In this paper we analyse the causal underpinnings of remedy claims found in technical problem solving instructions. For these claims to be successful, they need to be based on causal relations that hold in the world and that have certain properties. These required properties are the focus of our paper. We first introduce several examples from car and bike repair manuals that demarcate our topic and function as illustrations throughout the paper. We then formulate three success criteria for problem solving manuals: the efficiency requirement, the no harm requirement and the maximal assistance ideal. These criteria determine the required strength and properties of the causal relation, and are used to frame our analysis. We start from theories of causation by Ronald Giere, Ellery Eells and John Mackie and develop a series of definitions to capture the properties of the aforementioned causal relations. We conclude that remedy claims need to be based on causal relations with the following property: positive causal factorhood with weak contextunanimity. Moreover, it is desirable to look for Mackie causes, viz. causes that are sufficient in maximally normal contexts. We finally show that our analysis is not limited to means of conveyance (this is the field in which our initial examples are located) by means of a case study from a different field (radio repair manuals).
}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Weber, Erik} } @article {verdee2013degrees, title = {Degrees of inconsistency. Carefully combining classical and paraconsistent negation.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {This paper is devoted to combining the negation of Classical Logic (CL) and the negation of Graham Priest{\textquoteright}s LP in a way that is faithful to central properties of the combined logics. We give a number of desiderata for a logic L which combines both negations. These desiderata include the following: (a) L should be truth functional, (b) L should be strictly nonexplosive for the paraconsisent negation \~{} (i.e. if A and \~{}A both have a nontrivial set of consequences, then this should also be the case for the set containing both) and (c) L should be a conservative extension of CL and of LP. The desiderata are motivated by a particular propertytheoretic perspective on paraconsistency. Next we devise the logic CLP. We present an axiomatization of this logic and three semantical characterizations (a nondeterministic semantics, an in nitely valued settheoretic semantics and an in nitely valued semantics with integer numbers as values). We prove that CLP is the only logic satisfying all postulated desiderata. The in nitely valued semantics of CLP can be seen as giving rise to an interpretation in which inconsistencies and inconsistent properties come in degrees: not every sentence which involves inconsistencies is equally inconsistent.
}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {Meheus2014, title = {Deontic Reasoning on the Basis of Consistency Considerations}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {Deonticconflictsposeanimportantchallengetodeonticlogicians. The standard account standard deontic logic, SDL is not apt for addressing this challenge since it trivializes con flicts. Two main stratagems for gaining conflicttolerance have been proposed: to weaken SDL in various ways, and to contextualize the reign of SDL to consistent subsets of the premise set. The latter began with the work of van Fraassen and has been further developed by Horty. In this paper we characterize this second approach in general terms. We also study three basic ways to contextualize SDL and supplement each of these with a dynamic proof theory in the framework of adaptive logics.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Aleks Knoks} } @article {DeBal2017epauth, title = {Epistemic authority: a pragmatic approach.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {In this paper, I investigate how we can legitimate that certain regularities get epistemic authority in specific contexts of scientific practice. With {\textquotedblleft}epistemic authority{\textquotedblright} I refer to the fact that regularities are trusted to achieve epistemic goals like prediction, explanation and manipulation. For my analysis, I use the Neuber rule, a regularity used to model creep in notches, as an exemplar. I distinguish two traditional ways of legitimating epistemic authority: a necessitarian approach and an epistemic mark approach. Throughout the paper, I argue that neither is, in its current form, sufficient to account for the epistemic authority of regularities like the Neuber rule. Regarding necessity, I expand arguments from Matthias Frisch{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of physics to show that (1) the Neuber rule is currently not successfully derived from (more) fundamental laws, (2) the idea that there are truly fundamental laws that can be used to represent any phenomenon is not unproblematic given the functioning of scientific practice, and (3) even if there are such fundamental laws, there is no guarantee that their necessity is undamaged by the modelling practices of science. I then present an alternative that resembles the basic idea behind the epistemic mark approach, but is significantly more informative. For this part, I build on insights from Sandra Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of biology. This results in a pragmatic approach to epistemic authority. At the same time, this paper functions as a defence and expansion of both Frisch and Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work. I also emphasize the benefits of combining insights from various philosophical disciplines.
}, author = {De Bal, Inge} } @article {DeBal2017evid, title = {From one to many: generalisation and evidence in failure analysis.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {In this paper, I use cases and reasoning from failure analysis (a part of engineering
science which deals with artefact failure and its causes) to draw attention to a relatively
unstudied problem of knowledge generalisation: when we are focusing on creating new
things; designing new artefacts and technologies. Using three cases from failure
analysis practice, I present a twofold mechanismbased procedure to determine when
generalisations to nonexisting artefacts are warranted. This procedure builds on (1)
Cartwright{\textquoteright}s notion of capacities (2) literature on mechanisms and (3) Steel{\textquoteright}s
comparative process tracing, developed for the biomedical sciences. I will show that,
while they provide guidance, these literatures and concepts are not enough to grasp
how we use information from current artefacts and failures to create new things  we
will need a lot more specific information and adequate ways to present it. The account
developed in this paper is relevant for both philosophers and failure analysts. For
philosophers, it can provide input for a theory of evidence. For failure analysts, it allows
them to present stronger arguments for their recommendations by making the required
evidence explicit. My account can furthermore provide inspiration for similar inferences
in other innovation contexts such as pharmacology.
We study classical modal logics with pooling modalities, i.e. unary modal operators that allow one to express properties of sets obtained by the pointwise intersection of neighbourhoods. We discuss salient properties of these modalities, situate the logics in the broader area of modal logics (with a particular focus on relational semantics), establish key properties concerning their expressive power, and discuss their application to epistemic/doxastic logic, the logic of evidencebased belief, deontic logic, and logics of agency and ability.
}, keywords = {classical modal logics, coalition logic, distributed belief, multiagent systems, pointwise intersection, pooling modalities}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte}, editor = {Klein, Dominik} } @article {Pawlowski2017c, title = {Treelike proof systems for finitelymany valued deterministic and indeterministic consequence relations}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel} } @article {Blancke, title = {What science is fair? Representations of science in a Dutch creationist campaign}, journal = {Public Understanding of Science}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {In the Netherlands, creationists have started up a civil initiative by which they demand fair science. This paper offers an analysis of this peculiar notion. Fair science depends on two representations of science, one as an unimpressive label, and one as an authority. Each of these representations hinges on a different conception of the authority of science: on the one hand, science is endowed with authority because it produces technology and is able to make reliable predictions. On the other hand, sciences authority is only a matter of reputation. To the extent that these two conceptions tap into representations of science and its authority among the larger public, the notion of fair science might prove to be a compelling rhetorical tool. Suggestions are made as to how the appeal of the notion can be reduced.
}, author = {Blancke, Stefaan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @incollection {2020, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, volume = {2}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {College Publications}, edition = {1}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {Forest2014, title = {Against the disorder/nondisorder dichotomy}, booktitle = {Defining Mental Disorders: Jerome Wakefield and his critics.}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {MIT Press}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Faucher, Luc and Forest, Denis} } @article {2015, title = {Coarse Deontic Logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, year = {In Press}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @incollection {HA_DuAlJ, title = {Dutch Algebra and Arithmetic in Japan before the Meiji Restoration}, booktitle = {Navigating across Mathematical Cultures and Times: Exploring the Diversity of Discoveries and Proofs}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Co.}, abstract = {This paper gives an overview of the scarce occasions in which Japan came into contact with Western arithmetic and algebra before the Meiji restoration of 1868. After the refutation of persistent claims on the influence through Japanese students at Leiden during the seventeenth century, it concentrates on the reception of Dutch works during the last decades of the Tokugawa shogunate and the motivations to study and translate these books. While some studies based on Japanese sources have already been published on this period,2 this paper draws from Dutch sources and in particular on witness accounts from Dutch officers at the Nagasaki naval school, responsible for the instruction of mathematics to selected samurai and rangakusha. Two Japanese textbooks on arithmetic from that period are viewed within the context of this naval training school.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Vandoulakis, I.M. and Dun, Liu} } @incollection {1986, title = {The Feasibility of Modeling Hypothetical Reasoning by Formal Logics. Including an Overview of Adaptive Logics for Singular Fact Abduction}, booktitle = {Handbook of ModelBased Science}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Bertolotti, Tommaso} } @article {DeMoltoappear, title = {Formalism. The success(es) of a failure}, year = {In Press}, institution = {College publications}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Moktefi, A. and Moretti, A. and Schang, Fabian} } @article {4443711, title = {Groepsbeslissingen: kwaliteit, autoriteit en vertrouwen}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, year = {In Press}, author = {Baartmans, Tim and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {de2013haskell, title = {Haskell before Haskell: an alternative lesson in practical logics of the ENIAC}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, year = {In Press}, abstract = {This article expands on Curry{\textquoteright}s work on how to implement the problem of inverse interpolation on the ENIAC (1946) and his subsequent work on developing a theory of program composition (19481950). It is shown that Curry{\textquoteright}s handson experience with the ENIAC on the one side and his acquaintance with systems of formal logic on the other, were conductive to conceive a compact notation for program construction which in turn would be instrumental to a mechanical synthesis of programs. Since Curry{\textquoteright}s systematic programming technique pronounces a critique of the Goldstinevon Neumann style of coding, his calculus of program composition not only anticipates automatic programming but also proposes explicit hardware optimizations largely unperceived by computer history until Backus{\textquoteright} famous ACM Turing Award lecture (1977). The cohesion of these findings asks for an integrative historiographical approach. An appendix gives, for the first time, a full description of Curry{\textquoteright}s arithmetic compiler.
}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exs072}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Carl{\'e}, Martin and Bullynck, Maarten} } @article {BeirlaenForthcomingBEIALF, title = {A Logic for the Discovery of Deterministic Causal Regularities}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {In Press}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, author = {Mathieu Beirlaen and Bert Leuridan and Frederik Van De Putte} } @incollection {2045, title = {Logics of (formal and informal) provability}, booktitle = {Handbook of Formal Philosophy}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Pawlowski, Pawel}, editor = {Hansson, Sven Ove and Hendricks, Vincent F.} } @article {Pawlowski2017d, title = {Manyvalued logic of informal provability: a nondeterministic strategy}, journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic}, year = {In Press}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel and Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {JMFC:iadl, title = {NonAdjunctive Deontic Logics That Validate Aggregation as Much as Possible}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, year = {In Press}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {PawlowskiAcceptedandforthcoming, title = {Proof systems for {B}{A}{T} consequence relations }, journal = {The Logic Journal of IGPL}, year = {In Press}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel} } @proceedings {4443830, title = {Rethinking the explanatory power of extended cognition}, year = {In Press}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {4254511, title = {The semantics of untrustworthiness}, journal = {Topoi. An International Reiew of Philosophy}, year = {In Press}, abstract = {We oer a formal treatment of the semantics of both complete and incomplete mistrustful or distrustful information transmissions. The se mantics of such relations is analysed in view of rules that dene the be haviour of a receiving agent. We justify this approach in view of human agent communications and secure system design. We further specify some properties of such relations.
}, issn = {13165011}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1124501392272}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {D:afs, title = {Adaptive Fregean Set Theory}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {108}, year = {2020}, note = {Published online: 10 November 2019}, pages = {903{\textendash}939 (epublished 10 NOV 2019)}, abstract = {This paper defines provably nontrivial theories that characterize Frege{\textquoteright}s notion of a set, taking into account that the notion is inconsistent. By choosing an adaptive underlying logic, consistent sets behave classically notwithstanding the presence of inconsistent sets. Some of the theories have a fullblown presumably consistent set theory T as a subtheory, provided T is indeed consistent. An unexpected feature is the presence of classical negation within the language.
}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225019098821}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:devisingOmega, title = {Devising the Set of Abnormalities for a Given Defeasible Rule}, journal = {Logicheskie Issledovaniya / Logical Investigations}, volume = {26}, number = {1 [To the memory of Prof.\ Alexander Karpenko]}, year = {2020}, note = {https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en}, pages = {9{\textendash}35}, abstract = {Devising adaptive logics usually starts with a set of abnormalities and a deductive logic. Where the adaptive logic is ampliative, the deductive logic is the lower limit logic, the rules of which are unconditionally valid. Where the adaptive logic is corrective, the deductive logic is the upper limit logic, the rules of which are valid in case the premises do not require any abnormalities to be true. In some cases, the idea for devising an adaptive logic does not relate to a set of abnormalities, but to one or more defeasible rules, and perhaps also to one of the deductive logics. Defeasible rules are not universally valid, but are valid in {\textquoteleft}normal situations{\textquoteright} or for unproblematic parts of premise set.\ Where the idea is such, the set of abnormalities has to be delineated in view of the rules. The way in which this task may be tackled is by no means obvious and is the main topic studied in the present paper. The outcome is an extremely simple and transparent recipe. It is shown that, except for very special cases, the recipe leads to an adequate result.
}, doi = {10.21146/207414722020261935}, url = {https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {2074, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Axiomatization and Decidability}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {online first}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We establish completeness and the finite model property for logics featuring the pooling modalities that were introduced in Van De\ Putte and Klein (Pooling modalities and pointwise intersection: semantics, expressivity, and applications). The definition of our canonical models combines standard techniques with a socalled {\textquotedblleft}puzzle piece construction{\textquotedblright}, which we first illustrate informally. After that, we apply it to the weakest classical logics with pooling modalities and investigate the technique{\textquoteright}s potential for the axiomatization of stronger logics, obtained by imposing wellknown frame conditions on the models.
}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @article {2068, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics: A Survey}, journal = {IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications}, volume = {6}, number = {3}, year = {2019}, pages = {523608}, chapter = {523}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00032.pdf}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @article {farolditudo, title = {Deontic Modals and Hyperintensionality}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, year = {2019}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @article {8543197, title = {Do mechanismbased social explanations make a case for methodological individualism?}, journal = {JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {50}, number = {2}, year = {2019}, pages = {263{\textendash}282}, abstract = {In the recent philosophy of social science literature, we notice an increasing support for mechanismbased social explanations. Earlier pleas for social mechanisms were often closely linked to defenses of methodological individualism. However, more recent contributions by, e.g. Daniel Little and Petri Ylikoski, seem to be loosening that link and develop a more sophisticated accountascribing a less important role to microfoundations. In this paper, we want to review the impact of the social mechanismsapproach on methodological individualism and draw more radical conclusions with regard to the individualism/holism debate, severing the link between the social mechanismsapproach and individualism. Four steps will be taken in severing the link: (a) there are more than two levels of social explanation; (b) levels of explanation are perspectival, thus neither absolute, nor unique; (c) seeking microfoundations has a heuristic value, but so has seeking macrofoundations; (d) there are no general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations. In conclusion, the answer to the title question is that the social mechanisms approach does not strengthen the case for methodological individualism.
}, keywords = {Methodological individualism, PLURALISM, REDUCTION, Scientific explanation, Social explanations, Social mechanisms}, issn = {09254560}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1083801909446w}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {farolditudo, title = {Hyperintensional Logics of Reasons}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, year = {2019}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Protopopescu, Tudor} } @book {2063, title = {Hyperintensionality and Normativity}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, author = {Federico L.G. Faroldi} } @incollection {D:graham, title = {Looting Liars Masking Models}, booktitle = {Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency}, year = {2019}, pages = {139164}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {This paper does not raise objections but spells out problems that I consider at present unsolved within Priest{\textquoteright}s view on logic. In light of the state of scientific and other theories ({\textsection}2) and in light of the character of natural languages ({\textsection}3), Priest{\textquoteright}s central arguments do not seem convincing. Next, I offer some six independent obstacles for defining consistency, identifying models and describing the semantics and metatheory of LP ({\textsection}4).
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Ba{\c s}kent, Can and Ferguson, Thomas Macaulay} } @unpublished {2053, title = {The best we can do (extended abstract, submitted to LOFT)}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Tamminga, Allard and Duijf, Hein} } @article {2052, title = {Choosing the right concept of "right choices" (technical report)}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @proceedings {2050, title = {How to take heroin (if at all). A new approach to detachment in deontic logic}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: 14th International Conference}, year = {2018}, pages = {317335}, publisher = {College Publications}, type = {submitted}, address = {London}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Frijters, Stef and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Condoravdi, Cleo and Nair, Shyam and Pigozzi, Gabriella} } @incollection {RaD:i, title = {Induction}, booktitle = {Handbook of Formal Philosophy}, year = {2018}, publisher = {Springer}, keywords = {induction, logic, probability}, isbn = {9783319774336}, doi = {10.1007/9783319774343}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Hansson, Sven Ove and Hendricks, Vincent F.} } @incollection {D:JP65, title = {Kennissystemen selectief wieden}, booktitle = {Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem}, year = {2018}, pages = {227{\textendash}244}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent, Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789401455893}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Ducheyne, Steffen and Allo, Patrick} } @unpublished {2051, title = {Pointwise intersection in neighbourhood modal logic}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @incollection {D:Abd, title = {Abduction Logics Illustrating Pitfalls Of Defeasible Methods}, booktitle = {Applications of formal philosophy: the road less travelled}, series = {Logic argumentation \& reasoning}, volume = {14}, year = {2017}, pages = {169{\textendash}193}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Berlin}, abstract = {On the one hand this paper offers an introduction to adaptive logics, focussing on properties that are imposed upon adaptive logics by the fact that they explicate defeasible reasoning. On the other hand new adaptive logics of abduction are presented and employed to illustrate those properties. These logics were developed in view of the criticism to existing adaptive logics of abduction.}, isbn = {9783319585079,331958507X,9783319585055}, doi = {10.1007/9783319585079_8}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rafa{\l} Urbaniak and Gillman Payette} } @article {8535753, title = {Beyond consensus? A reply to Alan Irwin}, journal = {SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY REVIEW AND REPLY COLLECTIVE}, volume = {6}, number = {10}, year = {2017}, pages = {48{\textendash}53}, keywords = {democracy, disclosure, metaconsensus, public participation in science, scientific consensus}, issn = {24719560}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Van Oudheusden, Michiel} } @article {2055, title = {CoHyperintensionality}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {30}, year = {2017}, chapter = {270}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @conference {2016, title = {Doing Without Nature}, booktitle = {Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI)}, number = {VI}, year = {2017}, month = {911/7/2017}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Sapporro}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Tamminga, Allard and Duijf, Hein} } @incollection {2021, title = {Free Choice Permission in STIT}, booktitle = {Logica Yearbook 2016}, year = {2017}, pages = {289303}, publisher = {College Publications}, edition = {Pavel Arazim and Tom{\'a}{\v s} L{\'a}vi{\v c}ka}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @incollection {D:paradoxenVM, title = {Paradoxen in de vrijmetselarij en de relatie met waarden}, booktitle = {Kappen aan de ruwe steen}, year = {2017}, pages = {319{\textendash}336}, publisher = {Academic and Scientific Publishers}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rik Pinxten and Jean Swings} } @article {2071, title = {Participation beyond consensus? Technology assessments, consensus conferences and democratic modulation. }, journal = {Social Epistemology}, volume = {31 (6)}, year = {2017}, chapter = {497}, abstract = {In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats
that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus
conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how
these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong
appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and
informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies,
we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including
dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy.
