@incollection {Forest2014, title = {Against the disorder/nondisorder dichotomy}, booktitle = {Defining Mental Disorders: Jerome Wakefield and his critics.}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {MIT Press}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Faucher, Luc and Forest, Denis} } @article {8678415, title = {{Classical term-modal logics}}, journal = {{JOURNAL OF LOGIC AND COMPUTATION}}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2021}, pages = {1026-1054}, abstract = {

{We introduce classical term-modal logics and argue that they are useful for modelling agent-relative notions of obligation, evidence and abilities, and their interaction with properties of and relations between the agents in question. We spell out the semantics of these logics in terms of neighborhood models, provide sound and strongly complete axiomatizations and establish the decidability of specific (agent-finite) variants.}

}, keywords = {Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), CHOICE}, Hardware and Architecture, logic, Software, {Theoretical Computer Science}, issn = {{0955-792X}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa053}}, author = {Frijters, Stef and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {farolditudo, title = {Deontic Modals and Hyperintensionality}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, year = {2019}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @article {farolditudo, title = {Hyperintensional Logics of Reasons}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, year = {2019}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Protopopescu, Tudor} } @book {2063, title = {Hyperintensionality and Normativity}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, author = {Federico L.G. Faroldi} } @incollection {D:graham, title = {Looting Liars Masking Models}, booktitle = {Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency}, year = {2019}, pages = {139--164}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper does not raise objections but spells out problems that I consider at present unsolved within Priest{\textquoteright}s view on logic. In light of the state of scientific and other theories ({\textsection}2) and in light of the character of natural languages ({\textsection}3), Priest{\textquoteright}s central arguments do not seem convincing. Next, I offer some six independent obstacles for defining consistency, identifying models and describing the semantics and metatheory of LP ({\textsection}4).

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Ba{\c s}kent, Can and Ferguson, Thomas Macaulay} } @proceedings {2050, title = {How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference}, year = {2018}, pages = {317-335}, publisher = {College Publications}, type = {submitted}, address = {London}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Frijters, Stef and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Condoravdi, Cleo and Nair, Shyam and Pigozzi, Gabriella} } @incollection {D:JP65, title = {Kennissystemen selectief wieden}, booktitle = {Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem}, year = {2018}, pages = {227{\textendash}244}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent, Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {978-94-014-5589-3}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Ducheyne, Steffen and Allo, Patrick} } @article {2055, title = {Co-Hyperintensionality}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {30}, year = {2017}, chapter = {270}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @article {2057, title = {The Scale Structure of Moral Adjectives}, journal = {Studia Semiotyczne}, volume = {31}, year = {2017}, chapter = {161}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Soria Ruiz, Andr{\'e}s} } @article {2056, title = {Ethical copula, negation, and responsibility judgments}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, year = {2016}, chapter = {3441}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @incollection {2054, title = {An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Obligation and Permission}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, pages = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, author = {Anglberger, Albert and Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Korbmacher, Johannes} } @article {4443718, title = {Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {21 (1)}, year = {2016}, abstract = {

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9372-0}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {4443714, title = {Mathematical proofs in practice: Revisiting the reliability of published mathematical proofs}, journal = {Theoria. Revista de Teor{\'\i}a, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, year = {2015}, pages = {345{\textendash}360}, author = {Frans, Joachim and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @incollection {3120783, title = {Explanatory strategies beyond the individualism/holism debate}, booktitle = {Rethinking the individualism-holism debate}, volume = {372}, year = {2014}, pages = {153{\textendash}175}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Starting from the plurality of explanatory strategies in the actual practice of socialscientists, I introduce a framework for explanatory pluralism – a normative endorsement of the plurality of forms and levels of explanation used by social scientists. Equipped with thisframework, central issues in the individualism/holism debate are revisited, namely emergence,reduction and the idea of microfoundations. Discussing these issues, we notice that in recentcontributions the focus has been shifting towards relationism, pluralism and interaction, awayfrom dichotomous individualism/holism thinking and a winner-takes-all approach. Then, thechallenge of the debate is no longer to develop the ultimate individualistic approach ordefending the holist approach, but rather how to be combine individualism and holism; howcan they co-exist, interact, be integrated or develop some division of labour, while making thebest out of the strengths and limitations of the respective explanatory strategies of holists andindividualists? Thus, the debate shifts to how exactly pluralism should be understood as thenext leading question, going beyond the current individualism/holism debate. The paper endswith a discussion and evaluation of different understandings of explanatory pluralismdefended in the literature.

}, isbn = {9783319053431}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8_9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Finn, Collin and Zahle, Julie} } @article {frans2014mechanistic, title = {Mechanistic Explanation and Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics}, journal = {Philosophia Mathematica}, volume = {22}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, pages = {231{\textendash}248}, abstract = {

Although there is a consensus among philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians that mathematical explanations exist, only a few authors have proposed accounts of explanation in mathematics. These accounts fit into the unificationist or top-down approach to explanation. We argue that these models can be complemented by a bottom-up approach to explanation in mathematics. We introduce the mechanistic model of explanation in science and discuss the possibility of using this model in mathematics, arguing that using it does not presuppose a Platonist view of mathematics and allows one to gain insight into why a theorem is true by answering what-if-things-had-been-different questions.

}, doi = {10.1093/philmat/nku003}, author = {Frans, Joachim and Weber, Erik} } @book {4169996, title = {De Humanities: een bedreigde soort?}, series = {De uil van Minerva}, volume = {26}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, publisher = {UGent}, organization = {UGent}, editor = {De Vleminck, Jens and Froeyman, Anton} } @phdthesis {3257462, title = {{\textquoteright}I began with the desire to speak with the dead{\textquoteright}: de ethiek als {\textquoteright}eerste filosofie{\textquoteright} van de geschiedschrijving}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, isbn = {9789083125053}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2977241, title = {Frank {A}nkersmit and {E}elco {R}unia: the presence and the otherness of the past}, journal = {Rethinking history}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {393{\textendash}415}, abstract = {

This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I give an in-depth comparison and analysis of the theories of Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, in which I highlight their most important resemblances and differences. What both have in common is their notion of the presence of the past as a {\textquoteright}presence in absence{\textquoteright}. They differ, however, with respect to the character of this past and the role representation plays in making it present. Second, I also argue that for both Ankersmit and Runia, the presence of the past is always the present of our past, which excludes the experience of the otherness of the past, and which opens both theories to the criticisms of being self-centered and nationalistic.

}, issn = {1364-2529}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2012.695065}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {frans2012game, title = {The Game of Fictional Mathematics. {R}eview of “Mathematics and Reality” by {M}ary {L}eng}, journal = {Constructivist Foundations}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {126{\textendash}128}, abstract = {

Leng attacks the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. She offers an account that treats the role of mathematics in science as an indispensable and useful part of theories, but retains nonetheless a fictionalist position towards mathematics. The result is an account of mathematics that is interesting for constructivists. Her view towards the nominalistic part of science is, however, more in conflict with radical constructivism.

}, author = {Frans, Joachim} } @article {2125879, title = {On lawfulness in history and historiography}, journal = {HISTORY AND THEORY}, volume = {51}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {172{\textendash}192}, abstract = {

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is-or should be-is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward{\textquoteright}s notion of {\textacutedbl}invariance,{\textacutedbl}is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called {\textacutedbl}pragmatic laws{\textacutedbl}and {\textacutedbl}invariance{\textacutedbl}do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples-from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion-have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.

}, issn = {1468-2303}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00620.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2977237, title = {The ontology of causal process theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHIA}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {523{\textendash}538}, abstract = {

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of {\textacutedbl}causal process{\textacutedbl} does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe{\textquoteright}s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon{\textquoteright}s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair{\textquoteright}s phsyicalist reduction of causation.

}, issn = {0048-3893}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9329-2}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2977245, title = {Psychoanalyse en geschiedfilosofie}, journal = {PSYCHOANALYTISCHE PERSPECTIEVEN}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {293{\textendash}306}, issn = {0771-5862}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @incollection {1998274, title = {On the curious historical coincidence of algebra and double-entry bookkeeping}, booktitle = {Foundations of the formal sciences VII : bringing together philosophy and sociology of science}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {32}, year = {2011}, pages = {109{\textendash}130}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {9781848900493}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/logic/?00021}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {1207602, title = {Historische uitvoeringspraktijk}, journal = {De uil van minerva}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {21{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

In this paper, I offer some philosophical thoughts on the phenomenon of historical performance practice. I investigate the historical conditions of possibility of the {\textacutedbl}epistemologization{\textacutedbl} of historical performance practice and I argue for a more hermeneutical approach.

