@article {Meheus2014, title = {Deontic Reasoning on the Basis of Consistency Considerations}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

Deonticconflictsposeanimportantchallengetodeonticlogicians. The standard account —standard deontic logic, SDL— is not apt for addressing this challenge since it trivializes con flicts. Two main stratagems for gaining conflict-tolerance have been proposed: to weaken SDL in various ways, and to contextualize the reign of SDL to consistent subsets of the premise set. The latter began with the work of van Fraassen and has been further developed by Horty. In this paper we characterize this second approach in general terms. We also study three basic ways to contextualize SDL and supplement each of these with a dynamic proof theory in the framework of adaptive logics.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Aleks Knoks} } @unpublished {2070, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Semantics, Expressivity, and Applications}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @unpublished {2069, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Semantics, Expressivity, and Applications}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

We study classical modal logics with pooling modalities, i.e. unary modal operators that allow one to express properties of sets obtained by the pointwise intersection of neighbourhoods. We discuss salient properties of these modalities, situate the logics in the broader area of modal logics (with a particular focus on relational semantics), establish key properties concerning their expressive power, and discuss their application to epistemic/doxastic logic, the logic of evidence-based belief, deontic logic, and logics of agency and ability.

}, keywords = {classical modal logics, coalition logic, distributed belief, multi-agent systems, pointwise intersection, pooling modalities}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte}, editor = {Klein, Dominik} } @article {Blancke, title = {What science is fair? Representations of science in a Dutch creationist campaign}, journal = {Public Understanding of Science}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In the Netherlands, creationists have started up a civil initiative by which they demand “fair science”. This paper offers an analysis of this peculiar notion. Fair science depends on two representations of science, one as an unimpressive label, and one as an authority. Each of these representations hinges on a different conception of the authority of science: on the one hand, science is endowed with authority because it produces technology and is able to make reliable predictions. On the other hand, science’s authority is only a matter of reputation. To the extent that these two conceptions tap into representations of science and its authority among the larger public, the notion of fair science might prove to be a compelling rhetorical tool. Suggestions are made as to how the appeal of the notion can be reduced.

}, author = {Blancke, Stefaan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {4443711, title = {Groepsbeslissingen: kwaliteit, autoriteit en vertrouwen}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, year = {In Press}, author = {Baartmans, Tim and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {4254511, title = {The semantics of untrustworthiness}, journal = {Topoi. An International Reiew of Philosophy}, year = {In Press}, abstract = {

We o er a formal treatment of the semantics of both complete and incomplete mistrustful or distrustful information transmissions. The se- mantics of such relations is analysed in view of rules that dene the be- haviour of a receiving agent. We justify this approach in view of human agent communications and secure system design. We further specify some properties of such relations.

}, issn = {1316-5011}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9227-2}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {2074, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Axiomatization and Decidability}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {online first}, year = {2020}, abstract = {

We establish completeness and the finite model property for logics featuring the pooling modalities that were introduced in Van De\ Putte and Klein (Pooling modalities and pointwise intersection: semantics, expressivity, and applications). The definition of our canonical models combines standard techniques with a so-called {\textquotedblleft}puzzle piece construction{\textquotedblright}, which we first illustrate informally. After that, we apply it to the weakest classical logics with pooling modalities and investigate the technique{\textquoteright}s potential for the axiomatization of stronger logics, obtained by imposing well-known frame conditions on the models.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @unpublished {2051, title = {Pointwise intersection in neighbourhood modal logic}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @incollection {2054, title = {An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Obligation and Permission}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, pages = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, author = {Anglberger, Albert and Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Korbmacher, Johannes} } @article {4443718, title = {Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {21 (1)}, year = {2016}, abstract = {