Drawing on the notion of metaconsensus and a distinction between
four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and
agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides
opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and
democratic modulation{\textemdash}three aspirations that are at the heart of most
pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses
of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should
therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and
process in science and technology.
\ 
We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36{\textendash}41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of {\textquotedblleft}obligation as weakest permission{\textquotedblright} from Anglberger et al. :807{\textendash}827, 2015).

We translate the unconstrained and constrained input/outputlogics from [17, 18] to reflexive modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has various advantages. First, we obtain a prooftheoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our modal framework gives naturally rise to useful variants. Finally, the modal logics display a gain in expressive power over their original counterparts in the input/output framework.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {doi:10.1093/logcom/exu044, title = {Adaptive strategies and finiteconditional premise sets}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {5}, year = {2016}, pages = {15171539}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exu044}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exu044}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @conference {8122661, title = {Coarse Deontic Logic (short version)}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2056, title = {Ethical copula, negation, and responsibility judgments}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, year = {2016}, chapter = {3441}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @incollection {2054, title = {An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Obligation and Permission}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, pages = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, author = {Anglberger, Albert and Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Korbmacher, Johannes} } @article {PD:embed, title = {Nice Embedding in Classical Logic}, journal = {Studia Logica}, year = {2016}, pages = {4778}, abstract = {It is shown that a set of semirecursive logics, including many fragments of CL (Classical Logic), can be embedded within CL in an interesting way. A logic belongs
to the set iff it has a certain type of semantics, called nice semantics. The set includes
many logics presented in the literature. The embedding reveals structural properties of the embedded logic. The embedding turns finite premise sets into finite premise sets. The partial decision methods for CL that are goal directed with respect to CL are turned into partial decision methods that are goal directed with respect to the embedded logics.
In (Anglberger et al., 2015, Section 4.1), a deontic logic is proposed which explicates the idea that a formula φ is obligatory if and only if it is (semantically speaking) the weakest permission. We give a sound and strongly complete, Hilbert style axiomatization for this logic. As a corollary, it is compact, contradicting earlier claims from Anglberger et al. (2015). In addition, we prove that our axiomatization is equivalent to Anglberger et al.{\textquoteright}s infinitary proof system, and show that our results are robust w.r.t. certain changes in the underlying semantics.
}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte} } @article {4443718, title = {Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {21 (1)}, year = {2016}, abstract = {From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that Im a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means Im interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1069901493720}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {van2012splitting, title = {Splitting and Relevance: Broadening the Scope of Parikh{\textquoteright}s Concepts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {59}, year = {2016}, pages = {173 205}, chapter = {173 }, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {D:TelAviv2012, title = {Spoiled for Choice?}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, year = {2016}, pages = {6595}, abstract = {The transition from a theory that turned out trivial to a consistent replacement need not proceed in terms of inconsistencies, which are negation gluts. Logics that tolerate gluts or gaps (or both) with respect to any logical symbol may serve as the lower limit for adaptive logics that assign a minimally abnormal consequence set to a given premise set. The same obtains for logics that tolerate a combination of kinds of gluts and gaps. This result runs counter to the obsession with inconsistency that classical logicians and paraconsistent logicians share.
All such basic logics will be systematically reviewed, some variants will be outlined, and the claim will be argued for. While those logics tolerate gluts and gaps with respect to logical symbols, ambiguity logic tolerates ambiguities in nonlogical symbols. Moreover, forms of tolerance may be combined, with zero logic as an extreme.\{\.I}n the baffling plethora of corrective adaptive logics (roads from trivial theories to consistent replacements), adaptive zero logic turns out theoretically interesting as well as practically useful. On the one hand all meaning becomes contingent, depending on the premise set. On the other hand, precisely adaptive zero logic provides one with an excellent analyzing instrument. For example it enables one to figure out which corrective adaptive logics lead, for a specific trivial theory, to a suitable and interesting minimally abnormal consequence set.
In the context of nonmonotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The strong consequences are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The weak consequences follow from some maximal consistent subset. The free consequences follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences
}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {1997, title = {Contrastive Causation in Genetics and Physics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {90}, year = {2015}, pages = {93113}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Bal, Inge} } @incollection {4346560, title = {Explicating ways of consensusmaking in science and society: distinguishing the academic, the interface and the metaconsensus}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {71{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensusmaking in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts  i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty \& Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) as to put forth a new understanding of consensusmaking, focusing on the metaconsensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.
}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @article {4443682, title = {The {\textquoteright}green cheese{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}red herring{\textquoteright} problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, year = {2015}, pages = {433455}, author = {Weber, Erik and Gervais, Raoul and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {4443714, title = {Mathematical proofs in practice: Revisiting the reliability of published mathematical proofs}, journal = {Theoria. Revista de Teor{\'\i}a, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, year = {2015}, pages = {345{\textendash}360}, author = {Frans, Joachim and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {DeBal2006, title = {A new approach to classical relevance.}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {82}, year = {2015}, pages = {1{\textendash}31}, abstract = {n this paper we present a logic that determines when implications in a classical logic context express a relevant connection between antecedent and consequent. In contrast with logics in the relevance logic literature, we leave classical negation intact  in the sense that the law of noncontradiction can be used to obtain relevantly implications, as long as there is a connection between antecedent and consequent. On the other hand, we give up the requirement that our theory of relevance can define a new standard of deduction. We present and argue for a list of requirements that such a logical theory of classical relevance needs to meet and go on to formulate a system that respects each of these requirements. The presented system is a monotonic and transitive logic that extends the relevance logic ℜ with a richer relevant implication that allows for Disjunctive Syllogism and similar rules. This is achieved by interpreting the logical symbols in the antecedents in a stronger way than the logical symbols in consequents. A proof theory and an algebraic semantics are formulated and interesting metatheorems (soundness, completeness and the fact that it satisfies the requirements for classical relevance) are proven. Finally we give a philosophical motivation for our nonstandard relevant implication and the asymmetric interpretation of antecedents and consequents.
}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {4254591, title = {{\textquoteright}Peer review is melting our glaciers{\textquoteright}: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) went astray}, journal = {Journal for general philosophy of science}, year = {2015}, pages = {351366}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @incollection {4345994, title = {Private epistemic virtue, public vices: moral responsibility in the policy sciences}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {275{\textendash}295}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Lefevere, Merel and Schliesser, Eric}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @incollection {D:AcLFI, title = {Some Adaptive Contributions to Logics of Formal Inconsistency}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, pages = {309 333}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {Some insights were gained from the study of inconsistencyadaptive logics. The aim of the present paper is to put some of these insight to work for the study of logics of formal inconsistency. The focus of attention are application contexts of the aforementioned logics and their theoretical properties in as far as they are relevant for applications. As the questions discussed are difficult but important, a serious attempt was made to make the paper concise but transparent.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, JeanYves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @article {4188922, title = {Towards democratic models of science: exploring the case of scientific pluralism}, journal = {Perspectives on science}, volume = {23}, number = {2}, year = {2015}, pages = {149{\textendash}172}, abstract = {Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined.
}, issn = {10636145}, doi = {10.1162/POSC_a_00165}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {D:IALtut, title = {Tutorial on InconsistencyAdaptive Logics}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {This paper contains a concise introduction to a few central features of inconsistencyadaptive logics. The focus is on the aim of the program, on logics that may be useful with respect to applications, and on insights that are central for judging the importance of the research goals and the adequacy of results. Given the nature of adaptive logics, the paper may be read as a peculiar introduction to defeasible reasoning.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, JeanYves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @incollection {D:tmdm, title = {Two, Many, And Differently Many}, booktitle = {The Road to Universal Logic. Festschrift for the 50th Birthday of JeanYves B{\'e}ziau}, volume = {II}, year = {2015}, pages = {213{\textendash}242}, publisher = {Birkh{\"a}user}, address = {Basel}, abstract = {This paper is a modest contribution to a universal logic approach to manyvalued semantic systems. The main focus is on the relation between such systems and twovalued ones. The matter is discussed for usual manyvalued semantic systems. These turn out to exist for more logics than expected. A new type of manyvalued semantics is devised and its use illustrated. Truthfunctionality has a rather central place in the discussion, which leads to philosophical conclusions.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Koslow, Arnold and Buchsbaum, Arthur} } @incollection {strasser2015withstanding, title = {Withstanding Tensions: {S}cientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance}, booktitle = {Heuristic Reasoning}, series = {Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics}, volume = {16}, year = {2015}, pages = {113{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an account of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scientists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for ones epistemic stance and, more generally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Ippoliti, Emiliano} } @article {doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzu017, title = {Adaptive logics: a parametric approach}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {22}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, pages = {905932}, chapter = {905}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {D:llr10, title = {Adaptive Logics as a Necessary Tool for Relative Rationality. {I}ncluding a Section on Logical Pluralism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {125}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {In this paper, I show that adaptive logics are required by my epistemological stand. While doing so, I defy the reader to cope with the problems I am able to cope with.
The last section of the paper contains a defense of a specific form of logical pluralism. Although this section is an integral part of the paper, it may be read separately.
In this paper I will study some of William Harveys applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic action of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian natural philosophy interpretation of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.
}, doi = {10.1007/9789401790116_11}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {perring_concept_2014, title = {The Concept of Disease and Our Responsibility for Children}, booktitle = {Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry}, year = {2014}, pages = {35{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {The author of this chapter argues that ones understanding of the concept of what a disease is influences our way of behaving toward people we think of as diseased. The author asserts that our concept of disease is not noncommittal and that an oversimplified approach can lead to noncritical reasoning which could have significant impact on children with diseases. The author develops a pluralistic approach to the concept of disease and uses ADHD as an example throughout the chapter.
}, isbn = {9780199645756}, doi = {10.1093/med/9780199645756.003.0003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Perring, Christian and Wells, Lloyd} } @incollection {D:JP, title = {The Consistency of {P}eano {A}rithmetic. {A} Defeasible Perspective}, booktitle = {Modestly Radical or Radically Modest. Festschrift for Jean Paul Van Bendegem on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday}, year = {2014}, pages = {11{\textendash}59}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {This paper proposes to replace \sys{PA}, Peano Arithmetic, by a theory \sys{APA} defined in terms of (i)\ a set of axioms that is classically equivalent to the Peano axioms and (ii)\ a defeasible logic that minimizes inconsistency, viz.\ an inconsistencyadaptive logic. If \sys{PA} is consistent, its set of theorems coincides with the set of \sys{APA}theorems. If \sys{PA} is inconsistent, \sys{APA} is nontrivial and has the following remarkable property: there is a unique nonstandard number that is its own successor and every {\textquoteleft}desirable{\textquoteright} \sys{PA}theorem is retained if restricted to the other numbers. The restriction can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. And there is much more.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Allo, Patrick and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @incollection {5673678, title = {Datadriven induction in scientific discovery: a critical assessment based on Kepler{\textquoteright}s discoveries}, booktitle = {Logic, reasoning, and rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {59{\textendash}76}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {Motivated by the renewed interest in knowledge discovery from data (KDD) by the artificial intelligence community, this paper provides a critical assessment of the model of datadriven induction for scientific discovery. The most influential research program using this model is developed by the BACON team. Two of the main claims by this research program, the descriptive and constructive power of datadriven induction, are evaluated by means of two historical cases studies: the discovery of the sine law of refraction in optics and Kepler{\textquoteright}s third law of planetary motion. I will provide evidence that the data used by the BACON program{\textendash}despite the claims being made{\textendash}does not correspond with the historical data available to Kepler and his contemporaries. Secondly, it is shown that for the two cases the method by which the general law was arrived at did not involve datadriven induction. Finally, the value of the datadriven induction as a general model for scientific discovery is being questioned.
}, isbn = {9789401790109}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9789401790116\_4}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @proceedings {Strasser, title = {Dynamic Derivations for SequentBased Deductive Argumentation}, journal = {COMMA 2014}, volume = {Computational Models of Argument}, year = {2014}, pages = {89{\textendash}100}, abstract = {We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentationbased systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzenstyle sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer}, editor = {Parsons, Simon and Oren, Nir and Reed, Chris and Cerutti, Federico} } @article {Kosolosky2014, title = {Editorial and interview with {J}ustin {B}iddle}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {8}, number = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {47{\textendash}50}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {3144548, title = {Epistemic justification and operational symbolism}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {89{\textendash}113}, abstract = {By the end of the twelfth century in the south of Europe, new methods of calculating with HinduArabic numerals developed. This tradition of subscientific mathematical practices is known as the abbaco period and flourished during 1280{\textendash}1500. This paper investigates the methods of justification for the new calculating procedures and algorithms. It addresses in particular graphical schemes for the justification of operations on fractions and the multiplication of binomial structures. It is argued that these schemes provided the validation of mathematical practices necessary for the development towards symbolic reasoning. It is shown how justification schemes compensated for the lack of symbolism in abbaco treatises and at the same time facilitated a process of abstraction.
}, issn = {12331821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s106990129311x}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Strasser2014a, title = {Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit: A Coherentist Approach}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {13}, year = {2014}, month = {May}, pages = {31113141}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjours coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjours standardsconsistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the potential coherence of the given epistemic system.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1122901404764}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @incollection {4443651, title = {Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {4557}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {3120783, title = {Explanatory strategies beyond the individualism/holism debate}, booktitle = {Rethinking the individualismholism debate}, volume = {372}, year = {2014}, pages = {153{\textendash}175}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {Starting from the plurality of explanatory strategies in the actual practice of socialscientists, I introduce a framework for explanatory pluralism a normative endorsement of the plurality of forms and levels of explanation used by social scientists. Equipped with thisframework, central issues in the individualism/holism debate are revisited, namely emergence,reduction and the idea of microfoundations. Discussing these issues, we notice that in recentcontributions the focus has been shifting towards relationism, pluralism and interaction, awayfrom dichotomous individualism/holism thinking and a winnertakesall approach. Then, thechallenge of the debate is no longer to develop the ultimate individualistic approach ordefending the holist approach, but rather how to be combine individualism and holism; howcan they coexist, interact, be integrated or develop some division of labour, while making thebest out of the strengths and limitations of the respective explanatory strategies of holists andindividualists? Thus, the debate shifts to how exactly pluralism should be understood as thenext leading question, going beyond the current individualism/holism debate. The paper endswith a discussion and evaluation of different understandings of explanatory pluralismdefended in the literature.
}, isbn = {9783319053431}, doi = {10.1007/9783319053448_9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Finn, Collin and Zahle, Julie} } @article {Gervais2014, title = {A framework for interlevel explanations: Outlines for a new explanatory pluralism.}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {48}, year = {2014}, pages = {1{\textendash}9}, abstract = {According to explanatory pluralism, the appropriate explanatory level is determined by pragmatic factors, and there are no general exclusion or preference rules concerning higher or lowerlevel explanations. While I agree with the latter claim, I will argue that the former is in need of revision. In particular, I will argue that by distinguishing cases of two explanations being descriptions of one underlying causal process, and two explanations being descriptions of two distinct causal processes, it becomes clear that the grain size of an explanation is in fact determined by the interplay of various pragmatic and nonpragmatic factors. Within these constraints, positive guidelines can be developed to direct us to the appropriate explanatory level. This gives us the outlines for a general framework for classifying various types of relations between explanations on different levels. After making a comparison between this new framework and standard explanatory pluralism, I end by suggesting some ways in which the framework could be further developed.
}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.07.002}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {4443818, title = {Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {79}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, month = {February}, pages = {1367{\textendash}1389}, abstract = {Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanationseeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis{\`a}vis functional explanations.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1067001496051}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar and Weber, Erik} } @article {4254561, title = {Health, food, and science: an ethical assessment of research agendas}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {228}, year = {2014}, pages = {701726}, abstract = {We offer several new arguments for the view that existing research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences are morally deficient. More specifically, the following kinds of distortion of the agenda are discussed: in the health sciences, the health problems of the poor are more or less neglected, as well as nonmedicinal solutions to health problems, and in the agricultural sciences, insufficient attention is paid to agroecology. We justify the claim that these three kinds of distortion are problematic on ethical grounds, showing that they are moral failures. Instead of starting from one ethical theory to show this, we present different ethical justifications, based on different ethical theories (Benthams utilitarianism, Rawlss theory of justice, Pogges rightsbased account of minimal justice, Kitchers ethical theory, and classical liberalism). This should make our conclusion (i.e. that the distorted research agendas in the health sciences and the agricultural sciences pose a moral problem) at least initially convincing to adherents of different ethical theories.
