@article {BeirlaenForthcoming-BEIALF, title = {A Logic for the Discovery of Deterministic Causal Regularities}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {In Press}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, author = {Mathieu Beirlaen and Bert Leuridan and Frederik Van De Putte} } @incollection {4345994, title = {Private epistemic virtue, public vices: moral responsibility in the policy sciences}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {275{\textendash}295}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Lefevere, Merel and Schliesser, Eric}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @article {clarke2014modelling, title = {Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {8}, year = {2014}, pages = {1651{\textendash}1681}, abstract = {

Mechanistic philosophy of science views a large part of scientific activity as engaged in modelling mechanisms. While science textbooks tend to offer qualitative models of mechanisms, there is increasing demand for models from which one can draw quantitative predictions and explanations. Casini et al. (Theoria 26(1):5–33, 2011) put forward the Recursive Bayesian Networks (RBN) formalism as well suited to this end. The RBN formalism is an extension of the standard Bayesian net formalism, an extension that allows for modelling the hierarchical nature of mechanisms. Like the standard Bayesian net formalism, it models causal relationships using directed acyclic graphs. Given this appeal to acyclicity, causal cycles pose a prima facie problem for the RBN approach. This paper argues that the problem is a significant one given the ubiquity of causal cycles in mechanisms, but that the problem can be solved by combining two sorts of solution strategy in a judicious way.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0360-7}, author = {Clarke, Brendan and Leuridan, Bert and Williamson, Jon} } @article {4265612, title = {The role of unification in micro-explanations of physical laws}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {79}, year = {2014}, pages = {41{\textendash}56}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of particular facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically about microexplanations of laws in physics. We investigate whether providing unificatory information has a surplus value in micro-explanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is information that provides ontological unification in the sense defined by Uskali M{\"a}ki. We argue that providing unificatory information may lead to explanations with more explanatory power (we use Jim Woodward’s concept of explanatory power for that) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Weber, Erik and Lefevere, Merel} } @article {diez2013general, title = {General theories of explanation: buyer beware}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {379{\textendash}396}, abstract = {

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (No{\^u}s 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-011-0020-8}, author = {D{\'\i}ez, Jos{\'e} and Khalifa, Kareem and Leuridan, Bert} } @article {leuridan2013structure, title = {The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal-Structural Account}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {65}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {717{\textendash}771}, abstract = {

What are scientific theories and how should they be represented? In this article, I propose a causal–structural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher’s unificationist view, and Darden’s theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation is provided, which sheds light on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study.

}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt015}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {2977907, title = {Causality and explanation in the sciences}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {133{\textendash}136}, abstract = {

Editors{\textquoteright} introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at the University of Ghent in September 2011.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik} } @article {lycke2012formal, title = {A formal explication of the search for explanations: the adaptive logics approach to abductive reasoning}, journal = {Logic Journal of IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {497{\textendash}516}, abstract = {

Most logic–based approaches characterize abduction as a kind of backwards deduction plus additional conditions, which means that a number of conditions is specified that enable one to decide whether or not a particular abductive inference is sound (one of those conditions may e.g. be that abductive consequences have to be compatible with the background theory). Despite the fact that these approaches succeed in specifying which formulas count as valid consequences of abductive inference steps, they do not explicate the way people actually reason by means of abductive inferences. This is most clearly shown by the absence of a decent proof theory. Instead, search procedures are provided that enable one to determine the right abductive consequences. However, these do not by far resemble human reasoning. In order to explicate abductive reasoning more realistically, an alternative approach will be provided in this article, namely, one that is based on the adaptive logics programme. Proof theoretically, this approach interprets the argumentation schema affirming the consequent (AC: A ⊃ B, B |- A) as a defeasible rule of inference. This comes down to the fact that the abductive consequences obtained by means of AC are accepted only for as long as certain conditions are satis.ed—e.g. as long as their negation has not been derived from the background theory. In the end, only the unproblematic applications of AC are retained, while the problematic ones are rejected. In this way, the adaptive logics approach to abduction succeeds to provide a more realistic explication of the way people reason by means of abductive inferences. Moreover, as multiple abduction processes will be characterized, this article may be considered as the first step in the direction of a general formal approach to abduction based on the adaptive logics programme.

