@article {DeBalWeber2017, title = {Causation \& Technical Problem Solving: An analysis of causal knowledge underlying proposed solutions for technical problems.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper we analyse the causal underpinnings of remedy claims found in technical problem solving instructions. For these claims to be successful, they need to be based on causal relations that hold in the world and that have certain properties. These required properties are the focus of our paper. We first introduce several examples from car- and bike repair manuals that demarcate our topic and function as illustrations throughout the paper. We then formulate three success criteria for problem solving manuals: the efficiency requirement, the no harm requirement and the maximal assistance ideal. These criteria determine the required strength and properties of the causal relation, and are used to frame our analysis. We start from theories of causation by Ronald Giere, Ellery Eells and John Mackie and develop a series of definitions to capture the properties of the aforementioned causal relations. We conclude that remedy claims need to be based on causal relations with the following property: positive causal factorhood with weak context-unanimity. Moreover, it is desirable to look for Mackie causes, viz. causes that are sufficient in maximally normal contexts. We finally show that our analysis is not limited to means of conveyance (this is the field in which our initial examples are located) by means of a case study from a different field (radio repair manuals).

}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Weber, Erik} } @article {DeBal2017epauth, title = {Epistemic authority: a pragmatic approach.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper, I investigate how we can legitimate that certain regularities get epistemic authority in specific contexts of scientific practice. With {\textquotedblleft}epistemic authority{\textquotedblright} I refer to the fact that regularities are trusted to achieve epistemic goals like prediction, explanation and manipulation. For my analysis, I use the Neuber rule, a regularity used to model creep in notches, as an exemplar. I distinguish two traditional ways of legitimating epistemic authority: a necessitarian approach and an epistemic mark approach. Throughout the paper, I argue that neither is, in its current form, sufficient to account for the epistemic authority of regularities like the Neuber rule. Regarding necessity, I expand arguments from Matthias Frisch{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of physics to show that (1) the Neuber rule is currently not successfully derived from (more) fundamental laws, (2) the idea that there are truly fundamental laws that can be used to represent any phenomenon is not unproblematic given the functioning of scientific practice, and (3) even if there are such fundamental laws, there is no guarantee that their necessity is undamaged by the modelling practices of science. I then present an alternative that resembles the basic idea behind the epistemic mark approach, but is significantly more informative. For this part, I build on insights from Sandra Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of biology. This results in a pragmatic approach to epistemic authority. At the same time, this paper functions as a defence and expansion of both Frisch and Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work. I also emphasize the benefits of combining insights from various philosophical disciplines.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge} } @article {DeBal2017evid, title = {From one to many: generalisation and evidence in failure analysis.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper, I use cases and reasoning from failure analysis (a part of engineering
science which deals with artefact failure and its causes) to draw attention to a relatively
unstudied problem of knowledge generalisation: when we are focusing on creating new
things; designing new artefacts and technologies. Using three cases from failure
analysis practice, I present a two-fold mechanism-based procedure to determine when
generalisations to non-existing artefacts are warranted. This procedure builds on (1)
Cartwright{\textquoteright}s notion of capacities (2) literature on mechanisms and (3) Steel{\textquoteright}s
comparative process tracing, developed for the biomedical sciences. I will show that,
while they provide guidance, these literatures and concepts are not enough to grasp
how we use information from current artefacts and failures to create new things - we
will need a lot more specific information and adequate ways to present it. The account
developed in this paper is relevant for both philosophers and failure analysts. For
philosophers, it can provide input for a theory of evidence. For failure analysts, it allows
them to present stronger arguments for their recommendations by making the required
evidence explicit. My account can furthermore provide inspiration for similar inferences
in other innovation contexts such as pharmacology.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge} } @unpublished {2085, title = {Original position arguments: an axiomatic characterization}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Thijs De Coninck and Frederik Van De Putte} } @incollection {Forest2014, title = {Against the disorder/nondisorder dichotomy}, booktitle = {Defining Mental Disorders: Jerome Wakefield and his critics.}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {MIT Press}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Faucher, Luc and Forest, Denis} } @incollection {HA_DuAlJ, title = {Dutch Algebra and Arithmetic in Japan before the Meiji Restoration}, booktitle = {Navigating across Mathematical Cultures and Times: Exploring the Diversity of Discoveries and Proofs}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Co.}, abstract = {

This paper gives an overview of the scarce occasions in which Japan came into contact with Western arithmetic and algebra before the Meiji restoration of 1868. After the refutation of persistent claims on the influence through Japanese students at Leiden during the seventeenth century, it concentrates on the reception of Dutch works during the last decades of the Tokugawa shogunate and the motivations to study and translate these books. While some studies based on Japanese sources have already been published on this period,2 this paper draws from Dutch sources and in particular on witness accounts from Dutch officers at the Nagasaki naval school, responsible for the instruction of mathematics to selected samurai and rangakusha. Two Japanese textbooks on arithmetic from that period are viewed within the context of this naval training school.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Vandoulakis, I.M. and Dun, Liu} } @article {DeMoltoappear, title = {Formalism. The success(es) of a failure}, year = {In Press}, institution = {College publications}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Moktefi, A. and Moretti, A. and Schang, Fabian} } @article {de2013haskell, title = {Haskell before Haskell: an alternative lesson in practical logics of the ENIAC}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, year = {In Press}, abstract = {

This article expands on Curry{\textquoteright}s work on how to implement the problem of inverse interpolation on the ENIAC (1946) and his subsequent work on developing a theory of program composition (1948–1950). It is shown that Curry{\textquoteright}s hands-on experience with the ENIAC on the one side and his acquaintance with systems of formal logic on the other, were conductive to conceive a compact ‘notation for program construction’ which in turn would be instrumental to a mechanical synthesis of programs. Since Curry{\textquoteright}s systematic programming technique pronounces a critique of the Goldstine-von Neumann style of coding, his ‘calculus of program composition’ not only anticipates automatic programming but also proposes explicit hardware optimizations largely unperceived by computer history until Backus{\textquoteright} famous ACM Turing Award lecture (1977). The cohesion of these findings asks for an integrative historiographical approach. An appendix gives, for the first time, a full description of Curry{\textquoteright}s arithmetic compiler.

}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exs072}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Carl{\'e}, Martin and Bullynck, Maarten} } @unpublished {2053, title = {The best we can do (extended abstract, submitted to LOFT)}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Tamminga, Allard and Duijf, Hein} } @incollection {D:JP65, title = {Kennissystemen selectief wieden}, booktitle = {Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem}, year = {2018}, pages = {227{\textendash}244}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent, Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {978-94-014-5589-3}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Ducheyne, Steffen and Allo, Patrick} } @conference {2016, title = {Doing Without Nature}, booktitle = {Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI)}, number = {VI}, year = {2017}, month = {9-11/7/2017}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Sapporro}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Tamminga, Allard and Duijf, Hein} } @article {1997, title = {Contrastive Causation in Genetics and Physics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {90}, year = {2015}, pages = {93-113}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Bal, Inge} } @article {DeBal2006, title = {A new approach to classical relevance.}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {82}, year = {2015}, pages = {1{\textendash}31}, abstract = {

n this paper we present a logic that determines when implications in a classical logic context express a relevant connection between antecedent and consequent. In contrast with logics in the relevance logic literature, we leave classical negation intact - in the sense that the law of non-contradiction can be used to obtain relevantly implications, as long as there is a connection between antecedent and consequent. On the other hand, we give up the requirement that our theory of relevance can define a new standard of deduction. We present and argue for a list of requirements that such a logical theory of classical relevance needs to meet and go on to formulate a system that respects each of these requirements. The presented system is a monotonic and transitive logic that extends the relevance logic ℜ with a richer relevant implication that allows for Disjunctive Syllogism and similar rules. This is achieved by interpreting the logical symbols in the antecedents in a stronger way than the logical symbols in consequents. A proof theory and an algebraic semantics are formulated and interesting metatheorems (soundness, completeness and the fact that it satisfies the requirements for classical relevance) are proven. Finally we give a philosophical motivation for our non-standard relevant implication and the asymmetric interpretation of antecedents and consequents.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {D:AcLFI, title = {Some Adaptive Contributions to Logics of Formal Inconsistency}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, pages = {309 -333}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Some insights were gained from the study of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The aim of the present paper is to put some of these insight to work for the study of logics of formal inconsistency. The focus of attention are application contexts of the aforementioned logics and their theoretical properties in as far as they are relevant for applications. As the questions discussed are difficult but important, a serious attempt was made to make the paper concise but transparent.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, Jean-Yves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @incollection {D:IALtut, title = {Tutorial on Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper contains a concise introduction to a few central features of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The focus is on the aim of the program, on logics that may be useful with respect to applications, and on insights that are central for judging the importance of the research goals and the adequacy of results. Given the nature of adaptive logics, the paper may be read as a peculiar introduction to defeasible reasoning.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, Jean-Yves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @incollection {perring_concept_2014, title = {The Concept of Disease and Our Responsibility for Children}, booktitle = {Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry}, year = {2014}, pages = {35{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

The author of this chapter argues that one’s understanding of the concept of what a disease is influences our way of behaving toward people we think of as diseased. The author asserts that our concept of disease is not non-committal and that an oversimplified approach can lead to non-critical reasoning which could have significant impact on children with diseases. The author develops a pluralistic approach to the concept of disease and uses ADHD as an example throughout the chapter.

}, isbn = {9780199645756}, doi = {10.1093/med/9780199645756.003.0003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Perring, Christian and Wells, Lloyd} } @article {4254561, title = {Health, food, and science: an ethical assessment of research agendas}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {228}, year = {2014}, pages = {701-726}, abstract = {

We offer several new arguments for the view that existing research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences are morally deficient. More specifically, the following kinds of distortion of the agenda are discussed: in the health sciences, the health problems of the poor are more or less neglected, as well as non-medicinal solutions to health problems, and in the agricultural sciences, insufficient attention is paid to agroecology. We justify the claim that these three kinds of distortion are problematic on ethical grounds, showing that they are moral failures. Instead of starting from one ethical theory to show this, we present different ethical justifications, based on different ethical theories (Bentham’s utilitarianism, Rawls’s theory of justice, Pogge’s rights-based account of minimal justice, Kitcher’s ethical theory, and classical liberalism). This should make our conclusion (i.e. that the distorted research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences pose a moral problem) at least initially convincing to adherents of different ethical theories.

}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @incollection {de_winter_how_2014, title = {How (Not) to Reform Biomedical Research: A Review of Some Policy Proposals}, booktitle = {Responsible Innovation 1}, volume = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {97{\textendash}110}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Abstract In a recent article, Julian Reiss has identified some very important epistemic, moral and socio-economic failures in current biomedical research, and he argues that philosophers of science should reflect on how to (re)organize biomedical research in order to remedy these failures. In this chapter, several possible reforms of biomedical research are evaluated. I will reflect on how to tackle the epistemic failures by comparing the solution suggested by Julian Reiss to an alternative policy option. Most attention will, however, be paid to one of the moral failures: the fact that a disproportionately small part of the money devoted to health research goes to research into diseases that mainly affect third-world countries (the problem of neglected diseases). The most important advantages and disadvantages of some prominent proposals for a solution are disclosed – I will consider the proposals of Thomas Pogge, Joseph Stiglitz, Julian Reiss, and James Robert Brown – and I will also draw attention to an alternative policy proposal.

}, doi = {http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-8956-1_7}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @incollection {4090467, title = {Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry}, booktitle = {New directions in the philosophy of science}, year = {2014}, pages = {104{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner{\textquoteright}s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism {\textendash} different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry {\textendash} namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the {\textquotedblleft}genuine dialogue{\textquotedblright} or shape {\textquotedblleft}the pluralistic attitude{\textquotedblright} Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.

}, isbn = {9783319043814}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_8}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @incollection {de2014proof, title = {The Proof Is in the Process: A Preamble for a Philosophy of Computer-Assisted Mathematics}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Science}, series = {The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {15{\textendash}33}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

According to some well-known mathematicians well-versed in computer-assisted mathematics (CaM), “Computers are changing the way we are doing mathematics”. To what extent this is really true is still an open question. Indeed, even though some philosophers of math have taken up the challenge to think about CaM, it is unclear in what sense exactly a machine (can) affect(s) the so-called “queen of the sciences”. In fact, some have concluded that issues raised by the use of the computer in mathematics are not specific to the use of the computer per se. However, such findings seem precarious since a systematic study of computer-assisted mathematics is still lacking. In this paper I argue that in order to understand the impact of CaM, it is necessary to take more seriously the computer itself and how it is actually used in the process of doing mathematics. Within such an approach, one searches for characteristics that are specific to the use of the computer in mathematics. I will focus on a feature that is beyond any doubt inherently connected to the use of computing machinery, viz. mathematician-computer interactions. I will show how such interactions are fundamentally different from the usual interactions between mathematicians and non-human aids (a piece of paper, a blackboard etc) and how such interactions determine at least two more characteristics of CaM, viz. the significance of time and processes and the steady process of internalization of mathematical tools and knowledge into the machine. I will restrict myself to the use of the computer within so-called experimental mathematics since this is the main object of CaM within the philosophical literature.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_2}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @article {DeLanghe2014, title = {A unified model of the division of cognitive labor.}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {444{\textendash}459}, abstract = {

Current theories of the division of cognitive labor are confined to the {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}context of justification{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}, assuming exogenous theories. But new theories are made from the same labor that is used for developing existing theories, and if none of this labor is ever allocated to create new alternatives, then scientific progress is impossible. A unified model is proposed in which theories are no longer given but a function of the division of labor in the model itself. The interactions of individuals balancing the exploitation of existing theories and the exploration of new theories results in a robust cyclical pattern.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @book {4169996, title = {De Humanities: een bedreigde soort?}, series = {De uil van Minerva}, volume = {26}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, publisher = {UGent}, organization = {UGent}, editor = {De Vleminck, Jens and Froeyman, Anton} } @article {4254489, title = {The epistemic integrity of NASA practices in the space shuttle program}, journal = {ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH - POLICIES AND QUALITY ASSURANCE}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {72{\textendash}92}, abstract = {

This article presents an account of epistemic integrity and uses it to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of practices in NASA{\textquoteright}s Space Shuttle Program was limited. We focus on the following kinds of practices: (1) research by working engineers, (2) review by middle-level managers, and (3) communication with the public. We argue that the epistemic integrity of these practices was undermined by production pressure at NASA, i.e., the pressure to launch an unreasonable amount of flights per year. Finally, our findings are used to develop some potential strategies to protect epistemic integrity in aerospace science.

