@article {D:gluts, title = {Criteria Causing Inconsistencies. {G}eneral Gluts as Opposed to Negation Gluts}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {5{\textendash}37}, abstract = {

This paper studies the question: how should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare the approaches underlying several inconsistency-adaptive logics. I consider the Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations as well as adaptive logics defined from CLuN, CLuNs, LP, AN, and AL. The adaptive systems defined from CLuN appear to be superior to the others. They isolate inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises.

Nevertheless, the systems based on CLuN introduce an asymmetry between negated and non-negated formulas that seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the problem, the epistemological presuppositions of CLuN, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all other logical constants. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the study of the properties of these systems.

While this resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for CLuN.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }