@incollection {1986, title = {The Feasibility of Modeling Hypothetical Reasoning by Formal Logics. Including an Overview of Adaptive Logics for Singular Fact Abduction}, booktitle = {Handbook of Model-Based Science}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Bertolotti, Tommaso} } @incollection {Pawlowski2017a, title = {Philosophical Aspects of an Alleged Connection Between the Axiom of Choice and Predicting the Future}, booktitle = {Applications of Formal Philosophy The Road Less Travelled}, year = {2017}, pages = {213-220}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel}, editor = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Gillman, Payette} } @article {4443682, title = {The {\textquoteright}green cheese{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}red herring{\textquoteright} problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, year = {2015}, pages = {433-455}, author = {Weber, Erik and Gervais, Raoul and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {4443651, title = {Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {45-57}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {Gervais2014, title = {A framework for inter-level explanations: Outlines for a new explanatory pluralism.}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {48}, year = {2014}, pages = {1{\textendash}9}, abstract = {

According to explanatory pluralism, the appropriate explanatory level is determined by pragmatic factors, and there are no general exclusion or preference rules concerning higher- or lower-level explanations. While I agree with the latter claim, I will argue that the former is in need of revision. In particular, I will argue that by distinguishing cases of two explanations being descriptions of one underlying causal process, and two explanations being descriptions of two distinct causal processes, it becomes clear that the grain size of an explanation is in fact determined by the interplay of various pragmatic and non-pragmatic factors. Within these constraints, positive guidelines can be developed to direct us to the appropriate explanatory level. This gives us the outlines for a general framework for classifying various types of relations between explanations on different levels. After making a comparison between this new framework and standard explanatory pluralism, I end by suggesting some ways in which the framework could be further developed.

}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.07.002}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {5685708, title = {Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science: explanatory power, understanding, and the {\textquoteright}mere description{\textquoteright} worry}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {192}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {43{\textendash}66}, abstract = {

In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena (the ‘mere description’ worry). I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models (predictive power, counterfactual support, and unification) are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @phdthesis {PhD_Tjerk, title = {Patterns of Hypothesis Formation}, year = {2014}, month = {March 31}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @incollection {4090467, title = {Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry}, booktitle = {New directions in the philosophy of science}, year = {2014}, pages = {104{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner{\textquoteright}s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism {\textendash} different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry {\textendash} namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the {\textquotedblleft}genuine dialogue{\textquotedblright} or shape {\textquotedblleft}the pluralistic attitude{\textquotedblright} Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.

}, isbn = {9783319043814}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_8}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @incollection {de2014proof, title = {The Proof Is in the Process: A Preamble for a Philosophy of Computer-Assisted Mathematics}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Science}, series = {The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {15{\textendash}33}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

According to some well-known mathematicians well-versed in computer-assisted mathematics (CaM), “Computers are changing the way we are doing mathematics”. To what extent this is really true is still an open question. Indeed, even though some philosophers of math have taken up the challenge to think about CaM, it is unclear in what sense exactly a machine (can) affect(s) the so-called “queen of the sciences”. In fact, some have concluded that issues raised by the use of the computer in mathematics are not specific to the use of the computer per se. However, such findings seem precarious since a systematic study of computer-assisted mathematics is still lacking. In this paper I argue that in order to understand the impact of CaM, it is necessary to take more seriously the computer itself and how it is actually used in the process of doing mathematics. Within such an approach, one searches for characteristics that are specific to the use of the computer in mathematics. I will focus on a feature that is beyond any doubt inherently connected to the use of computing machinery, viz. mathematician-computer interactions. I will show how such interactions are fundamentally different from the usual interactions between mathematicians and non-human aids (a piece of paper, a blackboard etc) and how such interactions determine at least two more characteristics of CaM, viz. the significance of time and processes and the steady process of internalization of mathematical tools and knowledge into the machine. I will restrict myself to the use of the computer within so-called experimental mathematics since this is the main object of CaM within the philosophical literature.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_2}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @article {4341742, title = {To envision a new particle or change an existing law? Hypothesis formation and anomaly resolution for the curious spectrum of beta decay}, journal = {STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS}, volume = {45}, year = {2014}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, abstract = {

This paper addresses the question of how scientists determine which type of hypothesis is most suitable for tackling a particular problem by examining the historical case of the anomalous {\ss} spectrum in early nuclear physics (1927-1934), a puzzle that occasioned the most diverse hypotheses amongst physicists at the time. It is shown that such determinations are most often implicitly informed by scientists’ individual perspectives on the hierarchical relations between various elements of the theory and the problem at hand. In addition to this main result, it is suggested that Wolfgang Pauli’s neutrino idea may well have been an adaptation of Ernst Rutherford’s original and older neutron idea, which would provide evidence that the adaptation of older ideas is a more common practice than is often thought.