}, issn = {0898-9621}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2013.767122}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {2999532, title = {The epistemic integrity of scientific research}, journal = {SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS}, volume = {19}, year = {2013}, pages = {757{\textendash}774}, abstract = {

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.

}, issn = {1353-3452}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {4254569, title = {Fraud in academic medical research: lessons from Flanders, Belgium}, journal = {The reasoner}, volume = {7}, number = {7}, year = {2013}, pages = {2}, abstract = {

A scientific survey on fraud in academic medical research in Flanders , of which the results were recently published in popular science magazine Eos, has caused tumult in the Flemish academic community. The reason is that these results suggest that scientific fraud (which could indirectly cause ill health and death among patients) is not as rare as earlier estimates indicate . Malpractices are primarily attributed to the pressure to publish. In this piece , we elaborate on the content of the study and pave the way for reform.

}, issn = {1757-0522}, url = {http://thereasoner.org/}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {diez2013general, title = {General theories of explanation: buyer beware}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {379{\textendash}396}, abstract = {

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (No{\^u}s 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-011-0020-8}, author = {D{\'\i}ez, Jos{\'e} and Khalifa, Kareem and Leuridan, Bert} } @incollection {de2013generating, title = {Generating, solving and the mathematics of {H}omo {S}apiens. {E}mil {P}ost’s views on computation}, booktitle = {A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature as Computation}, year = {2013}, pages = {45{\textendash}62}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishers}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Zenil, H.} } @incollection {weber2013study, title = {How to Study Scientific Explanation?}, booktitle = {Scientific Explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {25{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @book {3259615, title = {Scientific explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {93}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.

}, isbn = {9789400764453}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3171382, title = {The status of functional explanation in psychology: reduction and mechanistic explanation}, journal = {THEORY \& PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {23}, year = {2013}, pages = {145{\textendash}163}, abstract = {

The validity of functional explanations as they are commonly used in psychology has recently come under attack. Kim’s supervenience argument purports to prove that higher-level generalizations have no causal powers of their own, and hence are explanatorily irrelevant. In a nutshell, the supervenience argument forces us to either embrace epiphenomenalism of higher- level properties, or accept Kim’s specific brand of reductionism. However, with the current emphasis on mechanistic explanations, the literature on explanation in psychology has undergone some drastic changes. It could be argued, therefore, that Kim’s argument targets an outdated concept of functional explanations. In any case, these developments warrant a reassessment of the implications of his argument, which is the purpose of the present paper. First, we argue that the metaphysics behind the supervenience argument is incompatible with that of mechanisms. Second, we argue that Kim’s proposed brand of reductionism does not accurately describe the explanatory practices of cognitive science.

}, issn = {0959-3543}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354312453093}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Looren de Jong, Huib} } @incollection {2020639, title = {Can economics become a purely experimental science? {A} comparative study}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world}, year = {2012}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

}, isbn = {9789814383073}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {2985552, title = {Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {123{\textendash}148}, abstract = {

In a paper "Causation in Context" (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies{\textquoteright} arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {Ducheyne2012, title = {History and Philosophy of Science: From Peaceful Coexistence to Golden Age of Interdisciplinarity?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {26-36}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {2119436, title = {How to make the research agenda in the health sciences less distorted}, journal = {THEORIA - REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA}, volume = {27}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {75{\textendash}93}, abstract = {

A well-known problem in the health sciences is the distorted research agenda: the agenda features too little research that is tailored to the health problems of the poor, and it features too little research that supports the development of other solutions to health problems than medicines (e.g., change of lifestyle). This article analyzes these two sub-problems in more detail, and assesses several strategies to deal with them, resulting in some specific recommendations that indicate what governments should do to make the research agenda in the health sciences less distorted.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @incollection {DeVreese2012, title = {An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {55-71}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, abstract = {

In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the {\textquoteleft}truth{\textquoteright} about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White{\textquoteright}s theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity

}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {Christiaens2012, title = {Metaphysics and Cinema}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {118-141}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {DeLanghe2012, title = {The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {11-31}, abstract = {

According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view is perceived to glorify irrationality. (ibid. 199) I present two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on concepts (the neo-positivist interpretation) and one based on values. I also describe two notions of rationality, optimizing and satisficing. Neither interpretation supports the notion of optimizing, but the values-interpretation supports satisficing, suggesting that if Kuhnian scientists are rational, as Kuhn insisted, they are satisficers. An agent-based model demonstrates that aggregating the behaviour of satisficing agents can account for Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view on the dynamics of scientific change.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @proceedings {3178954, title = {The problem of multiple explanatory hypotheses}, journal = {PhDs in Logic III}, year = {2012}, pages = {45-53}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In abduction – the process of finding explanatory hypotheses for puzzling phenomena – one is often confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses. In science one generally wants to test further the different hypotheses one by one. But, if we try to model this in a logic and make it possible to derive the differen t hypotheses apart from each other, we generally can derive their conjunction too. An elegant solution within the framework of adaptive logics is provided in Gauderis (2011). But this approach is not restricted to science. While it is true that a lot of cases in everyday reasoning require a more practical approach – in which one acts on the knowledge that all the different hypotheses might be the case – there are also a considerable amount of situations in which the more theoretical approach of the scientist is needed. In this paper we try to illustrate this by using this logic to model reasoning within detective literature.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Demey, Lorenz and Devuyst, Jonas} } @proceedings {dereasoning, title = {Reasoning with computer-assisted experiments in mathematics}, journal = {Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, year = {2012}, pages = {80-92}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} door Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Allo, Patrick} } @article {DeMol2012, title = {Report {\textquoteright}International Conference on History and Philosophy of Computing{\textquoteright} (HAPOC)}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {7-8}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @proceedings {1856691, title = {The role of unification in explanations of facts}, journal = {EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009}, year = {2012}, pages = {403-413}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

}, isbn = {9789400724037}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4\_33}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Lefevere, Merel}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Okasha, Samir and Hartmann, Stephan} } @article {de2012short, title = {A short history of small machines}, year = {2012}, abstract = {

One of the most famous results of Alan M. Turing is the so-called universal Tur- ing machine (UTM). Its in uence on (theoretical) computer science can hardly be overestimated. The operations of this machine are of a most elementary na- ture but nonetheless considered to capture all the (human) processes that can be carried out in computing a number. This kind of elementary machine ts into a tradition of {\textquoteleft}logical minimalism{\textquoteright} that looks for simplest sets of operations or axioms. It is part of the more general research programme into the foundations of mathematics and logic that was carried out in the beginning of the 20th cen- tury. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, this tradition was rede ned in the context of {\textquoteleft}computer science{\textquoteright} when computer engineers, logicians and mathematicians re-considered the problem of small(est) and/or simple(st) machines in the con- text of actual engineering practices. This paper looks into this early history of research on small symbolic and physical machines and tie it to this older tradi- tion of logical minimalism. Focus will be on how the transition and translation of symbolic machines into real computers integrates minimalist philosophies as parts of more complex computer design strategies. This contextualizes Turing{\textquoteright}s machines at the turn from logic to machines.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Bullynck, Maarten} } @incollection {VanBouwel2011, title = {An atlas for the social world: what should it (not) look like? {I}nterdisciplinarity and pluralism in the social sciences}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Worlds, Cultures and Society.}, series = {Worldviews, science and us : interdisciplinary perspectives on worlds, cultures and society}, year = {2011}, pages = {43{\textendash}72}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in section 1, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in section 2, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory-, method-, metaphysics-, and question-driven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with actual proposals made by, inter alia, World-Systems Analysis, Critical Realism and Economics Imperialism. Building on the framework of explanatory pluralism I have been developing before, I will make a case for question-driven interdisciplinarity in section 3. My argument for question-driven interdisciplinarity will be illustrated in section 4 by discussing recent developments in economics (i.e., the debate between the orthodoxy and heterodox theories, the pleas for pluralism, and the impact of globalisation {\textendash}and related institutional developments- on economics as a discipline). In conclusion, the contours of an adequate atlas for the social world should become clearer; when to use the different maps, how to activate the dialogue between social scientific disciplines in order to draw the different maps, and the risks of globalisation for social science (and adequate map making).

}, isbn = {9789814355056}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Pinxten, Rik and Wallerstein, Immanuel} } @article {de2011complex, title = {On the complex behavior of simple tag systems — An experimental approach}, journal = {Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {412}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {97{\textendash}112}, abstract = {

It is a well-know fact that apparently simple systems can give rise to complex behavior. But why exactly does a given system behave in a complex manner? There are two main approaches to tackle this and other related questions. One can take on a more theoretical approach or start from a more experimental study of the behavior of such systems with the help of the computer. In this paper, the experimental approach will be applied to very small tag systems. After a discussion of some of the main theoretical results on tag systems, several results from a computer-assisted and experimental study on tag systems will be analyzed. Special attention will be given to the well-known example Post provided and studied with only 2 symbols and a deletion number v = 3. These results will be combined with some theoretical results on tag systems in order to gain more insight into the computational power of simple tag systems.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {1931551, title = {Evidence-based medicine and progress in the medical sciences}, journal = {Journal of evaluation in clinical practice}, volume = {17}, number = {5}, year = {2011}, pages = {852{\textendash}856}, abstract = {

The question what scientific progress means for a particular domain such as medicine seems importantly different from the question what scientific progress is in general. While the latter question received ample treatment in the philosophical literature, the former question is hardly discussed. I argue that it is nonetheless important to think about this question in view of the methodological choices we make. I raise specific questions that should be tackled regarding scientific progress in the medical sciences and demonstrate their importance by means of an analysis of what evidence-based medicine (EBM) has, and has not, to offer in terms of progress. I show how critically thinking about EBM from the point of view of progress can help us in putting EBM and its favoured methodologies in the right perspective. My conclusion will be that blindly favouring certain methods because of their immediately tangible short-term benefits implies that we parry the important question of how best to advance progress in the long run. This leads us to losing sight of our general goals in doing research in the medical sciences.

}, issn = {1356-1294}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2753.2011.01715.x}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {J:flash, title = {A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation}, year = {2011}, pages = {93{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Erik} } @article {1890961, title = {Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction {\textendash} traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism {\textendash} can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {1854786, title = {Kant and {W}hewell on bridging principles between metaphysics and science}, journal = {Kant Studien}, volume = {102}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {22{\textendash}45}, abstract = {

In this essay, I call attention to Kant{\textquoteright}s and Whewell{\textquoteright}s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant{\textquoteright}s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 1796-1803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or {\textquoteright}Mittelbegriffe{\textquoteright} (henceforth this problem is referred to as {\textquoteright}the bridging-problem{\textquoteright}). It will be argued, on the basis of a close reading of Whewell{\textquoteright}s Notebooks on Induction, that Whewell{\textquoteright}s account of the Idea of Cause (and by extension, his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas in general) grew out of his dissatisfaction with Kantian philosophy of science and its seeming inability to solve the bridging-problem. This analysis throws new light on the importance of Kantianism in Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy, for it will be shown that Whewell took over and transformed Kant{\textquoteright}s idea of a priori principles as conditions for the establishment of proper knowledge about the world (without always clinging to Kant{\textquoteright}s exact differentiation between them) and that Whewell was trying to address a typical Kantian topic: namely, to show how scientific knowledge could be both empirical and necessary and how the gap between metaphysics and physics could be bridged.

}, issn = {0022-8877}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/KANT.2011.002}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {de2011looking, title = {Looking for busy beavers. A socio-philosophical study of a computer-assisted proof}, booktitle = {Foundations of the Formal Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}90}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

"Young man, in mathematics you don{\textquoteright}t understand things, you just get used to them" John von Neumann

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {2020633, title = {Needham{\textquoteright}s grand question revisited: on the meaning and justification of causal claims in the history of {C}hinese science}, journal = {East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine}, volume = {33}, year = {2011}, pages = {13{\textendash}32}, abstract = {

The Needham Question (i.e. the question why modern science has not developed in Chinese civilization but only in Europe) has drawn a substantial amount of criticism. Despite its apparent innocuousness, influential sinologists have written devastating critiques of it. These criticisms fall into two main categories. The first denies the validity of the central concepts by means of which the question is formulated (e.g. {\textquoteright}science’ or {\textquoteright}civilization’). The second calls into question (1) the legitimacy of asking for explanations of absences (i.e. of events that did not occur), (2) the legitimacy of citing absences as explanations (i.e. citing negative facts in explanations), and (3) whether the Needham question can be answered, even if asking for explanations of absences and citing absences as explanations are both legitimate. In this article, we take into account the former criticism, in order to arrive at a new starting point: dividing the Needham Problem into its various sub-questions. We then tackle the latter criticism by calling upon the contemporary philosophy of causation. We will argue that, according to certain theories of causation, the subquestions under discussion can be answered, and we will clarify how they can be argued for.

