@proceedings {2050, title = {How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference}, year = {2018}, pages = {317-335}, publisher = {College Publications}, type = {submitted}, address = {London}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Frijters, Stef and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Condoravdi, Cleo and Nair, Shyam and Pigozzi, Gabriella} } @incollection {2020639, title = {Can economics become a purely experimental science? {A} comparative study}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world}, year = {2012}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

}, isbn = {9789814383073}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {Ducheyne2012, title = {History and Philosophy of Science: From Peaceful Coexistence to Golden Age of Interdisciplinarity?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {26-36}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {DeVreese2012, title = {An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {55-71}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, abstract = {

In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the {\textquoteleft}truth{\textquoteright} about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White{\textquoteright}s theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity

}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {Christiaens2012, title = {Metaphysics and Cinema}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {118-141}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @conference {872462, title = {An Adaptive Logic for the Formal Explication of Scalar Implicatures}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non{\textendash}monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.

}, isbn = {978-3-642-14887-3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14888-0\_20}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @incollection {802714, title = {Two type-theoretical approaches to privative modification}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops}, year = {2009}, pages = {239{\textendash}258}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, abstract = {

In this paper we apply two kinds of procedural semantics to the problem of privative modification. We do this for three reasons. The first reason is to launch a tough test case to gauge the degree of substantial agreement between a constructivist and a realist interpretation of a procedural semantics; the second is to extend Martin-Lof{\textquoteright}s Type Theory to privative modification, which is characteristic of natural language; the third reason is to sketch a positive characterization of privation.

}, isbn = {4-915905-37-3 C3004}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Jespersen, Bj{\o}rn}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @conference {678254, title = {On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. {T}heoretical and experimental results.}, booktitle = {The complexity of simple programs}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Cork University Press}, organization = {Cork University Press}, abstract = {

Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Woods, Damien and Neary, Turlough and Seda, Tony} } @incollection {402962, title = {A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, volume = {25}, year = {2002}, pages = {21{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will present an adaptive logic that grasps the way we analyze metaphors. Metaphors are powerful tools to generate new scientific ideas. Therefore, it is important to have a good theory on what metaphors are and how they function. The first question we have to answer when we want to develop such a theory is obviously {\textacutedbl}what metaphors are{\textacutedbl}. Philosophy of language can offer some interesting ideas but most views do not allow for a cognitive function of metaphors. One of the sparse views that does allow for it is interactionism. The basic version, however, has some serious shortcomings that need solving when we want to use this theory. First of all the terminology is too vague. Furthermore, the description of the reasoning process we use when we analyze a metaphor, only works for very simple examples. The logic I will present, ALM, is based on a broadened version of this view. A logical approach of metaphors allows us to gain a profound insight in the way we analyze metaphors. The analysis of metaphors is a dynamical reasoning process. When we want to capture this process in a logical system, we need a logic that is capable of grasping that specific type of dynamics. An adaptive logic seems to be the best choice. Therefore, I shall present an adaptive logic that grasps the analysis of metaphors.

}, isbn = {1402007124}, author = {D{\textquoteright}Hanis, Isabel}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Nersessian, Nancy and Pizzi, Claudio} } @incollection {J:mbr, title = {Model-Based Reasoning in Creative Processes}, booktitle = {Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery}, year = {1999}, pages = {199{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Kluwer/Plenum}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (non-standard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of model-based reasoning in creative processes. I argue that model-based reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve model-based reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Nersessian, Nancy and Thagard, Paul} } @incollection {D:dyn, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistent Logic. {E}ssays on the Inconsistent}, year = {1989}, pages = {187{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Philosophica Verlag}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Priest, Graham and Routley, Richard and Norman, Jean} }