}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {Strasser2014, title = {Heuristic Reevaluation of the Bacterial Hypothesis of Peptic Ulcer Disease in the 1950s}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2014}, pages = {429{\textendash}454}, abstract = {Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the acidity and the bacterial one. The latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with Warrens and Marshalls discovery of Helicobacter pylori in the 1980s. In this paper we investigate why the bacterial hypothesis was abandoned in the 1950s, and whether there were good epistemic reasons for its dismissal. Of special interest for our research question is Palmers 1954 largescale study, which challenged the bacterial hypothesis with serious counterevidence, and which by many scholars is considered as the shifting point in the research on PUD. However, we show that: 1. The perceived refutatory impact of Palmers study was disproportionate to its methodological rigor. This undermines its perceived status as a crucial experiment against the bacterial hypothesis. 2. In view of this and other considerations we argue that the bacterial hypothesis was worthy of pursuit in the 1950s.
}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {de_winter_how_2014, title = {How (Not) to Reform Biomedical Research: A Review of Some Policy Proposals}, booktitle = {Responsible Innovation 1}, volume = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {97{\textendash}110}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {Abstract In a recent article, Julian Reiss has identified some very important epistemic, moral and socioeconomic failures in current biomedical research, and he argues that philosophers of science should reflect on how to (re)organize biomedical research in order to remedy these failures. In this chapter, several possible reforms of biomedical research are evaluated. I will reflect on how to tackle the epistemic failures by comparing the solution suggested by Julian Reiss to an alternative policy option. Most attention will, however, be paid to one of the moral failures: the fact that a disproportionately small part of the money devoted to health research goes to research into diseases that mainly affect thirdworld countries (the problem of neglected diseases). The most important advantages and disadvantages of some prominent proposals for a solution are disclosed I will consider the proposals of Thomas Pogge, Joseph Stiglitz, Julian Reiss, and James Robert Brown and I will also draw attention to an alternative policy proposal.
}, doi = {http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/9789401789561_7}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @incollection {Wieland2014, title = {Internalism Does Entail Scepticism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, series = {Logic, Argumentation \& Reasoning}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {247260}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philies solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.
}, keywords = {Internalism, Knowledge, Regress, Rule, Scepticism}, isbn = {9789401790109}, doi = {10.1007/9789401790116_13}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {pouliasis2014j, title = {JCalc: A typed lambda calculus for Intuitionistic Justification Logic}, journal = {Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {300}, year = {2014}, pages = {71{\textendash}87}, abstract = {In this paper we offer a system JCalc that can be regarded as a typed λ calculus for the {{\textrightarrow},\&\#8869;} fragment of Intuitionistic Justification Logic. We offer different interpretations of JCalc, in particular, as a two phase proof system in which we proof check the validity of deductions of a theory Τ based on deductions from a stronger theory Τ{\textquoteright} and computationally as a type system for separate compilations. We establish some first metatheoretic results.
}, doi = {10.1016/j.entcs.2013.12.012}, author = {Pouliasis, Konstantinos and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {5685708, title = {Mechanistic and nonmechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science: explanatory power, understanding, and the {\textquoteright}mere description{\textquoteright} worry}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {192}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {43{\textendash}66}, abstract = {In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and nonmechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the nonmechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena (the mere description worry). I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of nonmechanistic dynamical models (predictive power, counterfactual support, and unification) are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this.
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122901405485}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {frans2014mechanistic, title = {Mechanistic Explanation and Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics}, journal = {Philosophia Mathematica}, volume = {22}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, pages = {231{\textendash}248}, abstract = {Although there is a consensus among philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians that mathematical explanations exist, only a few authors have proposed accounts of explanation in mathematics. These accounts fit into the unificationist or topdown approach to explanation. We argue that these models can be complemented by a bottomup approach to explanation in mathematics. We introduce the mechanistic model of explanation in science and discuss the possibility of using this model in mathematics, arguing that using it does not presuppose a Platonist view of mathematics and allows one to gain insight into why a theorem is true by answering whatifthingshadbeendifferent questions.
}, doi = {10.1093/philmat/nku003}, author = {Frans, Joachim and Weber, Erik} } @article {clarke2014modelling, title = {Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {8}, year = {2014}, pages = {1651{\textendash}1681}, abstract = {Mechanistic philosophy of science views a large part of scientific activity as engaged in modelling mechanisms. While science textbooks tend to offer qualitative models of mechanisms, there is increasing demand for models from which one can draw quantitative predictions and explanations. Casini et al. (Theoria 26(1):533, 2011) put forward the Recursive Bayesian Networks (RBN) formalism as well suited to this end. The RBN formalism is an extension of the standard Bayesian net formalism, an extension that allows for modelling the hierarchical nature of mechanisms. Like the standard Bayesian net formalism, it models causal relationships using directed acyclic graphs. Given this appeal to acyclicity, causal cycles pose a prima facie problem for the RBN approach. This paper argues that the problem is a significant one given the ubiquity of causal cycles in mechanisms, but that the problem can be solved by combining two sorts of solution strategy in a judicious way.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1122901303607}, author = {Clarke, Brendan and Leuridan, Bert and Williamson, Jon} } @phdthesis {PhD_Tjerk, title = {Patterns of Hypothesis Formation}, year = {2014}, month = {March 31}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {4443770, title = {Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {7}, year = {2014}, pages = {1605{\textendash}1626}, abstract = {One of the standard views on plural quantification is that its use commits one to the existence of abstract objectssets. On this view claims like {\textquoteright}some logicians admire only each other{\textquoteright} involve ineliminable quantification over subsets of a salient domain. The main motivation for this view is that plural quantification has to be given some sort of semantics, and among the two main candidatessubstitutional and settheoreticonly the latter can provide the language of plurals with the desired expressive power (given that the nominalist seems committed to the assumption that there can be at most countably many names). To counter this approach I develop a modalsubstitutional semantics of plural quantification (on which plural variables, roughly speaking, range over ways names could be) and argue for its nominalistic acceptability.
}, issn = {00397857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122901303545}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {4090467, title = {Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry}, booktitle = {New directions in the philosophy of science}, year = {2014}, pages = {104{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner{\textquoteright}s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism {\textendash} different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry {\textendash} namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the {\textquotedblleft}genuine dialogue{\textquotedblright} or shape {\textquotedblleft}the pluralistic attitude{\textquotedblright} Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a questionbased framework for explanatory pluralism as well as socialepistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.
}, isbn = {9783319043814}, doi = {10.1007/9783319043821_8}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @incollection {de2014proof, title = {The Proof Is in the Process: A Preamble for a Philosophy of ComputerAssisted Mathematics}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Science}, series = {The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {15{\textendash}33}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {According to some wellknown mathematicians wellversed in computerassisted mathematics (CaM), Computers are changing the way we are doing mathematics. To what extent this is really true is still an open question. Indeed, even though some philosophers of math have taken up the challenge to think about CaM, it is unclear in what sense exactly a machine (can) affect(s) the socalled queen of the sciences. In fact, some have concluded that issues raised by the use of the computer in mathematics are not specific to the use of the computer per se. However, such findings seem precarious since a systematic study of computerassisted mathematics is still lacking. In this paper I argue that in order to understand the impact of CaM, it is necessary to take more seriously the computer itself and how it is actually used in the process of doing mathematics. Within such an approach, one searches for characteristics that are specific to the use of the computer in mathematics. I will focus on a feature that is beyond any doubt inherently connected to the use of computing machinery, viz. mathematiciancomputer interactions. I will show how such interactions are fundamentally different from the usual interactions between mathematicians and nonhuman aids (a piece of paper, a blackboard etc) and how such interactions determine at least two more characteristics of CaM, viz. the significance of time and processes and the steady process of internalization of mathematical tools and knowledge into the machine. I will restrict myself to the use of the computer within socalled experimental mathematics since this is the main object of CaM within the philosophical literature.
}, doi = {10.1007/9783319043821_2}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @article {D:pcr, title = {Propositional Logic Extended With A Pedagogically Useful Relevant Implication}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {245{\textendash}276}, abstract = {First and foremost, this paper concerns the combination of classical propositional logic with a relevant implication. The proposed combination is simple and transparent from a proof theoretic point of view and at the same time extremely useful for relating formal logic to natural language sentences. A specific system will be presented and studied, also from a semantic point of view. The last sections of the paper contain more general considerations on combining classical propositional logic with a relevant logic that has all classical theorems as theorems.
}, doi = {10.12775/LLP.2013.024}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {vanreconciling, title = {Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, month = {Aug}, pages = {5{\textendash}22}, abstract = {In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world (ontic aim) in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings (epistemic aim). Elaborating upon Illaris integration account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illaris account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology.
}, doi = {10.1007/s105160149243x}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {4265612, title = {The role of unification in microexplanations of physical laws}, journal = {Theoria  revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {79}, year = {2014}, pages = {41{\textendash}56}, abstract = {In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of particular facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically about microexplanations of laws in physics. We investigate whether providing unificatory information has a surplus value in microexplanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is information that provides ontological unification in the sense defined by Uskali M{\"a}ki. We argue that providing unificatory information may lead to explanations with more explanatory power (we use Jim Woodwards concept of explanatory power for that) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations.
}, issn = {04954548}, author = {Weber, Erik and Lefevere, Merel} } @article {wieland2014sceptical, title = {Sceptical Rationality}, journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, pages = {222{\textendash}238}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {Straser2014, title = {SequentBased Argumentation for Normative Reasoning}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {8554}, year = {2014}, pages = {224{\textendash}240}, abstract = {In this paper we present an argumentative approach to normative reasoning. Special attention is paid to normative conflicts, contrarytoduty and specificity cases. These are modeled by means of argumentative attacks. For this, we adopt a recently proposed frame work for logical argumentation in which arguments are generated by a sequent calculus of a given base logic (Arieli, CLIMA2013, pp.6985), and use an intuitionistic variant of stan dard deontic logic as our base logic. Argumentative attacks are realized by elimination rules that allow to discharge specific sequents. We demonstrate our system by means of various wellknown benchmark examples.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer} } @article {4443783, title = {S\lupecki{\textquoteright}s generalized mereology and its flaws}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {35}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {289{\textendash}300}, abstract = {One of the streams in the early development of set theory was an attempt to use mereology, a formal theory of parthood, as a foundational tool. The first such attempt is due to a Polish logician, Stanis\unmatched{0142}aw Le{\'s}niewski (1886{\textendash}1939). The attempt failed, but there is another, prima facie more promising attempt by Jerzy S\unmatched{0142}upecki (1904{\textendash}1987), who employed his generalized mereology to build mereological foundations for type theory. In this paper I (1) situate Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s attempt in the development of set theory, (2) describe and evaluate Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s approach, (3) describe S\unmatched{0142}upecki{\textquoteright}s strategy without unnecessary technical details, and (4) evaluate it with a rather negative outcome. The issues discussed go beyond merely historical interests due to the current popularity of mereology and because they are related to nominalistic attempts to understand mathematics in general. The introduction describes very briefly the situation in which mereology entered the scene of foundations of mathematics {\textendash} it can be safely skipped by anyone familiar with the early development of set theory. Section 2 describes and evaluates Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s attempt to use mereology as a foundational tool. In Section 3, I describe an attempt by S\unmatched{0142}upecki to improve on Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s work, which resulted in a system called generalized mereology. In Section 4, I point out the reasons why this attempt is still not successful. Section 5 contains an explanation of why Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s use of Ontology in developing arithmetic also is not nominalistically satisfactory.
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2014.917837}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {4443772, title = {Stanislaw {L}e{\'s}niewski: rethinking the philosophy of mathematics}, journal = {European review}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {125{\textendash}138}, abstract = {Near the end of the XIXth century part of mathematical research was focused on unification: the goal was to find {\textacutedbl}one sort of thing{\textacutedbl} that mathematics is (or could be taken to be) about. Quite quickly sets became the main candidate for this position. While the enterpize hit a rough patch with Frege{\textquoteright}s failure and settheoretic paradoxes, by the 1920s mathematicians (roughly speaking) settled on a promising axiomatization of set theory and considered it foundational. Quite parallel to this development was the work of Stanislaw Le{\textbackslash}{\textquoteright}sniewski (18861939), a Polish logician who did not accept the existence of abstract (aspatial, atemporal and acausal) objects such as sets. Lesniewski attempted to find a nominalistically acceptable replacement for set theory in the foundations of mathematics. His candidate was Mereology  a theory which instead of sets and elements spoke of wholes and parts. The goal of this paper will be to present Mereology in this context, to evaluate the feasibility of Lesniewski{\textquoteright}s project and to briefly comment on its contemporary relevance.
}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {4341742, title = {To envision a new particle or change an existing law? Hypothesis formation and anomaly resolution for the curious spectrum of beta decay}, journal = {STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS}, volume = {45}, year = {2014}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, abstract = {This paper addresses the question of how scientists determine which type of hypothesis is most suitable for tackling a particular problem by examining the historical case of the anomalous {\ss} spectrum in early nuclear physics (19271934), a puzzle that occasioned the most diverse hypotheses amongst physicists at the time. It is shown that such determinations are most often implicitly informed by scientists individual perspectives on the hierarchical relations between various elements of the theory and the problem at hand. In addition to this main result, it is suggested that Wolfgang Paulis neutrino idea may well have been an adaptation of Ernst Rutherfords original and older neutron idea, which would provide evidence that the adaptation of older ideas is a more common practice than is often thought.
}, issn = {13552198}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.11.002}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {DeLanghe2014, title = {A unified model of the division of cognitive labor.}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {444{\textendash}459}, abstract = {Current theories of the division of cognitive labor are confined to the {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}context of justification{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}, assuming exogenous theories. But new theories are made from the same labor that is used for developing existing theories, and if none of this labor is ever allocated to create new alternatives, then scientific progress is impossible. A unified model is proposed in which theories are no longer given but a function of the division of labor in the model itself. The interactions of individuals balancing the exploitation of existing theories and the exploration of new theories results in a robust cyclical pattern.
}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {4443828, title = {Validating functionbased design methods: an explanationist perspective}, journal = {Philosophy and Technology}, year = {2014}, pages = {511  531}, abstract = {Analysis of the adequacy of engineering design methods, as well as analysis of the utility of concepts of function often invoked in these methods, is a neglected topic in both philosophy of technology and in engineering proper. In this paper, I present an approachdubbed an explanationist perspectivefor assessing the adequacy of functionbased design methods. Engineering design is often intertwined with explanation, for instance, in reverse engineering and subsequent redesign, knowledge baseassisted designing, and diagnostic reasoning. I argue that the presented approach is useful for validating functionbased design methods with respect to their explanatory elements and that it supports assessment of the explanatory and design utility of function, and the different conceptualizations thereof, as used in such engineering design methods. I deploy two key desiderata from the explanation literature to assess the viability of functionbased design methods: explanatorily relevant differencemaking factors and counterfactual understanding defined in terms of whatifthingshadbeendifferent questions. I explicate the approach and its merits in terms of two case studies drawn from the engineering functional modeling literature: reverse engineering and redesign and malfunction analysis. I close the paper by discussing ramifications of the presented approach for the philosophy of design and the philosophy of explanation.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1334701401685}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {3152319, title = {Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {12}, year = {2013}, pages = {2195{\textendash}2217}, abstract = {Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung{\textquoteright}s wellknown abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.
}, issn = {00397857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s112290119964y}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {jespersen2013alleged, title = {Alleged assassins: realist and constructivist semantics for modal modification}, booktitle = {Logic, Language, and Computation}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {7758}, year = {2013}, pages = {94{\textendash}114}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {Modal modifiers such as Alleged oscillate between being subsective and being privative. If individual a is an alleged assassin (at some parameter of evaluation) then it is an open question whether a is an assassin (at that parameter). Standardly, modal modifiers are negatively defined, in terms of failed inferences or nonintersectivity or nonextensionality. Modal modifiers are in want of a positive definition and a workedout logical semantics. This paper offers two positive definitions. The realist definition is elaborated within Tich{\'y}s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) and builds upon Montagues modeltheoretic semantics for adjectives as representing mappings from properties to properties. The constructivist definition is based on an extension of MartinL{\"o}fs Constructive Type Theory (CTT) so as to accommodate partial verification. We show that, and why, a is an alleged assassin and Allegedly, a is an assassin are equivalent in TIL and synonymous in CTT.
}, doi = {10.1007/9783642369766_8}, author = {Jespersen, Bj{\o}rn and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @phdthesis {PhD_JanW, title = {And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy.}, year = {2013}, month = {February 25}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {3258356, title = {{\textquoteright}Argumentandi modus huius scientiae maxim{\`e} proprius: {\textquoteright} {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s mechanics and the question of mathematical principles}, booktitle = {Guidobaldo del {M}onte (15451607) : theory and practice of the mathematical disciplines from {U}rbino to {E}urope}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}34}, publisher = {Edition Open Access}, isbn = {9783844242836}, url = {http://www.editionopenaccess.de/media/proceedings/4/Proceedings4.pdf}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Becchi, Antonio and Bertoloni Meli, Domenico and Gamba, Enrico} } @article {wieland2013belief, title = {Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, by Katja Maria Vogt (review).}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {122}, number = {488}, year = {2013}, pages = {1204{\textendash}1207}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzu012}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {3182109, title = {Causaliteit en de methodestrijd: naar een ge{\"\i}ntegreerd gebruik van kwalitatief en kwantitatief onderzoek in een praktisch geori{\"e}nteerde criminologie}, journal = {Panopticon}, volume = {34}, year = {2013}, pages = {115{\textendash}133}, abstract = {In this article, we reexamine an old problem in criminology i.e the "battle of the methods". Even though the battle has become less explicit recently, it does have a contemporary named the incompatibility thesis in the field of mixed methods research in the social sciences. We look at this incompatibility thesis from the point of view of the philosophy of science, more precisely by discussing different forms of causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality are discussed. We argue that qualitative and quantitative methods each pursue a specific kind of knowledge, but that a functional integration of both is desirable. We conclude by referring to two main advantages of such integration, viz. the manipulation of causal relationships and extrapolation of research results in time and space.