}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzq053}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {2125879, title = {On lawfulness in history and historiography}, journal = {HISTORY AND THEORY}, volume = {51}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {172{\textendash}192}, abstract = {

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is-or should be-is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward{\textquoteright}s notion of {\textacutedbl}invariance,{\textacutedbl}is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called {\textacutedbl}pragmatic laws{\textacutedbl}and {\textacutedbl}invariance{\textacutedbl}do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples-from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion-have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.

}, issn = {1468-2303}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00620.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Froeyman, Anton} } @incollection {Gervais2012, title = {Pragmatic approaches to explanation applied to the cognitive sciences: two types of explanation-seeking questions compared}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {131{\textendash}137}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @proceedings {1856691, title = {The role of unification in explanations of facts}, journal = {EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009}, year = {2012}, pages = {403-413}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

}, isbn = {9789400724037}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4\_33}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Lefevere, Merel}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Okasha, Samir and Hartmann, Stephan} } @incollection {Beirlaen2012a, title = {Towards More Conflict-Tolerant Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {1-8}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, abstract = {

In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of ought. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams’ characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams’ solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of ought is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of ought, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that" oughtimplies can."

}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {Leuridan2012, title = {What are mechanisms in social science? (review)}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {395-398}, abstract = {

Why should we introduce the notion of ‘analytical sociology’ into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of ‘mechanism’? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences (1). Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation (3). Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of it

}, issn = {0815-0796}, doi = {10.1007/s11016-011-9610-9}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @incollection {1890996, title = {What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? {E}xploring the contours of epistemic democracy}, booktitle = {Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science}, volume = {11}, year = {2012}, pages = {35{\textendash}48}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator{\textquoteright}s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.

}, isbn = {9789400720817}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Le Roy, Frederik and Stalpaert, Christel and Aerts, Diederik} } @incollection {1998274, title = {On the curious historical coincidence of algebra and double-entry bookkeeping}, booktitle = {Foundations of the formal sciences VII : bringing together philosophy and sociology of science}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {32}, year = {2011}, pages = {109{\textendash}130}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {9781848900493}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/logic/?00021}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @incollection {1223153, title = {The IARC and mechanistic evidence}, booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {91{\textendash}109}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC{\textquoteright}s carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.

}, isbn = {9780199574131}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik}, editor = {McKay Illari, Phyllis and Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @incollection {1104693, title = {The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, {\textquoteleft}academic{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}non-academic consensus{\textquoteright}, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of {\textquoteleft}consensus{\textquoteright} when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {de2011looking, title = {Looking for busy beavers. A socio-philosophical study of a computer-assisted proof}, booktitle = {Foundations of the Formal Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}90}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

"Young man, in mathematics you don{\textquoteright}t understand things, you just get used to them" John von Neumann

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @proceedings {1861627, title = {A paraconsistent multi-agent framework for dealing with normative conflicts}, journal = {12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XII)}, year = {2011}, pages = {312-329}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra- and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms {\textquoteright}as consistently as possible{\textquoteright}.

}, isbn = {9783642223587}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Leite, Joao and Torroni, Paolo and Agotnes, Thomas and Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leon} } @article {leuridan2011three, title = {Three problems for the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {63}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {399{\textendash}427}, abstract = {

In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver{\textquoteright}s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel){\textquoteright}s claim that they are strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of spatio-temporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counterexamples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem (a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two partial, but fallible solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity.

}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr036}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {1905403, title = {Where the design argument goes wrong: auxiliary assumptions and unification}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, year = {2011}, pages = {558{\textendash}578}, abstract = {

Sober (2008) has reconstructed the biological design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, purporting to demonstrate that it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober{\textquoteright}s restrictions on the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are clearly valid. Our account shows that the design argument fails, not because it is intrinsically untestable, but because it clashes with the empirical evidence and fails to satisfy certain theoretical desiderata (in particular, unification). Likewise, Sober{\textquoteright}s critique of the arguments from imperfections and from evil against design is off the mark.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753}, author = {Boudry, Maarten and Leuridan, Bert} } @conference {872462, title = {An Adaptive Logic for the Formal Explication of Scalar Implicatures}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non{\textendash}monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.