}, issn = {1562-918X}, author = {De Saeger, David and Weber, Erik} } @article {drouet2011propensities, title = {Propensities and conditional probabilities}, journal = {International Journal of Approximate Reasoning}, volume = {52}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {153{\textendash}165}, abstract = {

The present paper deals with the objection that Paul Humphreys raised against the propensity interpretation of probability  "Humphreys{\textquoteright} paradox". An update on existing solutions is oered, and it is concluded that none of them is completely satisfactory in view of Humphreys{\textquoteright} 2004 rejoinder. Positively, an original solution is formulated and discussed.

}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle} } @article {1234908, title = {Testing universal gravitation in the laboratory, or the significance of research on the mean density of the earth and big {G}, 1798-1898: changing pursuits and long-term methodological-experimental continuity}, journal = {Archive for History of Exact Sciences}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {181{\textendash}227}, abstract = {

This article seeks to provide a historically well-informed analysis of an important post-Newtonian area of research in experimental physics between 1798 and 1898, namely the determination of the mean density of the earth and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the gravitational constant. Traditionally, research on these matters is seen as a case of {\textacutedbl}puzzle solving.{\textacutedbl} In this article, the author shows that such focus does not do justice to the evidential significance of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century experimental research on the mean density of the earth and the gravitational constant. As Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of universal gravitation was mainly based on astronomical observation, it remained to be shown that Newton{\textquoteright}s law of universal gravitation did not break down at terrestrial distances. In this context, Cavendish{\textquoteright} experiment and related nineteenth-century experiments played a decisive role, for they provided converging and increasingly stronger evidence for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation. More precisely, the author shall argue that, as the accuracy and precision of the experimental apparatuses and the procedures to eliminate external disturbances involved increasingly improved, the empirical support for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation improved correspondingly.

}, issn = {0003-9519}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00407-010-0075-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {939584, title = {Disentangling Causal Pluralism}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us. Studies of Analytical Metaphysics.}, year = {2010}, pages = {207{\textendash}223}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely out of the egg, the term {\textquoteleft}causal pluralism{\textquoteright} already covers diverse meanings. This creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible positions within them. In this paper, I argue for a general distinction between conceptual causal pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and epistemological-methodological causal pluralism. I mainly focus on metaphysical approaches to causation and discern herein four possible positions: metaphysical causal constructivism, metaphysical causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism, and strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Each of these positions are further related to their most obvious conceptual counterpart, specifically conceptual causal monism or conceptual causal pluralism.

}, isbn = {981-4295-81-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @conference {de_winter_distorted_2010, title = {The Distorted Research Agenda in the Health Sciences and James Robert Brown’s Policy Proposal.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_(2012)_-_Brown.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {1064451, title = {The division of labour in science: the tradeoff between specialisation and diversity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {37{\textendash}51}, abstract = {

Economics is a typical resource for social epistemology and the division of labour is acommon theme for economics. As such it should come as no surprise that the presentpaper turns to economics to formulate a view on the dynamics of scientific communities, with precursors such as Kitcher (1990), Goldman and Shaked (1991) andHull (1988). But although the approach is similar to theirs, the view defended isdifferent. M\&\#228;ki (2005) points out that the lessons philosophers draw from economicscan go either way depending on the model chosen. Thus, the aims of this paper are (1)to illustrate this flexibility by proposing an alternative model which assumes increasingreturns to adoption in science rather than the decreasing returns present in theaforementioned contributions; and (2) to outline the implications of this view forscientific pluralism and institutional design.

}, issn = {1350-178x}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/jemfinal.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {924776, title = {Explanations in software engineering: the pragmatic point of view}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {277{\textendash}289}, abstract = {

This article reveals that explanatory practice in software engineering is in accordance with pragmatic explanatory pluralism, which states that explanations should at least partially be evaluated by their practical use. More specifically, I offer a defense of the idea that several explanation-types are legitimate in software engineering, and that the appropriateness of an explanation-type depends on (a) the engineer{\textquoteright}s interests, and (b) the format of the explanation-seeking question he asks, with this format depending on his interests. This idea is defended by considering examples that are representative for explanatory practice in software engineering. Different kinds of technological explanation are spelled out, and the dependence of their appropriateness on interests and question-formats is extensively illustrated.

}, issn = {0924-6495}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9190-2}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Moor, James H} } @article {1054981, title = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: theory and practice}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, volume = {31}, number = {5}, year = {2010}, pages = {371{\textendash}390}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

}, issn = {1386-7415}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9156-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {1234635, title = {Fundamental questions and some new answers on philosophical, contextual and scientific {W}hewell: some reflections on recent {W}hewell scholarship and the progress made therein}, journal = {Perspectives on Science}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {242{\textendash}272}, issn = {1063-6145}, doi = {10.1162/posc.2010.18.2.242}, url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives\_on\_science/v018/18.2.ducheyne.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1064488, title = {How monist is heterodoxy?}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {34}, year = {2010}, pages = {793{\textendash}805}, abstract = {

Some heterodox economists, most notably Tony Lawson, have come under suspicion of not being truepluralists, but ‘strategic pluralists’: their advocacy of pluralism is thought to be merely instrumental to ahidden monist agenda. This paper does not aim to judge the accused but rather to assess the accusations;the focus is on clarifying the notion of pluralism itself. First a paradox is found to lie at the core of scientific pluralism. Different responses to this paradox can be traced to different views on pluralismfound in the literature. The resulting classification allows an analysis of the current controversy amongpluralists and provides an understanding of the different aspects of the debate.

}, issn = {0309-166X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bep057}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {DeLanghe2010, title = {Increasing returns in science: a model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278-294}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @phdthesis {PhD_Rogier, title = {Models in Science: Essays on Scientific Virtues, Scientific Pluralism and the Distribution of Labour in Science}, year = {2010}, month = {April 19}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {de_winter_pragmatic_2010, title = {A Pragmatic Account of Functions}, journal = {Ghent University, Ghent}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

In this article, a pluralism of function concepts is defended on the basis of pragmatic considerations. It is shown that we use functional statements for a variety of explanatory purposes, and that each explanatory purpose asks for a specific notion of function. More specifically, I argue that the meaning of the statement “the function of x is to ” depends on the explanation-seeking question that this statement is supposed to answer, and that we cannot construct one ultimate notion of function that is appropriate in every explanatory context. Several explanation-seeking questions are explicated, as well as the function concepts that can be used to answer them, resulting in a pragmatic framework for function concepts. This framework is applied to both the technical and the biological domain.

}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_-_Functional_Explanation__DRAFT_24_.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @article {934535, title = {Setting-up early computer programs: D. H. {L}ehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC computation}, journal = {Archive for Mathematical Logic}, volume = {49}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {123{\textendash}146}, abstract = {

A complete reconstruction of Lehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC set-up for computing the exponents of p modulo two is given. This program served as an early test program for the ENIAC (1946). The reconstruction illustrates the difficulties of early programmers to find a way between a man operated and a machine operated computation. These difficulties concern both the content level (the algorithm) and the formal level (the logic of sequencing operations).

}, issn = {1432-0665}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00153-009-0169-8}, author = {Bullynck, Maarten and De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @article {de2010solvability, title = {Solvability of the halting and reachability problem for binary 2-tag systems}, journal = {Fundamenta Informaticae}, volume = {99}, number = {4}, year = {2010}, pages = {435{\textendash}471}, abstract = {

In this report we will provide a detailed proof of the solvability of the halting and reachability problem for 2-symbolic tag systems with a shiftnumber v = 2.

}, doi = {10.3233/FI-2010-257}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {1064460, title = {Standards and the distribution of cognitive labour: A model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278{\textendash}294}, issn = {1367-0751}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzp058}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @booklet {pittphilsci5074, title = {The Status of Hypothesis and Theory}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

Nowadays, it is a truism that hypotheses and theories play an essential role in scientific practice. This, however, was far from an obvious given in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy. Different natural philosophers had different views on the role and status of hypotheses and theories, ranging from fierce promotion to bold rejection, and to both they ascribed varying meanings and connotations. The guiding idea of this chapter is that, in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy, the terms ?hypothesis???hypothetical? and ?theory???theoretical? were imbedded in a semantic network of interconnected epistemological and methodological notions ? such as ?knowledge?, ?method?, ?probability?, ?certainty?, ?induction?, ?deduction?, ?experimental philosophy?, ?speculative philosophy?, and the like). As these semantic networks changed overtime, the meaning and significance of ?hypothesis? and ?theory? likewise shifted. Without pretence of completeness, this chapter highlights chronologically some of the defining moments in the semantic transformation of these two terms within the context of seventeenth-century natural philosophy.

}, keywords = {Francis Bacon, history of natural-philosophical methodology, Hypothesis, Isaac Newton., John Locke, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, speculative versus experimental seventeenth-century natural philosophy, theory}, url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5074/}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1234613, title = {Towards a fruitful formulation of {N}eedham{\textquoteright}s grand question}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2010}, pages = {9{\textendash}26}, abstract = {

As it stands, Needham’s Grand Question is simply too general and ill-posed to be answered in a meaningful way. In this paper it is argued that Needham’s Grand Question, to wit Why did science emerge in the West and not in China?, can only be fruitfully pursued, (1) on the condition that one explicates the assumptions and conceptions involved in an informative and motivated way, and (2) on the condition that the question is concretized and fine-tuned by means of and in terms of a series of specific questions. In this paper, I attempt to reformulate Needham’s Grand Question on the basis of a minimal conception of modern science. Next I will split up the Grand Question into a series of more specific, controllable and arguably more fruitful questions.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/82-2.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {981629, title = {{W}hewell{\textquoteright}s tidal researches: scientific practice and philosophical methodology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {41}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {26{\textendash}40}, abstract = {

Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {812480, title = {Why social emergence? {D}iscussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics}, year = {2010}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer{\textquoteright}s use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.

}, isbn = {9789814295819}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @incollection {DeMey2010, title = {William {H}arvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.}, booktitle = {Fascinerend Leven. {M}arkante Figuren en Idee{\"e}n uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.}, year = {2010}, note = {

In print

}, publisher = {Nieuwezijds}, address = {Amsterdam}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Van Speybroeck, Linda and Braeckman, Johan} } @article {DeVreese2010a, title = {Work in Progress in Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {9}, year = {2010}, pages = {141}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {D:paraty, title = {Adaptive Cn Logics}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This paper solves an old problem: to devise decent inconsistency-adaptive logics that have the \C{n} logics as their lower limit. Two kinds of logics are presented. Those of the first kind offer a maximally consistent interpretation of the premise set in as far as this is possible in view of logical considerations. At the same time, they indicate at which points further choices may be made on extra-logical grounds. The logics of the second kind allow one to introduce those choices in a defeasible way and handle them.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {528863, title = {Anti-trinitarianism in {N}ewton’s {G}eneral {S}cholium to the {P}rincipia}, journal = {European Journal of Science and Theology}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}11}, abstract = {

Recent findings on Newton{\textquoteright}s heretical beliefs in the five draft versions of the General Scholium, which was added to the second edition of the Principia in 1713, are discussed here. We shall use these snapshots as a tool to gain understanding into the process of composition of the theological material from the General Scholium.

}, issn = {1841-0464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {924897, title = {Conceptual analysis of causation and theoretical utility in everyday contexts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {206}, year = {2009}, pages = {177{\textendash}190}, abstract = {

In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall{\textquoteright}s theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall{\textquoteright}s proposal is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation, traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up. However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive conceptual analysis can be useful.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {677635, title = {De ontologische focus van sociaal-wetenschappelijke verklaringen.}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {3{\textendash}22}, abstract = {

The author presents a survey of different opinions about the ontological focus of social scientific explanations. The opinions discussed are: methodological collectivism, methodological individualism, methodological structurism, methodological physicalism, the sociobiological point of view, and explanatory pluralism. These approaches all provide an answer to the question ‘On which ontological level(s) should social scientific explanations concentrate?’ Because all other forms of explanatory pluralism, as well as the non-pluralistic answers to this question, have certain problems, the author introduces a new form of explanatory pluralism that avoids these problems: context-related explanatory pluralism. Context-related explanatory pluralism makes a critical attitude (in the philosophy of science) compatible with a fluently developing and progressing science. This means that it is not only the most plausible guideline regarding the ontological focus of social scientific explanations, but also allows us to solve the conflict between Steve Fuller and Thomas Kuhn.

}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @article {drouet2009determinism, title = {Is determinism more favorable than indeterminism for the causal Markov condition?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {662{\textendash}675}, abstract = {

The present text comments on Steel 2005, in which the author claims to extend from the deterministic to the general case, the result according to which the causal Markov condition is satisfied by systems with jointly independent exogenous variables. I show that Steel’s claim cannot be accepted unless one is prepared to abandon standard causal modeling terminology. Correlatively, I argue that the most fruitful aspect of Steel 2005 consists in a realist conception of error terms, and I show how this conception sheds new light on the relationship between determinism and the causal Markov condition.