}, issn = {1355-2198}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.11.002}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @incollection {3258356, title = {{\textquoteright}Argumentandi modus huius scientiae maxim{\`e} proprius: {\textquoteright} {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s mechanics and the question of mathematical principles}, booktitle = {Guidobaldo del {M}onte (1545-1607) : theory and practice of the mathematical disciplines from {U}rbino to {E}urope}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}34}, publisher = {Edition Open Access}, isbn = {9783844242836}, url = {http://www.edition-open-access.de/media/proceedings/4/Proceedings4.pdf}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Becchi, Antonio and Bertoloni Meli, Domenico and Gamba, Enrico} } @phdthesis {PhD_Raoul, title = {Explanation in the Cognitive Sciences and Biology: Mechanisms, Laws and their Explanatory Virtues}, year = {2013}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {4118013, title = {Inferential explanations in biology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, volume = {44}, year = {2013}, pages = {356{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct- ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic expla- nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.

}, issn = {1369-8486}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {3178933, title = {Modelling abduction in science by means of a modal adaptive logic}, journal = {FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {611{\textendash}624}, abstract = {

Scientists confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses as a result of their abductive inferences, generally want to reason further on the different hypotheses one by one. This paper presents a modal adaptive logic MLA (s) that enables us to model abduction in such a way that the different explanatory hypotheses can be derived individually. This modelling is illustrated with a case study on the different hypotheses on the origin of the Moon.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9293-8}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {4269435, title = {Non-cognitive values and objectivity in scientific explanation: the case of the {M}ovius line}, journal = {PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {429{\textendash}452}, abstract = {

Although it is now widely accepted that in science, non-cognitive values play a role, it is still debated whether this has implications for its objectivity. It seems that the task of philosophers here is twofold: to flesh out what kinds of non-cognitive values play what kinds of roles, and to evaluate the implications for objectivity. I attempt to contribute to both tasks by introducing the value of egalitarianism, and showing how this non-cognitive value shapes three alternative explanations of the Movius Line. It is argued that although these explanations are motivated by egalitarianism, they are nevertheless objective.

}, issn = {0926-3977}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/POSC\_a\_00111}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @incollection {3178949, title = {Pauli{\textquoteright}s idea of the neutrino: how models in physics allow to revive old ideas for new purposes}, booktitle = {Model-based reasoning in science and technology : theoretical and cognitive issues}, year = {2013}, pages = {449-461}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Abstract Models have proven themselves to be the key catalyst of many new ideas in science. However, it is not yet fully clarified why models can fulfill such an important heuristic role. The two main reasons stated in the literature—the mental simulation of various scenarios and the wide cross-fertilization across various disciplines—seem to leave out one of the most obvious features of models: they are designed for a purpose. Therefore I investigated why, while the construction of models is a goal-oriented task with a predefined purpose, the use of models yields so many new ideas in science. This paper presents my conceptual analysis together with a detailed historical case study. The functional design of models forces scientists to explore vigorously older ideas to adapt them: as the lacunas in a functional model are also functional, scientists need to modify older ideas (that were formulated for different purposes) to fit the present functional gaps in their models. As such, they construct new ideas. The detailed historical case study exemplifies this by showing how Pauli’s original suggestion of the neutrino was, in fact, such an adaptation of Rutherford’s earlier idea of the neutron. The present analysis and case study suggest that functional adaptations are salient but often overlooked features of model based investigation.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo} } @article {3086510, title = {Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {139{\textendash}152}, abstract = {

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver{\textquoteright}s continuum of how-possibly, to how-plausibly, to how-actually models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism{\textquoteright}s activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models.