}, isbn = {978-3-642-14887-3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14888-0\_20}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @booklet {Lycke_addingthe, title = {Adding the Inference Rule Disjunctive Syllogism to Relevant Logics}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

In order to avoid trivial consequences, the derivability relation of relevant logics (RL) does not support the inference rule disjunctive syllogism (DS). In this paper, I will show that the inference rule DS can be added to this derivability relation in a way that doesn’t lead to trivial or irrelevant consequences. To do so, I will rely on the insights gained from the study of inconsistency–adaptive logics, the branch of adaptive logics that was devised to explicate reasoning based on inconsistent premise sets. Moreover, I will also point to the relations with some alternative proposals from the literature, and I will show that the inconsistency–adaptive framework has some major advantages over these.

}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {999416, title = {Can mechanisms really replace laws of nature?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {77}, number = {3}, year = {2010}, pages = {317{\textendash}340}, abstract = {

Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive-nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell{\textquoteright}s pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms onto-logically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell{\textquoteright}s account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account

}, issn = {0031-8248}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/652959}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @conference {de_winter_distorted_2010, title = {The Distorted Research Agenda in the Health Sciences and James Robert Brown’s Policy Proposal.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_(2012)_-_Brown.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {734645, title = {Inconsistency-adaptive modal logics: on how to cope with modal inconsistency}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {1-2}, year = {2010}, pages = {31{\textendash}61}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive logics, namely inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, url = {http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/pi.html}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Tanaka, Koji and Berto, Francesco and Mares, Edwin and Paoli, Francesco} } @incollection {767731, title = {On Relevance Conditions for Asserting Disjunctions}, booktitle = {The Logica Yearbook 2009}, year = {2010}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {1848900090}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pelis, Michal} } @article {934535, title = {Setting-up early computer programs: D. H. {L}ehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC computation}, journal = {Archive for Mathematical Logic}, volume = {49}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {123{\textendash}146}, abstract = {

A complete reconstruction of Lehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC set-up for computing the exponents of p modulo two is given. This program served as an early test program for the ENIAC (1946). The reconstruction illustrates the difficulties of early programmers to find a way between a man operated and a machine operated computation. These difficulties concern both the content level (the algorithm) and the formal level (the logic of sequencing operations).

}, issn = {1432-0665}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00153-009-0169-8}, author = {Bullynck, Maarten and De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @conference {605786, title = {The Adaptive Logics Approach to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in {B}elgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {594869, title = {Causal discovery and the problem of ignorance: an adaptive logic approach}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {188{\textendash}205}, abstract = {

In this paper, I want to substantiate three related claims regarding causal discovery from non-experimental data. Firstly, in scientific practice, the problem of ignorance is ubiquitous, persistent, and far-reaching. Intuitively, the problem of ignorance bears upon the following situation. A set of random variables VV is studied but only partly tested for (conditional) independencies; i.e. for some variables A and B it is not known whether they are (conditionally) independent. Secondly, Judea Pearl{\textquoteright}s most meritorious and influential algorithm for causal discovery (the IC algorithm) cannot be applied in cases of ignorance. It presupposes that a full list of (conditional) independence relations is on hand and it would lead to unsatisfactory results when applied to partial lists. Finally, the problem of ignorance is successfully treated by means of ALIC, the adaptive logic for causal discovery presented in this paper.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, doi = {10.1016/j.jal.2007.11.004}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2007.11.004}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @conference {674351, title = {"Clear Moon, Frost soon". An introduction to the Study of Meteorological Practices in the Low Countries (1550-1850)}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Pieters, Eva}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {674595, title = {Fitch-style natural deduction for modal paralogics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {193{\textendash}218}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will present a Fitch{\textendash}style natural deduction proof theory for modal paralogics (modal logics with gaps and/or gluts for negation). Besides the standard classical subproofs, the presented proof theory also contains modal subproofs, which express what would follow from a hypothesis, in case it would be true in some arbitrary world.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @book {689110, title = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Young Researchers Present their Work}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {678298, title = {Mathematics through man-computer interaction. A study of the early years of computing.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {Urbaniak2009a, title = {Modal Logic and Philosophy. {A} case study.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {79-83}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Rostalska, Agnieszka}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {Primiero2009, title = {A note on constructive modalities for information}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {drouet2009probabilistic, title = {Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {68{\textendash}72}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {Urbaniak2008, title = {Reasoning with dynamic conceptual frames.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {84-89}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {524726, title = {Trading off explanatory virtues}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

