@article {1019750,
	title = {Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project},
	journal = {Philosophy of Science},
	volume = {76},
	number = {5},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {389{\textendash}400},
	abstract = {<p>I show why Michael Friedman{\textquoteright}s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman{\textquoteright}s own terms.</p>},
	issn = {0031-8248},
	author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}
}
