@article {Meheus2014, title = {Deontic Reasoning on the Basis of Consistency Considerations}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

Deonticconflictsposeanimportantchallengetodeonticlogicians. The standard account —standard deontic logic, SDL— is not apt for addressing this challenge since it trivializes con flicts. Two main stratagems for gaining conflict-tolerance have been proposed: to weaken SDL in various ways, and to contextualize the reign of SDL to consistent subsets of the premise set. The latter began with the work of van Fraassen and has been further developed by Horty. In this paper we characterize this second approach in general terms. We also study three basic ways to contextualize SDL and supplement each of these with a dynamic proof theory in the framework of adaptive logics.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Aleks Knoks} } @article {DeMoltoappear, title = {Formalism. The success(es) of a failure}, year = {In Press}, institution = {College publications}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Moktefi, A. and Moretti, A. and Schang, Fabian} } @article {JMFC:iadl, title = {Non-Adjunctive Deontic Logics That Validate Aggregation as Much as Possible}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, year = {In Press}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {D:paradoxenVM, title = {Paradoxen in de vrijmetselarij en de relatie met waarden}, booktitle = {Kappen aan de ruwe steen}, year = {2017}, pages = {319{\textendash}336}, publisher = {Academic and Scientific Publishers}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rik Pinxten and Jean Swings} } @article {strasser2014dynamic, title = {Adaptive Logic Characterizations of Input/output Logic}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {104}, year = {2016}, pages = {869-916}, chapter = {869}, abstract = {

We translate the unconstrained and constrained input/output-logics from [17, 18] to reflexive modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has various advantages. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our modal framework gives naturally rise to useful variants. Finally, the modal logics display a gain in expressive power over their original counterparts in the input/output framework.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {doi:10.1093/logcom/exu044, title = {Adaptive strategies and finite-conditional premise sets}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {5}, year = {2016}, pages = {1517-1539}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exu044}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exu044}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {Meheus2013, title = {Which Style of Reasoning to Choose in the Face of Conflicting Information?}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2016}, pages = {361--380}, abstract = {

In the context of non-monotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The strong consequences are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The weak consequences follow from some maximal consistent subset. The free consequences follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {4345994, title = {Private epistemic virtue, public vices: moral responsibility in the policy sciences}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {275{\textendash}295}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Lefevere, Merel and Schliesser, Eric}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @incollection {strasser2015withstanding, title = {Withstanding Tensions: {S}cientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance}, booktitle = {Heuristic Reasoning}, series = {Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics}, volume = {16}, year = {2015}, pages = {113{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Ippoliti, Emiliano} } @article {doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzu017, title = {Adaptive logics: a parametric approach}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {22}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, pages = {905-932}, chapter = {905}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @proceedings {Strasser, title = {Dynamic Derivations for Sequent-Based Deductive Argumentation}, journal = {COMMA 2014}, volume = {Computational Models of Argument}, year = {2014}, pages = {89{\textendash}100}, abstract = {

We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentation-based systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzen-style sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer}, editor = {Parsons, Simon and Oren, Nir and Reed, Chris and Cerutti, Federico} } @article {Strasser2014a, title = {Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit: A Coherentist Approach}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {13}, year = {2014}, month = {May}, pages = {3111-3141}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards—consistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0476-4}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {Strasser2014, title = {Heuristic Reevaluation of the Bacterial Hypothesis of Peptic Ulcer Disease in the 1950s}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2014}, pages = {429{\textendash}454}, abstract = {

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the “acidity” and the “bacterial” one. The latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with Warren’s and Marshall’s discovery of Helicobacter pylori in the 1980s. In this paper we investigate why the bacterial hypothesis was abandoned in the 1950s, and whether there were good epistemic reasons for its dismissal. Of special interest for our research question is Palmer’s 1954 large-scale study, which challenged the bacterial hypothesis with serious counter-evidence, and which by many scholars is considered as the shifting point in the research on PUD. However, we show that: 1. The perceived refutatory impact of Palmer’s study was disproportionate to its methodological rigor. This undermines its perceived status as a crucial experiment against the bacterial hypothesis. 2. In view of this and other considerations we argue that the bacterial hypothesis was worthy of pursuit in the 1950s.