}, issn = {0951-5089}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.633693}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {3152435, title = {Reactive standard deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {117{\textendash}157}, abstract = {

We introduce a reactive variant of SDL (standard deontic logic): SDLR1 (reactive standard deontic logic). Given a Kripkean view on the semantics of SDL in terms of directed graphs where arrows {\textrightarrow} represent the accessibility relation between worlds, reactive models add two elements: arrows {\textrightarrow} are labelled as ‘active’ or ‘inactive’, and double arrows \&8608; connect arrows, e.g. (x1 {\textrightarrow} x2) \&\#8608; (x3 {\textrightarrow} x4). The idea is that passing through x1 {\textrightarrow} x2 activates a switch represented by \&8608; that inverts the label of x3 {\textrightarrow} x4 and hence activates respectively deactivates this arrow. This allows to introduce two modalities: \&\#9633; is the usual KD-modality of SDL and operates on the Kripkean graph where all labels and double arrows are ignored, while \&\#8709; takes them into account. We demonstrate that RSDL1 allows for an intuitive interpretation of ‘ought’. The logic can handle contrary-to-duty cases such as several instantiations of the Chisholm set in a paradox-free way by means of using double arrows and annotations to block and give access to ideal worlds.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs043}, author = {Gabbay, Dov M. and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3171382, title = {The status of functional explanation in psychology: reduction and mechanistic explanation}, journal = {THEORY \& PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {23}, year = {2013}, pages = {145{\textendash}163}, abstract = {

The validity of functional explanations as they are commonly used in psychology has recently come under attack. Kim’s supervenience argument purports to prove that higher-level generalizations have no causal powers of their own, and hence are explanatorily irrelevant. In a nutshell, the supervenience argument forces us to either embrace epiphenomenalism of higher- level properties, or accept Kim’s specific brand of reductionism. However, with the current emphasis on mechanistic explanations, the literature on explanation in psychology has undergone some drastic changes. It could be argued, therefore, that Kim’s argument targets an outdated concept of functional explanations. In any case, these developments warrant a reassessment of the implications of his argument, which is the purpose of the present paper. First, we argue that the metaphysics behind the supervenience argument is incompatible with that of mechanisms. Second, we argue that Kim’s proposed brand of reductionism does not accurately describe the explanatory practices of cognitive science.

}, issn = {0959-3543}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354312453093}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Looren de Jong, Huib} } @article {3099682, title = {Abduction of generalizations}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {345{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Abduction of generalizations is the process in which explanatory hypotheses are formed for generalizations such as “pineapples taste sweet” or “rainbows appear when the sun breaks through the rain”. This phenomenon has received little attention in formal logic and philosophy of science. The current paper remedies this lacuna by first giving an overview of some general characteristics of this process, elaborating on its ubiquity in scientific and everyday reasoning. Second, the adaptive logic LA \&\#8704; is presented to explicate this process formally

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {1854847, title = {Op het snijvlak van cognitie, wetenschap en filosofie: intertheoretische relaties in de twintigste eeuw}, journal = {ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE}, volume = {104}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {21{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

This article provides a critical survey of the debate on intertheoretic relations, with particular emphasis on the cognitive sciences. I begin by distinguishing two opposing sides, reductionism and antireductionism, and proceed by tracking the changes these positions underwent in the twentieth century. It appears that these changes consist to a significant degree in smoothing out the rough edges of both, so that the original positions can be understood as crude extremes. The monistic accounts of intertheoretic relations were traded in for more tolerant and nuanced approaches, a tendency that is chiefly inspired by an increasing focus on actual scientific practice.

}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @incollection {Gervais2012, title = {Pragmatic approaches to explanation applied to the cognitive sciences: two types of explanation-seeking questions compared}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {131{\textendash}137}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @proceedings {3178954, title = {The problem of multiple explanatory hypotheses}, journal = {PhDs in Logic III}, year = {2012}, pages = {45-53}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In abduction – the process of finding explanatory hypotheses for puzzling phenomena – one is often confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses. In science one generally wants to test further the different hypotheses one by one. But, if we try to model this in a logic and make it possible to derive the differen t hypotheses apart from each other, we generally can derive their conjunction too. An elegant solution within the framework of adaptive logics is provided in Gauderis (2011). But this approach is not restricted to science. While it is true that a lot of cases in everyday reasoning require a more practical approach – in which one acts on the knowledge that all the different hypotheses might be the case – there are also a considerable amount of situations in which the more theoretical approach of the scientist is needed. In this paper we try to illustrate this by using this logic to model reasoning within detective literature.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Demey, Lorenz and Devuyst, Jonas} } @proceedings {3178952, title = {An adaptive logic based approach to abduction in {A}{I}}, journal = {Ninth International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Action and Change}, year = {2011}, pages = {1-6}, abstract = {