}, doi = {10.1086/605797}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605797}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle} } @conference {678341, title = {Doing mathematics on the ENIAC. {V}on {N}eumann{\textquoteright}s and {L}ehmer{\textquoteright}s different visions}, booktitle = {Mathematical Practice and Development throughout History. Proceedings of the 18th Novembertagung on the History, Philosophy and Didactics of Mathematics}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Logos Verlag Berlin}, organization = {Logos Verlag Berlin}, abstract = {

In this paper we will study the impact of the computer on math- ematics and its practice from a historical point of view. We will look at what kind of mathematical problems were implemented on early electronic computing machines and how these implementations were perceived. By doing so, we want to stress that the computer was in fact, from its very beginning, conceived as a mathematical instru- ment per se, thus situating the contemporary usage of the computer in mathematics in its proper historical background. We will focus on the work by two computer pioneers: Derrick H. Lehmer and John von Neumann. They were both involved with the ENIAC and had strong opinions about how these new machines might influence (theoretical and applied) mathematics.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Witzke, Ingo and Wilhelmus, E.} } @article {732259, title = {Epidemiology and causation}, journal = {Medicine, health care and philosophy}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {345{\textendash}353}, abstract = {

Epidemiologists{\textquoteright} discussions on causation are not always very enlightening with regard to the notion of {\textquoteleft}cause{\textquoteright} in epidemiology. Epidemiologists rightly work from a science-based approach to causation in epidemiology, but largely disagree about the matter. Disagreement may be partly due to confusion of the question of useful concepts for causal inference in epidemiological practice with the question of the metaphysical presuppositions of causal concepts used in epidemiology. In other words, epidemiologists seem to confuse the practical results of epidemiological research at the population level with the metaphysical views about the reality of disease causation at the individual level in their writings on causation.

}, issn = {1386-7423}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11019-009-9184-0}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {733505, title = {The Flow of Influence: {F}rom {N}ewton to {L}ocke … and Back}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {64}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay, the affinity between Locke{\textquoteright}s empiricism and Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy is scrutinized. Parallels are distinguished from influences. I argue, pace G.A.J. Rogers, that Newton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute space and time influenced Locke{\textquoteright}s Essay concerning Human Understanding (first edition: 1689, though bearing the year 1690 on its cover) from the second edition onwards. I also show that Newton used Lockean terminology in his criticism of Cartesianism. It is further argued that Locke{\textquoteright}s endorsement of corpuscularianism is merely methodological, i.e. he accepts it as a scientifically useful and psychologically intelligible paradigm, but not as a realist explanation of rerum natura. Like Newton, Locke was reluctant to accept the corpuscular theory of light. However, his reasons for doing so were different from those of Newton. This essay is divided into three parts: in the first, the stage is set by looking at the fundamentals of Locke{\textquoteright}s epistemology; in the second, several correspondences between Locke{\textquoteright}s and Newton{\textquoteright}s thought are explored and two cases of influence are argued for; and in the third, several arguments are provided for interpreting Locke{\textquoteright}s corpuscularianism as methodological.

}, issn = {0393-2516}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {JK:gdt, title = {Goal-Directed Tableaux}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {241{\textendash}256}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This paper contains a new format for analytic tableaux, called goal-directed tableaux. Their main interest lies in the fact that the search for a closed tableau proceeds in a highly constrained way. The goal-directed tableaux do not form a complete decision method for propositional classical logic (because they do not sustain Ex Falso Quodlibet). For consistent sets of premises, however, they lead to the same results as the usual analytic tableaux for classical logic.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {909570, title = {Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, Its Crisis and Challenge}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. {A} Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective}, year = {2009}, pages = {4{\textendash}9}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, isbn = {978-981-4295-81-9}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @article {683771, title = {Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Of The Church{\textquoteright} Manuscript Description and Analysis of Bodmer Ms. in Geneva}, journal = {European journal of science and theology}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {25{\textendash}35}, abstract = {

In this essay, a manuscript description and analysis of Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s manuscript {\textquoteright}Of the Church{\textquoteright} (Bodmer Ms., Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Switzerland) is provided.

}, issn = {1841-0464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Rusu, Iulian} } @article {663049, title = {Mainstream economics: searching where the light is}, journal = {JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {137{\textendash}150}, abstract = {

The starting point of this paper is the question of how to explain mainstream economics{\textquoteright} great level of acceptance in the face of its poor empirical track record. An explanation is provided in terms of a combination of unification and, most importantly, inference to the best explanation. This paper asks whether the appeal of mainstream economics to inference to the best explanation is justified and as a consequence questions one of the main reasons for the dominance of mainstream economics today. The final section integrates the ideas from the previous sections into a general framework for explanatory pluralism.

}, issn = {0160-3477}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/PKE0160-3477320109}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @conference {678298, title = {Mathematics through man-computer interaction. A study of the early years of computing.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {1234666, title = {Newtonianism in {L}ocke, {H}ume, and {R}eid, or: how far can one stretch a label?}, journal = {Enlightenment and Dissent - Special}, volume = {25}, year = {2009}, pages = {62{\textendash}105}, issn = {0262-7612}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {Ducheyne2009, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s Theology and the Flow of Influence}, booktitle = {Future Perspectives on {N}ewton Scholarship and the {N}ewtonian Legacy}, year = {2009}, pages = {35-47}, publisher = {KVAB, Brussel}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {primieroprioritized, title = {Prioritized Dynamic Retraction Function on Non-monotonic Information Updates}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {443-463}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

In this paper a model for updates on belief sets and retractions thereof is introduced using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core of the update retraction procedure is represented by abnormal expressions derivable in the language: they express updates with information con- tradicting previously derived contents. The adaptive strategy aims at restricting the validity of these formulas by focusing at each decreasing degree on the update which is the most rational to retract in order to re- store consistency as soon as possible. This work is related to the standard operations of retraction and withdrawal from the AGM-paradigm and the e ects of dynamic operations such as public announcement in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {drouet2009probabilistic, title = {Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {68{\textendash}72}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {924546, title = {Strategies: what{\textquoteright}s in a name?}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {287{\textendash}306}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will show that Hintikka’s notion of ‘strategy’ can refer to proof-heuristic reasoning as well as to methodological reasoning forms. Stating this distinction allows for a better understanding of the notion and for an easier way to tackle the problem of formalization. Contrary to Hintikka’s opinion, heuristic reasoning can be implemented in formal proofs by means of goal-directed proof procedures. Methodological reasoning forms on the other hand can be formally represented by means of adaptive logics.

}, isbn = {9781904987789}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {ducheyne2009times, title = {The Times and Life of {J}ohn {T}h. {D}esaguliers (1683-1744): Newtonian and Freemason}, journal = {Revue belge de philologie et d{\textquoteright}histoire}, volume = {87}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {349{\textendash}363}, abstract = {

Jean Theophile Desaguliers (1683-1744) (geboren : Desaguillers) was een centrale figuur in twee aan belang winnende stromingen : het Newtonianisme en de Vrijmetselarij. Desaguliers werd lid van de Royal Society en hij was een persoonlijke kennis van Isaac Newton. Hij schreef talrijke wetenschappelijke boeken en artikelen waarin hij de Newtoniaanse natuurfi losofi e verdedigde. Om deze reden was hij centraal voor de popularisering van het Newtonianisme. Terwijl hij in London verbleef, werd Desaguliers eveneens een cruciale fi guur binnen de Vrijmetselarij : in 1719 werd hij grootmeester van de Grootloge van Londen en hij was rechtstreeks betrokken in de totstandkoming van James Andersons The Constitutions of the Free-masons (1723).

}, doi = {10.3406/rbph.2009.7676}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2009treat, title = {“To treat of the world”: {P}aul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s ontology and epistemology and the circle of knowledge}, journal = {Journal of Documentation}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {223{\textendash}244}, abstract = {

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to document how Paul Otlet, founding-father of what is termed at present as “information science”, attempted to provide a complete “image of the world” (and reality in general) by establishing the scientific discipline he dubbed “documentation”. The paper also aims to focus on how Otlet represented human knowledge and reality in a systematic and unified way. Design/methodology/approach – A close reading of Otlet{\textquoteright}s primary works and some of his personal archives was undertaken. Findings – Most importantly, it is shown that Otlet{\textquoteright}s views on documentation were immersed in a cosmological, objectivist, humanitarian and ontological framework that is alien to contemporary information science. Correspondingly, his alleged affinity with positivism is reassessed. Originality/value – The philosophical foundations of the origins of information science are highlighted. Indirectly, this paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on realism and anti-realism in information science.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {D:shahid, title = {Towards a Dialogic Interpretation of Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things. Essays in Honour of {S}hahid {R}ahman}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}51}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

The main result presented in this paper concerns a dialogic or game-theoretical interpretation of dynamic proofs. Dynamic proofs in themselves do not form a demonstration of the derivability of their last formula from a given premise set. Apart from the proof, such a demonstration requires a specific metalevel argument. In a natural and appealing form, the metalevel argument is phrased in terms of the existence of a winning strategy for the proponent.\par The aforementioned point is presented in terms of an approach that is in a sense Hilbertian and anti-Tarskian: the characterization of logical inference in terms of types of proofs, rather than in terms of properties of the consequence relation.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {D{\'e}gremont, C{\'e}dric and Keiff, Laurent and R{\"u}ckert, Helge} } @conference {524726, title = {Trading off explanatory virtues}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

The paper draws on Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Van Paemel, Geert} } @article {Ducheyne2009a, title = {Understanding (in) {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Argument for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {227-258}, abstract = {

In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’ reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation.

}, keywords = {1713, 1726), Actio in distans, D. Dieks, Discours de la cause de la pesanteur (1690), H. de Regt, Huygens, Incommensurability, Newton, Principia (1687, Scientific understanding, Spherical vortex cosmology, Theoretical virtues, Universal gravitation}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {10.1007/s10838-009-9096-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9096-y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {703844, title = {Understanding in political science: the plurality of epistemic interests}, booktitle = {Scientific Understanding. {P}hilosophical Perspectives}, year = {2009}, pages = {298{\textendash}313}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, isbn = {9780822943785}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Leonelli, Sabina and Eigner, Kai} } @article {981621, title = {Whewell, necessity and the inductive sciences: a philosophical-systematic survey}, journal = {South African Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {333{\textendash}358}, abstract = {

In this paper Whewell{\textquoteright}s concept of necessity is scrutinized and its historical development is outlined (ca. 1833-1860). Particular attention will be paid to how Whewell interpreted the laws of the inductive sciences as being necessary since the laws of nature are concretizations of the Fundamental Ideas which can be partially described by Axioms.

}, issn = {0258-0136}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {2009, title = {Why should I adopt pluralism?}, booktitle = {Economic Pluralism}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {

If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Garnett, Rob and Olsen, Erik and Starr, Martha} } @article {680715, title = {Yes Fellows, Most Human Reasoning is Complex}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {166}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {113{\textendash}131}, abstract = {

This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 41-60). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9268-4}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Verd{\'e}e, Peter and Meheus, Joke} } @conference {678254, title = {On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. {T}heoretical and experimental results.}, booktitle = {The complexity of simple programs}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Cork University Press}, organization = {Cork University Press}, abstract = {

Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Woods, Damien and Neary, Turlough and Seda, Tony} } @article {393211, title = {Causal (mis)understanding and the search for scientific explanations: a case study from the history of medicine.}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences}, volume = {39}, year = {2008}, pages = {14{\textendash}24}, abstract = {

In 1747, James Lind carried out an experiment which proved the usefulness of citrus fruit as a cure for scurvy. Nonetheless, he rejected the earlier hypothesis of Bachstrom that the absence of fresh fruit and vegetables was the only cause of the disease. I explain why it was rational for James Lind not to accept Bachstrom’s explanation. I argue that it was the urge for scientific understanding that guided Lind in his rejection and in the development of his alternative theory that humidity was the primary cause of the disease. Central in this process was the search for causal mechanisms which could provide understanding of how the disease developed and which fitted in with the knowledge of the time. Given that the relevant background knowledge and statistical methods were not yet available to Lind, he was right to prefer his own explanation to that of Bachstrom. Although his explanation turned out to be wrong, and Bachstrom’s right, from a historical point of view it offered deeper causal understanding of both the development of the disease and the preventive and curative effects of fresh vegetable food. This case study illustrates how the search for causal mechanisms can not only be enlightening, but also very misleading.

}, issn = {1369-8486}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {Ducheyne2008a, title = {Conference Report "Induction: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, {G}hent {U}niversity, 8–10 July 2008"}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {10}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {8-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {427052, title = {Confusion and bad arguments in the conceptual analysis of causation}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {51}, number = {201}, year = {2008}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {683583, title = {Disjunctive realism about color}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, series = {Acta philosophica Fennica}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {193{\textendash}200}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, abstract = {

Section 1: Analytical metaphysics and its methodology. Why the negations of false atomic propositions are true / Peter Simons {\textendash} The one over many / Anna-Sofia Maurin {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s conception of supervenience / Markku Keina\unmatched{0308}nen {\textendash} {\textacutedbl}Mirage realism{\textacutedbl} or {\textacutedbl}Positivism in naturalism{\textquoteright}s clothing{\textacutedbl}? / Panu Raatikainen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s metaphysical realism / Sami Pihlstro\unmatched{0308}m. Section 2: Laws of nature, dispositions, and modality. Some remarks on the metaphysical status of laws of nature / Wim Christiaens {\textendash} Dispositions pace Armstrong / Robrecht Vanderbeeken {\textendash} Armstrong on the metaphysics of modality: two dilemmas / Anssi Korhonen. Section 3: Mind and epistemology. Disjunctive realism about color / Tim De May {\textendash} On Armstrong{\textquoteright}s philosophy of perception / S. Albert Kivinen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s epistemology / Markus Lammenranta.

