@incollection {Wieland2014,
	title = {Internalism Does Entail Scepticism},
	booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality},
	series = {Logic, Argumentation \& Reasoning},
	volume = {5},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {247-260},
	publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	abstract = {<p>Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philies solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.</p>},
	keywords = {Internalism, Knowledge, Regress, Rule, Scepticism},
	isbn = {978-94-017-9010-9},
	doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_13},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem},
	editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke}
}