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9372-0}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {4346560, title = {Explicating ways of consensus-making in science and society: distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {71{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty \& Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) – as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @article {4443714, title = {Mathematical proofs in practice: Revisiting the reliability of published mathematical proofs}, journal = {Theoria. Revista de Teor{\'\i}a, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, year = {2015}, pages = {345{\textendash}360}, author = {Frans, Joachim and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {4254591, title = {{\textquoteright}Peer review is melting our glaciers{\textquoteright}: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) went astray}, journal = {Journal for general philosophy of science}, year = {2015}, pages = {351--366}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @incollection {D:tmdm, title = {Two, Many, And Differently Many}, booktitle = {The Road to Universal Logic. Festschrift for the 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves B{\'e}ziau}, volume = {II}, year = {2015}, pages = {213{\textendash}242}, publisher = {Birkh{\"a}user}, address = {Basel}, abstract = {

This paper is a modest contribution to a universal logic approach to many-valued semantic systems. The main focus is on the relation between such systems and two-valued ones. The matter is discussed for usual many-valued semantic systems. These turn out to exist for more logics than expected. A new type of many-valued semantics is devised and its use illustrated. Truth-functionality has a rather central place in the discussion, which leads to philosophical conclusions.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Koslow, Arnold and Buchsbaum, Arthur} } @article {Kosolosky2014, title = {Editorial and interview with {J}ustin {B}iddle}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {8}, number = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {47{\textendash}50}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {4254561, title = {Health, food, and science: an ethical assessment of research agendas}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {228}, year = {2014}, pages = {701-726}, abstract = {

We offer several new arguments for the view that existing research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences are morally deficient. More specifically, the following kinds of distortion of the agenda are discussed: in the health sciences, the health problems of the poor are more or less neglected, as well as non-medicinal solutions to health problems, and in the agricultural sciences, insufficient attention is paid to agroecology. We justify the claim that these three kinds of distortion are problematic on ethical grounds, showing that they are moral failures. Instead of starting from one ethical theory to show this, we present different ethical justifications, based on different ethical theories (Bentham’s utilitarianism, Rawls’s theory of justice, Pogge’s rights-based account of minimal justice, Kitcher’s ethical theory, and classical liberalism). This should make our conclusion (i.e. that the distorted research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences pose a moral problem) at least initially convincing to adherents of different ethical theories.

}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {3143178, title = {The conceptual elusiveness of engineering functions: a philosophical analysis}, journal = {Philosophy and Technology}, volume = {26}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {159-185}, abstract = {

In this paper, we describe the conceptual elusiveness of the notion of function as used in engineering practice. We argue that it should be accepted as an ambiguous notion, and then review philosophical argumentations in which engineering functions occur in order to identify the consequences of this ambiguity. Function is a key notion in engineering, yet is used by engineers systematically in a variety of meanings. First, we demonstrate that this ambiguous use is rational for engineers by considering the role of functions in design methods and by analysing the ambiguity in terms of Kuhn’s notion of methodological incommensurability. Second, we discuss ontological and mereological analyses of engineering functions and describe a proof that subfunctions cannot formally be taken as parts of the functions they decompose. Engineering functions figure sometimes in philosophical work and are then typically taken as having an unambiguous, well-defined meaning. Finally, we therefore revisit work in philosophy of technology on the dual nature of technical artefacts, in philosophy of science on functional and mechanistic explanations, and in philosophy of biology on biological functions, and explore the consequences of the fact that engineering function is an ambiguous notion. It is argued that one of these consequences may be that also the notion of biological function has an ambiguous meaning

}, issn = {2210-5441}, doi = {10.1007/s13347-012-0096-1}, author = {Vermaas, Pieter and van Eck, Dingmar and Kroes, Peter} } @article {4254489, title = {The epistemic integrity of NASA practices in the space shuttle program}, journal = {ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH - POLICIES AND QUALITY ASSURANCE}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {72{\textendash}92}, abstract = {

This article presents an account of epistemic integrity and uses it to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of practices in NASA{\textquoteright}s Space Shuttle Program was limited. We focus on the following kinds of practices: (1) research by working engineers, (2) review by middle-level managers, and (3) communication with the public. We argue that the epistemic integrity of these practices was undermined by production pressure at NASA, i.e., the pressure to launch an unreasonable amount of flights per year. Finally, our findings are used to develop some potential strategies to protect epistemic integrity in aerospace science.