}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {Straser2014, title = {Sequent-Based Argumentation for Normative Reasoning}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {8554}, year = {2014}, pages = {224{\textendash}240}, abstract = {

In this paper we present an argumentative approach to normative reasoning. Special attention is paid to normative conflicts, contrary-to-duty and specificity cases. These are modeled by means of argumentative attacks. For this, we adopt a recently proposed frame- work for logical argumentation in which arguments are generated by a sequent calculus of a given base logic (Arieli, CLIMA’2013, pp.69–85), and use an intuitionistic variant of stan- dard deontic logic as our base logic. Argumentative attacks are realized by elimination rules that allow to discharge specific sequents. We demonstrate our system by means of various well-known benchmark examples.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer} } @article {3152319, title = {Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {12}, year = {2013}, pages = {2195{\textendash}2217}, abstract = {

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung{\textquoteright}s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9964-y}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {Seselja2013, title = {Concerning Peter Vickers{\textquoteright} Recent Treatment of {\textquoteright}Paraconsistencitis{\textquoteright}}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {325{\textendash}340}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {MCJ:iadlnc, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {42}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {285{\textendash}315}, abstract = {

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}-rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke} } @article {3152328, title = {Kuhn and the question of pursuit worthiness}, journal = {Topoi - An International review of philosophy}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}19}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn{\textquoteright}s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn{\textquoteright}s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.

}, issn = {0167-7411}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9144-9}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {beirlaen2013non, title = {Non-monotonic reasoning with normative conflicts in multi-agent deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {24}, number = {6}, year = {2013}, pages = {1179{\textendash}1207}, abstract = {

We present two multi-agent deontic logics that consistently accommodate various types of normative conflicts. Its language features modal operators for obligation and permission, and for the realization of individual and collective actions. The logic is non-classical since it makes use of a paraconsistent and paracomplete negation connective. Moreover, it is non-monotonic due to its definition within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The logic is equipped with a defeasible proof theory and semantics.

}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exs059}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {van2013preferential, title = {Preferential Semantics using Non-smooth Preference Relations}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {43}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {903{\textendash}942}, abstract = {

This paper studies the properties of eight semantic consequence relations defined from a Tarski-logic L and a preference relation \&\#8826;. They are equivalent to Shoham’s so-called preferential entailment for smooth model structures, but avoid certain problems of the latter in non-smooth configurations. Each of the logics can be characterized in terms of what we call multi-selection semantics. After discussing this type of semantics, we focus on some concrete proposals from the literature, checking a number of meta-theoretic properties and elaborating on their intuitive motivation. As it turns out, many of their meta-properties only hold in case \&\#8826; is transitive. To tackle this problem, we propose slight modifications of each of the systems, showing the resulting logics to behave better at the intuitive level and in metatheoretic terms, for arbitrary \&\#8826;.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152435, title = {Reactive standard deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {117{\textendash}157}, abstract = {

We introduce a reactive variant of SDL (standard deontic logic): SDLR1 (reactive standard deontic logic). Given a Kripkean view on the semantics of SDL in terms of directed graphs where arrows {\textrightarrow} represent the accessibility relation between worlds, reactive models add two elements: arrows {\textrightarrow} are labelled as ‘active’ or ‘inactive’, and double arrows \&8608; connect arrows, e.g. (x1 {\textrightarrow} x2) \&\#8608; (x3 {\textrightarrow} x4). The idea is that passing through x1 {\textrightarrow} x2 activates a switch represented by \&8608; that inverts the label of x3 {\textrightarrow} x4 and hence activates respectively deactivates this arrow. This allows to introduce two modalities: \&\#9633; is the usual KD-modality of SDL and operates on the Kripkean graph where all labels and double arrows are ignored, while \&\#8709; takes them into account. We demonstrate that RSDL1 allows for an intuitive interpretation of ‘ought’. The logic can handle contrary-to-duty cases such as several instantiations of the Chisholm set in a paradox-free way by means of using double arrows and annotations to block and give access to ideal worlds.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs043}, author = {Gabbay, Dov M. and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152459, title = {Three formats of prioritized adaptive logics: a comparative study}, journal = {Logic journal of the IGPL}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {127{\textendash}159}, abstract = {

A broad range of defeasible reasoning forms has been explicated by prioritized adaptive logics. However, the relative lack in meta-theory of many of these logics stands in sharp contrast to the frequency of their application. This article presents the first comparative study of a large group of prioritized adaptive logics. Three formats of such logics are discussed: superpositions of adaptive logics, hierarchic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte (2011, Log. J. IGPL, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzr025) and lexicographic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte and C. Stra\&\#223;er (2012, Log. Anal., forthcoming). We restrict the scope to logics that use the strategy Minimal Abnormality. It is shown that the semantic characterizations of these systems are equivalent and that they are all sound with respect to either of these characterizations. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for the completeness and equivalence of the consequence relations of the three formats are established. Some attractive properties, including Fixed Point and the Deduction Theorem, are shown to hold whenever these conditions are obeyed.