In a logic-based approach to abductive reasoning, the background knowledge is represented by a logical theory. A sentence \&\#934; is then considered as an explanation for ω if it satisfies some formal conditions. In general, the following three conditions are considered crucial: (1) Φ together with the background knowledge implies !; (2) Φ is logically consistent with what is known; and (3) Φ is the most ‘parsimonious’ explanation. But, since abductive reasoning is a non-monotonic form of reasoning, each time the background knowledge is extended, the status of previously abduced explanations becomes once again undefined. The adaptive logics program is developed to address these types of non-monotonic reasoning. In addition to deductive reasoning steps, it allows for direct implementation of defeasible reasoning steps, but it adds to each formula the explicit set of conditions that would defeat this formula. So, in an adaptive logic for abduction, a formula is an abduced hypothesis as long as none of its conditions is deduced. This implies that we will not have to recheck all hypotheses each time an extension to our background knowledge is made. This is the key advantage of this approach, which allows us to save repetitive re-computations in fast growing knowledge bases.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {1855775, title = {The covering law model applied to dynamical cognitive science: a comment on Joel Walmsley}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim{\textquoteright}s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley{\textquoteright}s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.

}, issn = {0924-6495}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9216-9}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {J:flash, title = {A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation}, year = {2011}, pages = {93{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Erik} } @conference {1859548, title = {Strong paraconsistency by separating composition and decomposition in classical logic}, booktitle = {WoLLIC 2011 Proceedings LNAI Series}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper I elaborate a proof system that is able to prove all classical first order logic consequences of consistent premise sets, without proving trivial consequences of inconsistent premises (as in A, {\textlnot}A\,\unmatched{22a2}\,B). Essentially this result is obtained by formally distinguishing consequences that are the result of merely decomposing the premises into their subformulas from consequences that may be the result of also composing {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright}, more complex formulas. I require that, whenever {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright} formulas are derived, they are to be preceded by a special +-symbol and these +-preceded formulas are not to be decomposed. By doing this, the proofs are separated into a decomposition phase followed by a composition phase. The proofs are recursive, axiomatizable and, as they do not trivialize inconsistent premise sets, they define a very strong non-transitive paraconsistent logic, for which I also provide an adequate semantics.

}, isbn = {364220919X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20920-8\_26}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter}, editor = {Goebel, R} } @conference {JMF:adera, title = {Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called \sys{P2.1}$^r$, that is based on Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e${\textendash}-a bimodal extension of Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{P} that invalidates aggregation for all \emph{prima facie} obligations. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ has several advantages with respect to \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}as much as possible{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ avoids Goble{\textquoteright}s criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the {\textquoteleft}toy examples{\textquoteright} from the literature as well as more complex ones.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14183-6\_12}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik}, editor = {Governatori, Guido and Sartor, Giovanni} } @conference {924838, title = {The body in Renaissance arithmetic: from mnemonics to embodied cognition}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty Sixth Annual Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation}, year = {2010}, publisher = {The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour}, organization = {The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour}, abstract = {

In Medieval and Renaissance arithmetic we find several instances of references to body parts or actions involving body parts. In this paper we will address the question on the historical functions of body parts in mathematics and discuss its relation to the currently prevailing practice of symbolic mathematics.12

}, isbn = {1902956931}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Pease, Alison and Guhe, Markus and Smaill, Alan} } @conference {1166760, title = {Constructive contextual modal judgments for reasoning from open assumptions}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Computability in Europe 2010 Conference}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, organization = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, abstract = {