}, issn = {07711409}, author = {Heylen, Ben and Weber, Erik} } @article {3143178, title = {The conceptual elusiveness of engineering functions: a philosophical analysis}, journal = {Philosophy and Technology}, volume = {26}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {159185}, abstract = {In this paper, we describe the conceptual elusiveness of the notion of function as used in engineering practice. We argue that it should be accepted as an ambiguous notion, and then review philosophical argumentations in which engineering functions occur in order to identify the consequences of this ambiguity. Function is a key notion in engineering, yet is used by engineers systematically in a variety of meanings. First, we demonstrate that this ambiguous use is rational for engineers by considering the role of functions in design methods and by analysing the ambiguity in terms of Kuhns notion of methodological incommensurability. Second, we discuss ontological and mereological analyses of engineering functions and describe a proof that subfunctions cannot formally be taken as parts of the functions they decompose. Engineering functions figure sometimes in philosophical work and are then typically taken as having an unambiguous, welldefined meaning. Finally, we therefore revisit work in philosophy of technology on the dual nature of technical artefacts, in philosophy of science on functional and mechanistic explanations, and in philosophy of biology on biological functions, and explore the consequences of the fact that engineering function is an ambiguous notion. It is argued that one of these consequences may be that also the notion of biological function has an ambiguous meaning
}, issn = {22105441}, doi = {10.1007/s1334701200961}, author = {Vermaas, Pieter and van Eck, Dingmar and Kroes, Peter} } @article {Seselja2013, title = {Concerning Peter Vickers{\textquoteright} Recent Treatment of {\textquoteright}Paraconsistencitis{\textquoteright}}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {325{\textendash}340}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @book {4169996, title = {De Humanities: een bedreigde soort?}, series = {De uil van Minerva}, volume = {26}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, publisher = {UGent}, organization = {UGent}, editor = {De Vleminck, Jens and Froeyman, Anton} } @article {VanDePutte2013a, title = {Default Assumptions and Selection Functions: A Generic Framework for Nonmonotonic Logics}, journal = {Proceedings of MICAI2013, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence}, volume = {8264}, year = {2013}, pages = {5467}, abstract = {We investigate a generalization of socalled defaultassumption consequence relations, obtained by replacing the consequence relation of classical logic with an arbitrary supraclassical, compact Tarskilogic, and using arbitrary selection functions on sets of sets of defaults. Both generalizations are inspired by various approaches in nonmonotonic logic and belief revision. We establish some metatheoretic properties of the resulting systems. In addition, we compare them with two other frameworks from the literature on nonmonotonic logic, viz. adaptive logics and selection semantics.
}, doi = {10.1007/9783642451140_5}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {4254489, title = {The epistemic integrity of NASA practices in the space shuttle program}, journal = {ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH  POLICIES AND QUALITY ASSURANCE}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {72{\textendash}92}, abstract = {This article presents an account of epistemic integrity and uses it to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of practices in NASA{\textquoteright}s Space Shuttle Program was limited. We focus on the following kinds of practices: (1) research by working engineers, (2) review by middlelevel managers, and (3) communication with the public. We argue that the epistemic integrity of these practices was undermined by production pressure at NASA, i.e., the pressure to launch an unreasonable amount of flights per year. Finally, our findings are used to develop some potential strategies to protect epistemic integrity in aerospace science.
}, issn = {08989621}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2013.767122}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {2999532, title = {The epistemic integrity of scientific research}, journal = {SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS}, volume = {19}, year = {2013}, pages = {757{\textendash}774}, abstract = {We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnaps characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnaps four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.
}, issn = {13533452}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @phdthesis {PhD_Raoul, title = {Explanation in the Cognitive Sciences and Biology: Mechanisms, Laws and their Explanatory Virtues}, year = {2013}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {4254569, title = {Fraud in academic medical research: lessons from Flanders, Belgium}, journal = {The reasoner}, volume = {7}, number = {7}, year = {2013}, pages = {2}, abstract = {A scientific survey on fraud in academic medical research in Flanders , of which the results were recently published in popular science magazine Eos, has caused tumult in the Flemish academic community. The reason is that these results suggest that scientific fraud (which could indirectly cause ill health and death among patients) is not as rare as earlier estimates indicate . Malpractices are primarily attributed to the pressure to publish. In this piece , we elaborate on the content of the study and pave the way for reform.
}, issn = {17570522}, url = {http://thereasoner.org/}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {diez2013general, title = {General theories of explanation: buyer beware}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {379{\textendash}396}, abstract = {We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domaininvariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (No{\^u}s 44(2):305328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickels arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickels defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickels argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domaininvariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domaininvariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickels examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!
}, doi = {10.1007/s1122901100208}, author = {D{\'\i}ez, Jos{\'e} and Khalifa, Kareem and Leuridan, Bert} } @incollection {de2013generating, title = {Generating, solving and the mathematics of {H}omo {S}apiens. {E}mil {P}osts views on computation}, booktitle = {A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature as Computation}, year = {2013}, pages = {45{\textendash}62}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishers}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Zenil, H.} } @article {4443766, title = {G{\"o}delizing the Yablo sequence}, journal = {Journal of philosophical logic}, volume = {42}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {679{\textendash}695}, abstract = {We investigate what happens when {\textquoteright}truth{\textquoteright} is replaced with {\textquoteright}provability{\textquoteright} in Yablo{\textquoteright}s paradox. By diagonalization, appropriate sequences of sentences can be constructed. Such sequences contain no sentence decided by the background consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical theory. If the provability predicate satisfies the derivability conditions, each such sentence is provably equivalent to the consistency statement and to the Godel sentence. Thus each two such sentences are provably equivalent to each other. The same holds for the arithmetization of the existential Yablo paradox. We also look at a formulation which employs Rosser{\textquoteright}s provability predicate.
}, issn = {00223611}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1099201292444}, author = {Cie{\'s}li{\'n}ski, Cezary and Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {weber2013study, title = {How to Study Scientific Explanation?}, booktitle = {Scientific Explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {25{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {This paper investigates the workingmethod of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation. We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.
}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @phdthesis {3257462, title = {{\textquoteright}I began with the desire to speak with the dead{\textquoteright}: de ethiek als {\textquoteright}eerste filosofie{\textquoteright} van de geschiedschrijving}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, isbn = {9789083125053}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {3134040, title = {The ICEtheory of technical functions}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {23{\textendash}44}, issn = {08150796}, doi = {10.1007/s1101601296429}, author = {Weber, Erik and Reydon, Thomas and Boon, Mieke and Houkes, Wybo and Vermaas, Pieter} } @article {MCJ:iadlnc, title = {An InconsistencyAdaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {42}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {285{\textendash}315}, abstract = {We present the inconsistencyadaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set as normally as possible with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1099201192213}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke} } @article {4443727, title = {Induction from a single instance: {I}ncomplete frames}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {641{\textendash}653}, abstract = {In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.
}, issn = {12331821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1069901292956}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {4118013, title = {Inferential explanations in biology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, volume = {44}, year = {2013}, pages = {356{\textendash}364}, abstract = {Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempels DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these nonmechanistic expla nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.
}, issn = {13698486}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {wieland2013justification, title = {Is Justification Dialectical?}, journal = {International Journal for the Study of Skepticism}, volume = {3}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {182{\textendash}201}, abstract = {Much of presentday epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they ha ve in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in ord er to block the skeptics argument from disagreement. That is, they allow tha t one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it agains t challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in its most interesting format. In this paper I zoom i n on this debate, and fix further details of Lammenrantas lead. Specifically , I will side with skepticism that justification is dialectical, yet o nly if certain conditions are in place.
}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {3152328, title = {Kuhn and the question of pursuit worthiness}, journal = {Topoi  An International review of philosophy}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}19}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn{\textquoteright}s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn{\textquoteright}s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.
}, issn = {01677411}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1124501291449}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3178933, title = {Modelling abduction in science by means of a modal adaptive logic}, journal = {FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {611{\textendash}624}, abstract = {Scientists confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses as a result of their abductive inferences, generally want to reason further on the different hypotheses one by one. This paper presents a modal adaptive logic MLA (s) that enables us to model abduction in such a way that the different explanatory hypotheses can be derived individually. This modelling is illustrated with a case study on the different hypotheses on the origin of the Moon.
}, issn = {12331821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1069901292938}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {4269435, title = {Noncognitive values and objectivity in scientific explanation: the case of the {M}ovius line}, journal = {PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {429{\textendash}452}, abstract = {Although it is now widely accepted that in science, noncognitive values play a role, it is still debated whether this has implications for its objectivity. It seems that the task of philosophers here is twofold: to flesh out what kinds of noncognitive values play what kinds of roles, and to evaluate the implications for objectivity. I attempt to contribute to both tasks by introducing the value of egalitarianism, and showing how this noncognitive value shapes three alternative explanations of the Movius Line. It is argued that although these explanations are motivated by egalitarianism, they are nevertheless objective.
}, issn = {09263977}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/POSC\_a\_00111}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {beirlaen2013non, title = {Nonmonotonic reasoning with normative conflicts in multiagent deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {24}, number = {6}, year = {2013}, pages = {1179{\textendash}1207}, abstract = {We present two multiagent deontic logics that consistently accommodate various types of normative conflicts. Its language features modal operators for obligation and permission, and for the realization of individual and collective actions. The logic is nonclassical since it makes use of a paraconsistent and paracomplete negation connective. Moreover, it is nonmonotonic due to its definition within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The logic is equipped with a defeasible proof theory and semantics.
}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exs059}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {verdee2013non, title = {Nonmonotonic set theory as a pragmatic foundation of mathematics}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {655{\textendash}680}, abstract = {In this paper I propose a new approach to the foundation of mathematics: nonmonotonic set theory. I present two completely different methods to develop set theories based on adaptive logics. For both theories there is a finitistic nontriviality proof and both theories contain (a subtle version of) the comprehension axiom schema. The first theory contains only a maximal selection of instances of the comprehension schema that do not lead to inconsistencies. The second allows for all the instances, also the inconsistent ones, but restricts the conclusions one can draw from them in order to avoid triviality. The theories have enough expressive power to form a justification/explication for most of the established results of classical mathematics. They are therefore not limited by G{\"o}dels incompleteness theorems. This remarkable result is possible because of the nonrecursive character of the final proofs of theorems of nonmonotonic theories. I shall argue that, precisely because of the computational complexity of these final proofs, we cannot claim that nonmonotonic theories are ideal foundations for mathematics. Nevertheless, thanks to their strength, first order language and the recursive dynamic (defeasible) proofs of theorems of the theory, the nonmonotonic theories form (what I call) interesting pragmatic foundations.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1069901292965}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {2006773, title = {Offline and online data: on upgrading functional information to knowledge}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {164}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {371{\textendash}392}, abstract = {This paper addresses the problem of upgrading functional information to knowledge. Functional information is defined as syntactically wellformed, meaningful and collectively opaque data. Its use in the formal epistemology of information theories is crucial to solve the debate on the veridical nature of information, and it represents the companion notion to standard strongly semantic information, defined as wellformed, meaningful and true data. The formal framework, on which the definitions are based, uses a contextual version of the verificationist principle of truth in order to connect functional to semantic information, avoiding Gettierization and decoupling from true informational contents. The upgrade operation from functional information uses the machinery of epistemic modalities in order to add data localization and accessibility as its main properties. We show in this way the conceptual worthiness of this notion for issues in contemporary epistemology debates, such as the explanation of knowledge process acquisition from information retrieval systems, and open data repositories.
}, issn = {00318116}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1109801298604}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {3177520, title = {Oneindige regressieargumenten}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {105}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {1{\textendash}14}, abstract = {Infinite regress arguments show up in many philosophical debates. But what actually is a regress argument? This article reviews two theories: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory. According to the Paradox Theory, regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the statement that discussions are settled only if there is an agreedupon criterion to settle them). According to the Failure Theory, regress arguments can be used to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to solve an existentially or universally quantified problem (e.g. to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to settle all discussions, or that it fails to settle even one discussion). In the literature, the Paradox Theory is fairly welldeveloped, and this article shows that the Failure Theory can be supplied with similar tools.
}, issn = {00025275}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ANTW2013.1.WIEL}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {3178949, title = {Pauli{\textquoteright}s idea of the neutrino: how models in physics allow to revive old ideas for new purposes}, booktitle = {Modelbased reasoning in science and technology : theoretical and cognitive issues}, year = {2013}, pages = {449461}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {Abstract Models have proven themselves to be the key catalyst of many new ideas in science. However, it is not yet fully clarified why models can fulfill such an important heuristic role. The two main reasons stated in the literaturethe mental simulation of various scenarios and the wide crossfertilization across various disciplinesseem to leave out one of the most obvious features of models: they are designed for a purpose. Therefore I investigated why, while the construction of models is a goaloriented task with a predefined purpose, the use of models yields so many new ideas in science. This paper presents my conceptual analysis together with a detailed historical case study. The functional design of models forces scientists to explore vigorously older ideas to adapt them: as the lacunas in a functional model are also functional, scientists need to modify older ideas (that were formulated for different purposes) to fit the present functional gaps in their models. As such, they construct new ideas. The detailed historical case study exemplifies this by showing how Paulis original suggestion of the neutrino was, in fact, such an adaptation of Rutherfords earlier idea of the neutron. The present analysis and case study suggest that functional adaptations are salient but often overlooked features of model based investigation.
}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo} } @article {3086510, title = {Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {139{\textendash}152}, abstract = {In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver{\textquoteright}s continuum of howpossibly, to howplausibly, to howactually models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism{\textquoteright}s activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models.
}, issn = {09515089}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.633693}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {van2013preferential, title = {Preferential Semantics using Nonsmooth Preference Relations}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {43}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {903{\textendash}942}, abstract = {This paper studies the properties of eight semantic consequence relations defined from a Tarskilogic L and a preference relation \&\#8826;. They are equivalent to Shohams socalled preferential entailment for smooth model structures, but avoid certain problems of the latter in nonsmooth configurations. Each of the logics can be characterized in terms of what we call multiselection semantics. After discussing this type of semantics, we focus on some concrete proposals from the literature, checking a number of metatheoretic properties and elaborating on their intuitive motivation. As it turns out, many of their metaproperties only hold in case \&\#8826; is transitive. To tackle this problem, we propose slight modifications of each of the systems, showing the resulting logics to behave better at the intuitive level and in metatheoretic terms, for arbitrary \&\#8826;.
}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {van2013prime, title = {Prime implicates and relevant belief revision}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {109{\textendash}119}, abstract = {This article discusses Parikhs axiom of relevance in belief revision, and recalls some results from Kourousias and Makinson (2007, J. Symbolic Logic, 72, 9941002) in this context. The crucial distinction is emphasized between the uniqueness of the finest splitting of K and the fact that K has several normal forms associated with that finest splitting. The main new result of this article is a new proof for the theorem that the set of prime implicates of K is a normal form for the finest splitting of K. It is explained how this proof avoids a mistake in an earlier proof from Wu and Zhang (2010, KnowledgeBased Syst., 23, 7076). As a corollary, relevance can be redefined without reference to the finest splitting, using the notion of pathrelevance from Makinson (2009, J. Appl. Logic, 7, 377387). Finally, a weak yet sufficient condition for irrelevance is presented.
}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exr040}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {3152435, title = {Reactive standard deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {117{\textendash}157}, abstract = {We introduce a reactive variant of SDL (standard deontic logic): SDLR1 (reactive standard deontic logic). Given a Kripkean view on the semantics of SDL in terms of directed graphs where arrows {\textrightarrow} represent the accessibility relation between worlds, reactive models add two elements: arrows {\textrightarrow} are labelled as active or inactive, and double arrows \&8608; connect arrows, e.g. (x_{1} {\textrightarrow} x_{2}) \&\#8608; (x_{3} {\textrightarrow} x_{4}). The idea is that passing through x_{1} {\textrightarrow} x_{2} activates a switch represented by \&8608; that inverts the label of x_{3} {\textrightarrow} x_{4} and hence activates respectively deactivates this arrow. This allows to introduce two modalities: \&\#9633; is the usual KDmodality of SDL and operates on the Kripkean graph where all labels and double arrows are ignored, while \&\#8709; takes them into account. We demonstrate that RSDL1 allows for an intuitive interpretation of ought. The logic can handle contrarytoduty cases such as several instantiations of the Chisholm set in a paradoxfree way by means of using double arrows and annotations to block and give access to ideal worlds.
}, issn = {0955792X}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs043}, author = {Gabbay, Dov M. and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @book {3259615, title = {Scientific explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {93}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {This paper investigates the workingmethod of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation. We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.
}, isbn = {9789400764453}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3171382, title = {The status of functional explanation in psychology: reduction and mechanistic explanation}, journal = {THEORY \& PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {23}, year = {2013}, pages = {145{\textendash}163}, abstract = {The validity of functional explanations as they are commonly used in psychology has recently come under attack. Kims supervenience argument purports to prove that higherlevel generalizations have no causal powers of their own, and hence are explanatorily irrelevant. In a nutshell, the supervenience argument forces us to either embrace epiphenomenalism of higher level properties, or accept Kims specific brand of reductionism. However, with the current emphasis on mechanistic explanations, the literature on explanation in psychology has undergone some drastic changes. It could be argued, therefore, that Kims argument targets an outdated concept of functional explanations. In any case, these developments warrant a reassessment of the implications of his argument, which is the purpose of the present paper. First, we argue that the metaphysics behind the supervenience argument is incompatible with that of mechanisms. Second, we argue that Kims proposed brand of reductionism does not accurately describe the explanatory practices of cognitive science.
