@article {de2013haskell, title = {Haskell before Haskell: an alternative lesson in practical logics of the ENIAC}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, year = {In Press}, abstract = {

This article expands on Curry{\textquoteright}s work on how to implement the problem of inverse interpolation on the ENIAC (1946) and his subsequent work on developing a theory of program composition (1948–1950). It is shown that Curry{\textquoteright}s hands-on experience with the ENIAC on the one side and his acquaintance with systems of formal logic on the other, were conductive to conceive a compact ‘notation for program construction’ which in turn would be instrumental to a mechanical synthesis of programs. Since Curry{\textquoteright}s systematic programming technique pronounces a critique of the Goldstine-von Neumann style of coding, his ‘calculus of program composition’ not only anticipates automatic programming but also proposes explicit hardware optimizations largely unperceived by computer history until Backus{\textquoteright} famous ACM Turing Award lecture (1977). The cohesion of these findings asks for an integrative historiographical approach. An appendix gives, for the first time, a full description of Curry{\textquoteright}s arithmetic compiler.

}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exs072}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Carl{\'e}, Martin and Bullynck, Maarten} } @proceedings {2050, title = {How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference}, year = {2018}, pages = {317-335}, publisher = {College Publications}, type = {submitted}, address = {London}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Frijters, Stef and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Condoravdi, Cleo and Nair, Shyam and Pigozzi, Gabriella} } @incollection {D:AcLFI, title = {Some Adaptive Contributions to Logics of Formal Inconsistency}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, pages = {309 -333}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Some insights were gained from the study of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The aim of the present paper is to put some of these insight to work for the study of logics of formal inconsistency. The focus of attention are application contexts of the aforementioned logics and their theoretical properties in as far as they are relevant for applications. As the questions discussed are difficult but important, a serious attempt was made to make the paper concise but transparent.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, Jean-Yves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @incollection {D:IALtut, title = {Tutorial on Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper contains a concise introduction to a few central features of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The focus is on the aim of the program, on logics that may be useful with respect to applications, and on insights that are central for judging the importance of the research goals and the adequacy of results. Given the nature of adaptive logics, the paper may be read as a peculiar introduction to defeasible reasoning.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, Jean-Yves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @proceedings {Strasser, title = {Dynamic Derivations for Sequent-Based Deductive Argumentation}, journal = {COMMA 2014}, volume = {Computational Models of Argument}, year = {2014}, pages = {89{\textendash}100}, abstract = {

We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentation-based systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzen-style sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer}, editor = {Parsons, Simon and Oren, Nir and Reed, Chris and Cerutti, Federico} } @article {clarke2014modelling, title = {Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {8}, year = {2014}, pages = {1651{\textendash}1681}, abstract = {

Mechanistic philosophy of science views a large part of scientific activity as engaged in modelling mechanisms. While science textbooks tend to offer qualitative models of mechanisms, there is increasing demand for models from which one can draw quantitative predictions and explanations. Casini et al. (Theoria 26(1):5–33, 2011) put forward the Recursive Bayesian Networks (RBN) formalism as well suited to this end. The RBN formalism is an extension of the standard Bayesian net formalism, an extension that allows for modelling the hierarchical nature of mechanisms. Like the standard Bayesian net formalism, it models causal relationships using directed acyclic graphs. Given this appeal to acyclicity, causal cycles pose a prima facie problem for the RBN approach. This paper argues that the problem is a significant one given the ubiquity of causal cycles in mechanisms, but that the problem can be solved by combining two sorts of solution strategy in a judicious way.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0360-7}, author = {Clarke, Brendan and Leuridan, Bert and Williamson, Jon} } @article {4443766, title = {G{\"o}delizing the Yablo sequence}, journal = {Journal of philosophical logic}, volume = {42}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {679{\textendash}695}, abstract = {

We investigate what happens when {\textquoteright}truth{\textquoteright} is replaced with {\textquoteright}provability{\textquoteright} in Yablo{\textquoteright}s paradox. By diagonalization, appropriate sequences of sentences can be constructed. Such sequences contain no sentence decided by the background consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical theory. If the provability predicate satisfies the derivability conditions, each such sentence is provably equivalent to the consistency statement and to the Godel sentence. Thus each two such sentences are provably equivalent to each other. The same holds for the arithmetization of the existential Yablo paradox. We also look at a formulation which employs Rosser{\textquoteright}s provability predicate.