}, isbn = {9519264663}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {397684, title = {Dispositions pace Armstrong.}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {127{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, isbn = {9789519264660}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {Ducheyne2008c, title = {Entry "{H}elmont, {J}ohannes ({J}oan) {B}aptista {V}an"}, booktitle = {New Dictionary of Scientific Biography}, volume = {III}, year = {2008}, pages = {277-281}, publisher = {Thomson Gale}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Pilchak, Angela} } @article {444488, title = {Galileo and {H}uygens on free fall: Mathematical and methodological ifferences}, journal = {Dynamis}, volume = {28}, year = {2008}, pages = {243{\textendash}274}, abstract = {

In this essay, I will scrutinize the differences between Galileo{\textquoteright}s and Huygens{\textquoteright}s demonstrations of free fall, which can be found respectively in the Discorsi and the Horologium, from a mathematical, representational and methodological perspective. I argue that more can be learnt from such an analysis than the thesis that Huygens re-styled Galilean mechanics which is a communis opinio. I shall argue that the differences in their approach on free fall highlight a significantly different mathematical and methodological outlook.

}, issn = {0211-9536}, doi = {10.4321/S0211-95362008000100011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {678369, title = {How to talk with a computer: an essay on computability and man-computer conversations}, journal = {Off Topic: {U}bersetzen. {Z}eitschrift f{\"u}r Medienkunst der KHM}, volume = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {80{\textendash}89}, issn = {1867-5948}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {432906, title = {J. B. {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}{D}e {T}empore{\textquoteright} as an influence on {I}saac {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute time}, journal = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie}, volume = {90}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {216{\textendash}228}, abstract = {

Here, I shall argue that Van Helmont needs to be added to the list of sources on which Newton drew when formulating his doctrine of absolute time. This by no means implies that Van Helmont is the factual source of Newton{\textquoteright}s views on absolute time (I have found no clear-cut evidence in support of this claim). It is by no means my aim to debunk the importance of the other sources, but rather to broaden them. Different authors help to explain different aspects of Newton{\textquoteright}s conception of absolute time.

}, issn = {0003-9101}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {441499, title = {JS {M}ill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction: From True Causes to Provisional Ones}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {361{\textendash}376}, abstract = {

In this essay, my aim is twofold: to clarify how the late Mill conceived of the certainty of inductive generalisations and to offer a systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of Mill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction. I shall argue that Mill{\textquoteright}s views on the certainty of knowledge changed over time and that this change was accompanied by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results yielded by the Canons of Induction. The key message of the later editions of The System of Logic as conceived by the late Mill was no longer that by the Canons of Induction we can establish scientific certainty and true causes, but rather that the Canons are useful in establishing causal laws in a provisional way. Deduction is a game and induction a grievance. (Bagehot 1913, vol. 3, p. 37)

}, issn = {0144-5340}, doi = {10.1080/01445340802164377}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340802164377}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {531125, title = {Mainstream economics: searching where the light is}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Association of Heterodox Economics}, year = {2008}, month = {July}, publisher = {Anglia Ruskin University}, organization = {Anglia Ruskin University}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @incollection {683245, title = {Middeleeuwse en Arabische Wijsbegeerte}, booktitle = {De rivier van Herakleitos: Een eigenzinnige visie op de wijsbegeere}, year = {2008}, pages = {93{\textendash}101}, publisher = {Houtekiet}, isbn = {978 90 8924 035 4}, url = {http://lib.ugent.be/catalog/pug01:683245}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Vermeersch, Etienne and Braeckman, Johan} } @incollection {683520, title = {Ockhams theorie van evidente kennis en het epistemologisch externalisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. {E}ssays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {227{\textendash}239}, publisher = {Academia Press}, isbn = {978-90-382-1279-1}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @article {981623, title = {A preliminary study of the appropriation of {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in {B}ritain in chymistry, medicine and natural philosophy}, journal = {Ambix}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {122{\textendash}135}, abstract = {

Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s work was of major importance in seventeenth-century medicine, chymistry and natural philosophy. His work was a source of inspiration and mystery and an authoritas. His oeuvre was, together with that of many others, the culminating point of an ongoing process, starting in the Middle Ages, of turning medicine into a scientific discipline. In this essay, the appropriation, that is, the process of assimilation of an author{\textquoteright}s work by other scholars, of Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in England will be studied among chymists, physicians and natural philosophers (the distinctions between these three groups is primarily conceptual, but in practice hard to distinguish). Appropriation reminds us that the process of assimilating ideas of an author by contemporaries or later generations is not a passive activity, for scholars actively adapt and interpret them in new ways not initially envisaged by its original author.

}, issn = {0002-6980}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/174582308X255479}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2008b, title = {Review of {F}lorian {E}beling{\textquoteright}s The Sectret History of Hermes}, journal = {Annals of Science}, volume = {66}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {294{\textendash}295}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1098767, title = {{\textquoteright}Since heaven has not yet destroyed this culture, what can the men of {K}uang do to me?{\textquoteright}: cosmological confucianism and the development of science}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2008}, pages = {27{\textendash}53}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Dessein, Bart}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Ducheyne2008, title = {Some Worries for J.D. {N}orton’s Material Theory of Induction}, journal = {Philosophia Naturalis}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {37 - 46}, abstract = {

In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to three potential worries for John D. Norton’s material theory of induction (Norton, 2003). I attempt to show (1) that his “principle argument” is based on a false dichotomy, (2) that the idea that facts ultimately derive their license from matters of fact is debatable, and (3) that one of the core implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental reasons.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {436211, title = {Tag systems and Collatz-like functions}, journal = {Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {390}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {92{\textendash}101}, abstract = {

Tag systems were invented by Emil Leon Post and proven recursively unsolvable by Marvin Minsky. These production systems have shown very useful in constructing small universal (Turing complete) systems for several different classes of computational systems, including Turing machines, and are thus important instruments for studying limits or boundaries of solvability and unsolvability. Although there are some results on tag systems and their limits of solvability and unsolvability, there are hardly any that consider both the shift number n, as well as the number of symbols {\textmu}. This paper aims to contribute to research on limits of solvability and unsolvability for tag systems, taking into account these two parameters. The main result is the reduction of the 3n + 1-problem to a surprisingly small tag system. It indicates that the present unsolvability line – defined in terms of {\textmu} and v – for tag systems might be significantly decreased.

}, issn = {0304-3975}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/12954}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {Ducheyne2008d, title = {Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models}, journal = {Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {119-127}, abstract = {

Scientific models occupy centre stage in scientific practice. Correspondingly, in recent literature in the philosophy of science, scientific models have been a focus of research. However, little attention has been paid so far to the ontology of scientific models. In this essay, I attempt to clarify the issues involved in formulating an informatively rich ontology of scientific models. Although no full-blown theory—containing all ontological issues involved—is provided, I make several distinctions and point to several characteristic properties exhibited by scientific models that are relevant for individuating scientific models.

}, keywords = {Abstraction, Idealisation, Ontology of scientific models}, issn = {1437-2053}, doi = {10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {924886, title = {Unravelling the methodology of causal pluralism}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {73{\textendash}89}, abstract = {

In this paper we try to bring some clarification in the recent debate on causal pluralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qua lify as a pluralistic theory of causation. We also show that there is currently no theory on the market which meets these criteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and De Vreese, Leen} } @conference {430672, title = {A week-end off: the first extensive number-theoretical computation on the ENIAC}, booktitle = {Logic and Theory of Algorithms}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

The first extensive number-theoretical computation run on the ENIAC, is reconstructed. The problem, computing the exponent of 2 modulo a prime, was set up on the ENIAC during a week-end in July 1946 by the number-theorist D.H. Lehmer, with help from his wife Emma and John Mauchly. Important aspects of the ENIAC{\textquoteright}s design are presented-and the reconstruction of the implementation of the problem on the ENIAC is discussed in its salient points.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-69405-2}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-69407-6_19}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Bullynck, Maarten}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @article {445650, title = {Whewell{\textquoteright}s metaphorical usage of light and the ultimate reality underlying it}, journal = {Semiotica}, volume = {172}, number = {1-4}, year = {2008}, month = {November}, pages = {269{\textendash}278}, abstract = {

In this article, I seek to study Whewell as writer of philosophical doctrines by focusing on his frequent usage of the metaphor of light, which symbolized (human) knowledge. It is my primary claim that Whewell choose to visually illustrate his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas, which are the bearers of ultimate reality and meaning in Whewell{\textquoteright}s epistemology, by means some key metaphors that made reference to light.

}, issn = {0037-1998}, doi = {10.1515/SEMI.2008.098}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2007, title = {Abstraction vs. Idealization: A Conceptual Analysis.}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {9-10}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {381569, title = {Algunas notas metodol{\'o}gicas sobre los experimentos de {J}.{B}. {V}an {H}elmont}, journal = {Azogue, Revista electr{\'o}nica dedicada al hist{\'o}rico cr{\'\i}tico de la alquimia}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {100{\textendash}107}, issn = {1575-8184}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {386240, title = {The Concept of Causation in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Mechanical and Optical Work}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {16}, year = {2007}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau- sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in- terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe- nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly- ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani- cist one.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen and Weber, Erik} } @article {ducheyne2007huygens, title = {Huygens{\textquoteright}s understanding of trajectory: Via media between {G}alileo and {N}ewton}, journal = {Historia scientiarum, International Journal of the History of Science Society of Japan}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {1{\textendash}19}, abstract = {

In this essay, I shall argue that Huygens can be truly seen as the via media between Galileo and Newton as far as conceptualizing orbital motion is concerned. Contrary to Galileo (who endorsed a concept of circular inertia when dealing with orbital motion), Huygens subscribed to our modern idea of rectilinear motion. Huygens was unable to integrate adequately in his worldview of vortical mechanics. However, he was aware of the utter importance of studying nascent motions (as Joella G. Yoder has pointed out before) It will be shown that an adequate account of orbital motion required three necessary ingredients: (1) an adequate conceptual framework (rectilinear inertia), (2) a fruitful metaphysical outlook (the existence of voids) and an appropriate mathematical machinery (with a focus on nascent motion). All three components were successfully put to practice by Newton.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2007a, title = {"Ignorance is Bliss": On {B}ernard {N}ieuwentijt{\textquoteright}s {D}octrina {I}gnorantia and His Contribution to Our Understanding of Scientific Idealisation}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, pages = {699-710}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {362595, title = {Johannes {B}aptista {V}an {H}elmonts experimentele aanpak: een poging tot omschrijving}, journal = {Gewina, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Techniek}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}25}, issn = {0928-303X}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {531096, title = {Naar een Pluralistisch Model van Onderzoeksfinanciering in de Humane Wetenschappen}, booktitle = {Welke Universiteit Willen We (Niet)?}, year = {2007}, pages = {205{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Het nieuwe Financieringsmodel voor het Hoger Onderwijs wordt vaak bekritiseerd vanuit argumentendie teruggaan op de eigenheid van de humane wetenschappen. Dit artikel poogt deze eigenheid preciezer teomschrijven en brengt de gevolgen voor de relatie tussen onderzoek en het tijdschriftenlandschap in kaart. Opbasis daarvan wordt de doelmatigheid betwist van het huidige voorstel, dat de effici{\"e}ntie van onderzoek wilverhogen door publicaties te wegen op basis van de tijdschriften waarin ze worden gepubliceerd. Dit betekentgeenszins dat een effici{\"e}ntere humane wetenschap onmogelijk is, alleen moet dat gebeuren op een manierwaarop haar pluralistische natuur niet wordt miskend. Hoe een dergelijk beleid er kan uitzien wordt daaromuitgewerkt in een aanzet naar een pluralististisch model van onderzoeksfinanciering in de humanewetenschappen.

}, isbn = {9789038211879}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/onderzoeksfinanciering.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Loobuyck, Patrick and Vanheeswijck, G. and Van Herck, W.} } @article {ducheyne2007noodzakelijkheid, title = {Noodzakelijkheid bij {W}illiam {W}hewell: De ontwikkeling Van een concept}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2007}, pages = {239{\textendash}265}, abstract = {

The immense oeuvre of William Whewell (1794-1886), a Victorian monument by itself, has to some extent been treated in a stepmotherly fashion by philosophers and historiansof philosophy. This paper attempts to conceptually clarify Whewell{\textquoteright}s notion of necessity, which was a core notion in his philosophical project. The author also sketches in broad lines the historical development of this notion in Whewell{\textquoteright}s thinking and points tothe intertwinement between Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy and theology. Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophical work was deeply based on the history of science and his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas can be interpreted as an attempt to historicize Kant{\textquoteright}s transcendental categories.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {1895032, title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory}, booktitle = {6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings}, year = {2007}, publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, abstract = {

One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.