}, issn = {1367-0751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzs004}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152453, title = {Two adaptive logics of norm-propositions}, journal = {JOURNAL OF APPLIED LOGIC}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {147{\textendash}168}, abstract = {

We present two defeasible logics of norm-propositions (statements about norms) that (i) consistently allow for the possibility of normative gaps and normative conflicts, and (ii) map each premise set to a sufficiently rich consequence set. In order to meet (i), we define the logic LNP, a conflict- and gap-tolerant logic of norm-propositions capable of formalizing both normative conflicts and normative gaps within the object language. Next, we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logic framework for non-monotonic reasoning in order to meet (ii). This results in the adaptive logics LNPrLNPr and LNPmLNPm, which interpret a given set of premises in such a way that normative conflicts and normative gaps are avoided ‘whenever possible’. LNPrLNPr and LNPmLNPm are equipped with a preferential semantics and a dynamic proof theory.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2013.02.001}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152442, title = {Adaptively applying modus ponens in conditional logics of normality}, journal = {Journal of applied non-classical logics}, volume = {22}, number = {1-2}, year = {2012}, pages = {125{\textendash}148}, abstract = {

This paper presents an adaptive logic enhancement of conditional logics of normality that allows for defeasible applications of Modus Ponens to conditionals. In addition to the possibilities these logics already offer in terms of reasoning about conditionals, this way they are enriched by the ability to perform default inferencing itself. The idea is to apply Modus Ponens defeasibly to a conditional A\&\#8605;B and a fact A on the condition that it is “safe” to do so concerning the factual and conditional knowledge at hand. It is for instance not safe if the given information describes exceptional circumstances: although birds usually fly, penguins are exceptional to this rule. The two adaptive standard strategies are shown to correspond to different intuitions, a skeptical and a credulous reasoning type, which manifest themselves in the handling of so-called floating conclusions.

}, issn = {1166-3081}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2012.682450}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {van2012extending, title = {Extending the standard format of adaptive logics to the prioritized case}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {220}, year = {2012}, pages = {601{\textendash}641}, abstract = {

This paper introduces a new format for reasoning with prioritized stan- dards of normality. It is applicable in a broad variety of contexts, e.g. dealing with (possibly conflicting) prioritized belief bases or combining different reasoning methods in a prioritized way. The format is a gener- alization of the standard format of adaptive logics (see [4]). Every logic that is formulated within it has a straightforward semantics in the style of Shoham’s selection semantics (see [22]) and a dynamic proof theory. Fur- thermore, it can count on a rich meta-theory that inherits the attractive features of the standard format, such as soundness and completeness, re- flexivity, idempotence, cautious monotonicity, and many other properties.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @proceedings {2973606, title = {An {A}ndersonian deontic logic with contextualized sanctions}, journal = {11th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, DEON2012}, year = {2012}, pages = {151-169}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

We present a refinement of Anderson{\textquoteright}s reduction of deontic logic to modal logic with only alethic modalities. The refined proposal contextualizes the Andersonian sanction constant s by replacing it with a unary sanction operator S that is dependent on the concrete normative requirement that is violated. A formula S B is then for instance interpreted as ldquo B causes a sanctionrdquo or as ldquo B provides a reason for (the applicability of) a sanctionrdquo. Due to its modified sanction operator, the resulting logic DSL invalidates some instances of the inheritance principle. This gives rise to new interesting features. For instance, DSL consistently allows for the presence of conflicting obligations. Moreover, it provides novel insights in various central {\textquoteleft}paradoxes{\textquoteright} in deontic logic such as the Ross paradox, the paradox of the good Samaritan, and Forrester{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteleft}gentle murderer{\textquoteright} paradox.

