@article {D:ialfnm,
	title = {Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Non-Monotonic Logics},
	journal = {Logique et Analyse},
	volume = {37},
	number = {145},
	year = {1994},
	note = {Appeared 1996},
	pages = {57{\textendash}94},
	abstract = {<p>This paper contains the reconstruction of (what I shall call) mixed non-monotonic logics as a combination of a deductive and a preferential component. The first leads from the premises to a possibly inconsistent consequence set; the second weeds out the inconsistencies. Among the candidates for the deductive component inconsistency-adaptive logics prove most suitable. The ensuing preferential component is formulated in terms of models and is itself split into two parts: (i) a transparent, purely logical procedure leads from a set of inconsistent models to a set of associated consistent models and (ii) the choice between the latter relies on the preferences. The real fight between mixed non-monotonic logics should concentrate on this last aspect. The outlined approach has a broader domain of application than mixed non-monotonic logics.</p>},
	author = {Batens, Diderik}
}