The paper draws on Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Van Paemel, Geert} } @incollection {703844, title = {Understanding in political science: the plurality of epistemic interests}, booktitle = {Scientific Understanding. {P}hilosophical Perspectives}, year = {2009}, pages = {298{\textendash}313}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, isbn = {9780822943785}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Leonelli, Sabina and Eigner, Kai} } @phdthesis {PhD_Bert, title = {Laws of Nature and Causality in the Special Sciences: A Philosophical and Formal Analysis}, year = {2008}, month = {March 13}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {431737, title = {The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {298{\textendash}303}, issn = {0003-2638}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00756.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @conference {430672, title = {A week-end off: the first extensive number-theoretical computation on the ENIAC}, booktitle = {Logic and Theory of Algorithms}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

The first extensive number-theoretical computation run on the ENIAC, is reconstructed. The problem, computing the exponent of 2 modulo a prime, was set up on the ENIAC during a week-end in July 1946 by the number-theorist D.H. Lehmer, with help from his wife Emma and John Mauchly. Important aspects of the ENIAC{\textquoteright}s design are presented-and the reconstruction of the implementation of the problem on the ENIAC is discussed in its salient points.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-69405-2}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-69407-6_19}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Bullynck, Maarten}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @article {380250, title = {An adaptive logic for relevant classical deduction}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {602{\textendash}612}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will show that it is possible to delete Ex Falso Quodlibet from Classical Logic, without depriving it of any of its deductive powers. This is done by means of the ambiguity{\textendash}adaptive logic AALns, which is equivalent to dCR, the deductive version of Neil Tennant{\textquoteright}s CR.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @incollection {373206, title = {Galton{\textquoteright}s blinding glasses: modern statistics hiding causal structure in early theories of inheritance.}, booktitle = {Causality and probability in the sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {243{\textendash}262}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {1-904987-35-4}, author = {Leuridan, Bert}, editor = {Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @incollection {531096, title = {Naar een Pluralistisch Model van Onderzoeksfinanciering in de Humane Wetenschappen}, booktitle = {Welke Universiteit Willen We (Niet)?}, year = {2007}, pages = {205{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Het nieuwe Financieringsmodel voor het Hoger Onderwijs wordt vaak bekritiseerd vanuit argumentendie teruggaan op de eigenheid van de humane wetenschappen. Dit artikel poogt deze eigenheid preciezer teomschrijven en brengt de gevolgen voor de relatie tussen onderzoek en het tijdschriftenlandschap in kaart. Opbasis daarvan wordt de doelmatigheid betwist van het huidige voorstel, dat de effici{\"e}ntie van onderzoek wilverhogen door publicaties te wegen op basis van de tijdschriften waarin ze worden gepubliceerd. Dit betekentgeenszins dat een effici{\"e}ntere humane wetenschap onmogelijk is, alleen moet dat gebeuren op een manierwaarop haar pluralistische natuur niet wordt miskend. Hoe een dergelijk beleid er kan uitzien wordt daaromuitgewerkt in een aanzet naar een pluralististisch model van onderzoeksfinanciering in de humanewetenschappen.

}, isbn = {9789038211879}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/onderzoeksfinanciering.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Loobuyck, Patrick and Vanheeswijck, G. and Van Herck, W.} } @phdthesis {PhD_Hans, title = {Relevance in Reasoning: The Adaptive Logics Approach}, year = {2007}, month = {May 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @conference {384497, title = {Study of limits of solvability in tag systems}, booktitle = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper we will give an outline of the proof of the solvability of the halting and reachability problem for 2-symbolic tag systems with a deletion number v = 2. This result will be situated in a more general context of research on limits of solvability in tag systems.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-74592-1}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Durand Lose, J and Margenstern, M} } @article {427293, title = {Supervenience: Its logic and its inferential role in classical genetics}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {50}, number = {198}, year = {2007}, pages = {147{\textendash}171}, abstract = {

Supervenience is mostly conceived of as a purely philosophical concept. Nevertheless, I will argue, it played an important and very fruitful inferential role in classical genetics. Gregor Mendel assumed that phenotypic traits supervene on underlying factors, and this assumption allowed him to successfully predict and explain the phenotypical regularities he had experimentally discovered. Therefore it is interesting to explicate how we reason about supervenience relations. I will tackle the following two questions. Firstly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found for inferring supervenience claims from data? Secondly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found to empirically test supervenience claims? I will answer these questions within the framework of the adaptive logics programme.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @conference {322369, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Compassionate Relevantism}, booktitle = {Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications}, year = {2005}, publisher = {CENTRIA}, organization = {CENTRIA}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pereira, Luis Moniz and Wheeler, Gregory} } @article {360923, title = {Socratic proofs and paraconsistency: a case study}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {80}, number = {2-3}, year = {2005}, pages = {431{\textendash}466}, abstract = {

This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens{\textquoteright} weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Sch{\"u}tte{\textquoteright}s maximally paraconsistent logic Fv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.

