@article {1019750, title = {Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {389{\textendash}400}, abstract = {

I show why Michael Friedman{\textquoteright}s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman{\textquoteright}s own terms.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} }