}, issn = {0022-3611}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9244-4}, author = {Cie{\'s}li{\'n}ski, Cezary and Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {D:ronald, title = {Bedoelingen en principes. {E}en onverwachte relatie}, booktitle = {Door Denken en Doen. {E}ssays bij het Werk van {R}onald {C}ommers}, year = {2012}, pages = {93{\textendash}106}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @book {3173717, title = {Door denken en doen: essays bij het werk van Ronald Commers}, year = {2012}, pages = {375}, publisher = {Academia Press}, organization = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Deze bundel is een vriendenboek, uit erkentelijkheid aan Ronald Commers aangeboden naar aanleiding van zijn emeritaat. Ronald Commers was tot 2011 als hoogleraar verbonden aan de vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschap van de Universiteit Gent. Zijn werk is breed en diepgaand en heeft velen ge{\"\i}nspireerd. De bijdragen in deze bundel dragen er de sporen van. Zo divers als de onderwerpen die Commers heeft behandeld, zo divers zijn ook de essays die hier zijn opgenomen. Ze zijn een blijk van waardering vanwege de auteurs voor de invloed die Commers door zijn denken en doen op hun werk en leven heeft gehad en nog steeds heeft. In alfabetische volgorde bevat dit boek essays van: Diderik Batens die nadenkt over bedoelingen, alledaagse principes, symbolische principes en {\textquoteleft}luie{\textquoteright} principes; Karel Boullart die naast een kleine diabologie ook een reflectie presenteert over het belang van het realisme voor de moraalfilosoof; Roger Burggraeve die de broederschap doordenkt als grondslag voor de noties gelijkheid en vrijheid; Tom Claes die op zoek gaat naar positieve effecten van seksualisering; Hubert Dethier die reflecteert over de geschiedenis van het humanisme; Raymond Detrez die het heeft over de visie van G. Schamelhout over de volken van Europa en hun nationale bewegingen; Jan De Vos die onderzoekt hoe hedendaagse vormen van psychologisering geworteld zitten in de moderniteit; Alicja Gescinska die de stelling verdedigt dat de esthetische ervaring nauw verbonden is met de ethische waardering; Freddy Mortier die ingaat op de relatie tussen Wagner en de vrijmetselarij; Rik Pinxten die het moraalwetenschappelijke project en de invloed hiervan op zijn en Commers{\textquoteright} werk traceert; Danny Praet die het intellectueel kader schetst van de Gentse godsdienst-historicus Franz Cumont; Stef Slembrouck die onderzoekt hoe meertaligheid zich voltrekt; Wim Vandekerckhove die parallellen aantoont tussen het 18de eeuwse slavenhandeldebat en het hedendaagse debat over kinderarbeid en {\textquoteleft}bonded labour;{\textquoteright} Gertrudis Van de Vijver die de vraag stelt wat de sofist nog voor de (post-)moderne denker kan betekenen; Eric Vanhaute die op zoek gaat naar de legitimering van de nieuwe wereldgeschiedenis; An Verlinden die de begeesterende indruk van Ronald Commers{\textquoteright} onderwijs, denken en activisme op haar eigen wijsgerig en ge{\"e}ngageerd werk en denken belicht; Etienne Vermeersch die een gedachtewisseling presenteert omtrent de mogelijkheid van de menselijke vrije wil; en Erik Weber die argumenteert dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme.

}, isbn = {9789038219431}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @incollection {2094355, title = {Het doel van wetenschap: is er een derde weg tussen onbeperkt intentioneel realisme en strikt pragmatisme?}, booktitle = {Door Denken en Doen. Essays bij het Werk van {R}onald {C}ommers}, year = {2012}, pages = {243{\textendash}253}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Ik onderscheid drie posities met betrekking tot het doel van wetenschap: onbeperkt intentioneel realisme, strikt pragmatisme en gesofistikeerd pragmatisme. Ik argumenteer dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme: ze komen beide neer op "anything goes." Dit betekent dat gesofistikeerd pragmatisme niet de gulden middenweg is die het op het eerste zicht lijkt te zijn.