}, url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20Langhe-SGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20-\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20-\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {Christiaens2007, title = {Some notes on {A}erts{\textquoteright} interpretation of the {E}{P}{R}-paradox and the violation of {B}ell-inequalities}, booktitle = {Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality, Probability and Axiomatics}, year = {2007}, pages = {250{\textendash}286}, publisher = {World Scientific}, author = {Christiaens, Wim and Czachor, Marek}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Durt, Thomas} } @conference {384497, title = {Study of limits of solvability in tag systems}, booktitle = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper we will give an outline of the proof of the solvability of the halting and reachability problem for 2-symbolic tag systems with a deletion number v = 2. This result will be situated in a more general context of research on limits of solvability in tag systems.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-74592-1}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Durand Lose, J and Margenstern, M} } @article {531119, title = {Is there no alternative?}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, pages = {101{\textendash}111}, issn = {1373-0975}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/alternative.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @phdthesis {PhD_Liesbeth, title = {Tracing Unsolvability. A Mathematical, Historical and Philosophical Analysis with a Special Focus on Tag Systems}, year = {2007}, month = {May 23}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @book {371040, title = {Wetenschapsfilosofie.}, year = {2007}, pages = {238 p.}, publisher = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, organization = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, isbn = {978-90-232-4312-0}, author = {Horsten, Leon and Douven, Igor and Weber, Erik} } @article {Ducheyne2006, title = {The Argument(s) for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {11}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {419-447}, abstract = {

In this paper an analysis of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation is provided. In the past, the complexity of the argument has not been fully appreciated. Recent authors like George E. Smith and William L. Harper have done a far better job. Nevertheless, a thorough account of the argument is still lacking. Both authors seem to stress the importance of only one methodological component. Smith stresses the procedure of approximative deductions backed-up by the laws of motion. Harper stresses “systematic dependencies” between theoretical parameters and phenomena. I will argue that Newton used a variety of different inferential strategies: causal parsimony considerations, deductions, demonstrative inductions, abductions and thought-experiments. Each of these strategies is part of Newton’s famous argument.

}, keywords = {argumentative pluralism, Newton, Principia, Universal gravitation}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {10.1007/s10699-005-3189-9}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-005-3189-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {352773, title = {Ascribing contemporary scientific concepts to past thinkers: towards a frame-work for handling matters more precisely}, journal = {Scientia Poetica}, volume = {10}, year = {2006}, pages = {274{\textendash}290}, issn = {1431-5041}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {732209, title = {Causal pluralism and scientific knowledge: an underexposed problem}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {77}, year = {2006}, pages = {125{\textendash}150}, abstract = {

Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology is heavily underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemological-methodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its own and to demonstrate how epistemological- methodological causal pluralism differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend epistemological- methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within singular domains.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {340414, title = {Closing the circle: An analysis of {E}mil {P}ost{\textquoteright}s early work}, journal = {Bulletin of symbolic logic}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {267{\textendash}289}, abstract = {

In 1931 Kurt G{\"o}del published his incompleteness results, and some years later Church and Turing showed that the decision problem for certain systems of symbolic logic has a negative solution. However, already in 1921 the young logician Emil Post worked on similar problems which resulted in what he called an “anticipation” of these results. For several reasons though he did not submit these results to a journal until 1941. This failure ‘to be the first’, did not discourage him: his contributions to mathematical logic and its foundations should not be underestimated. It is the purpose of this article to show that an interest in the early work of Emil Post should be motivated not only by this historical fact, but also by the fact that Post’s approach and method differs substantially from those offered by G{\"o}del, Turing and Church. In this paper it will be shown how this method evolved in his early work and how it finally led him to his results.

}, issn = {1079-8986}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @conference {DeMol2006, title = {Facing the Computer. Some techniques to understand technique.}, booktitle = {Computers and Philosophy, an International Conference}, year = {2006}, month = {May}, publisher = {EOARD}, organization = {EOARD}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Schmidt, C. T. A.} } @article {345101, title = {Galileo{\textquoteright}s interventionist notion of "cause"}, journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas}, volume = {67}, number = {3}, year = {2006}, pages = {443{\textendash}464}, abstract = {

In this essay, I shall argue that Galileo introduced a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality was an interventionist notion, according to which causal relations can be discovered by actively exploring and manipulating natural processes. The presence of this conception can be seen from Galileo{\textquoteright}s explanation of floating bodies and his theory of the tides. I shall point to the similarity between Galileo{\textquoteright}s notion of "cause" and recent interventionist accounts of causation in the philosophy of science (especially James Woodward{\textquoteright}s).

}, issn = {0022-5037}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {683834, title = {Imagination{\textquoteright}s Grip on Science}, journal = {Metaphilosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {222{\textendash}239}, abstract = {

In part because {\textacutedbl}imagination{\textacutedbl} is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.

}, issn = {0026-1068}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {683842, title = {Kuhn{\textquoteright}s paradox of thought experiments resolved}, journal = {The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {111{\textendash}125}, issn = {1944-3676}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {demathematics, title = {Mathematics and Pictures. Some popular examples}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

Mathematics is a science that is traditionally known as a highly abstract discipline. Due to its apparent possibility of deducing abstract formulas without the necessity of back-linking to the outside reality, pure mathematics’ status is often experienced as being isolated from and superior to the dubious reality and our evenly ambiguous perception of it. Despite this attitude, several examples can be given of the usefulness of this back-linking. Moreover, since the commercialisation of the computer, new possibilities for mathematical research became available. These possibilities though can only be reached through experimenting. One of the aspects of this experimental approach to mathematics is the use of computer generated images. On the one hand they are used as testing instruments, on the other hand they are necessary tools for certain mathematical theories to be possible - as the outside reality is the object of observation of a physicist, computer generated images are the reality to be observed and perceived by the mathematician.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @conference {353364, title = {The Methodological Relevance of the History of Mathematics for Mathematics Education}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Conference on 21st Century Information Technology in Mathematics Education}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

Mathematics education benefits from an integration of the history of mathematics within the mathematics curriculum. We provide three basic arguments for such integration. The first is epistemological and addresses a contextual view on mathematical knowledge. The second concerns the phylogenic aspects of the development of mathematics. Conceptual difficulties with teaching children mathematics often correspond with historical periods of conceptual crisis in mathematics. A third, historical argument, draws on the vast repository of experience in mathematics education. We provide examples for each of these arguments from the history of algebra.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Dhompongsa, G and Bhatti , F and Kitson , Q} } @article {326144, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s onto-theology versus {D}escartes{\textquoteright}s and {L}eibniz{\textquoteright}s: or on the relevance of unificatory tendencies in the secularization-process}, journal = {Theology and Science}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {71{\textendash}85}, issn = {1474-6700}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {345102, title = {Optical versus Mechanical Models: Newton{\textquoteright}s "Failure" to Construct an Optical Theory}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {49}, number = {194}, year = {2006}, pages = {199{\textendash}223}, abstract = {

In this essay, I take up both Shapiro’s and Hakfoort’s suggestion that Newton tried to apply the same method he used in the Principia (first edition: 1687) to The Opticks (first edition: 1704). Why did Newton’s method, which was apparently so successful in the realm of mechanics, fail when applied to optics? I shall argue that both empirical as well as methodological aspects are needed to explain Newton’s failure. Newton’s repugnance to introduce hypotheses in published texts forced him to explore, in the demonstrative part of science, a conceptually poor framework. Such framework has limited inferential power, i.e. the set of consequences which can be deduced from it is limited. This will be contrasted with the Principia where a richer conceptual framework was at hand and its deduced effects could by confirmed by experiment. The conceptual framework in the Principia allowed Newton to a priori deduce the celestial motions. As I have argued elsewhere, a priori deducing the phenomena under investigation was one of Newton’s most central methodological ideals. In this essay, I shall attempt to explain why a priori deduction of phenomena was impossible in optics.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Leen, title = {Pluralisme versus Monisme in het Filosofische Debat over Causaliteit. Naar een Zinvolle Pluralistische Benadering van Causaliteit als Theoretisch Kader voor de Explicatie van Causaal Redeneren.}, year = {2006}, month = {October 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @booklet {de2006post, title = {Post{\textquoteright}’s machine}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

In 1936 Turing gave his answer to the question ”What is a computable number?” by constructing his now well-known Turing machines as formalisations of the actions of a human computor. Less well-known is the almost synchronously published result by Emil Leon Post, in which a quasi-identical mechanism was developed for similar purposes. In 1979 these Post ”toy” machines were described in a little booklet, called ”Post’s machine” by the Russian mathematician Uspensky. The purpose of this text was to advance abstract concepts as algorithm and programming for school children. In discussing this booklet in relation to the historical text it is based on, the author wants to show how this kind of ideas cannot only help to teach school children some of the basics of computer science, but furthermore contribute to a training in formal thinking.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {337658, title = {Reid{\textquoteright}s adaptation and radicalization of Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy.}, journal = {History of European Ideas}, volume = {32}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {173{\textendash}189}, abstract = {

For Thomas Reid, Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s scientific methodology in natural philosophy was a source of inspiration for philosophical methodology in general. I shall look at how Reid adapted Newton{\textquoteright}s views on methodology in natural philosophy. We shall see that Reid radicalized Newton{\textquoteright}s methodology (especially his view on causal explanation) and, thereby, begins to pave the way for the positivist movement, of which the origin is traditionally associated with the Frenchman Auguste Comte. In the Reidian adaptation of Newtonianism, we can already notice the beginnings of the anti-causal trend that would become so popular in the age of positivism.

}, issn = {0191-6599}, doi = {10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2006.02.001}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {detheory, title = {Theory and Experiment in the work of {A}lonzo {C}hurch and {E}mil {P}ost}, journal = {unpublished}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

While most mathematicians would probably agree that ‘experimentation’ together with an ‘empirical’ attitude – both understood in their most general sense – can be important methods of mathematical discovery, this is often obscured in the final presentation of the results for the sake of mathematical elegance. In this paper it will be shown how this “method” has played a significant role in the work of two major contributors to the rather abstract discipline called mathematical logic, namely Alonzo Church and Emil Post.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @phdthesis {PhD_Steffen, title = {Virtuosi at Work: Historical-Philosophical Essays on Causality and Methodology in the Natural Philosophy of Galileo, Huyghens and Newton}, year = {2006}, month = {March 1}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ELe:scurvy, title = {The Causes and Cures of Scurvy. {H}ow Modern was {J}ames {L}ind{\textquoteright}s Methodology?}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {55{\textendash}67}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {Ducheyne2005, title = {The Challenges for Early-Modern Philosophy: Editorial Introduction.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {5-10}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2005a, title = {De Inductione: where {B}acon{\textquoteright}s Idea of Induction meets {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Practice of it.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {115-128}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {524788, title = {Graham Allisons modellen voor de analyse van internationale betrekkingen: een pluralistische kritiek}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {8}, number = {2}, year = {2005}, pages = {64{\textendash}77}, abstract = {

A call for epistemic pluralism is credible only when showing enough pluralism itself. Graham Allison’s three conceptual models made such a call, but do his models differ enough? Based on a fundamental theoretical analysis, disentangling the ontological and methodological aspects of Allison’s models, I conclude they do not. Subsequently, arguing that additional diversity is necessary and not an impossible endeavour, I construct a fourth model based on Alexander Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’. This model is fundamentally different from Allison’s models, and in combination with them a more convincing case for epistemic pluralism.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {354192, title = {Joan {B}aptiste {V}an {H}elmont and the question of experimental modernism}, journal = {Physis: Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza}, volume = {43}, year = {2005}, pages = {305{\textendash}332}, abstract = {

In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Joan Baptista Van Helmont’s (1579-1644) style of experimenting as ‘‘modern.’’ Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmont’s precise contribution to experimental practice has been. I will argue – after having analysed some of Van Helmont’s experiments such as his tree experiment, ice experiment, and thermoscope experiment – that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and, ultimately, in relatively closed physical systems such as, paradigmatically, the vessel, globe, or sphere [vas, globus, sphera]). After having reviewed some alternative options, I shall argue that Van Helmont’s usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification is the feature that best characterizes his contributions to ‘‘modern’’ experimentation.

}, issn = {0031-9414}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2005lessons, title = {Lessons from {G}alileo: The pragmatic model of shared characteristics of scientific representation}, journal = {Philosophia naturalis}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {214{\textendash}234}, abstract = {

In this paper I will defend a new account of scientific representation. I will begin by looking at the benefits and drawbacks of two recent accounts on scientific representation: Hughes’ DDI account and Su{\'a}rez’ inferential account. Next I use some of Galileo’s models in the Discorsi as a heuristic tool for a better account of scientific representation. Next I will present my model. The main idea of my account, which I refer to as the pragmatic model of shared characteristics (PMSC), is that a model represents, if and only if, (1) a person accepts that there is a set of shared characteristics between the model and its target; (2) this set has the inferential power to generate results which can be tested empirically; (3) and the corresponding test(s) of these results is/are in agreement with our data and the specific cognitive goals we have in mind.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {300874, title = {Mathematical models in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Principia: a new view of the {\textquoteright}{N}ewtonian Style{\textquoteright}.}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}19}, abstract = {

In this essay I argue against I. Bernard Cohen’s influential account of Newton’s methodology in the Principia: the ‘Newtonian Style’. The crux of Cohen’s account is the successive adaptation of ‘mental constructs’ through comparisons with nature. In Cohen’s view there is a direct dynamic between the mental constructs and physical systems. I argue that his account is essentially hypothetical-deductive, which is at odds with Newton’s rejection of the hypothetical-deductive method. An adequate account of Newton’s methodology needs to show how Newton’s method proceeds differently from the hypothetical-deductive method. In the constructive part I argue for my own account, which is model based: it focuses on how Newton constructed his models in Book I of the Principia. I will show that Newton understood Book I as an exercise in determining the mathematical consequences of certain force functions. The growing complexity of Newton’s models is a result of exploring increasingly complex force functions (intra-theoretical dynamics) rather than a successive comparison with nature (extra-theoretical dynamics). Nature did not enter the scene here. This intra-theoretical dynamics is related to the ‘autonomy of the models’.

