@article {415526,
	title = {The paradox of conceptual novelty and {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s use of experiments},
	journal = {Philosophy of Science},
	volume = {72},
	number = {5},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {864{\textendash}875},
	abstract = {<p>Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyr{\'e}s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileos work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileos conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileos use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileos pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileos experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.</p>},
	issn = {0031-8248},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10928},
	author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}
}
