@article {1078347,
	title = {Kuhn and coherentist epistemology},
	journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science},
	volume = {40},
	number = {3},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {322{\textendash}327},
	abstract = {<p>The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhns philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanens first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhns view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) the weak notion of rationality, and that Kuukkanens argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhns argument against it is not ultimately empirical, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.</p>},
	issn = {0039-3681},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.003},
	author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}
}
