@article {J:parcomp,
	title = {Paraconsistent Compatibility},
	journal = {Logique et Analyse},
	volume = {46},
	number = {183{\textendash}184},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {251{\textendash}287},
	abstract = {<p>In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent com-patibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are com-patible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical com-patibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsistent compatibility cannot be defined with respect to a monotonic paraconsistent logic, but only with respect to an inconsistency-adaptive logic. The paper contains modal versions of two well-studied inconsistency-adaptive logics. These modal versions form the basis for the logics for paraconsistent compatibility, but are also interesting with respect to other applications.</p>},
	author = {Meheus, Joke}
}