}, issn = {0039-3215}, author = {Vanackere, Guido and Wisniewski, Andzrej and Leszczynska, Dorota} } @incollection {290835, title = {Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {179{\textendash}187}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, isbn = {987-9281-89-6}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {J:pcsr, title = {Do We Need Paraconsistency in Commonsense Reasoning?}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {135{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentina}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {D:faps, title = {A Formal Approach to Problem Solving}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {15{\textendash}26}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {217593, title = {Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law: a qualitative computational model.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {93{\textendash}102}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, abstract = {

Computational models offer an excellent tool for the study and analysis of scientific discovery processes. The study of failures provides an insight into the history and philosophy of science as valuable as the study of successful discoveries. Using a computational model I analyzed Kepler’s approach in formulating a quantitative law for refraction. Although Kepler ultimately failed in discovering the sine law, the model shows that his basic hypothesis as well as his approach by geometrical reasoning was a correct one. This went largely unnoticed by commentators on the history of optics. Based on this analysis I provide new evidence that Descartes and Snell found in Kepler’s main hypothesis everything needed to deduce the sine law by pure geometrical reasoning. Our computational model is based on geometrical knowledge as contrasted with previous quantitative approaches. It has been implemented as a Prolog program.

}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {597466, title = {A Procedure for Generating (Conditional) Answers in a Goal-Directed Way}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {57{\textendash}63}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, abstract = {

Two evolutionary games : collective action and prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilema / Jakson Alves de Aquino {\textendash} A formal approach to problem solving / Diderik Batens {\textendash} Application of mathematics and underdetermination / Ota\unmatched{0301}vio Bueno {\textendash} A framework for combining defeasible argumentation with labeled deduction / Carlos Iva\unmatched{0301}n Chesn\unmatched{0303}evar and Guillermo Ricardo Simari {\textendash} A procedure for generating (conditional) answers in a goal-directed way / Kristof De Clerq and Rob Vanderbeken {\textendash} Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning : a model for research programmes / Claudio Delrieux {\textendash} Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law : a quantitative computational model / Albrecht Heeffer {\textendash} Default models of rationality / Silvia Lerner {\textendash} Most inferences are defeasible / Jose\unmatched{0301} Carlos Loureiro Ralha and Ce\unmatched{0301}lia Ghedini Rahla {\textendash} Reasoning through doing : epistemic mediators in scientific reasoning / Lorenzo Magnani {\textendash} Do we need paraconsistency in commonsense reasoning? / Joke Meheus {\textendash} Descartes, a methodical elimination of paradoxes for (de)-ontology building / Jean Sallantin ... [et al.] {\textendash} Measuring coherence using LP-models / Carlos A. Oller {\textendash} What are multi-agent systems trying to accomplish? Towards pragmatic game-theoretical agenda / Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen {\textendash} Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility / Dagmar Provijn {\textendash} Semantic computations of truth, based on associations already learned / Patrick Suppes and Jean-Yves Be\unmatched{0301}ziau {\textendash} On the sense of eating strawberries, or, On the exclusivity implcature fo {\textquoteright}or{\textquoteright} / Liza Verhoeven and Leon Horsten {\textendash} A note on epistemology and logical afrificial intelligence / Gregory R. Wheeler and Lui\unmatched{0301}s Moniz Pereira.

}, isbn = {9879281896}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {DeMey2002, title = {Qualia, spectruminversie en filosofische zombies.}, booktitle = {Het bewustzijn in de fysische wereld: Filosofische essays over materialisme en fenomenaal bewustzijn}, year = {2002}, pages = {171-194}, publisher = {Peeters}, address = {Leuven}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {J. Leilich, P. Reynaert and Veldeman, J.} }