}, issn = {09593543}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354312453093}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Looren de Jong, Huib} } @article {wieland2013strong, title = {Strong and weak regress arguments}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {56}, number = {224}, year = {2013}, pages = {439{\textendash}461}, abstract = {In the literature, regress arguments often take one of two different forms: either they conclude that a given solution fails to solve any problem of a certain kind (the strong conclusion), or they conclude that a given solution fails to solve all problems of a certain kind (the weaker conclusion). This gives rise to a logical problem: do regresses entail the strong or the weaker conclusion, or none? In this paper I demonstrate that regress arguments can in fact take both forms, and clearly set out the logical difference between them. Throughout the paper, I confine myself to metaphysical examples from the early Russell. Only now that we know they are valid can we start to discuss whether they are sound.
}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {Verdee01022013, title = {Strong, universal and provably nontrivial set theory by means of adaptive logic}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {108125}, abstract = {In this article, I present a nontrivial but inconsistent set theory based on unrestricted comprehension. The theory is provably nontrivial and strong enough for most of the applications of regular mathematics. This is realized by distinguishing between strong and weak set membership and allowing for the derivation of strong membership from weak membership whenever this is not problematic (it does not lead to paradoxes). This idea of applying rules whenever unproblematic is formalized by means of an adaptive logic.
}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzs025}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {leuridan2013structure, title = {The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A CausalStructural Account}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {65}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {717{\textendash}771}, abstract = {What are scientific theories and how should they be represented? In this article, I propose a causalstructural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitchers unificationist view, and Dardens theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation is provided, which sheds light on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study.
}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt015}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {primiero2013taxonomy, title = {A taxonomy of errors for information systems}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {249{\textendash}273}, abstract = {We provide a full characterization of computational error states for information systems. The class of errors considered is general enough to include human rational processes, logical reasoning, scientific progress and data processing in some functional programming languages. The aim is to reach a full taxonomy of error states by analysing the recovery and processing of data. We conclude by presenting machinereadable checking and resolve algorithms.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1102301393075}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {3152459, title = {Three formats of prioritized adaptive logics: a comparative study}, journal = {Logic journal of the IGPL}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {127{\textendash}159}, abstract = {A broad range of defeasible reasoning forms has been explicated by prioritized adaptive logics. However, the relative lack in metatheory of many of these logics stands in sharp contrast to the frequency of their application. This article presents the first comparative study of a large group of prioritized adaptive logics. Three formats of such logics are discussed: superpositions of adaptive logics, hierarchic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte (2011, Log. J. IGPL, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzr025) and lexicographic adaptive logics from F. Van De Putte and C. Stra\&\#223;er (2012, Log. Anal., forthcoming). We restrict the scope to logics that use the strategy Minimal Abnormality. It is shown that the semantic characterizations of these systems are equivalent and that they are all sound with respect to either of these characterizations. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for the completeness and equivalence of the consequence relations of the three formats are established. Some attractive properties, including Fixed Point and the Deduction Theorem, are shown to hold whenever these conditions are obeyed.
}, issn = {13670751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzs004}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152453, title = {Two adaptive logics of normpropositions}, journal = {JOURNAL OF APPLIED LOGIC}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {147{\textendash}168}, abstract = {We present two defeasible logics of normpropositions (statements about norms) that (i) consistently allow for the possibility of normative gaps and normative conflicts, and (ii) map each premise set to a sufficiently rich consequence set. In order to meet (i), we define the logic LNP, a conflict and gaptolerant logic of normpropositions capable of formalizing both normative conflicts and normative gaps within the object language. Next, we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logic framework for nonmonotonic reasoning in order to meet (ii). This results in the adaptive logics LNP^{r}LNP^{r} and LNP_{mLNPm}, which interpret a given set of premises in such a way that normative conflicts and normative gaps are avoided whenever possible. LNP^{r}LNP^{r} and LNP^{m}LNP^{m} are equipped with a preferential semantics and a dynamic proof theory.
}, issn = {15708683}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2013.02.001}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {wieland2013carroll, title = {What Carrolls tortoise actually proves}, journal = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, volume = {16}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {983{\textendash}997}, abstract = {Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carrolls Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557569, 2005), I ask what Carrollstyle considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1067701293979}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {3099682, title = {Abduction of generalizations}, journal = {Theoria  revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {345{\textendash}364}, abstract = {Abduction of generalizations is the process in which explanatory hypotheses are formed for generalizations such as pineapples taste sweet or rainbows appear when the sun breaks through the rain. This phenomenon has received little attention in formal logic and philosophy of science. The current paper remedies this lacuna by first giving an overview of some general characteristics of this process, elaborating on its ubiquity in scientific and everyday reasoning. Second, the adaptive logic LA \&\#8704; is presented to explicate this process formally
}, issn = {04954548}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {3152442, title = {Adaptively applying modus ponens in conditional logics of normality}, journal = {Journal of applied nonclassical logics}, volume = {22}, number = {12}, year = {2012}, pages = {125{\textendash}148}, abstract = {This paper presents an adaptive logic enhancement of conditional logics of normality that allows for defeasible applications of Modus Ponens to conditionals. In addition to the possibilities these logics already offer in terms of reasoning about conditionals, this way they are enriched by the ability to perform default inferencing itself. The idea is to apply Modus Ponens defeasibly to a conditional A\&\#8605;B and a fact A on the condition that it is safe to do so concerning the factual and conditional knowledge at hand. It is for instance not safe if the given information describes exceptional circumstances: although birds usually fly, penguins are exceptional to this rule. The two adaptive standard strategies are shown to correspond to different intuitions, a skeptical and a credulous reasoning type, which manifest themselves in the handling of socalled floating conclusions.
}, issn = {11663081}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2012.682450}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {D:ronald, title = {Bedoelingen en principes. {E}en onverwachte relatie}, booktitle = {Door Denken en Doen. {E}ssays bij het Werk van {R}onald {C}ommers}, year = {2012}, pages = {93{\textendash}106}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @article {3148393, title = {Busting a myth about Le{\'s}niewski and definitions}, journal = {History and philosophy of logic}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {159{\textendash}189}, abstract = {A theory of definitions which places the eliminability and conservativeness requirements on definitions is usually called the standard theory. We examine a persistent myth which credits this theory to Lesniewski, a Polish logician. After a brief survey of its origins, we show that the myth is highly dubious. First, no place in Lesniewski{\textquoteright}s published or unpublished work is known where the standard conditions are discussed. Second, Lesniewski{\textquoteright}s own logical theories allow for creative definitions. Third, Lesniewski{\textquoteright}s celebrated {\textquoteright}rules of definition{\textquoteright} lay merely syntactical restrictions on the form of definitions: they do not provide definitions with such metatheoretical requirements as eliminability or conservativeness. On the positive side, we point out that among the Polish logicians, in the 1920s and 1930s, a study of these metatheoretical conditions is more readily found in the works of Lukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz.
}, issn = {01445340}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2011.583771}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and H{\"a}m{\"a}ri, K Severi} } @incollection {2020639, title = {Can economics become a purely experimental science? {A} comparative study}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world}, year = {2012}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.
}, isbn = {9789814383073}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {2964109, title = {Can Pyrrhonists act normally?}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {15}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {227{\textendash}289}, abstract = {Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following I take up this systematic query, and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus{\textquoteright} ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to insure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life.
}, issn = {13869795}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2012.696133}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2012carving, title = {Carving the world as we please}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {7{\textendash}24}, abstract = {Nelson Goodman defends the seemingly radical view that, in a certain sense, all facts depend on our perspective on the matter. We make the world, rather than merely find it. The aim of this contribution is threefold: to make sense of Goodmans metaphysical perspectivalism, clearly explain how it differs from other branches of perspectivalism (epistemic and semantic), and put two issues on the agenda that deserve renewed attention.
}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {2977907, title = {Causality and explanation in the sciences}, journal = {Theoria  revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {133{\textendash}136}, abstract = {Editors{\textquoteright} introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at the University of Ghent in September 2011.
}, issn = {04954548}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik} } @article {2985552, title = {Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {123{\textendash}148}, abstract = {In a paper "Causation in Context" (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspectiverelative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mindindependent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies{\textquoteright} arguments. Then we show that perspectiverelativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspectiverelativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3094113, title = {A contextual type theory with judgemental modalities for reasoning from open assumptions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {220}, year = {2012}, pages = {579{\textendash}600}, abstract = {Contextual type theories are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. The combination of a constructive language with a modal extension of contexts appears crucial to explore the attractive idea of a typetheoretical calculus of provability from refutable assumptions for nonmonotonic reasoning. This paper introduces such a language: the modal operators are meant to internalize two different modes of correctness, respectively with necessity as the standard notion of constructive verification and possibility as provability up to refutation of contextual conditions.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {wieland2012pyrronistische, title = {De pyrronistische zaak}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {523{\textendash}532}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @book {3173717, title = {Door denken en doen: essays bij het werk van Ronald Commers}, year = {2012}, pages = {375}, publisher = {Academia Press}, organization = {Academia Press}, abstract = {Deze bundel is een vriendenboek, uit erkentelijkheid aan Ronald Commers aangeboden naar aanleiding van zijn emeritaat. Ronald Commers was tot 2011 als hoogleraar verbonden aan de vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschap van de Universiteit Gent. Zijn werk is breed en diepgaand en heeft velen ge{\"\i}nspireerd. De bijdragen in deze bundel dragen er de sporen van. Zo divers als de onderwerpen die Commers heeft behandeld, zo divers zijn ook de essays die hier zijn opgenomen. Ze zijn een blijk van waardering vanwege de auteurs voor de invloed die Commers door zijn denken en doen op hun werk en leven heeft gehad en nog steeds heeft. In alfabetische volgorde bevat dit boek essays van: Diderik Batens die nadenkt over bedoelingen, alledaagse principes, symbolische principes en {\textquoteleft}luie{\textquoteright} principes; Karel Boullart die naast een kleine diabologie ook een reflectie presenteert over het belang van het realisme voor de moraalfilosoof; Roger Burggraeve die de broederschap doordenkt als grondslag voor de noties gelijkheid en vrijheid; Tom Claes die op zoek gaat naar positieve effecten van seksualisering; Hubert Dethier die reflecteert over de geschiedenis van het humanisme; Raymond Detrez die het heeft over de visie van G. Schamelhout over de volken van Europa en hun nationale bewegingen; Jan De Vos die onderzoekt hoe hedendaagse vormen van psychologisering geworteld zitten in de moderniteit; Alicja Gescinska die de stelling verdedigt dat de esthetische ervaring nauw verbonden is met de ethische waardering; Freddy Mortier die ingaat op de relatie tussen Wagner en de vrijmetselarij; Rik Pinxten die het moraalwetenschappelijke project en de invloed hiervan op zijn en Commers{\textquoteright} werk traceert; Danny Praet die het intellectueel kader schetst van de Gentse godsdiensthistoricus Franz Cumont; Stef Slembrouck die onderzoekt hoe meertaligheid zich voltrekt; Wim Vandekerckhove die parallellen aantoont tussen het 18de eeuwse slavenhandeldebat en het hedendaagse debat over kinderarbeid en {\textquoteleft}bonded labour;{\textquoteright} Gertrudis Van de Vijver die de vraag stelt wat de sofist nog voor de (post)moderne denker kan betekenen; Eric Vanhaute die op zoek gaat naar de legitimering van de nieuwe wereldgeschiedenis; An Verlinden die de begeesterende indruk van Ronald Commers{\textquoteright} onderwijs, denken en activisme op haar eigen wijsgerig en ge{\"e}ngageerd werk en denken belicht; Etienne Vermeersch die een gedachtewisseling presenteert omtrent de mogelijkheid van de menselijke vrije wil; en Erik Weber die argumenteert dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme.
}, isbn = {9789038219431}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @article {VanDePutte2012, title = {The Dynamics of Relevance: Adaptive Belief Revision}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {187}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, month = {May}, pages = {142}, abstract = {This paper presents eight (previously unpublished) adaptive logics for belief revision, each of which define a belief revision operation in the sense of the AGM framework. All these revision operations are shown to satisfy the six basic AGM postulates for belief revision, and Parikhs axiom of Relevance. Using one of these logics as an example, we show how their proof theory gives a more dynamic flavor to belief revision than existing approaches. It is argued that this turns belief revision (that obeys Relevance) into a more natural undertaking, where analytic steps are performed only as soon as they turn out to be necessary in order to uphold certain beliefs.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1122901201169}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {van2012extending, title = {Extending the standard format of adaptive logics to the prioritized case}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {220}, year = {2012}, pages = {601{\textendash}641}, abstract = {This paper introduces a new format for reasoning with prioritized stan dards of normality. It is applicable in a broad variety of contexts, e.g. dealing with (possibly conflicting) prioritized belief bases or combining different reasoning methods in a prioritized way. The format is a gener alization of the standard format of adaptive logics (see [4]). Every logic that is formulated within it has a straightforward semantics in the style of Shohams selection semantics (see [22]) and a dynamic proof theory. Fur thermore, it can count on a rich metatheory that inherits the attractive features of the standard format, such as soundness and completeness, re flexivity, idempotence, cautious monotonicity, and many other properties.
}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @proceedings {martens2012formal, title = {A formal approach to vague expressions with indexicals}, journal = {Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 9 (LENLS 92012)}, year = {2012}, pages = {3751}, publisher = {Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence}, abstract = {In this paper, we offer a formal approach to the scantily investigated problem of vague expressions with indexicals, in particular including the spatial indexical {\textquoteleft}here{\textquoteright} and the temporal indexical {\textquoteleft}now{\textquoteright}. We present two versions of an adaptive fuzzy logic extended with an indexical, formally expressed by a modifier as a function that applies to predicative formulas. In the first version, such an operator is applied to nonvague predicates. The modified formulas may have a fuzzy truth value and fit into a Sorites paradox. We use adaptive fuzzy logics as a reasoning tool to address such a paradox. The modifier enables us to offer an adequate explication of the dynamic reasoning process. In the second version, a different result is obtained for an indexical applied to a formula with a possibly vague predicate, where the resulting modified formula has a crisp value and does not add up to a Sorites paradox.
}, author = {Martens, Liesbeth and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {lycke2012formal, title = {A formal explication of the search for explanations: the adaptive logics approach to abductive reasoning}, journal = {Logic Journal of IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {497{\textendash}516}, abstract = {Most logicbased approaches characterize abduction as a kind of backwards deduction plus additional conditions, which means that a number of conditions is specified that enable one to decide whether or not a particular abductive inference is sound (one of those conditions may e.g. be that abductive consequences have to be compatible with the background theory). Despite the fact that these approaches succeed in specifying which formulas count as valid consequences of abductive inference steps, they do not explicate the way people actually reason by means of abductive inferences. This is most clearly shown by the absence of a decent proof theory. Instead, search procedures are provided that enable one to determine the right abductive consequences. However, these do not by far resemble human reasoning. In order to explicate abductive reasoning more realistically, an alternative approach will be provided in this article, namely, one that is based on the adaptive logics programme. Proof theoretically, this approach interprets the argumentation schema affirming the consequent (AC: A ⊃ B, B  A) as a defeasible rule of inference. This comes down to the fact that the abductive consequences obtained by means of AC are accepted only for as long as certain conditions are satis.ede.g. as long as their negation has not been derived from the background theory. In the end, only the unproblematic applications of AC are retained, while the problematic ones are rejected. In this way, the adaptive logics approach to abduction succeeds to provide a more realistic explication of the way people reason by means of abductive inferences. Moreover, as multiple abduction processes will be characterized, this article may be considered as the first step in the direction of a general formal approach to abduction based on the adaptive logics programme.
}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzq053}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {2977241, title = {Frank {A}nkersmit and {E}elco {R}unia: the presence and the otherness of the past}, journal = {Rethinking history}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {393{\textendash}415}, abstract = {This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I give an indepth comparison and analysis of the theories of Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, in which I highlight their most important resemblances and differences. What both have in common is their notion of the presence of the past as a {\textquoteright}presence in absence{\textquoteright}. They differ, however, with respect to the character of this past and the role representation plays in making it present. Second, I also argue that for both Ankersmit and Runia, the presence of the past is always the present of our past, which excludes the experience of the otherness of the past, and which opens both theories to the criticisms of being selfcentered and nationalistic.
}, issn = {13642529}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2012.695065}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {frans2012game, title = {The Game of Fictional Mathematics. {R}eview of Mathematics and Reality by {M}ary {L}eng}, journal = {Constructivist Foundations}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {126{\textendash}128}, abstract = {Leng attacks the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. She offers an account that treats the role of mathematics in science as an indispensable and useful part of theories, but retains nonetheless a fictionalist position towards mathematics. The result is an account of mathematics that is interesting for constructivists. Her view towards the nominalistic part of science is, however, more in conflict with radical constructivism.
}, author = {Frans, Joachim} } @article {3139252, title = {The generation of abductive explanations from inconsistent theories}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {400{\textendash}416}, abstract = {In this article I will show how the goaldirected proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the {\textquoteright}inconsistencyadaptive{\textquoteright} logic CLuN(r)from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221250) called pCLuN(r) allows for generating sensible abductive explanations from finite inconsistent theories. Before this is shown, I give a more general account on how goaldirected proof procedures contribute to the study of abduction as backward reasoning. Between these two parts, I describe the goaldirected proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the {\textquoteright}inconsistencyadaptive{\textquoteright} logic CLuNr from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221250).
}, issn = {13670751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzq056}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @phdthesis {PhD_Frederik, title = {Generic Formats for Prioritized Adaptive Logics. With Applications in Deontic Logic, Abduction and Belief Revision}, year = {2012}, month = {May 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {3145156, title = {Het debat tussen {\textquoteright}groene spellers{\textquoteright} en {\textquoteright}witte spellers{\textquoteright} ge{\"e}valueerd vanuit een sociaalepistemologische invalshoek}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {14}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {In the Netherlands and Flanders, a debate on the Dutch spelling has been raging between, on the one hand, the green spellers, who follow the official green spelling, and, on the other hand, the protesting white spellers, who espouse an alternative spelling. In the present article, this debate will be approached from a socioepistemological perspective. Using the theory of Helen Longino, we highlight how the debate between the parties has been conducted, and explain why it failed to become a fruitful debate, based on a critical discourse and by which both parties strive for objective knowledge. We also draw a few lessons for the future.