}, isbn = {9783642315695}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Agotnes, Thomas and Broersen, Jan and Elgesem, Dag} } @article {Strasser2012, title = {Proof Theories for Superpositions of Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, year = {2012}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, abstract = {

The standard format for adaptive logics offers a generic and unifying formal framework for defeasible reasoning forms. One of its main distinguishing features is a dynamic proof theory by means of which it is able to explicate actual reasoning. In many applications it has proven very useful to superpose sequences of adaptive logics, such that each logic treats the consequence set of its predecessor as premise set. Although attempts have been made to define dynamic proof theories for some of the resulting logics, no generic proof theory is available yet. Moreover, the existing proof theories for concrete superpositions are suboptimal in various respects: the derivability relations characterized by these proposals are often not adequate with respect to the consequence relation of the superposed adaptive logics and in some cases they even trivialize premise sets. An adequate and generic proof theory is needed in order to meet the requirement of explicating defeasible reasoning in terms of superpositions of adaptive logics. This paper presents two generic proof theories for superpositions of adaptive logics in standard format. By means of simple examples, the basic ideas behind these proof theories are illustrated and it is shown how the older proposals are inadequate.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2079125, title = {Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit?}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {147{\textendash}159}, abstract = {

The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegener’s theory was epistemically worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in \&\#353;e\&\#353;elja and Stra\&\#223;er (accepted for publication). We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy

}, issn = {0039-3681}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.11.005}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Weber, Erik} } @article {2999523, title = {The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: drawing appropriate distinctions}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {51{\textendash}82}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {2116243, title = {The rule of quantity by {C}huquet and de la {R}oche and its influence on {G}erman {C}ossic algebra}, booktitle = {Pluralit{\'e} de l{\textquoteright}alg{\`e}bre {\`a} la Renaissance}, year = {2012}, pages = {127{\textendash}147}, publisher = {Honor{\'e} Champion}, abstract = {

The importance of Larismethique of de La Roche, published in 1520, has been seriously underestimated. One reason for the neglect is related to the inscrutable way he is referred to. Buteo and Wallis called him Stephanus {\`a} Rupe de Lyon. Other obscure references, such as Gosselin calling him Villafrancus Gallus have been overlooked by many commentators. His influence can be determined in several works that do not credit him but use problems or definitions from the Larismethique. However, most damaging for its historical assessment was Aristide Marre?s misrepresentation of the Larismethique as a grave case of plagiarism. Marre discovered that the printed work of 1520 by Estienne de la Roche contained large fragments that were literally copied from Chuquet?s manuscript of the Triparty. Especially on the Appendice, which contains the solution to a large number of problems, Marre writes repeatedly that it is a literal copy of Chuquet. However, he fails to mention that the structure of the text of de la Roche, his solution methods and symbolism differs significantly from Chuquet. De la Roche introduces several improvements, especially with regards to the use of the second unknown. We provide an in-depth comparison of some problems solved by the so-called regle de la quantite by Chuquet with those of de la Roche. We further report on the surprising finding that Christoff Rudolff{\textquoteright}s solution to linear problems by means of the second unknown in his Behend vnnd Hubsch Rechnung of 1525 depends on Chuquet and de la Roche. As it is generally considered that algebra was introduced in Germany through Italy this provides a new light on the transmission of algebraic knowledge from France to the rest of Europe.

}, isbn = {9782745323989}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Rommevaux, Sabine and Spiesser, Maryvonne and Massa Esteve, Maria Rosa} } @article {CJM:demi, title = {Tolerating Deontic Conflicts by Adaptively Restricting Inheritance}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {219}, year = {2012}, pages = {477-506}, abstract = {

In order to deal with the possibility of deontic conflicts Lou Goble developed a group of logics DPM that are characterized by a restriction of the inheritance principle. While they approximate the deductive power of standard deontic logic, they do so only if the user adds certain statements to the premises. By adaptively strengthening the DPM logics, this paper presents logics that overcome this shortcoming. Furthermore, they are capable of modeling the dynamic and defeasible aspect of our normative reasoning by their dynamic proof theory. This way they enable us to have a better insight in the relations between obligations and thus to localize deontic conflicts.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {1890996, title = {What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? {E}xploring the contours of epistemic democracy}, booktitle = {Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science}, volume = {11}, year = {2012}, pages = {35{\textendash}48}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator{\textquoteright}s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.

