@incollection {1980039,
	title = {Rules regresses},
	booktitle = {AGPC 2010 Proceedings},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {79{\textendash}92},
	publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences},
	abstract = {<p>Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as {\textquoteright}if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p{\textquoteright}? Gluer and Wikforss (2009) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a {\textquoteright}dilemma of regress and idleness{\textquoteright}, as Gluer and Wikforss have dubbed it.</p>},
	url = {http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc10/},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}
}
