@incollection {D:JP65, title = {Kennissystemen selectief wieden}, booktitle = {Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem}, year = {2018}, pages = {227{\textendash}244}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent, Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {978-94-014-5589-3}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Ducheyne, Steffen and Allo, Patrick} } @incollection {2054, title = {An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Obligation and Permission}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, pages = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, author = {Anglberger, Albert and Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Korbmacher, Johannes} } @incollection {D:JP, title = {The Consistency of {P}eano {A}rithmetic. {A} Defeasible Perspective}, booktitle = {Modestly Radical or Radically Modest. Festschrift for Jean Paul Van Bendegem on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday}, year = {2014}, pages = {11{\textendash}59}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

This paper proposes to replace \sys{PA}, Peano Arithmetic, by a theory \sys{APA} defined in terms of (i)\ a set of axioms that is classically equivalent to the Peano axioms and (ii)\ a defeasible logic that minimizes inconsistency, viz.\ an inconsistency-adaptive logic. If \sys{PA} is consistent, its set of theorems coincides with the set of \sys{APA}-theorems. If \sys{PA} is inconsistent, \sys{APA} is non-trivial and has the following remarkable property: there is a unique non-standard number that is its own successor and every {\textquoteleft}desirable{\textquoteright} \sys{PA}-theorem is retained if restricted to the other numbers. The restriction can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. And there is much more.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Allo, Patrick and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @proceedings {Strasser, title = {Dynamic Derivations for Sequent-Based Deductive Argumentation}, journal = {COMMA 2014}, volume = {Computational Models of Argument}, year = {2014}, pages = {89{\textendash}100}, abstract = {

We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentation-based systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzen-style sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer}, editor = {Parsons, Simon and Oren, Nir and Reed, Chris and Cerutti, Federico} } @article {Straser2014, title = {Sequent-Based Argumentation for Normative Reasoning}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {8554}, year = {2014}, pages = {224{\textendash}240}, abstract = {

In this paper we present an argumentative approach to normative reasoning. Special attention is paid to normative conflicts, contrary-to-duty and specificity cases. These are modeled by means of argumentative attacks. For this, we adopt a recently proposed frame- work for logical argumentation in which arguments are generated by a sequent calculus of a given base logic (Arieli, CLIMA’2013, pp.69–85), and use an intuitionistic variant of stan- dard deontic logic as our base logic. Argumentative attacks are realized by elimination rules that allow to discharge specific sequents. We demonstrate our system by means of various well-known benchmark examples.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer} } @incollection {2020639, title = {Can economics become a purely experimental science? {A} comparative study}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world}, year = {2012}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

}, isbn = {9789814383073}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {Ducheyne2012, title = {History and Philosophy of Science: From Peaceful Coexistence to Golden Age of Interdisciplinarity?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {26-36}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {DeVreese2012, title = {An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {55-71}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, abstract = {

In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the {\textquoteleft}truth{\textquoteright} about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White{\textquoteright}s theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity

}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {Christiaens2012, title = {Metaphysics and Cinema}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {118-141}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @proceedings {2973606, title = {An {A}ndersonian deontic logic with contextualized sanctions}, journal = {11th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, DEON2012}, year = {2012}, pages = {151-169}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

We present a refinement of Anderson{\textquoteright}s reduction of deontic logic to modal logic with only alethic modalities. The refined proposal contextualizes the Andersonian sanction constant s by replacing it with a unary sanction operator S that is dependent on the concrete normative requirement that is violated. A formula S B is then for instance interpreted as ldquo B causes a sanctionrdquo or as ldquo B provides a reason for (the applicability of) a sanctionrdquo. Due to its modified sanction operator, the resulting logic DSL invalidates some instances of the inheritance principle. This gives rise to new interesting features. For instance, DSL consistently allows for the presence of conflicting obligations. Moreover, it provides novel insights in various central {\textquoteleft}paradoxes{\textquoteright} in deontic logic such as the Ross paradox, the paradox of the good Samaritan, and Forrester{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteleft}gentle murderer{\textquoteright} paradox.

}, isbn = {9783642315695}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Agotnes, Thomas and Broersen, Jan and Elgesem, Dag} } @proceedings {dereasoning, title = {Reasoning with computer-assisted experiments in mathematics}, journal = {Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, year = {2012}, pages = {80-92}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} door Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Allo, Patrick} } @incollection {1890996, title = {What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? {E}xploring the contours of epistemic democracy}, booktitle = {Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science}, volume = {11}, year = {2012}, pages = {35{\textendash}48}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator{\textquoteright}s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.