}, issn = {13730975}, author = {Martens, Liesbeth and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {2094355, title = {Het doel van wetenschap: is er een derde weg tussen onbeperkt intentioneel realisme en strikt pragmatisme?}, booktitle = {Door Denken en Doen. Essays bij het Werk van {R}onald {C}ommers}, year = {2012}, pages = {243{\textendash}253}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {Ik onderscheid drie posities met betrekking tot het doel van wetenschap: onbeperkt intentioneel realisme, strikt pragmatisme en gesofistikeerd pragmatisme. Ik argumenteer dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme: ze komen beide neer op "anything goes." Dit betekent dat gesofistikeerd pragmatisme niet de gulden middenweg is die het op het eerste zicht lijkt te zijn.
}, isbn = {9789038219431}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @incollection {Ducheyne2012, title = {History and Philosophy of Science: From Peaceful Coexistence to Golden Age of Interdisciplinarity?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {2636}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {2119436, title = {How to make the research agenda in the health sciences less distorted}, journal = {THEORIA  REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA}, volume = {27}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {75{\textendash}93}, abstract = {A wellknown problem in the health sciences is the distorted research agenda: the agenda features too little research that is tailored to the health problems of the poor, and it features too little research that supports the development of other solutions to health problems than medicines (e.g., change of lifestyle). This article analyzes these two subproblems in more detail, and assesses several strategies to deal with them, resulting in some specific recommendations that indicate what governments should do to make the research agenda in the health sciences less distorted.
}, issn = {04954548}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @incollection {DeVreese2012, title = {An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {5571}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, abstract = {In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the {\textquoteleft}truth{\textquoteright} about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White{\textquoteright}s theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis temological approaches to causationand hence between philosophy and psychologymay be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity
}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {Prim_Intu_lo, title = {Intuitionistic Logic of Proofs with dependent proof terms}, year = {2012}, abstract = {The basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by expressions of the form "s is a proof of A", for any proposition A. In this paper we explore the extension of its intuitionistic fragment to a language including expressions of the form "t is a proof of B, dependent from sbeing a proof of A". We aim at laying down a ground comparison with equivalent constructions present in theories of dependent types, especially those similarly based on the BrouwerHeytingKolmogorov semantics. We further translate this extended language to a natural deduction calculus which allows for a double interpretation of the construction on which a proof term may depend: as actually proven, or valid assumption, or as possibly proven, locally true assumption. We show metatheoretical properties for this calculus and explain normalisation to a language with only unconditional proofs. We conclude by stating the characterization of our calculus with standard intutionistic logic of proofs
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {D:CL, title = {It might have been {C}lassical {L}ogic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {218}, year = {2012}, pages = {241{\textendash}279}, abstract = {In this paper, a propositional logic Q is presented. This logic is more attractive than classical propositional logic P for explicating actual proofs. Moreover, while Q and P assign the same consequence set to consistent premise sets, Q assigns a sensible and nontrivial consequence set to in consistent premise sets.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {2125879, title = {On lawfulness in history and historiography}, journal = {HISTORY AND THEORY}, volume = {51}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {172{\textendash}192}, abstract = {The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography isor should beis wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward{\textquoteright}s notion of {\textacutedbl}invariance,{\textacutedbl}is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called {\textacutedbl}pragmatic laws{\textacutedbl}and {\textacutedbl}invariance{\textacutedbl}do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examplesfrom cultural history, economic history, and the history of religionhave been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.
}, issn = {14682303}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.14682303.2012.00620.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Froeyman, Anton} } @incollection {Christiaens2012, title = {Metaphysics and Cinema}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {118141}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {primiero2012modal, title = {A modal type theory for formalizing trusted communications}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {92{\textendash}114}, abstract = {This paper introduces a multimodal polymorphic type theory to model epistemic processes characterized by trust, defined as a secondorder relation affecting the communication process between sources and a receiver. In this language, a set of senders is expressed by a modal prioritized context, whereas the receiver is formulated in terms of a contextually derived modal judgement. Introduction and elimination rules for modalities are based on the polymorphism of terms in the language. This leads to a multimodal nonhomogeneous version of a type theory, in which we show the embedding of the modal operators into standard group knowledge operators.
}, doi = {10.1016/j.jal.2011.12.002}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Taddeo, Mariarosaria} } @article {1859590, title = {Modelling defeasible reasoning by means of adaptive logic games}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {417{\textendash}437}, abstract = {In this article, I present a dynamic logic game for defeasible reasoning. I argue that, as far as defeasible reasoning is concerned, one should distinguish between practical and ideal rationality. Starting from the adaptive logic framework, I formalize both rationality notions by means of logic games. The presented adaptive logic games are based on (i) standard logic games on the one hand and (ii) dynamic proof procedures for adaptive logic on the other hand. The games are similar to standard logic games, but have the extra property that some moves are revisable. This is handled by means of a main control game, which starts different standard logic games. I argue that the adaptive logic games form intuitive reasoning models for rationality in defeasible reasoning contexts. Moreover, I will also demonstrate that the games give a good insight in the computational complexity of defeasible reasoning forms.
}, issn = {13670751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzq060}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @proceedings {2973606, title = {An {A}ndersonian deontic logic with contextualized sanctions}, journal = {11th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, DEON2012}, year = {2012}, pages = {151169}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {We present a refinement of Anderson{\textquoteright}s reduction of deontic logic to modal logic with only alethic modalities. The refined proposal contextualizes the Andersonian sanction constant s by replacing it with a unary sanction operator S that is dependent on the concrete normative requirement that is violated. A formula S B is then for instance interpreted as ldquo B causes a sanctionrdquo or as ldquo B provides a reason for (the applicability of) a sanctionrdquo. Due to its modified sanction operator, the resulting logic DSL invalidates some instances of the inheritance principle. This gives rise to new interesting features. For instance, DSL consistently allows for the presence of conflicting obligations. Moreover, it provides novel insights in various central {\textquoteleft}paradoxes{\textquoteright} in deontic logic such as the Ross paradox, the paradox of the good Samaritan, and Forrester{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteleft}gentle murderer{\textquoteright} paradox.
}, isbn = {9783642315695}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Agotnes, Thomas and Broersen, Jan and Elgesem, Dag} } @article {3148353, title = {Numbers and propositions versus nominalists: yellow cards for {S}almon \& {S}oames}, journal = {ERKENNTNIS}, volume = {77}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {381{\textendash}397}, abstract = {Salmon and Soames argue against nominalism about numbers and sentence types. They employ (respectively) higherorder and firstorder logic to model certain natural language inferences and claim that the natural language conclusions carry commitment to abstract objects, partially because their renderings in those formal systems seem to do that. I argue that this strategy fails because the nominalist can accept those natural language consequences, provide them with plausible and noncommitting truth conditions and account for the inferences made without committing themselves to abstract objects. I sketch a modal account of higherorder quantification, on which instead of ranging over sets, higher order quantifiers are used to make (logical) possibility claims about which predicate tokens can be introduced. This approach provides an alternative account of truth conditions for natural language sentences which seem to employ higherorder quantification, thus allowing the nominalist to evade Salmon{\textquoteright}s argument. I also show how the nominalist can account for the occurrence of apparently singular abstract terms in certain true statements. I argue that the nominalist can achieve this by, first, dividing singular terms into real singular terms (referring to concrete objects) and only apparent singular terms (called onomatoids), introduced for the sake of brevity and simplicity, and then providing an account of nominalistically acceptable truth conditions of sentences containing onomatoids. I develop such an account in terms of modally interpreted abstraction principles and argue that applying this strategy to Soames{\textquoteright}s argument allows the nominalists to defend themselves. One would hope and perhaps conjecture that the whole general set theory, however beautiful it is, will in the future disappear. With the higher types Platonism begins. The tendencies of Chwistek and others ({\textquoteright}Nominalism{\textquoteright}) of speaking only of what can be named are healthy. [Alfred Tarski](1)
}, issn = {01650106}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1067001294027}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {2977237, title = {The ontology of causal process theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHIA}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {523{\textendash}538}, abstract = {There is a widespread belief that the socalled process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of {\textacutedbl}causal process{\textacutedbl} does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe{\textquoteright}s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon{\textquoteright}s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair{\textquoteright}s phsyicalist reduction of causation.
}, issn = {00483893}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1140601193292}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {1854847, title = {Op het snijvlak van cognitie, wetenschap en filosofie: intertheoretische relaties in de twintigste eeuw}, journal = {ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE}, volume = {104}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {21{\textendash}38}, abstract = {This article provides a critical survey of the debate on intertheoretic relations, with particular emphasis on the cognitive sciences. I begin by distinguishing two opposing sides, reductionism and antireductionism, and proceed by tracking the changes these positions underwent in the twentieth century. It appears that these changes consist to a significant degree in smoothing out the rough edges of both, so that the original positions can be understood as crude extremes. The monistic accounts of intertheoretic relations were traded in for more tolerant and nuanced approaches, a tendency that is chiefly inspired by an increasing focus on actual scientific practice.
}, issn = {00025275}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {3148385, title = {{\textquoteright}Platonic{\textquoteright} thought experiments: how on earth}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {187}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {731{\textendash}752}, abstract = {Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural science, 1991a, 1991b; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004; Thought experiments, 2008) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be arguments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown calls such TEs "platonic"). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent them as arguments for logical reasons: there is no logic that can adequately model such phenomena. (Brown further argues that this being the case, "platonic" TEs provide us with irreducible insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature). I argue against this approach by describing how "platonic" TEs can be modeled within the logical framework of adaptive proofs for prioritized consequence operations. To show how this mundane apparatus works, I use it to reconstruct one of the key examples used by Brown, Galileo{\textquoteright}s TE involving falling bodies.
}, issn = {00397857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122901100084}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {Gervais2012, title = {Pragmatic approaches to explanation applied to the cognitive sciences: two types of explanationseeking questions compared}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {131{\textendash}137}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {DeLanghe2012, title = {The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {1131}, abstract = {According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view is perceived to glorify irrationality. (ibid. 199) I present two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on concepts (the neopositivist interpretation) and one based on values. I also describe two notions of rationality, optimizing and satisficing. Neither interpretation supports the notion of optimizing, but the valuesinterpretation supports satisficing, suggesting that if Kuhnian scientists are rational, as Kuhn insisted, they are satisficers. An agentbased model demonstrates that aggregating the behaviour of satisficing agents can account for Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view on the dynamics of scientific change.
}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @proceedings {3178954, title = {The problem of multiple explanatory hypotheses}, journal = {PhDs in Logic III}, year = {2012}, pages = {4553}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {In abduction the process of finding explanatory hypotheses for puzzling phenomena one is often confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses. In science one generally wants to test further the different hypotheses one by one. But, if we try to model this in a logic and make it possible to derive the differen t hypotheses apart from each other, we generally can derive their conjunction too. An elegant solution within the framework of adaptive logics is provided in Gauderis (2011). But this approach is not restricted to science. While it is true that a lot of cases in everyday reasoning require a more practical approach in which one acts on the knowledge that all the different hypotheses might be the case there are also a considerable amount of situations in which the more theoretical approach of the scientist is needed. In this paper we try to illustrate this by using this logic to model reasoning within detective literature.
}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Demey, Lorenz and Devuyst, Jonas} } @article {Verdee30112012, title = {A proof procedure for adaptive logics}, journal = {Logic Journal of IGPL}, volume = {21}, year = {2012}, pages = {743766}, abstract = {In this article, I present a procedure that generates proofs for finally derivable adaptive logic consequences. A proof procedure for the inconsistency adaptive logic CLuNr is already presented in [7]. In this article a procedure for CLuNm is presented and the results for both logics are generalized to all adaptive logics, on the presupposition that there exists a proof procedure for the lower limit logic. The generated proofs are so called goaldirected proofs, i.e. proofs that (i) start with the formula (the goal) of which one wants to know whether it is a consequence of a certain premise set and (ii) only consist of lines that may potentially be useful for proving or disproving the goal. The goaldirected proofs form good explications of actual problemsolving reasoning processes.
}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzs046}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {Strasser2012, title = {Proof Theories for Superpositions of Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, year = {2012}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, abstract = {The standard format for adaptive logics offers a generic and unifying formal framework for defeasible reasoning forms. One of its main distinguishing features is a dynamic proof theory by means of which it is able to explicate actual reasoning. In many applications it has proven very useful to superpose sequences of adaptive logics, such that each logic treats the consequence set of its predecessor as premise set. Although attempts have been made to define dynamic proof theories for some of the resulting logics, no generic proof theory is available yet. Moreover, the existing proof theories for concrete superpositions are suboptimal in various respects: the derivability relations characterized by these proposals are often not adequate with respect to the consequence relation of the superposed adaptive logics and in some cases they even trivialize premise sets. An adequate and generic proof theory is needed in order to meet the requirement of explicating defeasible reasoning in terms of superpositions of adaptive logics. This paper presents two generic proof theories for superpositions of adaptive logics in standard format. By means of simple examples, the basic ideas behind these proof theories are illustrated and it is shown how the older proposals are inadequate.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2977245, title = {Psychoanalyse en geschiedfilosofie}, journal = {PSYCHOANALYTISCHE PERSPECTIEVEN}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {293{\textendash}306}, issn = {07715862}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2079125, title = {Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit?}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {147{\textendash}159}, abstract = {The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegeners theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegeners theory was epistemically worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in \&\#353;e\&\#353;elja and Stra\&\#223;er (accepted for publication). We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy
}, issn = {00393681}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.11.005}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Weber, Erik} } @article {2999523, title = {The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: drawing appropriate distinctions}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {51{\textendash}82}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z. By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3063631, title = {Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {83{\textendash}99}, abstract = {What happens if one applies the "evaluation methodology" of The Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the "problem solving methodology" of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers{\textquoteright} methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan{\textquoteright}s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutins to these problems.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @proceedings {dereasoning, title = {Reasoning with computerassisted experiments in mathematics}, journal = {Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, year = {2012}, pages = {8092}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} door Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Allo, Patrick} } @article {raey, title = {Regress Argument Reconstruction}, journal = {Argumentation}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {489503}, abstract = {If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryles infinite regress argument against the view that knowledgehow requires knowledgethat. First, I demonstrate that Ryles initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.
}, keywords = {Argument, Charity, Infinite regress, Interpretation, Reconstruction}, issn = {0920427X}, doi = {10.1007/s1050301292649}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {DeMol2012, title = {Report {\textquoteright}International Conference on History and Philosophy of Computing{\textquoteright} (HAPOC)}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {78}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @proceedings {1856691, title = {The role of unification in explanations of facts}, journal = {EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009}, year = {2012}, pages = {403413}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.
}, isbn = {9789400724037}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9789400724044\_33}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Lefevere, Merel}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Okasha, Samir and Hartmann, Stephan} } @incollection {2116243, title = {The rule of quantity by {C}huquet and de la {R}oche and its influence on {G}erman {C}ossic algebra}, booktitle = {Pluralit{\'e} de l{\textquoteright}alg{\`e}bre {\`a} la Renaissance}, year = {2012}, pages = {127{\textendash}147}, publisher = {Honor{\'e} Champion}, abstract = {The importance of Larismethique of de La Roche, published in 1520, has been seriously underestimated. One reason for the neglect is related to the inscrutable way he is referred to. Buteo and Wallis called him Stephanus {\`a} Rupe de Lyon. Other obscure references, such as Gosselin calling him Villafrancus Gallus have been overlooked by many commentators. His influence can be determined in several works that do not credit him but use problems or definitions from the Larismethique. However, most damaging for its historical assessment was Aristide Marre?s misrepresentation of the Larismethique as a grave case of plagiarism. Marre discovered that the printed work of 1520 by Estienne de la Roche contained large fragments that were literally copied from Chuquet?s manuscript of the Triparty. Especially on the Appendice, which contains the solution to a large number of problems, Marre writes repeatedly that it is a literal copy of Chuquet. However, he fails to mention that the structure of the text of de la Roche, his solution methods and symbolism differs significantly from Chuquet. De la Roche introduces several improvements, especially with regards to the use of the second unknown. We provide an indepth comparison of some problems solved by the socalled regle de la quantite by Chuquet with those of de la Roche. We further report on the surprising finding that Christoff Rudolff{\textquoteright}s solution to linear problems by means of the second unknown in his Behend vnnd Hubsch Rechnung of 1525 depends on Chuquet and de la Roche. As it is generally considered that algebra was introduced in Germany through Italy this provides a new light on the transmission of algebraic knowledge from France to the rest of Europe.
}, isbn = {9782745323989}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Rommevaux, Sabine and Spiesser, Maryvonne and Massa Esteve, Maria Rosa} } @article {de2012short, title = {A short history of small machines}, year = {2012}, abstract = {One of the most famous results of Alan M. Turing is the socalled universal Tur ing machine (UTM). Its in uence on (theoretical) computer science can hardly be overestimated. The operations of this machine are of a most elementary na ture but nonetheless considered to capture all the (human) processes that can be carried out in computing a number. This kind of elementary machine ts into a tradition of {\textquoteleft}logical minimalism{\textquoteright} that looks for simplest sets of operations or axioms. It is part of the more general research programme into the foundations of mathematics and logic that was carried out in the beginning of the 20th cen tury. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, this tradition was redened in the context of {\textquoteleft}computer science{\textquoteright} when computer engineers, logicians and mathematicians reconsidered the problem of small(est) and/or simple(st) machines in the con text of actual engineering practices. This paper looks into this early history of research on small symbolic and physical machines and tie it to this older tradi tion of logical minimalism. Focus will be on how the transition and translation of symbolic machines into real computers integrates minimalist philosophies as parts of more complex computer design strategies. This contextualizes Turing{\textquoteright}s machines at the turn from logic to machines.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Bullynck, Maarten} } @article {CJM:demi, title = {Tolerating Deontic Conflicts by Adaptively Restricting Inheritance}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {219}, year = {2012}, pages = {477506}, abstract = {In order to deal with the possibility of deontic conflicts Lou Goble developed a group of logics DPM that are characterized by a restriction of the inheritance principle. While they approximate the deductive power of standard deontic logic, they do so only if the user adds certain statements to the premises. By adaptively strengthening the DPM logics, this paper presents logics that overcome this shortcoming. Furthermore, they are capable of modeling the dynamic and defeasible aspect of our normative reasoning by their dynamic proof theory. This way they enable us to have a better insight in the relations between obligations and thus to localize deontic conflicts.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @phdthesis {PhD_Mathieu, title = {Tolerating Normative Conflicts in Deontic Logic.}, year = {2012}, month = {September 13}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {Beirlaen2012a, title = {Towards More ConflictTolerant Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {18}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, abstract = {In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of ought. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of ought is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of ought, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that" oughtimplies can."