}, issn = {0269-8595}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {340350, title = {Micro-explanations of laws.}, booktitle = {Structures in Scientific Cognition. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers}, year = {2005}, pages = {177{\textendash}186}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {

After a brief introduction to Kuipers{\textquoteright} views on explanations of laws we argue that micro-explanations of laws can have two formats: they work either by aggregation and transformation (as Kuipers suggests) or by means of function ascriptions (Kuipers neglects this possibility). We compare both types from an epistemic point of view (which information is needed to construct the explanation?) and from a means-end perspective (do both types serve the same purposes? are they equally good?).

}, isbn = {9042016485}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Preester, Helena} } @article {ducheyne2005newton, title = {Newton’s notion and practice of unification}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {36}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

In this paper I deal with a neglected topic with respect to unification in Newton’s Principia. I will clarify Newton’s notion (as can be found in Newton’s utterances on unification) and practice of unification (its actual occurrence in his scientific work). In order to do so, I will use the recent theories on unification as tools of analysis (Kitcher, Salmon and Schurz). I will argue, after showing that neither Kitcher’s nor Schurz’s account aptly capture Newton’s notion and practice of unification, that Salmon’s later work is a good starting point for analysing this notion and its practice in the Principia. Finally, I will supplement Salmon’s account in order to answer the question at stake.

}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.12.004}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {321509, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s training in the {A}ristotelian textbook tradition: From effects to causes and back}, journal = {History of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {141}, year = {2005}, pages = {217{\textendash}237}, issn = {0073-2753}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2005paul, title = {Paul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s theory of knowledge and linguistic objectivism}, journal = {Knowledge Organization}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {110{\textendash}116}, abstract = {

In this paper, I point to the importance of an often neglected objectivist strand in Paul Otlet{\textquoteright}s (1868-1944) thinking: his linguistic objectivism. Linguistic objectivism consists in the view that linguistic atoms uniquely correspond to certain discrete and well-defined elements in the world and further combinations of these linguistic atoms can objectively capture "the order of the world". This analysis tempers some of the past claims on the influence of positivism on Otlet.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {683494, title = {Remodeling the past}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {10}, year = {2005}, pages = {47{\textendash}66}, abstract = {

In some of the papers in which she develops and defends the mental modelview of thought experiments in physics, Nersessian expresses the belief that her account has implications for thought experiments in other domains as well. In this paper, I argue, firstly, that counterfactual reasoning has a legitimate place in historical inquiry, and secondly, that the mental model view can account for such "alternative histories". I proceed as follows. Firstly, I review the main accounts of thought experiments in physics and point at some explanatory advantages of the mental model view. Subsequently, I argue that historians cannot dispense with counterfactual reasoning altogether and qualify a number of principled objections against the explicit use of alternative histories for theoretical purposes. Finally, I show that the mental model view can account for such thought experiments in history.

}, issn = {1572-8471}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {326990, title = {Review of {I}. {B}ernard {C}ohen and {G}eorge {E}. {S}mith ({E}{D}s.), The {C}ambridge companion to {N}ewton}, journal = {PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {506{\textendash}508}, issn = {0031-8248}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {324419, title = {Secularizerende Tendenzen in {I}saac {N}ewtons Onto-theologie}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {98}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {18{\textendash}33}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {332160, title = {Study of fractals derived from {I}{F}{S}-fractals by metric procedures}, journal = {Fractals. {C}omplex Geometry, Patterns, and Scaling in Nature and Society}, volume = {13}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {237{\textendash}244}, abstract = {

It is a well-known fact that when visualizing an IFS-attractor through the chaos game, it is possible that the first points mapped will come closer to but stay visibly different from the attractor. This simple fact will be analyzed in more detail, through visualizations of different aspects of this convergence process. It will be shown that, in applying on every point in a 2D-plane the same sequence of mappings and coloring each point according to convergence distance, neighboring points form structures which resemble the attractor itself. Further, it is in this way possible to generate boundaries of the attractor that vary between small and coarse-grained. Using these results, it will be shown that it is possible to, starting with an IFS-attractor, construct fractals of which this IFS-attractor is a subset.

}, issn = {0218-348X}, doi = {10.1142/S0218348X05002878}, url = {http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0218348X05002878}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {322177, title = {Tales of the Unexpected: Incongruity-Resolution in Joke Comprehension, Scientific Discovery and Thought Experimentation}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {69{\textendash}88}, abstract = {

Some scholars suspect that thought experiments have something in common with jokes. Moreover, Thomas Kuhn has suggested that what happens to someone who thinks through a thought experiment “is very similar to what happens to a man, like Lavoisier, who must assimilate the result of a new unexpected experimental discovery” (1964: 321). In this paper, I pinpoint the presumed commonalities. I identify, more specifically, what cognitive linguists call “incongruity-resolution” as the problem-solving process not only involved in humor comprehension, but in scientific discovery and thought experimentation as well

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {LeE:aalcd, title = {Applications of the Adaptive Logic for Causal Discovery}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {33{\textendash}51}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @conference {383110, title = {Computer Generated Images as Mathematical Tools}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Conference and Exhibition on Generative Art}, year = {2004}, abstract = {

Since the commercialisation of the computer, it became possible to visualise certain aspects of mathematics that were not possible to visualise before because of the complexity or the size of the datasets involved. Some of these computer generated images even have become the icons of certain mathematical theories like for example fractal geometry. One of the advantages of these visualisations is the fact that in using them, certain properties that involve complexity can be immediately shown. This possibility will be discussed through experiments done by the author.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {322173, title = {De maat van het mogelijke: gedachte-experimenten en verbeelding}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {96}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {28{\textendash}39}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @phdthesis {PhD_Kristof, title = {Logica in Communicatie. Bijdragen vanuit Vraaglogica en {\textquoteright}Belief Revision{\textquoteright}, Steunend op Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s}, year = {2004}, month = {September 3}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof} } @incollection {DeMey2004, title = {Mere Logical Possibility: A Bridge too Far}, booktitle = {Modal Epistemology}, year = {2004}, pages = {53-62}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @book {322175, title = {Modal epistemology.}, year = {2004}, pages = {106 p.}, publisher = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, isbn = {N/A}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @article {DK:cluns, title = {A Rich Paraconsistent Extension of Full Positive Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, note = {Appeared 2005}, pages = {227{\textendash}257}, abstract = {

In the present paper we devise and study the most natural predicative extension of Sch{\"u}tte{\textquoteright}s maximally paraconsistent logic. With some of its large fragments, this logic, \sys{CLuNs}, forms the most popular family of paraconsistent logics. Devising the system involves some entanglements, and the system itself raises several interesting questions. As the system and fragments were studied by other authors, we restrict our attention to results that we have not seen in press.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof} } @article {322466, title = {Sieving Out Relevant and Efficient Questions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {189{\textendash}216}, abstract = {

Wisniewksi’s erotetic logic provides us with two slightly different semantic explications of the intuitive concept of “a question arises from a set of declarative premises”. Unfortunately, Wisniewski’s erotetic concepts suffer from the drawback that they allow for the raising of irrelevant and inefficient questions. The aim of this paper is to show that raising such questions can be avoided by changing the underlying logic. Several closely related logical approaches which enable us to eliminate irrelevant and inefficient questions, are presented.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof and Verhoeven, Liza} } @incollection {290835, title = {Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {179{\textendash}187}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, isbn = {987-9281-89-6}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {J:pcsr, title = {Do We Need Paraconsistency in Commonsense Reasoning?}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {135{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentina}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {322176, title = {The dual nature of thought experiments}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {72}, year = {2003}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

It is often assumed that thought experiments are either experiments or arguments. In this paper, I argue that this disjunction is not an exclusive one and that we can only account for the demonstrative force or evidential significance of thought experiments by conceiving of them as both experiments and arguments. First, I distinguish between three related, but nevertheless distinct problems that thought experiments in physics pose. In this context, I also show that the choice between an experiment view and an argument view on the nature of thought experiments pops up in connection with two of those problems: (1) the problem of the source of thought-experimental knowledge and (2) the problem of the evidential significance of thought experiments. Subsequently, I argue that as far as the issue of evidential significance is concerned, we should at least recognise that thought experiments have a dual structure: an experiment-like set up and an. argument-like winding up. Then I introduce Hans Radder{\textquoteright}s conceptual framework for the analysis of "real" experiments and I apply it to thought experimet:J.ts. Finally, I argue that Radder{\textquoteright}s distinction between the aspects of {\textquoteright}theoretical description or interpretation" and "material realization" allows us to move on from the recognition of the dual structure of thought experiments to a full-blown dual nature view of them.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {386237, title = {Explanation and thought experiments in history.}, journal = {History and Theory}, volume = {42}, year = {2003}, pages = {28{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and contrasts. Then, we pinpoint the functions thought experiments fulfill in arriving at weighted explanations of contrasts

}, issn = {0018-2656}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:faps, title = {A Formal Approach to Problem Solving}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {15{\textendash}26}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {322172, title = {Hoe geschiedenis tot lering strekt}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {6}, year = {2003}, pages = {47{\textendash}54}, abstract = {

How History Can Teach Us – Counterfactual questions (hypothetical questions of which the premises contradict the historical facts) are not often explicitly used in historical research to identify causes of particular facts. The methodology of thought experiments offers nevertheless important opportunities to contemporary historiography. One could even ask oneself if historical research is possible at all without so called ‘what if…’-questions. Just like analogies, thought experiments are necessary to complete the mental process which interpretes causes and effects of human behaviour in history. Therefore, counterfactual thought experiments can easily be traced in the construction of historical explanations.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @incollection {217593, title = {Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law: a qualitative computational model.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {93{\textendash}102}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, abstract = {

Computational models offer an excellent tool for the study and analysis of scientific discovery processes. The study of failures provides an insight into the history and philosophy of science as valuable as the study of successful discoveries. Using a computational model I analyzed Kepler’s approach in formulating a quantitative law for refraction. Although Kepler ultimately failed in discovering the sine law, the model shows that his basic hypothesis as well as his approach by geometrical reasoning was a correct one. This went largely unnoticed by commentators on the history of optics. Based on this analysis I provide new evidence that Descartes and Snell found in Kepler’s main hypothesis everything needed to deduce the sine law by pure geometrical reasoning. Our computational model is based on geometrical knowledge as contrasted with previous quantitative approaches. It has been implemented as a Prolog program.

}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {597466, title = {A Procedure for Generating (Conditional) Answers in a Goal-Directed Way}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {57{\textendash}63}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, abstract = {

Two evolutionary games : collective action and prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilema / Jakson Alves de Aquino {\textendash} A formal approach to problem solving / Diderik Batens {\textendash} Application of mathematics and underdetermination / Ota\unmatched{0301}vio Bueno {\textendash} A framework for combining defeasible argumentation with labeled deduction / Carlos Iva\unmatched{0301}n Chesn\unmatched{0303}evar and Guillermo Ricardo Simari {\textendash} A procedure for generating (conditional) answers in a goal-directed way / Kristof De Clerq and Rob Vanderbeken {\textendash} Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning : a model for research programmes / Claudio Delrieux {\textendash} Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law : a quantitative computational model / Albrecht Heeffer {\textendash} Default models of rationality / Silvia Lerner {\textendash} Most inferences are defeasible / Jose\unmatched{0301} Carlos Loureiro Ralha and Ce\unmatched{0301}lia Ghedini Rahla {\textendash} Reasoning through doing : epistemic mediators in scientific reasoning / Lorenzo Magnani {\textendash} Do we need paraconsistency in commonsense reasoning? / Joke Meheus {\textendash} Descartes, a methodical elimination of paradoxes for (de)-ontology building / Jean Sallantin ... [et al.] {\textendash} Measuring coherence using LP-models / Carlos A. Oller {\textendash} What are multi-agent systems trying to accomplish? Towards pragmatic game-theoretical agenda / Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen {\textendash} Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility / Dagmar Provijn {\textendash} Semantic computations of truth, based on associations already learned / Patrick Suppes and Jean-Yves Be\unmatched{0301}ziau {\textendash} On the sense of eating strawberries, or, On the exclusivity implcature fo {\textquoteright}or{\textquoteright} / Liza Verhoeven and Leon Horsten {\textendash} A note on epistemology and logical afrificial intelligence / Gregory R. Wheeler and Lui\unmatched{0301}s Moniz Pereira.