}, isbn = {9789038219431}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @incollection {Christiaens2012, title = {Metaphysics and Cinema}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {118-141}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {1217131, title = {The symbolic model for algebra: functions and mechanisms}, booktitle = {Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology}, volume = {314}, year = {2010}, pages = {519{\textendash}532}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The symbolic mode of reasoning in algebra, as it emerged during the sixteenth century, can be considered as a form of model-based reasoning. In this paper we will discuss the functions and mechanisms of this model and show how the model relates to its arithmetical basis. We will argue that the symbolic model was made possible by the epistemic justification of the basic operations of algebra as practiced within the abbaco tradition. We will also show that this form of model-based reasoning facilitated the expansion of the number concept from Renaissance interpretations of number to the full notion of algebraic numbers.

}, isbn = {9783642152221}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15223-8\_29}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Carnielli, Walter A. and Pizzi, Claudio} } @incollection {D:paraty, title = {Adaptive Cn Logics}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This paper solves an old problem: to devise decent inconsistency-adaptive logics that have the \C{n} logics as their lower limit. Two kinds of logics are presented. Those of the first kind offer a maximally consistent interpretation of the premise set in as far as this is possible in view of logical considerations. At the same time, they indicate at which points further choices may be made on extra-logical grounds. The logics of the second kind allow one to introduce those choices in a defeasible way and handle them.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {JK:gdt, title = {Goal-Directed Tableaux}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {241{\textendash}256}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This paper contains a new format for analytic tableaux, called goal-directed tableaux. Their main interest lies in the fact that the search for a closed tableau proceeds in a highly constrained way. The goal-directed tableaux do not form a complete decision method for propositional classical logic (because they do not sustain Ex Falso Quodlibet). For consistent sets of premises, however, they lead to the same results as the usual analytic tableaux for classical logic.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {Christiaens2009, title = {La m{\'e}tamorphose gra{\c c}e au cin{\`e}ma.}, booktitle = {La m{\'e}tamorphose: d{\'e}finition, formes et th{\`e}mes}, year = {2009}, publisher = {G{\'e}rard Monfort Editeur}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Tatham, Anne-Marie and Bonnecase, Denis} } @incollection {primieroprioritized, title = {Prioritized Dynamic Retraction Function on Non-monotonic Information Updates}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {443-463}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

In this paper a model for updates on belief sets and retractions thereof is introduced using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core of the update retraction procedure is represented by abnormal expressions derivable in the language: they express updates with information con- tradicting previously derived contents. The adaptive strategy aims at restricting the validity of these formulas by focusing at each decreasing degree on the update which is the most rational to retract in order to re- store consistency as soon as possible. This work is related to the standard operations of retraction and withdrawal from the AGM-paradigm and the e ects of dynamic operations such as public announcement in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {924546, title = {Strategies: what{\textquoteright}s in a name?}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {287{\textendash}306}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will show that Hintikka’s notion of ‘strategy’ can refer to proof-heuristic reasoning as well as to methodological reasoning forms. Stating this distinction allows for a better understanding of the notion and for an easier way to tackle the problem of formalization. Contrary to Hintikka’s opinion, heuristic reasoning can be implemented in formal proofs by means of goal-directed proof procedures. Methodological reasoning forms on the other hand can be formally represented by means of adaptive logics.

}, isbn = {9781904987789}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {ciuciura2008negations, title = {Negations in the adjunctive discursive logic}, journal = {Bulletin of the Section of Logic}, volume = {37}, number = {3-4}, year = {2008}, pages = {143{\textendash}160}, abstract = {

In the logical literature, Discursive (or Discussive) Logic introduced by Stanis law Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski is seen as one of the earliest examples of the so-called paraconsistent logic. Nevertheless, there is some confusion over what discursive logic actually is. One of the possible sources of the confusion may be easily discerned; it comes from the fact that Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski published his two papers in Polish and their English translations appeared many years later.1 Up till 1999, no one but a Polish reader was able to read Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s paper on the discursive conjunction and, consequently some authors took discursive logic to be a foremost example of a non-adjunctive logic. The situation became even more complicated when da Costa, Dubikajtis and Kotas presented an axiomatization with discursive connectives as primitive symbols. It turned out that a connective of the discursive conjunction they considered did not correspond to any of Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s connectives. Thus, their axiomatization contained some axiom schemata that were not generally valid in Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s logic. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the confusion surrounding the discursive logic. We will present a direct semantics and axiomatization of Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s adjunctive discursive logic and show how to define and axiomatize two additional connectives of negation.