}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {Weber2012, title = {Two Gaps in the Contextual Theory of Scientific Understanding}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {8}, year = {2012}, pages = {130131}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {2079127, title = {Two problems for the contextual theory of scienitfic understanding}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {60{\textendash}62}, abstract = {In this paper I argue that the contextual theory of scientific understanding as developed by Henk De Regt and Dennis Dieks (2005: A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding, Synthese 144, 137170) and further developed by Henk De Regt (2009: The Epistemic Value of Understanding, Philosophy of Science 76: 585597) is not contextual in one crucial respect: the meaning of understanding. I also argue that its scope needs to be restricted: it cannot be a theory of scientific understanding in general.
}, issn = {17570522}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {primiero2012type, title = {TypeTheoretical Dynamics. {E}xploring Belief Revision in a Constructive Framework}, booktitle = {The realismantirealism debate in the age of alternative logics}, year = {2012}, pages = {191{\textendash}212}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {In the present paper a dynamics for type theory is introduced. The formalization provides epistemic explanations for the basic notions of belief state and belief set by referring to assertion conditions for typetheoretical judgements; it interprets expectations in terms of default assumptions for such a structure and it adapts the usual revision operations and the analogous of the Ramsey test. The model, restricted to operations of revision, merging and information preference, provides a constructive typetheoretical approach to epistemic dynamics.
}, doi = {10.1007/9789400719231_11}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Primiero, Giuseppe and Marion, Mathieu} } @article {Beirlaen2012, title = {Understanding Human Agency, by {E}rasmus {M}ayr (review; in Dutch)}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {383385}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {3126287, title = {A unifying framework for reasoning about normative conflicts}, booktitle = {The logica yearbook 2011}, year = {2012}, pages = {1{\textendash}14}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {First, two contextdependent desiderata are presented for devising calculi of deontic logic that can consistently accommodate normative conflicts. Conflicttolerant deontic logics (CTDLs) can be evaluated by their treatment of the tradeoff between these desiderata. Next, it is argued that CTDLs defined within the standard format for adaptive logics are particularly good at overcoming this tradeoff.
}, isbn = {9781848900714}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Pelis, Michal and Puncochar, Vit} } @article {Leuridan2012, title = {What are mechanisms in social science? (review)}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {395398}, abstract = {Why should we introduce the notion of analytical sociology into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of mechanism? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of ParisSorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences (1). Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation (3). Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of it
}, issn = {08150796}, doi = {10.1007/s1101601196109}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @incollection {1890996, title = {What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? {E}xploring the contours of epistemic democracy}, booktitle = {Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science}, volume = {11}, year = {2012}, pages = {35{\textendash}48}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Takehome lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator{\textquoteright}s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interestdriven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.
}, isbn = {9789400720817}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Le Roy, Frederik and Stalpaert, Christel and Aerts, Diederik} } @proceedings {3178952, title = {An adaptive logic based approach to abduction in {A}{I}}, journal = {Ninth International Workshop on NonMonotonic Reasoning, Action and Change}, year = {2011}, pages = {16}, abstract = {In a logicbased approach to abductive reasoning, the background knowledge is represented by a logical theory. A sentence \&\#934; is then considered as an explanation for ω if it satisfies some formal conditions. In general, the following three conditions are considered crucial: (1) Φ together with the background knowledge implies !; (2) Φ is logically consistent with what is known; and (3) Φ is the most parsimonious explanation. But, since abductive reasoning is a nonmonotonic form of reasoning, each time the background knowledge is extended, the status of previously abduced explanations becomes once again undefined. The adaptive logics program is developed to address these types of nonmonotonic reasoning. In addition to deductive reasoning steps, it allows for direct implementation of defeasible reasoning steps, but it adds to each formula the explicit set of conditions that would defeat this formula. So, in an adaptive logic for abduction, a formula is an abduced hypothesis as long as none of its conditions is deduced. This implies that we will not have to recheck all hypotheses each time an extension to our background knowledge is made. This is the key advantage of this approach, which allows us to save repetitive recomputations in fast growing knowledge bases.
}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @phdthesis {PhD_Christian, title = {Adaptive Logic Characterizations of Defeasible Reasoning with Applications in Argumentation, Normative Reasoning and Default Reasoning}, year = {2011}, month = {April 5}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {Beirlaen2011, title = {Aristotle{\textquoteright}s Modal Proofs, by {A}driane {R}ini (review; in Dutch)}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {4}, number = {73}, year = {2011}, pages = {749751}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {VanBouwel2011, title = {An atlas for the social world: what should it (not) look like? {I}nterdisciplinarity and pluralism in the social sciences}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Worlds, Cultures and Society.}, series = {Worldviews, science and us : interdisciplinary perspectives on worlds, cultures and society}, year = {2011}, pages = {43{\textendash}72}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in section 1, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in section 2, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory, method, metaphysics, and questiondriven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with actual proposals made by, inter alia, WorldSystems Analysis, Critical Realism and Economics Imperialism. Building on the framework of explanatory pluralism I have been developing before, I will make a case for questiondriven interdisciplinarity in section 3. My argument for questiondriven interdisciplinarity will be illustrated in section 4 by discussing recent developments in economics (i.e., the debate between the orthodoxy and heterodox theories, the pleas for pluralism, and the impact of globalisation {\textendash}and related institutional developments on economics as a discipline). In conclusion, the contours of an adequate atlas for the social world should become clearer; when to use the different maps, how to activate the dialogue between social scientific disciplines in order to draw the different maps, and the risks of globalisation for social science (and adequate map making).
}, isbn = {9789814355056}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Pinxten, Rik and Wallerstein, Immanuel} } @article {de2011complex, title = {On the complex behavior of simple tag systems An experimental approach}, journal = {Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {412}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {97{\textendash}112}, abstract = {It is a wellknow fact that apparently simple systems can give rise to complex behavior. But why exactly does a given system behave in a complex manner? There are two main approaches to tackle this and other related questions. One can take on a more theoretical approach or start from a more experimental study of the behavior of such systems with the help of the computer. In this paper, the experimental approach will be applied to very small tag systems. After a discussion of some of the main theoretical results on tag systems, several results from a computerassisted and experimental study on tag systems will be analyzed. Special attention will be given to the wellknown example Post provided and studied with only 2 symbols and a deletion number v = 3. These results will be combined with some theoretical results on tag systems in order to gain more insight into the computational power of simple tag systems.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {1855775, title = {The covering law model applied to dynamical cognitive science: a comment on Joel Walmsley}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}39}, abstract = {In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim{\textquoteright}s deductivenomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley{\textquoteright}s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductivenomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.
}, issn = {09246495}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1102301092169}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {1998274, title = {On the curious historical coincidence of algebra and doubleentry bookkeeping}, booktitle = {Foundations of the formal sciences VII : bringing together philosophy and sociology of science}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {32}, year = {2011}, pages = {109{\textendash}130}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {9781848900493}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/logic/?00021}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @phdthesis {PhD_Dunja, title = {Epistemic Evaluation in the Context of Pursuit and in the Argumentative Approach to Methodology}, year = {2011}, month = {September 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {1970192, title = {Ethical consistency and the logic of ought}, journal = {Theoretical and applied ethics}, volume = {1}, number = {3}, year = {2011}, pages = {45{\textendash}51}, abstract = {In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright}. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams{\textquoteright} characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams{\textquoteright} solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright} is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright}, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that {\textacutedbl}ought implies can{\textacutedbl}.
}, issn = {21567174}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @article {1931551, title = {Evidencebased medicine and progress in the medical sciences}, journal = {Journal of evaluation in clinical practice}, volume = {17}, number = {5}, year = {2011}, pages = {852{\textendash}856}, abstract = {The question what scientific progress means for a particular domain such as medicine seems importantly different from the question what scientific progress is in general. While the latter question received ample treatment in the philosophical literature, the former question is hardly discussed. I argue that it is nonetheless important to think about this question in view of the methodological choices we make. I raise specific questions that should be tackled regarding scientific progress in the medical sciences and demonstrate their importance by means of an analysis of what evidencebased medicine (EBM) has, and has not, to offer in terms of progress. I show how critically thinking about EBM from the point of view of progress can help us in putting EBM and its favoured methodologies in the right perspective. My conclusion will be that blindly favouring certain methods because of their immediately tangible shortterm benefits implies that we parry the important question of how best to advance progress in the long run. This leads us to losing sight of our general goals in doing research in the medical sciences.
}, issn = {13561294}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.13652753.2011.01715.x}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {1853233, title = {Explanation in the social sciences}, booktitle = {The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {632{\textendash}646}, publisher = {Sage Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {This chapter gives an overview of the philosophical debates concerning explanation in the social sciences.
}, isbn = {9781847874009}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Jarvie, Ian and ZamoraBonilla, Jesus} } @article {924343, title = {Filling a typical gap in a regress argument}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {54}, number = {216}, year = {2011}, pages = {589{\textendash}597}, abstract = {In the following we fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gapfilling readings of its first premise.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {J:flash, title = {A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation}, year = {2011}, pages = {93{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Erik} } @proceedings {1854115, title = {From problem solving to the teaching of algebra: the genesis of the algebra textbook}, journal = {11th international IHPST and 6th Greek history, philosophy and science teaching joint conference, Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {344347}, publisher = {Epikentro Publications}, isbn = {9789604583256}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Seroglou, Fanny and Koulountzos, Vassilis and Siatras, Anastasios} } @article {Primiero2011, title = {Giovanni Sommaruga (ed): Formal Theories of Information: From {S}hannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information (Review)}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {119122}, issn = {09246495}, doi = {10.1007/s1102301192280}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {1854795, title = {Hierarchic adaptive logics}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {45{\textendash}72}, abstract = {This article discusses the proof theory, semantics and metatheory of a class of adaptive logics, called hierarchic adaptive logics. Their specific characteristics are illustrated throughout the article with the use of one exemplary logic HKx, an explicans for reasoning with prioritized belief bases. A generic proof theory for these systems is defined, together with a less complex proof theory for a subclass of them. Soundness and a restricted form of completeness are established with respect to a nonredundant semantics. It is shown that all hierarchic adaptive logics are reflexive, have the strong reassurance property and that a subclass of them is a fixed point for a broad class of premise sets. Finally, they are compared to a different yet related class of adaptive logics.
}, issn = {13670751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzr025}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {1891046, title = {Historical objections against the number line}, journal = {Science and Education}, volume = {20}, number = {9}, year = {2011}, pages = {863{\textendash}880}, abstract = {Historical studies on the development of mathematical concepts will help mathematics teachers to relate their students{\textquoteright} difficulties in understanding to conceptual problems in the history of mathematics. We argue that one popular tool for teaching about numbers, the number line, may not be fit for early teaching of operations involving negative numbers. Our arguments are drawn from the many discussions on negative numbers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from philosophers and mathematicians such as Arnauld, Leibniz, Wallis, Euler and d{\textquoteright}Alembert. Not only does division by negative numbers pose problems for the number line, but even the very idea of quantities smaller than nothing has been challenged. Drawing lessons from the history of mathematics, we argue for the introduction of negative numbers in education within the context of symbolic operations.
}, issn = {09267220}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1119101193490}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {1207602, title = {Historische uitvoeringspraktijk}, journal = {De uil van minerva}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {21{\textendash}38}, abstract = {In this paper, I offer some philosophical thoughts on the phenomenon of historical performance practice. I investigate the historical conditions of possibility of the {\textacutedbl}epistemologization{\textacutedbl} of historical performance practice and I argue for a more hermeneutical approach.
}, issn = {07724381}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {3148473, title = {How not to use the {C}hurch{T}uring thesis against platonism}, journal = {Philosophia Mathematica}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {74{\textendash}89}, abstract = {Olszewski claims that the ChurchTuring thesis can be used in an argument against platonism in philosophy of mathematics. The key step of his argument employs an example of a supposedly effectively computable but not Turingcomputable function. I argue that the process he describes is not an effective computation, and that the argument relies on the illegitimate conflation of effective computability with there being a way to find out.
}, issn = {00318019}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkr001}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {1931707, title = {Hypocrisie binnen de wiskunde?}, journal = {Wiskunde \& onderwijs}, volume = {148}, year = {2011}, pages = {306{\textendash}315}, issn = {20320485}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {1223153, title = {The IARC and mechanistic evidence}, booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {91{\textendash}109}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC{\textquoteright}s carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures  more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise reevaluation of the current findings.
}, isbn = {9780199574131}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik}, editor = {McKay Illari, Phyllis and Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @article {3144317, title = {Incommensurability and rationality in engineering design: the case of functional decomposition}, journal = {SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY \& TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL}, volume = {15}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {118{\textendash}136}, issn = {10918264}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {1890961, title = {Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanationseeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction {\textendash} traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism {\textendash} can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.
}, issn = {09254560}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1083801191415}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {1104693, title = {The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, {\textquoteleft}academic{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}nonacademic consensus{\textquoteright}, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of {\textquoteleft}consensus{\textquoteright} when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.
}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {1854786, title = {Kant and {W}hewell on bridging principles between metaphysics and science}, journal = {Kant Studien}, volume = {102}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {22{\textendash}45}, abstract = {In this essay, I call attention to Kant{\textquoteright}s and Whewell{\textquoteright}s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant{\textquoteright}s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 17961803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or {\textquoteright}Mittelbegriffe{\textquoteright} (henceforth this problem is referred to as {\textquoteright}the bridgingproblem{\textquoteright}). It will be argued, on the basis of a close reading of Whewell{\textquoteright}s Notebooks on Induction, that Whewell{\textquoteright}s account of the Idea of Cause (and by extension, his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas in general) grew out of his dissatisfaction with Kantian philosophy of science and its seeming inability to solve the bridgingproblem. This analysis throws new light on the importance of Kantianism in Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy, for it will be shown that Whewell took over and transformed Kant{\textquoteright}s idea of a priori principles as conditions for the establishment of proper knowledge about the world (without always clinging to Kant{\textquoteright}s exact differentiation between them) and that Whewell was trying to address a typical Kantian topic: namely, to show how scientific knowledge could be both empirical and necessary and how the gap between metaphysics and physics could be bridged.
}, issn = {00228877}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/KANT.2011.002}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {D:campinas, title = {Logics for Qualitative Inductive Generalization}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {97}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {The paper contains a survey of (mainly unpublished) adaptive logics of inductive generalization. These defeasible logics are precise formulations of certain methods.\\ Some attention is also paid to ways of handling background knowledge, introducing mere conjectures, and the research guiding capabilities of the logics.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1122501092978}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {de2011looking, title = {Looking for busy beavers. A sociophilosophical study of a computerassisted proof}, booktitle = {Foundations of the Formal Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}90}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {"Young man, in mathematics you don{\textquoteright}t understand things, you just get used to them" John von Neumann
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {primiero2011multi, title = {A multimodal type system and its procedural semantics for safe distributed programming}, year = {2011}, abstract = {In this paper we present a multimodal polymorphic type system for a computational interpretation of programs with distributed resources. Polymorphism induces a distinction between programs whose code is safe at location, and programs whose value is safe overall. We formulate judge mental modalities to express such distinction and use their introduction and elimination rules to express mobility of code and values within a net work. The syntactic formulation is completed by a procedural semantics interpreted over states of an abstract machine for which a standard sound ness result is given in the form of a type safety theorem.
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {primieronecessity, title = {On the necessity of (sometimes) being synthetic. {C}omment on {P}oggiolesi.}, booktitle = {Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, year = {2011}, pages = {6368}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussels}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Allo, Patrick and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {2020633, title = {Needham{\textquoteright}s grand question revisited: on the meaning and justification of causal claims in the history of {C}hinese science}, journal = {East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine}, volume = {33}, year = {2011}, pages = {13{\textendash}32}, abstract = {The Needham Question (i.e. the question why modern science has not developed in Chinese civilization but only in Europe) has drawn a substantial amount of criticism. Despite its apparent innocuousness, influential sinologists have written devastating critiques of it. These criticisms fall into two main categories. The first denies the validity of the central concepts by means of which the question is formulated (e.g. {\textquoteright}science or {\textquoteright}civilization). The second calls into question (1) the legitimacy of asking for explanations of absences (i.e. of events that did not occur), (2) the legitimacy of citing absences as explanations (i.e. citing negative facts in explanations), and (3) whether the Needham question can be answered, even if asking for explanations of absences and citing absences as explanations are both legitimate. In this article, we take into account the former criticism, in order to arrive at a new starting point: dividing the Needham Problem into its various subquestions. We then tackle the latter criticism by calling upon the contemporary philosophy of causation. We will argue that, according to certain theories of causation, the subquestions under discussion can be answered, and we will clarify how they can be argued for.