}, issn = {0898-9621}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2013.767122}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {2999532, title = {The epistemic integrity of scientific research}, journal = {SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS}, volume = {19}, year = {2013}, pages = {757{\textendash}774}, abstract = {

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.

}, issn = {1353-3452}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {4254569, title = {Fraud in academic medical research: lessons from Flanders, Belgium}, journal = {The reasoner}, volume = {7}, number = {7}, year = {2013}, pages = {2}, abstract = {

A scientific survey on fraud in academic medical research in Flanders , of which the results were recently published in popular science magazine Eos, has caused tumult in the Flemish academic community. The reason is that these results suggest that scientific fraud (which could indirectly cause ill health and death among patients) is not as rare as earlier estimates indicate . Malpractices are primarily attributed to the pressure to publish. In this piece , we elaborate on the content of the study and pave the way for reform.

}, issn = {1757-0522}, url = {http://thereasoner.org/}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {diez2013general, title = {General theories of explanation: buyer beware}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {379{\textendash}396}, abstract = {

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (No{\^u}s 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-011-0020-8}, author = {D{\'\i}ez, Jos{\'e} and Khalifa, Kareem and Leuridan, Bert} } @article {2999523, title = {The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: drawing appropriate distinctions}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {51{\textendash}82}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @proceedings {1854115, title = {From problem solving to the teaching of algebra: the genesis of the algebra textbook}, journal = {11th international IHPST and 6th Greek history, philosophy and science teaching joint conference, Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {344-347}, publisher = {Epikentro Publications}, isbn = {9789604583256}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Seroglou, Fanny and Koulountzos, Vassilis and Siatras, Anastasios} } @incollection {1104693, title = {The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, {\textquoteleft}academic{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}non-academic consensus{\textquoteright}, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of {\textquoteleft}consensus{\textquoteright} when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @conference {1182635, title = {Who guards the guardians/experts? {P}hilosophers?}, booktitle = {32e Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, organization = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {1096409, title = {Expertise doordacht: reflectie via klimaatanalyse}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {72{\textendash}82}, abstract = {

This paper analyses four theoretical problems concerning the notion of expertise and tries to formulate answers by scrutinizing these problems in light of scientific practice. The focus will be on the problems arising from the interference of experts in democratic decision making. I formulate my answers by referring to the Review-process of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Analysing how expertise influences this particular scientific practice is an example of how social-epistemological research is done and has to be done.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {1096460, title = {Report LRR10: Logic, reasoning and rationality}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {165{\textendash}166}, url = {http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol4/TheReasoner-4(11).pdf}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Gauderis, Tjerk and Gervais, Raoul and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @incollection {D:shahid, title = {Towards a Dialogic Interpretation of Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things. Essays in Honour of {S}hahid {R}ahman}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}51}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

The main result presented in this paper concerns a dialogic or game-theoretical interpretation of dynamic proofs. Dynamic proofs in themselves do not form a demonstration of the derivability of their last formula from a given premise set. Apart from the proof, such a demonstration requires a specific metalevel argument. In a natural and appealing form, the metalevel argument is phrased in terms of the existence of a winning strategy for the proponent.\par The aforementioned point is presented in terms of an approach that is in a sense Hilbertian and anti-Tarskian: the characterization of logical inference in terms of types of proofs, rather than in terms of properties of the consequence relation.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {D{\'e}gremont, C{\'e}dric and Keiff, Laurent and R{\"u}ckert, Helge} } @incollection {683583, title = {Disjunctive realism about color}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, series = {Acta philosophica Fennica}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {193{\textendash}200}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, abstract = {