}, author = {Ciuciura, Janusz} } @incollection {D:LiPoS, title = {The Role of Logic in Philosophy of Science}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {47{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London, New York}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Psillos, Stathis and Curd, Martin} } @incollection {Christiaens2007, title = {Some notes on {A}erts{\textquoteright} interpretation of the {E}{P}{R}-paradox and the violation of {B}ell-inequalities}, booktitle = {Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality, Probability and Axiomatics}, year = {2007}, pages = {250{\textendash}286}, publisher = {World Scientific}, author = {Christiaens, Wim and Czachor, Marek}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Durt, Thomas} } @article {Christiaens2006a, title = {Basic Ontology and the Ontology of the Phenomenological Life World: A Proposal}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {11}, number = {3}, year = {2006}, pages = {249-274}, abstract = {

The condition of explicit theoretically discursive cognitive performance, as it culminates in scientific activity, is, I claim, the life world. I contrast life world and scientific world and argue that the latter arises from the first and that contrary to the prevailing views the scientific world (actually, worlds, since the classical world is substantially different from the quantum world) finds its completion in the life world and not the other way around. In other words: the closure we used to search in a complete and comprehensive scientific description of all aspects of experience by referring it back to underlying atoms, genes and other scientific objects and the covering laws ruling them, should be sought in a reintegrating and occasionally dissolving of the abstract scientific model in the self-organizational fluidity and superposition-like indeterminateness and non-locality of the life world: “We have to acknowledge the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon” (Merleau-Ponty in his The Phenomenology of Perception).

}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, process ontology}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {10.1007/s10699-004-5909-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-004-5909-y}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {Christiaens2006, title = {Lichamelijkheid en cinema volgens een {A}posteliaanse ontologie}, journal = {Esthetica. Tijdschrift voor kunst en filosofie}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {1{\textendash}8}, abstract = {

In 1998 verschenen twee opmerkelijke films, Saving Private Ryan van Steven Spielberg en The Thin Red Line van Terrence Malick. De overeenkomsten tussen deze producties zijn oppervlakkig: ze gaan beide over de Tweede Wereldoorlog en het zijn allebei grote Hollywoodproducties. De verschillen daarentegen zijn diepgaand en nodigen uit tot nadenken over de aard van film. Ik zal eerst enkele verschillen en contrasten tussen genoemde films schetsen, bij wijze van inleiding tot de thema’s ontologie, cinema en lichamelijkheid. Daarna komen in (2) de volgende onderwerpen aan de orde: (2.1) film is het tot stand komen van een lichamelijkheid binnen onze eigen lichamelijkheid; en voorts (2.2) lichamelijkheid is een ontologisch proces. De ontologie waarbinnen ik werk is gebaseerd op de inzichten van Leo Apostel. In dit deel zal ik daarom ook de centrale aspecten van de Aposteliaanse ontologie beschrijven. Ik zal verder (3.) een verband leggen tussen de cinema van Malick en de Aposteliaanse ontologie. Op basis van deze ontologie maak ik in (4.) een onderscheid tussen films zoals Saving Private Ryan, waarin het ontologische (de lichamelijkheid) impliciet gehouden wordt, en films zoals The Thin Red Line die dat niet doen.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {C:bioApo, title = {Biografie van Leo Apostel}, booktitle = {Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek}, year = {2005}, pages = {23-34}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {397669, title = {Introduction: beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {197{\textendash}201}, issn = {1386-9795}, doi = {10.1080/1386979042000258303}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Cuypers, Stefaan} } @incollection {Christiaens2003, title = {The EPR-Experiment and Free Process Theory}, booktitle = {Process Theories. {C}ross-Disciplinary Studies on Dynamic Categories}, year = {2003}, pages = {267-284}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

As part of the ‘creation-discovery’ interpretation of quantum mechanics Diederik Aerts presented a setting with macroscopical coincidence experiments designed to exhibit significant conceptual analogies between portions of stuff and quantum compound entities in a singlet state in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bell-experiments (EPR-experiments). One important claim of the creation-discovery view is that the singlet state describes an entity that does not have a definite position in space and thus ‘does not exist in space’. ‘Free Process Theory’ is a recent proposal by Johanna Seibt of an integrated ontology, i.e., of an ontology suitable for the interpretation of theories of the macrophysical and microphysical domain (quantum field theory). The framework of free process theory allows us to show systematically the relevant analogies and disanalogies between Aerts’ experiment and EPR-experiments. From free process ontology it also follows quite naturally that the quantum compound entity described by the singlet state ‘does not exist in space.’