}, isbn = {9789400720817}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Le Roy, Frederik and Stalpaert, Christel and Aerts, Diederik} } @phdthesis {PhD_Christian, title = {Adaptive Logic Characterizations of Defeasible Reasoning with Applications in Argumentation, Normative Reasoning and Default Reasoning}, year = {2011}, month = {April 5}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @phdthesis {PhD_Dunja, title = {Epistemic Evaluation in the Context of Pursuit and in the Argumentative Approach to Methodology}, year = {2011}, month = {September 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @proceedings {1854115, title = {From problem solving to the teaching of algebra: the genesis of the algebra textbook}, journal = {11th international IHPST and 6th Greek history, philosophy and science teaching joint conference, Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {344-347}, publisher = {Epikentro Publications}, isbn = {9789604583256}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Seroglou, Fanny and Koulountzos, Vassilis and Siatras, Anastasios} } @proceedings {1861627, title = {A paraconsistent multi-agent framework for dealing with normative conflicts}, journal = {12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XII)}, year = {2011}, pages = {312-329}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra- and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms {\textquoteright}as consistently as possible{\textquoteright}.

}, isbn = {9783642223587}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Leite, Joao and Torroni, Paolo and Agotnes, Thomas and Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leon} } @article {1101225, title = {Towards the proof-theoretic unification of {D}ung{\textquoteright}s argumentation framework: an adaptive logic approach}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {133{\textendash}156}, abstract = {

The article presents a unifying adaptive logic framework for abstract argumentation. It consists of a core system for abstract argumentation and various adaptive logics based on it. These logics represent in an accurate sense all standard extensions defined within Dung{\textquoteright}s abstract argumentation system with respect to sceptical and credulous acceptance. The models of our logics correspond exactly to specific extensions of given argument systems. Additionally, the dynamics of adaptive proofs mirror the argumentative reasoning of a rational agent. In particular, the presented logics allow for external dynamics, i.e. they are able to deal with the arrival of new arguments and are therefore apt to model open-ended argumentations by providing provisional conclusions.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exq015}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {1101409, title = {An adaptive logic framework for conditional obligations and deontic dilemmas}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {1-2}, year = {2010}, pages = {95{\textendash}128}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Tanaka, Koji and Berto, Francesco and Mares, Edwin and Paoli, Francesco} } @conference {JMF:adera, title = {Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called \sys{P2.1}$^r$, that is based on Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e${\textendash}-a bimodal extension of Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{P} that invalidates aggregation for all \emph{prima facie} obligations. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ has several advantages with respect to \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}as much as possible{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ avoids Goble{\textquoteright}s criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the {\textquoteleft}toy examples{\textquoteright} from the literature as well as more complex ones.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14183-6\_12}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik}, editor = {Governatori, Guido and Sartor, Giovanni} } @conference {924838, title = {The body in Renaissance arithmetic: from mnemonics to embodied cognition}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty Sixth Annual Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation}, year = {2010}, publisher = {The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour}, organization = {The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour}, abstract = {

In Medieval and Renaissance arithmetic we find several instances of references to body parts or actions involving body parts. In this paper we will address the question on the historical functions of body parts in mathematics and discuss its relation to the currently prevailing practice of symbolic mathematics.12

}, isbn = {1902956931}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Pease, Alison and Guhe, Markus and Smaill, Alan} } @article {1101420, title = {A deontic logic framework allowing for factual detachment}, journal = {Journal of applied logic}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

Since our ethical and behavioral norms have a conditional form, it is of great importance that deontic logics give an account of deontic commitments such as “A commits you to do/bring about B”. It is commonly agreed that monadic approaches are suboptimal for this task due to several shortcomings, for instance their falling short of giving a satisfactory account of “Strengthening the Antecedent” or their difficulties in dealing with contrary-to-duty paradoxes. While dyadic logics are more promising in these respects, they have been criticized for not being able to model “detachment”: A and the commitment under A to do B implies the actual obligation to do B. “We seem to feel that detachment should be possible after all. But we cannot have things both ways, can we? This is the dilemma on commitment and detachment.” (Lennart {\r A}qvis. Deontic logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, p. 199, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002). In this paper I answer \&\#197;qvist{\textquoteright}s question with “Yes, we can”. I propose a general method to turn dyadic deontic logics in adaptive logics allowing for a defeasible factual detachment while paying special attention to specificity and contrary-to-duty cases. I show that a lot of controversy about detachment can be resolved by analysing different notions of unconditional obligations. The logical modeling of detachment is paradigmatically realized on basis of one of Lou Goble{\textquoteright}s conflict tolerant CDPM logics.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, doi = {10.1016/j.jal.2010.11.001}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2010.11.001}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {944198, title = {How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?}, booktitle = {On Kuhn{\textquoteright}s Philosophy and its Legacy}, volume = {8}, year = {2010}, pages = {251{\textendash}282}, publisher = {CFCUL}, address = {Lisbon}, abstract = {

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such {\textquotedblleft}explanatory concepts{\textquotedblright} of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions {\textendash} Kuhn{\textquoteright}s, Thagard{\textquoteright}s, Chen{\textquoteright}s and Barker{\textquoteright}s, and Laudan{\textquoteright}s {\textendash} and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.