Section 1: Analytical metaphysics and its methodology. Why the negations of false atomic propositions are true / Peter Simons {\textendash} The one over many / Anna-Sofia Maurin {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s conception of supervenience / Markku Keina\unmatched{0308}nen {\textendash} {\textacutedbl}Mirage realism{\textacutedbl} or {\textacutedbl}Positivism in naturalism{\textquoteright}s clothing{\textacutedbl}? / Panu Raatikainen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s metaphysical realism / Sami Pihlstro\unmatched{0308}m. Section 2: Laws of nature, dispositions, and modality. Some remarks on the metaphysical status of laws of nature / Wim Christiaens {\textendash} Dispositions pace Armstrong / Robrecht Vanderbeeken {\textendash} Armstrong on the metaphysics of modality: two dilemmas / Anssi Korhonen. Section 3: Mind and epistemology. Disjunctive realism about color / Tim De May {\textendash} On Armstrong{\textquoteright}s philosophy of perception / S. Albert Kivinen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s epistemology / Markus Lammenranta.

}, isbn = {9519264663}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {397684, title = {Dispositions pace Armstrong.}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {127{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, isbn = {9789519264660}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @conference {WaartvanGulik2007, title = {On the Implementation of Concept Structures in Fuzzy Logic.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

A procedure is presented which can modify a large number of fuzzy logics in such a way that the result integrates a logically meaningful representation of the family resemblance structure of fuzzy concepts. The most important aspect of this modification is the implementation of so-called ‘concept matrices’. The interpretation and construction of these new formal objects is based upon Fintan Costello’s ‘Diagnostic Evidence Model’ (2000), a contemporary cognitive scientific model of concept structure and concept combination. As a result, it becomes possible to formalize, explain and simulate new logical aspects of cognitive fuzziness such as meaning transformations by means of non-scalar hedges, and interpretational and inferential operations over non-intersective concept combinations.

}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Vosniadou, S. and Kayser, D. and Athanassios, P.} } @conference {353364, title = {The Methodological Relevance of the History of Mathematics for Mathematics Education}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Conference on 21st Century Information Technology in Mathematics Education}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

Mathematics education benefits from an integration of the history of mathematics within the mathematics curriculum. We provide three basic arguments for such integration. The first is epistemological and addresses a contextual view on mathematical knowledge. The second concerns the phylogenic aspects of the development of mathematics. Conceptual difficulties with teaching children mathematics often correspond with historical periods of conceptual crisis in mathematics. A third, historical argument, draws on the vast repository of experience in mathematics education. We provide examples for each of these arguments from the history of algebra.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Dhompongsa, G and Bhatti , F and Kitson , Q} } @conference {403803, title = {Explaining laws by reduction}, booktitle = {Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Scientific explanations have been intensively studied by philosophers of science during the last five decades. Explanations of laws did not receive as much attention as explanations of particular facts. In this article, I present a model for one type of explanations of laws: reductions of laws to phenomena at a micro-level. Examples of such reductions can be found in the natural sciences (the ideal gas law is probably the most famous example here) and in the social sciences (e.g., reduction of macroeconomic laws to the behaviour of individual economic agents).

}, isbn = {140201645X}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-2612-2_9}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Rojsczak, A and Cachro, J and Kurczewski, G} } @article {klijn2003using, title = {Using classical resolution method to check derivability for some propositional paralogics and adaptive logics.}, year = {2003}, abstract = {

In this article it will be shown how results from [2] can be used to decide wether, for a range of propositional paralogics and adaptive logics L, A1 , ..., An \#L B is derivable by means of a resolution method for C1 , ..., Cn D, where C1 , ..., Cn and D are the translations of the original premisses and the conclusion respectively from L into CL. This method simplifies the use of automated deduction for non-classical logics, since the framework for these logics can be put "on top of" any existing resolution method for classical logic. This theoretical framework has been implemented in a computer program. The URL where this program is available will be given. This approach, moreover, makes it easier to compare the derivability of well formed formulas from sets of premisses between the implemented range of logics. The resulting computer program can thus be seen as an useful tool for research in logics.