}, isbn = {9879281896}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {LeE:ssce, title = {Searching for Singular Causal Explanations: a formal analysis}, year = {2003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @phdthesis {PhD_Tim, title = {Thinking Through Thought Experiments}, year = {2003}, note = {

Promotor: Erik Weber

}, month = {March 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @incollection {J:alpt, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Pragmatic Truth}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {167{\textendash}185}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper presents the new adaptive logic APT. APT has the peculiar property that it enables one to interpret a (possibly inconsistent) theory Gamma {\textquoteright}as pragmatically as possible{\textquoteright}. The aim is to capture the idea of a partial structure (in the sense of da Costa and associates) that adequately models a (possibly inconsistent) set of beliefs Gamma. What this comes to is that APT localizes the {\textquoteright}consistent core{\textquoteright} of Gamma, and that it delivers all sentences that are compatible with this core. For the core itself, APT is just as rich as Classical Logic. APT is defined from a modal adaptive logic APV that is based itself on two other adaptive logics. I present the semantics of all three systems, as well as their dynamic proof theory. The dynamic proof theory for APV is unusual (even within the adaptive logic programme) in that it incorporates two different kinds of dynamics.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @conference {152575, title = {How to obtain elegant Fitch-style proofs from Goal directed ones.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourtheenth Belgium-Netherlands Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2002}, year = {2002}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Blockeel, H. and Denecker, M.} } @incollection {vermeir2002inconsistency, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Proof Procedure for Logic Programming}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {323-340}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

It is the goal of this paper to de ne a paraconsistent proof procedure that has the best of two mechanisms, in casu logic programming and inconsistency-adaptive logics. From logic programming we will maintain the ease of computing, and from adaptive logics their paraconsistency, dynamics and non-monotonicity. This will be done by combining the notion of competitor from logic programming together with the conditionallity that is common in all adaptive proofs.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {152512, title = {Isaac Newton on space and time: metaphysician or not?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2002}, pages = {77{\textendash}114}, abstract = {

But whereas we can blame Bohr, Schrodinger and Einstein for our problems, Newton has only God to blame for his. (Tamny, 1979: 58). After all, if Newton does not believe in the reality of space and time themselves, over and above the material inhabitants of them, who does? (Sklar, 1990: 68).

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {402962, title = {A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, volume = {25}, year = {2002}, pages = {21{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will present an adaptive logic that grasps the way we analyze metaphors. Metaphors are powerful tools to generate new scientific ideas. Therefore, it is important to have a good theory on what metaphors are and how they function. The first question we have to answer when we want to develop such a theory is obviously {\textacutedbl}what metaphors are{\textacutedbl}. Philosophy of language can offer some interesting ideas but most views do not allow for a cognitive function of metaphors. One of the sparse views that does allow for it is interactionism. The basic version, however, has some serious shortcomings that need solving when we want to use this theory. First of all the terminology is too vague. Furthermore, the description of the reasoning process we use when we analyze a metaphor, only works for very simple examples. The logic I will present, ALM, is based on a broadened version of this view. A logical approach of metaphors allows us to gain a profound insight in the way we analyze metaphors. The analysis of metaphors is a dynamical reasoning process. When we want to capture this process in a logical system, we need a logic that is capable of grasping that specific type of dynamics. An adaptive logic seems to be the best choice. Therefore, I shall present an adaptive logic that grasps the analysis of metaphors.

}, isbn = {1402007124}, author = {D{\textquoteright}Hanis, Isabel}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Nersessian, Nancy and Pizzi, Claudio} } @incollection {Amo2002, title = {A Logical Framework for Integrating Inconsistent Information in Multiple Databases}, booktitle = {Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {2284}, year = {2002}, pages = {67-84}, publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, abstract = {

When integrating data coming from multiple different sources we are faced with the possibility of inconsistency in databases. In this paper, we use one of the paraconsistent logics introduced in [9,7] (LFI1) as a logical framework to model possibly inconsistent database instances obtained by integrating different sources.We propose a method based on the sound and complete tableau proof system of LFI1 to treat both the integration process and the evolution of the integrated database submitted to users updates. In order to treat the integrated database evolution, we introduce a kind of generalized database context, the evolutionary databases, which are databases having the capability of storing and manipulating inconsistent information and, at the same time, allowing integrity constraints to change in time. We argue that our approach is sufficiently general and can be applied in most circumstances where inconsistency may arise in databases.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-43220-3}, doi = {10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, author = {de Amo, Sandra and Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Eiter, Thomas and Schewe, Klaus-Dieter} } @incollection {402884, title = {Ontological causes of inconsistency and a change-adaptive, logical solution}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, volume = {228}, year = {2002}, pages = {151{\textendash}166}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, abstract = {

This paper reveals an implicit ontological assumption that is presupposed in common thought. This assumption results in the fact that people usually do not make any distinction between {\textquoteright}the object a{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}the object a at a given moment{\textquoteright}. This laziness causes many inconsistencies. Several attempts to solve these inconsistencies are studied, and the most natural one is elaborated, namely the one obtained by applying Classical Logic to an ontological correct domain. This solution has a drawback with respect to communication, which is solved by the change-adaptive logic CAL2. This non-monotonic, paraconsistent logic, belongs to the family of ambiguity-adaptive logics. It has the special characteristic that it solves inconsistencies by the introduction of more precise names for objects, more exactly names that refer to objects at a moment. The dynamics of the logic captures the change in objects. CAL2 has a nice proof theory, and an intuitive semantics. Interesting results and applications are commented upon, for instance those making use of the notion {\textquoteright}periods of invariance{\textquoteright}. Of course, the philosophical background is discussed.

}, isbn = {0824708059}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {D:pdmdp, title = {On a Partial Decision Method for Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {P{C}{L} 2002. Paraconsistent Computational Logic}, volume = {95}, year = {2002}, note = {

Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at \texttt{http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html}

}, pages = {91{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Roskilde University}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, it forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0207090}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Dekker, Hendrik and Villadsen, Jorgen and Waragai, Toshiharu} } @incollection {DeMey2002, title = {Qualia, spectruminversie en filosofische zombies.}, booktitle = {Het bewustzijn in de fysische wereld: Filosofische essays over materialisme en fenomenaal bewustzijn}, year = {2002}, pages = {171-194}, publisher = {Peeters}, address = {Leuven}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {J. Leilich, P. Reynaert and Veldeman, J.} } @incollection {D:camp, title = {On some Remarkable Relations between Paraconsistent Logics, Modal Logics, and Ambiguity Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {275{\textendash}293}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper concerns some connections between paraconsistent logics, modal logics (mainly S5), and Ambiguity Logic AL (Classical Logic applied to a language in which all letters are indexed and in which quantifiers over such indices are present). S5 may be defined from AL.

Three kinds of connections are illustrated. First, a paraconsistent logic A is presented that has the same expressive power as S5. Next, I consider the definition of paraconsistent logics from S5 and AL. Such definition is shown to work for some logics, for example Priest{\textquoteright}s LP. Other paraconsistent logics appear to withstand such definition, typically those that contain a detachable material implication. Finally, I show that some paraconsistent logics and inconsistency-adaptive logics serve exactly the same purpose as some modal logics and ampliative adaptive logics based on S5. However, they serve this purpose along very different roads and the logics cannot be defined from one another.

The paper intends to open lines of research rather than pursuing them to the end. It also contains a poor person{\textquoteright}s semantics for S5 as well as a description of the simple but useful and powerful AL.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {152596, title = {Subject ingebed? {O}ver het methodologisch individualisme in de sociale wetenschappen.}, booktitle = {De terugkeer van het subject? {R}ecente Ontwikkelingen binnen de filosofie}, year = {2002}, pages = {169{\textendash}179}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, isbn = {90-5867-237-9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Verdonck, Barbara}, editor = {Devos, Rob and Braeckman, Antoon} } @article {152486, title = {Thought experiments, conceivability arguments and conceptual blending}, journal = {Odense Working Papers in Language and Communication}, volume = {24}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, issn = {0906-7612}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @incollection {152663, title = {Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in science}, year = {2002}, pages = {165{\textendash}184}, publisher = {Kluwer}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_10}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {weber2001pragmatic, title = {A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions}, booktitle = {Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium}, series = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Leske \& Budrich}, address = {Keulen}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Blasius, J{\"o}rg and Hox, J. and de Leeuw, E. and Schmidt, P.} } @article {322170, title = {Secondary qualities in retrospect}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {68}, year = {2001}, pages = {41{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primary-secondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntosh{\textquoteright}s analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different primary-secondary quality distinctions to Boyle and Locke. On the other hand, he forbears to attribute a particular primary-secondary quality distinction to them, which, at least in the case of Boyle, differs genuinely from his main distinction between the mechanical affections of matter and all of matter{\textquoteright}s other qualities.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {carnielli2001taxonomy, title = {A taxonomy of C-systems}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2001}, pages = {1-94}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

A thorough investigation of the foundations of paraconsistent logics. Relations between logical principles are formally studied, a novel notion of consistency is introduced, the logics of formal inconsistency, and the subclasses of C-systems and dC-systems are defined and studied. An enormous variety of paraconsistent logics in the literature is shown to constitute C-systems.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E.} } @article {d2001use, title = {The use of metaphors in scientific development: a logical approach}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {215{\textendash}235}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that the use of multiple metaphors plays an important part in scientific reasoning. It is more powerful in generating new ideas than the use of single metaphors. The aim of this paper is twofold. First I will argue, by means of some historical examples, that the combination of metaphors adds a very specific type of dynamics, that makes them more powerful than single metaphors. Secondly, I will discuss an adaptive logic that grasps the use of multiple metaphors and that increases our insight in the reasoning process.

}, author = {D’Hanis, Isabel} } @incollection {121607, title = {Alternative mathematics: the vague way.}, booktitle = {Festschrift in honor of {N}ewton {C}.{A}. da {C}osta on the occasion of his seventieth birthday}, volume = {125}, year = {2000}, pages = {19{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Krause, D{\'e}cio and French, Steven and Doria, Francisco A.} } @incollection {DJ:tabl1, title = {A Tableau Method for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods}, series = {Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence}, volume = {1847}, year = {2000}, pages = {127{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

We present a tableau method for inconsistency-adaptive logics and illustrate it in terms of the two best studied systems. The method is new in that adaptive logics require a more complex structure of the tableaus and of some rules and conditions. As there is no positive test for derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics, the tableau method is important for providing criteria for derivability.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dyckhoff, Roy} } @article {322468, title = {Two New Strategies for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2000}, pages = {65{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

In this paper I present two new strategies for inconsistency- adaptive logics: the reliable sufficient information strategyof ACLuN3 and the minimally abnormal sufficient information strategyof ACLuN4. I give proof theory and semantics for both ACLuN3 and ACLuN4. I also com- pare them with the well-known inconsistency-adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, doi = {10.12775/LLP.2000.004}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof} } @article {DK\&N, title = {Embedding and Interpolation for Some Paralogics. {T}he Propositional Case}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {33}, year = {1999}, pages = {29{\textendash}44}, abstract = {

We consider the very weak paracomplete and paraconsistent logics that are obtained by a straightforward weakening of Classical Logic, as well as some of their maximal extensions that are a fragment of Classical Logic. We prove (for the propositional case) that these logics may be faithfully embedded in Classical Logic (as well as in each other), and that the interpolation theorem obtains for them.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Kurtonina, Natasha} } @article {Kurtonina:1997:BTL:595833.595898, title = {Bisimulations for Temporal Logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, year = {1997}, pages = {403{\textendash}425}, abstract = {

We define bisimulations for temporal logic with Since and Until. This new notion is compared to existing notions of bisimulations, and then used to develop the basic model theory of temporal logic with Since and Until. Our results concern both invariance and definability. We conclude with a brief discussion of the wider applicability of our ideas.

}, keywords = {definability, expressive power, modal and temporal logic, model theory}, issn = {0925-8531}, doi = {10.1023/A:1008223921944}, author = {Kurtonina, Natasha and De Rijke, Maarten} } @article {184851, title = {Simulating without negation.}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, year = {1997}, pages = {501{\textendash}522}, abstract = {

Although negation-free languages are widely used in logic and computer science, relatively little is known about their expressive power. To address this issue we consider kinds of non-symmetric bisimulations called directed simulations, and use these to analyse the expressive power and model theory of negation-free modal and temporal languages. We first use them to obtain preservation, safety and definability results for a simple negation-free modal language. We then obtain analogous results for stronger negation-free languages. Finally, we extend our methods to deal with languages with non-Boolean negation. Keywords: Expressive power, modal logic, negation-free languages.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, author = {Kurtonina, Natasha and De Rijke, Maarten} } @incollection {DJ:real, title = {In-world realism vs. reflective realism.}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {35{\textendash}53}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} } @incollection {257816, title = {Mathematical Experiments and Mathematical Pictures}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {203{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} } @incollection {D:catm\&k, title = {A contextual approach to meaning and knowledge}, booktitle = {Science and Society}, year = {1987}, pages = {84{\textendash}110}, publisher = {VUB-Uitgaven}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Gosselin, M. and Demeyere, F.} } @incollection {D:cwm, title = {Creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek}, booktitle = {Liber Amicorum J.L. Broeckx}, year = {1986}, pages = {29{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Grafisch Bureau M \& Team}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Hen, Ferdinand J. and Riessauw, Anne-Marie and Sabbe, Herman} } @incollection {LA\&D\&a, title = {An empirical investigation on scientific observation}, booktitle = {Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy}, year = {1979}, pages = {3{\textendash}36}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Apostel, Leo and Batens, Diderik and Breusegem, Erwin and De Coninck, Jan and De Waele, Danny and Pinxten, Rik and Swings, Jean and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Vandamme, Fernand}, editor = {Callebaut, Werner and De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {D:ind, title = {Inductie}, booktitle = {Standaard Encyclopedia voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs}, year = {1977}, pages = {180}, publisher = {Standaard}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Block, A. and Ten Have, T.T. and De Keyser, C.C.} } @incollection {D:_inf, title = {Inferentie}, booktitle = {Standaard Encyclopedie voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs}, year = {1977}, pages = {382{\textendash}383}, publisher = {Standaard}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Block, A. and Ten Have, T.T. and De Keyser, C.C.} } @incollection {D:v\&mr, title = {Verisimilitude and meaning relations}, booktitle = {CC77. International Workshop on the Cognitive Viewpoint}, year = {1977}, pages = {321{\textendash}328}, publisher = {Ghent University}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Poriau, M. and Vandamme, Fernand} }