}, isbn = {978-1-4020-1751-3}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Seibt, Johanna} } @conference {403803, title = {Explaining laws by reduction}, booktitle = {Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Scientific explanations have been intensively studied by philosophers of science during the last five decades. Explanations of laws did not receive as much attention as explanations of particular facts. In this article, I present a model for one type of explanations of laws: reductions of laws to phenomena at a micro-level. Examples of such reductions can be found in the natural sciences (the ideal gas law is probably the most famous example here) and in the social sciences (e.g., reduction of macroeconomic laws to the behaviour of individual economic agents).

}, isbn = {140201645X}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-2612-2_9}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Rojsczak, A and Cachro, J and Kurczewski, G} } @article {287734, title = {Non-spatiality and EPR-experiments according to the creation-discovery view}, journal = {Foundations of Physics Letters}, volume = {16}, number = {4}, year = {2003}, month = {August}, pages = {379{\textendash}387}, abstract = {

The creation-discovery interpretation of the EPR-experiments, developed by D. Aerts, draws our attention on the role of spacetime in our description of the physical world: the EPR-experiments give us reason to believe that quantum entities do not always exist in space. This interpretation of the quantum description would explain the peculiar correlations obtained in these experiments as arising from the most obvious candidate for a common cause, the entity described by the singlet state. The absence of unique and determinate localization as a criterium for individuation is met by a new physical ontology. We use it to obtain a better understanding of the interaction between quantum individuals and spacetime.

}, issn = {0894-9875}, doi = {10.1023/A:1025317910387}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {christiaens2003note, title = {A note concerning the place of contradictions in the ontologies of constitution}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {67{\textendash}72}, abstract = {

In this first section we start with defining the notions of inconsistency and para-consistency, we give an example of an inconsistency and clarify what according to us is the basic problem with respect to the occurrence of inconsistencies. We are then in a position to state the aim of this paper

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {J:alpt, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Pragmatic Truth}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {167{\textendash}185}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper presents the new adaptive logic APT. APT has the peculiar property that it enables one to interpret a (possibly inconsistent) theory Gamma {\textquoteright}as pragmatically as possible{\textquoteright}. The aim is to capture the idea of a partial structure (in the sense of da Costa and associates) that adequately models a (possibly inconsistent) set of beliefs Gamma. What this comes to is that APT localizes the {\textquoteright}consistent core{\textquoteright} of Gamma, and that it delivers all sentences that are compatible with this core. For the core itself, APT is just as rich as Classical Logic. APT is defined from a modal adaptive logic APV that is based itself on two other adaptive logics. I present the semantics of all three systems, as well as their dynamic proof theory. The dynamic proof theory for APV is unusual (even within the adaptive logic programme) in that it incorporates two different kinds of dynamics.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @phdthesis {PhD_Brenda, title = {Epistemologie}, year = {2002}, month = {September 6}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Casteleyn, Brenda} } @incollection {vermeir2002inconsistency, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Proof Procedure for Logic Programming}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {323-340}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

It is the goal of this paper to de ne a paraconsistent proof procedure that has the best of two mechanisms, in casu logic programming and inconsistency-adaptive logics. From logic programming we will maintain the ease of computing, and from adaptive logics their paraconsistency, dynamics and non-monotonicity. This will be done by combining the notion of competitor from logic programming together with the conditionallity that is common in all adaptive proofs.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {Amo2002, title = {A Logical Framework for Integrating Inconsistent Information in Multiple Databases}, booktitle = {Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {2284}, year = {2002}, pages = {67-84}, publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, abstract = {