}, isbn = {9789400720817}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Le Roy, Frederik and Stalpaert, Christel and Aerts, Diederik} } @incollection {VanBouwel2011, title = {An atlas for the social world: what should it (not) look like? {I}nterdisciplinarity and pluralism in the social sciences}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Worlds, Cultures and Society.}, series = {Worldviews, science and us : interdisciplinary perspectives on worlds, cultures and society}, year = {2011}, pages = {43{\textendash}72}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in section 1, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in section 2, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory-, method-, metaphysics-, and question-driven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with actual proposals made by, inter alia, World-Systems Analysis, Critical Realism and Economics Imperialism. Building on the framework of explanatory pluralism I have been developing before, I will make a case for question-driven interdisciplinarity in section 3. My argument for question-driven interdisciplinarity will be illustrated in section 4 by discussing recent developments in economics (i.e., the debate between the orthodoxy and heterodox theories, the pleas for pluralism, and the impact of globalisation {\textendash}and related institutional developments- on economics as a discipline). In conclusion, the contours of an adequate atlas for the social world should become clearer; when to use the different maps, how to activate the dialogue between social scientific disciplines in order to draw the different maps, and the risks of globalisation for social science (and adequate map making).

}, isbn = {9789814355056}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Pinxten, Rik and Wallerstein, Immanuel} } @incollection {primieronecessity, title = {On the necessity of (sometimes) being synthetic. {C}omment on {P}oggiolesi.}, booktitle = {Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, year = {2011}, pages = {63-68}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussels}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Allo, Patrick and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @proceedings {1861627, title = {A paraconsistent multi-agent framework for dealing with normative conflicts}, journal = {12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XII)}, year = {2011}, pages = {312-329}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra- and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms {\textquoteright}as consistently as possible{\textquoteright}.

}, isbn = {9783642223587}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Leite, Joao and Torroni, Paolo and Agotnes, Thomas and Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leon} } @article {Allo2011, title = {Report 3rd Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {1}, number = {5}, year = {2011}, pages = {6-7}, author = {Allo, Patrick and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {909568, title = {What About Interdisciplinarity Within Philosophy?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and Its Implications For Our Perspectives on the World}, year = {2010}, pages = {10{\textendash}25}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik} } @incollection {D:rescher, title = {On Possibilities and Thought Experiments}, booktitle = {Rescher Studies. {A} Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of {N}icholas {R}escher}, year = {2008}, pages = {29{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Ontos Verlag}, address = {Frankfurt}, abstract = {

This paper concerns two related recent books by Nicholas Rescher, Imagining Irreality on possibilities and What If? on thought experiments. Apart from an expository part, the present contribution consist on the one hand of some proposed elaborations, especially of two technical points, and on the other hand of some discussion concerning points where I am in doubt about Rescher{\textquoteright}s precise stand and of some suggestions for further research.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Almeder, Robert} } @conference {WaartvanGulik2007, title = {On the Implementation of Concept Structures in Fuzzy Logic.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

A procedure is presented which can modify a large number of fuzzy logics in such a way that the result integrates a logically meaningful representation of the family resemblance structure of fuzzy concepts. The most important aspect of this modification is the implementation of so-called ‘concept matrices’. The interpretation and construction of these new formal objects is based upon Fintan Costello’s ‘Diagnostic Evidence Model’ (2000), a contemporary cognitive scientific model of concept structure and concept combination. As a result, it becomes possible to formalize, explain and simulate new logical aspects of cognitive fuzziness such as meaning transformations by means of non-scalar hedges, and interpretational and inferential operations over non-intersective concept combinations.

}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Vosniadou, S. and Kayser, D. and Athanassios, P.} } @incollection {Christiaens2007, title = {Some notes on {A}erts{\textquoteright} interpretation of the {E}{P}{R}-paradox and the violation of {B}ell-inequalities}, booktitle = {Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality, Probability and Axiomatics}, year = {2007}, pages = {250{\textendash}286}, publisher = {World Scientific}, author = {Christiaens, Wim and Czachor, Marek}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Durt, Thomas} } @incollection {VanBouwel2006, title = {The idea of social mechanisms in social scientific explanations.}, booktitle = {Progress in Social Psychology Research}, series = {Advances in social psychology research}, year = {2006}, pages = {83{\textendash}95}, publisher = {Nova Science}, isbn = {1594546584}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Arlsdale, John Z.} } @incollection {J:ep\&aal, title = {Empirical Progress and Ampliative Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers. Vol. 1}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {83}, year = {2005}, pages = {193{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Festa, Roberto and Aliseda, Atocha and Peijnenburg, Jeanne} } @proceedings {caleiro2001non, title = {Non-truth-functional fibred semantics}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}-{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, volume = {2}, year = {2001}, pages = {841{\textendash}847}, publisher = {CSREA Press}, abstract = {

