@article {1970192,
	title = {Ethical consistency and the logic of ought},
	journal = {Theoretical and applied ethics},
	volume = {1},
	number = {3},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {45{\textendash}51},
	abstract = {<p>In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright}. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams{\textquoteright} characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams{\textquoteright} solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright} is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright}, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that {\textacutedbl}ought implies can{\textacutedbl}.</p>},
	issn = {2156-7174},
	author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu}
}
