@article {152660,
	title = {Symposium on Explanation and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts?},
	journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
	volume = {18},
	number = {2},
	year = {2002},
	pages = {259{\textendash}275},
	abstract = {<p>Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels social, psychological, biological, etc.  which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.</p>},
	issn = {0266-2671},
	author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}
}