When integrating data coming from multiple different sources we are faced with the possibility of inconsistency in databases. In this paper, we use one of the paraconsistent logics introduced in [9,7] (LFI1) as a logical framework to model possibly inconsistent database instances obtained by integrating different sources.We propose a method based on the sound and complete tableau proof system of LFI1 to treat both the integration process and the evolution of the integrated database submitted to users updates. In order to treat the integrated database evolution, we introduce a kind of generalized database context, the evolutionary databases, which are databases having the capability of storing and manipulating inconsistent information and, at the same time, allowing integrity constraints to change in time. We argue that our approach is sufficiently general and can be applied in most circumstances where inconsistency may arise in databases.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-43220-3}, doi = {10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, author = {de Amo, Sandra and Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Eiter, Thomas and Schewe, Klaus-Dieter} } @incollection {402884, title = {Ontological causes of inconsistency and a change-adaptive, logical solution}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, volume = {228}, year = {2002}, pages = {151{\textendash}166}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, abstract = {

This paper reveals an implicit ontological assumption that is presupposed in common thought. This assumption results in the fact that people usually do not make any distinction between {\textquoteright}the object a{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}the object a at a given moment{\textquoteright}. This laziness causes many inconsistencies. Several attempts to solve these inconsistencies are studied, and the most natural one is elaborated, namely the one obtained by applying Classical Logic to an ontological correct domain. This solution has a drawback with respect to communication, which is solved by the change-adaptive logic CAL2. This non-monotonic, paraconsistent logic, belongs to the family of ambiguity-adaptive logics. It has the special characteristic that it solves inconsistencies by the introduction of more precise names for objects, more exactly names that refer to objects at a moment. The dynamics of the logic captures the change in objects. CAL2 has a nice proof theory, and an intuitive semantics. Interesting results and applications are commented upon, for instance those making use of the notion {\textquoteright}periods of invariance{\textquoteright}. Of course, the philosophical background is discussed.

}, isbn = {0824708059}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {D:camp, title = {On some Remarkable Relations between Paraconsistent Logics, Modal Logics, and Ambiguity Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {275{\textendash}293}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper concerns some connections between paraconsistent logics, modal logics (mainly S5), and Ambiguity Logic AL (Classical Logic applied to a language in which all letters are indexed and in which quantifiers over such indices are present). S5 may be defined from AL.

Three kinds of connections are illustrated. First, a paraconsistent logic A is presented that has the same expressive power as S5. Next, I consider the definition of paraconsistent logics from S5 and AL. Such definition is shown to work for some logics, for example Priest{\textquoteright}s LP. Other paraconsistent logics appear to withstand such definition, typically those that contain a detachable material implication. Finally, I show that some paraconsistent logics and inconsistency-adaptive logics serve exactly the same purpose as some modal logics and ampliative adaptive logics based on S5. However, they serve this purpose along very different roads and the logics cannot be defined from one another.

The paper intends to open lines of research rather than pursuing them to the end. It also contains a poor person{\textquoteright}s semantics for S5 as well as a description of the simple but useful and powerful AL.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @phdthesis {PhD_Wim, title = {De Cirkel Sluiten. Aanzet tot een Wetenschappelijke Metafysica}, year = {2001}, note = {

Promotor: Diderik Batens

}, month = {January 19}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @conference {carnielli2001ex, title = {Ex contradictione non sequitur quodlibet}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2000 Advanced Reasoning Forum Conference}, year = {2001}, abstract = {

We summarize here the main arguments, basic research lines, and results on the foundations of the logics of formal inconsistency. These involve, in particular, some classes of well-known paraconsistent systems. We also present their semantical interpretations by way of possible-translations semantics and their applications to human reasoning and machine reasoning.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o} } @proceedings {caleiro2001non, title = {Non-truth-functional fibred semantics}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}-{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, volume = {2}, year = {2001}, pages = {841{\textendash}847}, publisher = {CSREA Press}, abstract = {

Until recently, truth-functionality has been considered essential to the mechanism for combining logics known as fibring. Following the first efforts towards extending fibred semantics to logics with nontruth- functional operators, this paper aims to clarify the subject at the light of ideas borrowed from the theory of general logics as institutions and the novel notion of non-truth-functional room. Besides introducing the relevant concepts and constructions, the paper presents a detailed worked example combining classical first-order logic with the paraconsistent propositional system C1, for which a meaningful semantics is obtained. The possibility of extending this technique to build rst-order versions of further logics of formal inconsistency is also discussed.