Dependent type theories using a structural notion of context are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. In particular, types with modalities are already used for distributed and staged computation. This paper introduces a type system extended with judgmental modalities internalizing epistemically different modes of correctness to explore a calculus of provability from refutable assumptions.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Ferreira, F and Guerra, H and Mayordomo, E and Rasga, J} } @article {DeLanghe2010, title = {Increasing returns in science: a model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278-294}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @article {1096460, title = {Report LRR10: Logic, reasoning and rationality}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {165{\textendash}166}, url = {http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol4/TheReasoner-4(11).pdf}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Gauderis, Tjerk and Gervais, Raoul and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {1064460, title = {Standards and the distribution of cognitive labour: A model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278{\textendash}294}, issn = {1367-0751}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzp058}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @incollection {2009, title = {Why should I adopt pluralism?}, booktitle = {Economic Pluralism}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {

If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Garnett, Rob and Olsen, Erik and Starr, Martha} } @incollection {381663, title = {Abduction as a strategy for concept formation in mathematics: {C}ardano postulating a negative.}, booktitle = {Abduction and the process of scientific discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {179{\textendash}194}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da Universidade de Lisboa}, abstract = {

When dealing with abductive reasoning in scientific discovery, historical case studies are focused mostly on the physical sciences, as with the discoveries of Kepler, Galilei and Newton. We will present a case study of abductive reasoning in early algebra. Two new concepts introduced by Cardano in his Ars Magna, imaginary numbers and a negative solution to a linear problem, can be explained as a result of a process of abduction. We will show that the first appearance of these new concepts fits very well Peirce’s original description of abductive reasoning. Abduction may be regarded as one important strategy for the formation of new concepts in mathematics.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @incollection {J:ala, title = {Adaptive Logics for Abduction and the Explication of Explanation-Seeking Processes}, booktitle = {Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {97{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da U. de Lisboa}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {

In this paper, I illustrate the main characteristics of abductive reasoning processes by means of an example from the history of the sciences. The example is taken from the history of chemistry and concerns a very small episode from Lavoisier’s struggle with the ‘air’ obtained from mercury oxide. Eventually, this struggle would lead to the discovery of oxygen. I also show that Lavoisier’s reasoning process can be explicated by means of a particular formal logic, namely the adaptive logic LAr. An important property of LAr is that it not only nicely integrates deductive and abductive steps, but that it moreover has a decent proof theory. This proof theory is dynamic, but warrants that the conclusions derived at a given stage are justified in view of the insight in the premises at that stage. Another advantage of the presented logic is that, as compared to other existing systems for abductive reasoning, it is very close to natural reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @incollection {D:cg_fpsp, title = {Content Guidance in Formal Problem Solving Processes}, booktitle = {Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {121{\textendash}156}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da U. de Lisboa}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {

In this paper, a formal framework to problem-solving processes is presented. The framework is not complete. Nevertheless, even its present sophistication allows one to see that it is promising.\par The framework demonstrably allows one to understand scientific change as content-guided. It will be argued that a formal framework is required in order to make definite and precise statements about the content-guided aspects of scientific problem solving.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @incollection {324232, title = {Cassirer{\textquoteright}s critical idealism: a comment on {T}homas {M}ormann.}, booktitle = {Laws and Models in Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {161{\textendash}171}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {0954300661}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Gillies, D.} } @incollection {D:eial, title = {The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology}, booktitle = {Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {459{\textendash}485}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Symons, John and Gabbay, Dov M. and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {D:clash, title = {Rich inconsistency-adaptive logics. {T}he clash between heuristic efficiency and realistic reconstruction}, booktitle = {Logique en perspective. {M}{\'e}langes offerts {\`a} {P}aul {G}ochet}, year = {2000}, pages = {513{\textendash}543}, publisher = {{\'E}ditions OUSIA}, address = {Brussels}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Grillet, Eric and Beets, Fran{\c c}ois} } @incollection {D:ftal, title = {Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics}, booktitle = {Logic and Argumentation}, year = {1996}, pages = {241{\textendash}254}, publisher = {North-Holland}, abstract = {

This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Veltman, Frank} } @incollection {Weber1995, title = {Scientific Arguments and Scientific Prediction.}, booktitle = {Special Fields and Cases. Proceedings on the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation}, volume = {IV}, year = {1995}, pages = {377-387}, publisher = {SicSat}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Blair, J. and Willart, C.} } @incollection {D:catm\&k, title = {A contextual approach to meaning and knowledge}, booktitle = {Science and Society}, year = {1987}, pages = {84{\textendash}110}, publisher = {VUB-Uitgaven}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Gosselin, M. and Demeyere, F.} }