Until recently, truth-functionality has been considered essential to the mechanism for combining logics known as fibring. Following the first efforts towards extending fibred semantics to logics with nontruth- functional operators, this paper aims to clarify the subject at the light of ideas borrowed from the theory of general logics as institutions and the novel notion of non-truth-functional room. Besides introducing the relevant concepts and constructions, the paper presents a detailed worked example combining classical first-order logic with the paraconsistent propositional system C1, for which a meaningful semantics is obtained. The possibility of extending this technique to build rst-order versions of further logics of formal inconsistency is also discussed.

}, author = {Caleiro, Carlos and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @proceedings {carnielli_tableau_2001, title = {Tableau systems for logics of formal inconsistency}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}-{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, year = {2001}, pages = {848-852}, publisher = {{CSREA} Press, Athens {GA}, {USA}}, abstract = {

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFI’s) are logics that allow to explicitly formalize the concepts of consistency and inconsistency by means of formulas of their language. Contradictoriness, on the other hand, can always be expressed in any logic, provided its language includes a symbol for negation. Besides being able to represent the distinction between contradiction and inconsistency, LFI’s are non-explosive logics, in the sense that a contradiction does not entail arbitrary statements, but yet are gently explosive, in the sense that, adjoining the additional requirement of consistency, then contradictoriness do cause explosion. Several logics can be seen as LFI’s, among them the great majority of paraconsistent systems developed under the Brazilian and Polish tradition. We present here tableau systems for some important LFI’s: bC, Ci and LFI1.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @incollection {Christiaens2000, title = {De eenheid van de inhoud}, booktitle = {Natuurfilosofie. Voorbereidend werk voor een op de fysica gebaseerde ontologie}, year = {2000}, pages = {9-35}, publisher = {VUB}, abstract = {

In deze tekst richten we onze aandacht niet zozeer op het inleiding van manuscripten Natuurfilosofie en Oorsprong. Veelmeer belichten we de belangrijkste bouwstenen van Apostels project voor een metafysica en proberen we enkele centrale noties te verhelderen. Met de titel {\textquoteright}de eenheid van de inhoud{\textquoteright} wordt reed gewezen op het coherente onderbouwde idee{\"e}ngoed van Apostel. We zullen zien dat het begrip causaliteit als een rode draad doorheen Apostels filosofie loopt. We gaan er dan ook iets uitvoeriger op in. We kunnen hier evenwel niet uitgebreid ingaan op alle aspecten die we ter sprake brengen, maar zullen geregeld verwijzen naar publicaties in de voetnoten. We hopen op deze manier ge{\"\i}nteresseerden een instrument in handen te geven dat toelaat dieper in te gaan op de filosofie van Apostel.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Apostel, Leo} } @incollection {von1998if, title = {What, if anything, is an experiment in mathematics?}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science}, year = {1998}, pages = {172{\textendash}182}, publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Anapolitanos, Dionysios and Baltas, Aristides and Tsinorema, Stavroula} } @incollection {D:determinisme, title = {Determinisme en indeterminisme}, booktitle = {Verwijdering of ontmoeting?}, year = {1994}, pages = {183{\textendash}202}, publisher = {Pelckmans}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Verbeure, Frans and Apostel, Leo} } @incollection {D:rssm\&l, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, booktitle = {Reason, Emotion and Music. {T}owards a Common Structure for Arts, Sciences and Philosophies, Based on a Conceptual Framework for the Description of Music}, year = {1986}, note = {

Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}

}, pages = {127{\textendash}143}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Apostel, Leo and Sabbe, Herman and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D\&AA, title = {Russell{\textquoteright}s Set versus the Universal Set in Paraconsistent Set Theory}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {25}, number = {98}, year = {1982}, pages = {121{\textendash}133}, author = {Arruda, Ayda I. and Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {LA\&D\&a, title = {An empirical investigation on scientific observation}, booktitle = {Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy}, year = {1979}, pages = {3{\textendash}36}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Apostel, Leo and Batens, Diderik and Breusegem, Erwin and De Coninck, Jan and De Waele, Danny and Pinxten, Rik and Swings, Jean and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Vandamme, Fernand}, editor = {Callebaut, Werner and De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Vandamme, Fernand} }