}, author = {Caleiro, Carlos and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @proceedings {carnielli_tableau_2001, title = {Tableau systems for logics of formal inconsistency}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}-{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, year = {2001}, pages = {848-852}, publisher = {{CSREA} Press, Athens {GA}, {USA}}, abstract = {

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFI’s) are logics that allow to explicitly formalize the concepts of consistency and inconsistency by means of formulas of their language. Contradictoriness, on the other hand, can always be expressed in any logic, provided its language includes a symbol for negation. Besides being able to represent the distinction between contradiction and inconsistency, LFI’s are non-explosive logics, in the sense that a contradiction does not entail arbitrary statements, but yet are gently explosive, in the sense that, adjoining the additional requirement of consistency, then contradictoriness do cause explosion. Several logics can be seen as LFI’s, among them the great majority of paraconsistent systems developed under the Brazilian and Polish tradition. We present here tableau systems for some important LFI’s: bC, Ci and LFI1.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @incollection {carnielli2001taxonomy, title = {A taxonomy of C-systems}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2001}, pages = {1-94}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

A thorough investigation of the foundations of paraconsistent logics. Relations between logical principles are formally studied, a novel notion of consistency is introduced, the logics of formal inconsistency, and the subclasses of C-systems and dC-systems are defined and studied. An enormous variety of paraconsistent logics in the literature is shown to constitute C-systems.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E.} } @article {christiaens2001universe, title = {This Universe Is the {\textquoteleft}Best{\textquoteright} of All Possible Worlds. {A} Tentative Reconstruction of the Metaphysical System of Leo Apostel}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2001}, pages = {115-146}, abstract = {

After presenting Apostel’s views on scientific realism, I present definitions of the concepts of ontology and metaphysics. I then proceed to develop Apostel’s basic ontology and his metaphysics. Apostel proposed a particular understanding of existence based on his views on causation. He also developed a view of the universe as a causal self-explaining system. I discuss and illustrate three kinds of what he calls “metaphysical deductions” that aim to deliver such a view of the universe. The most important one is the Leibnizian variational method, that should allow us to deduce the existing universe as the ‘best’ of all possible worlds.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {Christiaens2000, title = {De eenheid van de inhoud}, booktitle = {Natuurfilosofie. Voorbereidend werk voor een op de fysica gebaseerde ontologie}, year = {2000}, pages = {9-35}, publisher = {VUB}, abstract = {

In deze tekst richten we onze aandacht niet zozeer op het inleiding van manuscripten Natuurfilosofie en Oorsprong. Veelmeer belichten we de belangrijkste bouwstenen van Apostels project voor een metafysica en proberen we enkele centrale noties te verhelderen. Met de titel {\textquoteright}de eenheid van de inhoud{\textquoteright} wordt reed gewezen op het coherente onderbouwde idee{\"e}ngoed van Apostel. We zullen zien dat het begrip causaliteit als een rode draad doorheen Apostels filosofie loopt. We gaan er dan ook iets uitvoeriger op in. We kunnen hier evenwel niet uitgebreid ingaan op alle aspecten die we ter sprake brengen, maar zullen geregeld verwijzen naar publicaties in de voetnoten. We hopen op deze manier ge{\"\i}nteresseerden een instrument in handen te geven dat toelaat dieper in te gaan op de filosofie van Apostel.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Apostel, Leo} } @article {109728, title = {World Models and Inconsistencies.}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {285{\textendash}311}, abstract = {

A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {248905, title = {Realism and scientific explanations}, booktitle = {The Many Problems of Realism}, year = {1995}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Tilburg University Press}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Cortois, Paul} } @article {D\&PC:tep, title = {The two-envelope paradox: the infinite case}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {54}, year = {1994}, pages = {46{\textendash}49}, author = {Castel, Paul and Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {241638, title = {Waarom {W}esley {S}almons causaal-mechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {81-86}, publisher = {VUB Press}, isbn = {9789054870845}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Cornelis, Gustaaf C} } @incollection {219925, title = {De verklarende kracht van statistische hypothesen}, booktitle = {Acta Filosofiedag 1990}, year = {1992}, pages = {53-56}, publisher = {Ebduron}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Commers, Ronald} } @incollection {LA\&D\&a, title = {An empirical investigation on scientific observation}, booktitle = {Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy}, year = {1979}, pages = {3{\textendash}36}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Apostel, Leo and Batens, Diderik and Breusegem, Erwin and De Coninck, Jan and De Waele, Danny and Pinxten, Rik and Swings, Jean and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Vandamme, Fernand}, editor = {Callebaut, Werner and De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Vandamme, Fernand} }