}, issn = {0772-4381}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @incollection {de2011looking, title = {Looking for busy beavers. A socio-philosophical study of a computer-assisted proof}, booktitle = {Foundations of the Formal Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}90}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

"Young man, in mathematics you don{\textquoteright}t understand things, you just get used to them" John von Neumann

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {1209545, title = {Anticipation and the constitution of time in the philosophy of {E}rnst {C}assirer}, journal = {Casys: International journal of computing anticipatory systems}, volume = {23}, year = {2010}, pages = {11}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will argue with Ernst Cassirer that anticipation plays an essential part in the constitution of time from a transcendental perspective. Time is, as any transcendental concept, seen as basically relational and subjective and only in a derivative way objective and indifferent to us. This entails that memory is prior to history, and anticipation is prior to prediction. In this paper, I will give some examples in order to argue for this point. Furthermore, I will also argue, again with Cassirer and against Henri Bergson, that time should be seen as a functional unity, and not as a collection of three different things-in-themselves (past, present and future).

}, issn = {1373-5411}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @conference {1166760, title = {Constructive contextual modal judgments for reasoning from open assumptions}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Computability in Europe 2010 Conference}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, organization = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, abstract = {

Dependent type theories using a structural notion of context are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. In particular, types with modalities are already used for distributed and staged computation. This paper introduces a type system extended with judgmental modalities internalizing epistemically different modes of correctness to explore a calculus of provability from refutable assumptions.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Ferreira, F and Guerra, H and Mayordomo, E and Rasga, J} } @article {924906, title = {Concepts of causation in historiography}, journal = {Historical methods}, volume = {42}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {116{\textendash}128}, abstract = {

Historians can use the concept of causation in a variety of ways. each of which is associated with different historiographical claims and different kinds of argumentation. The author shows that, contrary to the Usual view, historical narratives are causal (in a specific way), and microhistory can be seen as a response to a very specific causal problem of Braudelian macrohistory.

}, issn = {0161-5440}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {515799, title = {Betekenisverschuiving in het causaliteitsbegrip van Ernst Cassirer}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor filosofie}, volume = {70}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {733{\textendash}761}, abstract = {

Cassirer’s conception of causation has until now been treated largely on the basis of Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. In this article, I argue that a characterisation of this sort can not be complete. There appear to be several apparent contradictions (of which I discuss three) when we compare the concept of causality in Determinism and Indeterminism with treatments of the concept in other works, especially those of mythical causation. We need a general view of Cassirer’s conception of causality to account for these contradictions. I offer such a view, which is partly universal (in as far as it refers to universals as time and space) and partly contextual (in as far as it refers, through the conception of the object, to principles that are specific to certain symbolic forms). Then, I discuss the differences and the resemblances between theoretical and mythical causation, and, within the theoretical world view, between the natural, cultural and biological sciences.

}, issn = {0040-750X}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @incollection {VanBouwel2008, title = {Explanatory Pluralism.}, booktitle = {Pluralist Economics}, year = {2008}, pages = {151-170}, publisher = {Zed Books}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Fullbrook, Edward} } @article {924886, title = {Unravelling the methodology of causal pluralism}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {73{\textendash}89}, abstract = {

In this paper we try to bring some clarification in the recent debate on causal pluralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qua lify as a pluralistic theory of causation. We also show that there is currently no theory on the market which meets these criteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {370857, title = {Learning concepts through the history of mathematics: the case of symbolic algebra.}, booktitle = {Philosophical dimensions in mathematics education}, year = {2007}, pages = {83{\textendash}103}, publisher = {Springer}, isbn = {978-0-387-71571-1}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {J:ep\&aal, title = {Empirical Progress and Ampliative Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers. Vol. 1}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {83}, year = {2005}, pages = {193{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Festa, Roberto and Aliseda, Atocha and Peijnenburg, Jeanne} } @incollection {121607, title = {Alternative mathematics: the vague way.}, booktitle = {Festschrift in honor of {N}ewton {C}.{A}. da {C}osta on the occasion of his seventieth birthday}, volume = {125}, year = {2000}, pages = {19{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Krause, D{\'e}cio and French, Steven and Doria, Francisco A.} }