}, isbn = {978-989-8247-12-4}, author = {Weber, Erik and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja}, editor = {Torres, Juan Manuel} } @article {strasser2010towards, title = {Towards more conflict-tolerant deontic logics by relaxing the interdefinability between obligations and permissions}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

While conflict-tolerant logics (CTDLs) usually allow for obligation- obligation conflicts, they fall short of tolerating obligation-permission con- flicts (OP-conflicts) of the type OA \&\#8743; P\&\#172; A. Moreover, for the sake of conflict-tolerance these logics usually do not validate the very intuitive principle (D), OA \&\#8835; PA. We demonstrate in this paper that by relaxing the interdefinability between obligations and permission PA =df \&\#172;O\&\#172;A that is characteristic for most deontic logics, the logics get more conflict-tolerant since they allow for OP-conflicts. Moreover, this way they can be equipped with (D) without the need to sacrifice conflict-tolerance. In this paper we offer a generic procedure that transforms a given CTDL into a logic that tolerates OP-conflicts and validates (D).

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @article {Strasser2009, title = {A Deontic Logic Framework Allowing for Factual Detachment {\textendash}- Appendix}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

This Appendix contains in part A the semantic characterization of logics CDPM.2d and CDPM.2e defined in [3]. Soundness and completeness are proven. In part B the logical framework presented in [3] is generalized such that it is able to deal with nested permissible contexts.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {1078347, title = {Kuhn and coherentist epistemology}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {322{\textendash}327}, abstract = {

The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) ‘the weak notion of rationality’, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not ‘ultimately empirical’, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.003}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {DC\&P:tdl, title = {On the Transparency of Defeasible Logics: Equivalent Premise Sets, Equivalence of Their Extensions, and Maximality of the Lower Limit}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {281{\textendash}304}, abstract = {

For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms.
A related property of Tarski logics is that the extensions of equivalent premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets. This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion does.
We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic or identical to it. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {2009, title = {Why should I adopt pluralism?}, booktitle = {Economic Pluralism}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {

If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Garnett, Rob and Olsen, Erik and Starr, Martha} } @conference {678254, title = {On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. {T}heoretical and experimental results.}, booktitle = {The complexity of simple programs}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Cork University Press}, organization = {Cork University Press}, abstract = {

Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Woods, Damien and Neary, Turlough and Seda, Tony} } @incollection {417858, title = {A conceptual analysis of early arabic algebra}, booktitle = {The unity of science in the arabic tradition : science, logic, epistemology and their interactions}, year = {2008}, pages = {89{\textendash}128}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Arabic algebra derives its epistemic value not from proofs but from correctly performing calculations using coequal polynomials. This idea of ‘mathematics as calculation’ had an important influence on the epistemological status of European mathematics until the seventeenth century. We analyze the basic concepts of early Arabic algebra such as the unknown and the equation and their subsequent changes within the Italian abacus tradition. We demonstrate that the use of these concepts has been problematic in several aspects. Early Arabic algebra reveals anomalies which can be attributed to the diversity of influences in which the al-jabr practice flourished. We argue that the concept of a symbolic equation as it emerges in algebra textbooks around 1550 is fundamentally different from the ‘equation’ as known in Arabic algebra.

