@article {2977237,
	title = {The ontology of causal process theories},
	journal = {PHILOSOPHIA},
	volume = {40},
	number = {3},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {523{\textendash}538},
	abstract = {<p>There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of {\textacutedbl}causal process{\textacutedbl} does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe{\textquoteright}s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon{\textquoteright}s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair{\textquoteright}s phsyicalist reduction of causation.</p>},
	issn = {0048-3893},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9329-2},
	author = {Froeyman, Anton}
}