}, author = {Klijn, Alex} } @incollection {J:clau2, title = {Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. {C}lausius{\textquoteright}s Remarkable Derivation of {C}arnot{\textquoteright}s Theorem}, booktitle = {History of Modern Physics. {A}cta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Brepols}, address = {Turnhout (Belgium)}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Krach, Helghe and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {DJ:lpe, title = {On the Logic and Pragmatics of the Process of Explanation}, booktitle = {Explanatory Connections. {E}lectronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen}, year = {2001}, note = {

22\ pp.

}, publisher = {University of Helsinki}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an \emph{explanandum} and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain.

}, url = {http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/matti/}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Kiikeri, Mika and Ylikoski, Petri} } @article {Klijn2001, title = {Robots en Onderwijs.}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {28}, year = {2001}, pages = {249-263}, author = {Klijn, Alex} } @article {322170, title = {Secondary qualities in retrospect}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {68}, year = {2001}, pages = {41{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primary-secondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntosh{\textquoteright}s analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different primary-secondary quality distinctions to Boyle and Locke. On the other hand, he forbears to attribute a particular primary-secondary quality distinction to them, which, at least in the case of Boyle, differs genuinely from his main distinction between the mechanical affections of matter and all of matter{\textquoteright}s other qualities.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {121607, title = {Alternative mathematics: the vague way.}, booktitle = {Festschrift in honor of {N}ewton {C}.{A}. da {C}osta on the occasion of his seventieth birthday}, volume = {125}, year = {2000}, pages = {19{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Krause, D{\'e}cio and French, Steven and Doria, Francisco A.} } @article {DK\&N, title = {Embedding and Interpolation for Some Paralogics. {T}he Propositional Case}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {33}, year = {1999}, pages = {29{\textendash}44}, abstract = {

We consider the very weak paracomplete and paraconsistent logics that are obtained by a straightforward weakening of Classical Logic, as well as some of their maximal extensions that are a fragment of Classical Logic. We prove (for the propositional case) that these logics may be faithfully embedded in Classical Logic (as well as in each other), and that the interpolation theorem obtains for them.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Kurtonina, Natasha} } @article {Kurtonina:1997:BTL:595833.595898, title = {Bisimulations for Temporal Logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, year = {1997}, pages = {403{\textendash}425}, abstract = {

We define bisimulations for temporal logic with Since and Until. This new notion is compared to existing notions of bisimulations, and then used to develop the basic model theory of temporal logic with Since and Until. Our results concern both invariance and definability. We conclude with a brief discussion of the wider applicability of our ideas.

}, keywords = {definability, expressive power, modal and temporal logic, model theory}, issn = {0925-8531}, doi = {10.1023/A:1008223921944}, author = {Kurtonina, Natasha and De Rijke, Maarten} } @article {184851, title = {Simulating without negation.}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, year = {1997}, pages = {501{\textendash}522}, abstract = {

Although negation-free languages are widely used in logic and computer science, relatively little is known about their expressive power. To address this issue we consider kinds of non-symmetric bisimulations called directed simulations, and use these to analyse the expressive power and model theory of negation-free modal and temporal languages. We first use them to obtain preservation, safety and definability results for a simple negation-free modal language. We then obtain analogous results for stronger negation-free languages. Finally, we extend our methods to deal with languages with non-Boolean negation. Keywords: Expressive power, modal logic, negation-free languages.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, author = {Kurtonina, Natasha and De Rijke, Maarten} } @incollection {D:alaoetb, title = {Adaptieve logica{\textquoteright}s: een aanzet om elkaar te begrijpen}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {13{\textendash}19}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @incollection {J:nvfb, title = {Elk wetenschapper zijn onderzoeksprogramma?}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}67}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @incollection {D:goedel, title = {Kurt {G}{\"o}del en de wetenschappelijke zekerheid}, booktitle = {Nieuwe visies in de wetenschap}, year = {1989}, pages = {43{\textendash}66}, publisher = {Acco}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Kint, J.} }