}, isbn = {978-1-4020-8404-1}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/11276}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan} } @conference {376586, title = {Belief Merging based on Adaptive Interaction}, booktitle = {A Meeting of the Minds, proceedings of the workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction}, year = {2007}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, isbn = {978-1-904987-48-2}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Shier, Ju and Veltman, Frank} } @conference {DeMol2006, title = {Facing the Computer. Some techniques to understand technique.}, booktitle = {Computers and Philosophy, an International Conference}, year = {2006}, month = {May}, publisher = {EOARD}, organization = {EOARD}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Schmidt, C. T. A.} } @incollection {J:al_iid, title = {Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and Deduction}, booktitle = {Induction and Deduction in the Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {93{\textendash}120}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Stadler, Friedrich} } @incollection {D:eial, title = {The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology}, booktitle = {Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {459{\textendash}485}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Symons, John and Gabbay, Dov M. and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {Christiaens2003, title = {The EPR-Experiment and Free Process Theory}, booktitle = {Process Theories. {C}ross-Disciplinary Studies on Dynamic Categories}, year = {2003}, pages = {267-284}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

As part of the ‘creation-discovery’ interpretation of quantum mechanics Diederik Aerts presented a setting with macroscopical coincidence experiments designed to exhibit significant conceptual analogies between portions of stuff and quantum compound entities in a singlet state in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bell-experiments (EPR-experiments). One important claim of the creation-discovery view is that the singlet state describes an entity that does not have a definite position in space and thus ‘does not exist in space’. ‘Free Process Theory’ is a recent proposal by Johanna Seibt of an integrated ontology, i.e., of an ontology suitable for the interpretation of theories of the macrophysical and microphysical domain (quantum field theory). The framework of free process theory allows us to show systematically the relevant analogies and disanalogies between Aerts’ experiment and EPR-experiments. From free process ontology it also follows quite naturally that the quantum compound entity described by the singlet state ‘does not exist in space.’

}, isbn = {978-1-4020-1751-3}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Seibt, Johanna} } @incollection {Amo2002, title = {A Logical Framework for Integrating Inconsistent Information in Multiple Databases}, booktitle = {Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {2284}, year = {2002}, pages = {67-84}, publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, abstract = {

When integrating data coming from multiple different sources we are faced with the possibility of inconsistency in databases. In this paper, we use one of the paraconsistent logics introduced in [9,7] (LFI1) as a logical framework to model possibly inconsistent database instances obtained by integrating different sources.We propose a method based on the sound and complete tableau proof system of LFI1 to treat both the integration process and the evolution of the integrated database submitted to users updates. In order to treat the integrated database evolution, we introduce a kind of generalized database context, the evolutionary databases, which are databases having the capability of storing and manipulating inconsistent information and, at the same time, allowing integrity constraints to change in time. We argue that our approach is sufficiently general and can be applied in most circumstances where inconsistency may arise in databases.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-43220-3}, doi = {10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, author = {de Amo, Sandra and Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Eiter, Thomas and Schewe, Klaus-Dieter} } @incollection {weber2001pragmatic, title = {A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions}, booktitle = {Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium}, series = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Leske \& Budrich}, address = {Keulen}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Blasius, J{\"o}rg and Hox, J. and de Leeuw, E. and Schmidt, P.} } @incollection {VanBendegem1999, title = {Oorlog en vrede in wetenschapsland}, booktitle = {Denken als Openheid. {L}iber Amicorum {H}ubert {D}ethier}, year = {1999}, pages = {153-160}, publisher = {VUB}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Walraves, Else and Stuy, Johan} } @incollection {267462, title = {Scientific explanation and the interrogative model of inquiry}, booktitle = {Knowledge and inquiry : essays on Jaakko Hintikka{\textquoteright}s epistemology and philosophy of science}, series = {Poznan Studies}, volume = {51}, year = {1997}, pages = {239{\textendash}259}, publisher = {Rodopi}, isbn = {9789042000803}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Sintonen, M} } @incollection {D:cwm, title = {Creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek}, booktitle = {Liber Amicorum J.L. Broeckx}, year = {1986}, pages = {29{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Grafisch Bureau M \& Team}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Hen, Ferdinand J. and Riessauw, Anne-Marie and Sabbe, Herman} } @incollection {D:rssm\&l, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, booktitle = {Reason, Emotion and Music. {T}owards a Common Structure for Arts, Sciences and Philosophies, Based on a Conceptual Framework for the Description of Music}, year = {1986}, note = {

Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}

}, pages = {127{\textendash}143}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Apostel, Leo and Sabbe, Herman and Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {LA\&D\&a, title = {An empirical investigation on scientific observation}, booktitle = {Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy}, year = {1979}, pages = {3{\textendash}36}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Apostel, Leo and Batens, Diderik and Breusegem, Erwin and De Coninck, Jan and De Waele, Danny and Pinxten, Rik and Swings, Jean and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Vandamme, Fernand}, editor = {Callebaut, Werner and De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Vandamme, Fernand} }