Although I show that the formula in its original form cannot be maintained, I present a reinterpretation that adapts the formula for measuring the beauty of mathematical proofs. However, this type of measure is not the only aesthetic element in mathematics. There exists a {\textquoteright}romantic{\textquoteright} side as well, to use the term introduced by Fran{\c c}ois Le Lionnais. Thus, a more complex proposal of mathematical beauty is presented. Finally and as a consequence, I argue against the dichotomy that associates science, including mathematics, with the beauty of simplicity and that associates the arts with the beauty of complexity. As an example, the work of Oulipo, Raymond Queneau in particular, is briefly presented.

}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {von1998if, title = {What, if anything, is an experiment in mathematics?}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science}, year = {1998}, pages = {172{\textendash}182}, publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Anapolitanos, Dionysios and Baltas, Aristides and Tsinorema, Stavroula} } @article {VanBendegem1998, title = {Zeker lezen: logica.}, journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap}, volume = {38}, year = {1998}, pages = {68-69}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {109693, title = {Ambiguity-adaptive logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {159}, year = {1997}, pages = {261{\textendash}280}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {D:vrijzhum, title = {Grondslagen van het vrijzinnig humanisme. {E}en kennistheoretisch pleidooi}, booktitle = {Grondslagen Vrijzinnig Humanisme}, year = {1997}, pages = {75{\textendash}104}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} } @article {VanBendegem1997, title = {L.E.J. Brouwer.}, journal = {Kritisch Denkerslexicon}, volume = {23}, year = {1997}, pages = {1-14}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {VanBendegem1997c, title = {Twee grote verhalen over wetenschap (voor allen en voor niemand).}, booktitle = {Ik \& het verhaal}, year = {1997}, pages = {107-130}, publisher = {Uitgaven Woord en Argument}, address = {Hasselt}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Vandormael, Jan} } @incollection {VanBendegem1997b, title = {Vrijzinnig (?) humanisme (?) in een moderne (?) wereld.}, booktitle = {Grondslagen Vrijzinnig Humanisme}, year = {1997}, pages = {149-169}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} } @article {VanBendegem1997a, title = {Wetenschap en religie: zo verzoenbaar als men maar wil.}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {42}, year = {1997}, pages = {381-388}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {D:ftal, title = {Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics}, booktitle = {Logic and Argumentation}, year = {1996}, pages = {241{\textendash}254}, publisher = {North-Holland}, abstract = {

This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Veltman, Frank} } @incollection {257816, title = {Mathematical Experiments and Mathematical Pictures}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {203{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} } @incollection {257818, title = {Ook het oneindige is ons werk}, booktitle = {Leo Apostel. Tien filosofen getuigen}, year = {1996}, pages = {119{\textendash}134}, publisher = {Hadewijch}, address = {Antwerpen/Baarn}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {van1996strange, title = {The strange case of the missing body of mathematics}, journal = {Semiotica}, volume = {112}, number = {3-4}, year = {1996}, pages = {403{\textendash}413}, abstract = {

La notion d{\textquoteright}infini est analys{\'e}e en comparant les math{\'e}matiques et la th{\'e}ologie car les math{\'e}maticiens ont pendant longtemps per{\c c}u une relation entre la notion infinie math{\'e}matique et la notion d{\textquoteright}infinit{\'e} de Dieu

}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {257814, title = {Strict finitism as a viable alternative in the foundations of mathematics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1996}, pages = {23{\textendash}40}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {van1995defence, title = {In defence of discrete space and time}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {38}, number = {150-151-152}, year = {1995}, pages = {127-150}, abstract = {

In this paper several arguments are discussed and evaluated concerning the possibility of discrete space and time.

}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {Weber1995, title = {Scientific Arguments and Scientific Prediction.}, booktitle = {Special Fields and Cases. Proceedings on the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation}, volume = {IV}, year = {1995}, pages = {377-387}, publisher = {SicSat}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Blair, J. and Willart, C.} } @incollection {D:alaoetb, title = {Adaptieve logica{\textquoteright}s: een aanzet om elkaar te begrijpen}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {13{\textendash}19}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @incollection {D:determinisme, title = {Determinisme en indeterminisme}, booktitle = {Verwijdering of ontmoeting?}, year = {1994}, pages = {183{\textendash}202}, publisher = {Pelckmans}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Verbeure, Frans and Apostel, Leo} } @incollection {J:nvfb, title = {Elk wetenschapper zijn onderzoeksprogramma?}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}67}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @article {VanMeirvenne1994, title = {Indexed Inconsistency-Adaptive Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1994}, pages = {41-55}, author = {Van Meirvenne, Joachim} } @incollection {241638, title = {Waarom {W}esley {S}almons causaal-mechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {81-86}, publisher = {VUB Press}, isbn = {9789054870845}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Cornelis, Gustaaf C} } @incollection {D:ialddl, title = {De inconsistentie-adaptieve logica {D}{D}{L}}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {39{\textendash}45}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {J:nvfd, title = {De rationaliteit van persoonlijke inperkingen}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {33{\textendash}38}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {241636, title = {Wetenschappelijke verklaringen en subjectief verwacht nut}, booktitle = {Actueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {53-60}, publisher = {Eburon}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {D:ladl, title = {Leo {A}postel on Dialectical Logic}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of {L}eo {A}postel, vol. 2: {D}escriptive and Critical Essays}, year = {1989}, pages = {24{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Communication and Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Vandamme, Fernand and Pinxten, Rik} } @incollection {D:kloof, title = {Over de kloof tussen feit en norm, bekeken vanuit de hedendaagse wetenschapsfilosofie}, booktitle = {Dwarsdenken. Omtrent {J}aap {K}ruithof}, year = {1989}, pages = {165{\textendash}177}, publisher = {EPO}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van den Enden, Hugo} } @book {DJp:t\&e, title = {Theory and Experiment. {R}ecent Insights and New Perspectives on Their Relation}, year = {1988}, publisher = {Reidel}, organization = {Reidel}, address = {Dordrecht}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {D:sks, title = {The structure of our knowledge system}, booktitle = {Communication and Cognition. {A}pplied Epistemology}, year = {1987}, pages = {101}, publisher = {Communication and Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {D:rssm\&l, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, booktitle = {Reason, Emotion and Music. {T}owards a Common Structure for Arts, Sciences and Philosophies, Based on a Conceptual Framework for the Description of Music}, year = {1986}, note = {

Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}

}, pages = {127{\textendash}143}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Apostel, Leo and Sabbe, Herman and Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {D:tool, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics as a Tool to Deal with and Partly Eliminate Unexpected Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {The Logic of Discovery and the Logic of Discourse}, year = {1985}, pages = {263{\textendash}271}, publisher = {Plenum Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Hintikka, Jaakko and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {DJp:rd\&cl, title = {Relevant derivability and classical derivability in {F}itch-style and axiomatic formulations of relevant logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {28}, number = {109}, year = {1985}, pages = {21{\textendash}31}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {LA\&D\&a, title = {An empirical investigation on scientific observation}, booktitle = {Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy}, year = {1979}, pages = {3{\textendash}36}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Apostel, Leo and Batens, Diderik and Breusegem, Erwin and De Coninck, Jan and De Waele, Danny and Pinxten, Rik and Swings, Jean and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Vandamme, Fernand}, editor = {Callebaut, Werner and De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {D:v\&mr, title = {Verisimilitude and meaning relations}, booktitle = {CC77. International Workshop on the Cognitive Viewpoint}, year = {1977}, pages = {321{\textendash}328}, publisher = {Ghent University}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Poriau, M. and Vandamme, Fernand} }