}, issn = {1562918X}, author = {De Saeger, David and Weber, Erik} } @proceedings {1861627, title = {A paraconsistent multiagent framework for dealing with normative conflicts}, journal = {12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in MultiAgent Systems (CLIMA XII)}, year = {2011}, pages = {312329}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {In a multiagent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra and interagent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflicttypes, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of noncontradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistencyadaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms {\textquoteright}as consistently as possible{\textquoteright}.
}, isbn = {9783642223587}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9783642223594}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Leite, Joao and Torroni, Paolo and Agotnes, Thomas and Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leon} } @article {drouet2011propensities, title = {Propensities and conditional probabilities}, journal = {International Journal of Approximate Reasoning}, volume = {52}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {153{\textendash}165}, abstract = {The present paper deals with the objection that Paul Humphreys raised against the propensity interpretation of probability "Humphreys{\textquoteright} paradox". An update on existing solutions is oered, and it is concluded that none of them is completely satisfactory in view of Humphreys{\textquoteright} 2004 rejoinder. Positively, an original solution is formulated and discussed.
}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle} } @incollection {1980049, title = {Protoregress argument schemas}, booktitle = {ISSA 2010 Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {2000{\textendash}2007}, publisher = {Ghent University. Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {Allo2011, title = {Report 3rd Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {1}, number = {5}, year = {2011}, pages = {67}, author = {Allo, Patrick and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {Heeffer2011, title = {The Rhetoric of Problems in Algebra Textbooks from Pacioli to Euler}, year = {2011}, abstract = {The selection of problems by Euler in his Vollst{\"a}ndige Anleitung zur Algebra displays a great familiarity with the typical recreational and practical problems of Renaissance and sixteenthcentury algebra books. A detailed study into the sources of Euler reveals that he copied most of his problems from Christoff Rudolffs Coss which was first published in 1525 and reissued in 1553 by Michael Stifel. Why would Euler found his popular textbook on algebra on a book published 250 years before? We propose an explanation based on the evolving rhetorical function of problems in algebra textbooks since the Renaissance. We discern six stages in the evolution from abacus problem solving to algebraic theory. The first theory emerged through the extraction of general principles from the practice of problem solving. The algebra textbooks of the eighteenth century close a circle of continuous rhetorical development by using problems for practicing general principles and applying the algebraic language. Eulers Algebra is a prime example of the new rhetoric of problems still prominent in todays textbooks.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {1980039, title = {Rules regresses}, booktitle = {AGPC 2010 Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {79{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, abstract = {Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as {\textquoteright}if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p{\textquoteright}? Gluer and Wikforss (2009) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a {\textquoteright}dilemma of regress and idleness{\textquoteright}, as Gluer and Wikforss have dubbed it.
}, url = {http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc10/}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2011sceptic, title = {The Sceptic{\textquoteright}s Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress}, journal = {Philosophical Papers}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2011}, pages = {359{\textendash}369}, abstract = {Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, David Hume and Paul Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers{\textquoteright} practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.
}, doi = {10.1080/05568641.2011.634246}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @conference {1859548, title = {Strong paraconsistency by separating composition and decomposition in classical logic}, booktitle = {WoLLIC 2011 Proceedings LNAI Series}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {In this paper I elaborate a proof system that is able to prove all classical first order logic consequences of consistent premise sets, without proving trivial consequences of inconsistent premises (as in A, {\textlnot}A\,\unmatched{22a2}\,B). Essentially this result is obtained by formally distinguishing consequences that are the result of merely decomposing the premises into their subformulas from consequences that may be the result of also composing {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright}, more complex formulas. I require that, whenever {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright} formulas are derived, they are to be preceded by a special +symbol and these +preceded formulas are not to be decomposed. By doing this, the proofs are separated into a decomposition phase followed by a composition phase. The proofs are recursive, axiomatizable and, as they do not trivialize inconsistent premise sets, they define a very strong nontransitive paraconsistent logic, for which I also provide an adequate semantics.
}, isbn = {364220919X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9783642209208\_26}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter}, editor = {Goebel, R} } @article {3144328, title = {Supporting design knowledge exchange by converting models of functional decomposition}, journal = {JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING DESIGN}, volume = {22}, number = {1112}, year = {2011}, pages = {839{\textendash}858}, issn = {09544828}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09544828.2011.603692}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {1234908, title = {Testing universal gravitation in the laboratory, or the significance of research on the mean density of the earth and big {G}, 17981898: changing pursuits and longterm methodologicalexperimental continuity}, journal = {Archive for History of Exact Sciences}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {181{\textendash}227}, abstract = {This article seeks to provide a historically wellinformed analysis of an important postNewtonian area of research in experimental physics between 1798 and 1898, namely the determination of the mean density of the earth and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the gravitational constant. Traditionally, research on these matters is seen as a case of {\textacutedbl}puzzle solving.{\textacutedbl} In this article, the author shows that such focus does not do justice to the evidential significance of eighteenthand nineteenthcentury experimental research on the mean density of the earth and the gravitational constant. As Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of universal gravitation was mainly based on astronomical observation, it remained to be shown that Newton{\textquoteright}s law of universal gravitation did not break down at terrestrial distances. In this context, Cavendish{\textquoteright} experiment and related nineteenthcentury experiments played a decisive role, for they provided converging and increasingly stronger evidence for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation. More precisely, the author shall argue that, as the accuracy and precision of the experimental apparatuses and the procedures to eliminate external disturbances involved increasingly improved, the empirical support for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation improved correspondingly.
}, issn = {00039519}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s0040701000759}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {leuridan2011three, title = {Three problems for the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {63}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {399{\textendash}427}, abstract = {In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver{\textquoteright}s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel){\textquoteright}s claim that they are strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of spatiotemporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counterexamples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem (a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two partial, but fallible solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity.
}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr036}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {1101225, title = {Towards the prooftheoretic unification of {D}ung{\textquoteright}s argumentation framework: an adaptive logic approach}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {133{\textendash}156}, abstract = {The article presents a unifying adaptive logic framework for abstract argumentation. It consists of a core system for abstract argumentation and various adaptive logics based on it. These logics represent in an accurate sense all standard extensions defined within Dung{\textquoteright}s abstract argumentation system with respect to sceptical and credulous acceptance. The models of our logics correspond exactly to specific extensions of given argument systems. Additionally, the dynamics of adaptive proofs mirror the argumentative reasoning of a rational agent. In particular, the presented logics allow for external dynamics, i.e. they are able to deal with the arrival of new arguments and are therefore apt to model openended argumentations by providing provisional conclusions.
}, issn = {0955792X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exq015}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {1905403, title = {Where the design argument goes wrong: auxiliary assumptions and unification}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {78}, number = {4}, year = {2011}, pages = {558{\textendash}578}, abstract = {Sober (2008) has reconstructed the biological design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, purporting to demonstrate that it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober{\textquoteright}s restrictions on the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are clearly valid. Our account shows that the design argument fails, not because it is intrinsically untestable, but because it clashes with the empirical evidence and fails to satisfy certain theoretical desiderata (in particular, unification). Likewise, Sober{\textquoteright}s critique of the arguments from imperfections and from evil against design is off the mark.
}, issn = {00318248}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753}, author = {Boudry, Maarten and Leuridan, Bert} } @conference {1182635, title = {Who guards the guardians/experts? {P}hilosophers?}, booktitle = {32e VlaamsNederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, organization = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @conference {872462, title = {An Adaptive Logic for the Formal Explication of Scalar Implicatures}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAIisAI 2009 Workshops}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non{\textendash}monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.
}, isbn = {9783642148873}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9783642148880\_20}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @article {1101409, title = {An adaptive logic framework for conditional obligations and deontic dilemmas}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {12}, year = {2010}, pages = {95{\textendash}128}, issn = {14253305}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Tanaka, Koji and Berto, Francesco and Mares, Edwin and Paoli, Francesco} } @booklet {Lycke_addingthe, title = {Adding the Inference Rule Disjunctive Syllogism to Relevant Logics}, year = {2010}, abstract = {In order to avoid trivial consequences, the derivability relation of relevant logics (RL) does not support the inference rule disjunctive syllogism (DS). In this paper, I will show that the inference rule DS can be added to this derivability relation in a way that doesnt lead to trivial or irrelevant consequences. To do so, I will rely on the insights gained from the study of inconsistencyadaptive logics, the branch of adaptive logics that was devised to explicate reasoning based on inconsistent premise sets. Moreover, I will also point to the relations with some alternative proposals from the literature, and I will show that the inconsistencyadaptive framework has some major advantages over these.
}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {1019205, title = {Algebraic partitioning problems from {L}uca {P}acioli{\textquoteright}s {P}erugia manuscript (Vat. Lat. 3129)}, journal = {Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences}, volume = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {3{\textendash}51}, issn = {13454617}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {1209545, title = {Anticipation and the constitution of time in the philosophy of {E}rnst {C}assirer}, journal = {Casys: International journal of computing anticipatory systems}, volume = {23}, year = {2010}, pages = {11}, abstract = {In this paper, I will argue with Ernst Cassirer that anticipation plays an essential part in the constitution of time from a transcendental perspective. Time is, as any transcendental concept, seen as basically relational and subjective and only in a derivative way objective and indifferent to us. This entails that memory is prior to history, and anticipation is prior to prediction. In this paper, I will give some examples in order to argue for this point. Furthermore, I will also argue, again with Cassirer and against Henri Bergson, that time should be seen as a functional unity, and not as a collection of three different thingsinthemselves (past, present and future).
}, issn = {13735411}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {924341, title = {Antipositionalism{\textquoteright}s regress}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, year = {2010}, pages = {479{\textendash}493}, abstract = {This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a{\textquoteright}s preceding b and b{\textquoteright}s preceding a, and the identity of facts like a{\textquoteright}s preceding b and b{\textquoteright}s succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is AntiPositionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, AntiPositionalism falls prey to a regress argument which is to prove its failure. In the paper we spell out this worry, show that the worry is a serious one, and distinguish four possible strategies for AntiPositionalism to deal with it.
}, issn = {11221151}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1051601090979}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @conference {JMF:adera, title = {Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called \sys{P2.1}$^r$, that is based on Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e${\textendash}a bimodal extension of Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{P} that invalidates aggregation for all \emph{prima facie} obligations. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ has several advantages with respect to \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}as much as possible{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ avoids Goble{\textquoteright}s criticisms against other nonadjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the {\textquoteleft}toy examples{\textquoteright} from the literature as well as more complex ones.
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9783642141836\_12}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik}, editor = {Governatori, Guido and Sartor, Giovanni} } @conference {924838, title = {The body in Renaissance arithmetic: from mnemonics to embodied cognition}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty Sixth Annual Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation}, year = {2010}, publisher = {The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour}, organization = {The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour}, abstract = {In Medieval and Renaissance arithmetic we find several instances of references to body parts or actions involving body parts. In this paper we will address the question on the historical functions of body parts in mathematics and discuss its relation to the currently prevailing practice of symbolic mathematics.12
}, isbn = {1902956931}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Pease, Alison and Guhe, Markus and Smaill, Alan} } @article {999416, title = {Can mechanisms really replace laws of nature?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {77}, number = {3}, year = {2010}, pages = {317{\textendash}340}, abstract = {Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductivenomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell{\textquoteright}s pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complexsystems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell{\textquoteright}s account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account
}, issn = {00318248}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/652959}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {weber2010causal, title = {Causal Methodology. A Comment on Nancy Cartwright{\textquoteright}s Hunting Causes and Using Them}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {318{\textendash}325}, doi = {10.1093/analys/anp045}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @conference {1166760, title = {Constructive contextual modal judgments for reasoning from open assumptions}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Computability in Europe 2010 Conference}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, organization = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, abstract = {Dependent type theories using a structural notion of context are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. In particular, types with modalities are already used for distributed and staged computation. This paper introduces a type system extended with judgmental modalities internalizing epistemically different modes of correctness to explore a calculus of provability from refutable assumptions.
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Ferreira, F and Guerra, H and Mayordomo, E and Rasga, J} } @article {1101420, title = {A deontic logic framework allowing for factual detachment}, journal = {Journal of applied logic}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {Since our ethical and behavioral norms have a conditional form, it is of great importance that deontic logics give an account of deontic commitments such as A commits you to do/bring about B. It is commonly agreed that monadic approaches are suboptimal for this task due to several shortcomings, for instance their falling short of giving a satisfactory account of Strengthening the Antecedent or their difficulties in dealing with contrarytoduty paradoxes. While dyadic logics are more promising in these respects, they have been criticized for not being able to model detachment: A and the commitment under A to do B implies the actual obligation to do B. We seem to feel that detachment should be possible after all. But we cannot have things both ways, can we? This is the dilemma on commitment and detachment. (Lennart {\r A}qvis. Deontic logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, p. 199, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002). In this paper I answer \&\#197;qvist{\textquoteright}s question with Yes, we can. I propose a general method to turn dyadic deontic logics in adaptive logics allowing for a defeasible factual detachment while paying special attention to specificity and contrarytoduty cases. I show that a lot of controversy about detachment can be resolved by analysing different notions of unconditional obligations. The logical modeling of detachment is paradigmatically realized on basis of one of Lou Goble{\textquoteright}s conflict tolerant CDPM logics.
}, issn = {15708683}, doi = {10.1016/j.jal.2010.11.001}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2010.11.001}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {939584, title = {Disentangling Causal Pluralism}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us. Studies of Analytical Metaphysics.}, year = {2010}, pages = {207{\textendash}223}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely out of the egg, the term {\textquoteleft}causal pluralism{\textquoteright} already covers diverse meanings. This creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible positions within them. In this paper, I argue for a general distinction between conceptual causal pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and epistemologicalmethodological causal pluralism. I mainly focus on metaphysical approaches to causation and discern herein four possible positions: metaphysical causal constructivism, metaphysical causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism, and strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Each of these positions are further related to their most obvious conceptual counterpart, specifically conceptual causal monism or conceptual causal pluralism.
}, isbn = {9814295817}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @conference {de_winter_distorted_2010, title = {The Distorted Research Agenda in the Health Sciences and James Robert Browns Policy Proposal.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_(2012)__Brown.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {1064451, title = {The division of labour in science: the tradeoff between specialisation and diversity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {37{\textendash}51}, abstract = {Economics is a typical resource for social epistemology and the division of labour is acommon theme for economics. As such it should come as no surprise that the presentpaper turns to economics to formulate a view on the dynamics of scientific communities, with precursors such as Kitcher (1990), Goldman and Shaked (1991) andHull (1988). But although the approach is similar to theirs, the view defended isdifferent. M\&\#228;ki (2005) points out that the lessons philosophers draw from economicscan go either way depending on the model chosen. Thus, the aims of this paper are (1)to illustrate this flexibility by proposing an alternative model which assumes increasingreturns to adoption in science rather than the decreasing returns present in theaforementioned contributions; and (2) to outline the implications of this view forscientific pluralism and institutional design.
}, issn = {1350178x}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/jemfinal.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @conference {heeffer2010estienne, title = {Estienne de la {R}oches appropriation of {C}huquet (1484)}, booktitle = {3rd International Conference of the European Society for the History of Science}, year = {2010}, abstract = {The importance of Larismethique of de La Roche, published in 1520, has been seriously underestimated. One reason for the neglect is related to the inscrutable way he is referred to. Buteo and Wallis called him Stephanus {\`a} Rupe de Lyon. Other obscure references, such as Gosselin calling him Villafrancus Gallus have been overlooked by many commentators. His influence can be determined in several works that do not credit him but use problems or definitions from the Larismethique. However, most damaging for its historical assessment was Aristide Marre?s misrepresentation of the Larismethique as a grave case of plagiarism. Marre discovered that the printed work of 1520 by Estienne de la Roche contained large fragments that were literally copied from Chuquet?s manuscript of the Triparty. Especially on the Appendice, which contains the solution to a large number of problems, Marre writes repeatedly that it is a literal copy of Chuquet. However, he fails to mention that the structure of the text of de la Roche, his solution methods and symbolism differs significantly from Chuquet. De la Roche introduces several improvements, especially with regards to the use of the second unknown. We provide an indepth comparison of some problems solved by the socalled regle de la quantite by Chuquet with those of de la Roche. We further report on the surprising finding that Christoff Rudolff?s solution to linear problems by means of the second unknown in his Behend vnnd Hubsch Rechnung of 1525 depends on Chuquet and de la Roche. As it is generally considered that algebra was introduced in Germany through Italy this provides a new light on the transmission of algebraic knowledge from France to the rest of Europe.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Hunger, Hermann} } @article {1096409, title = {Expertise doordacht: reflectie via klimaatanalyse}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {72{\textendash}82}, abstract = {This paper analyses four theoretical problems concerning the notion of expertise and tries to formulate answers by scrutinizing these problems in light of scientific practice. The focus will be on the problems arising from the interference of experts in democratic decision making. I formulate my answers by referring to the Reviewprocess of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Analysing how expertise influences this particular scientific practice is an example of how socialepistemological research is done and has to be done.
}, issn = {13730975}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {924776, title = {Explanations in software engineering: the pragmatic point of view}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {277{\textendash}289}, abstract = {This article reveals that explanatory practice in software engineering is in accordance with pragmatic explanatory pluralism, which states that explanations should at least partially be evaluated by their practical use. More specifically, I offer a defense of the idea that several explanationtypes are legitimate in software engineering, and that the appropriateness of an explanationtype depends on (a) the engineer{\textquoteright}s interests, and (b) the format of the explanationseeking question he asks, with this format depending on his interests. This idea is defended by considering examples that are representative for explanatory practice in software engineering. Different kinds of technological explanation are spelled out, and the dependence of their appropriateness on interests and questionformats is extensively illustrated.
}, issn = {09246495}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1102301091902}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Moor, James H} } @article {1054981, title = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: theory and practice}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, volume = {31}, number = {5}, year = {2010}, pages = {371{\textendash}390}, abstract = {Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in nonreductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that nonreductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and nonreductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.
}, issn = {13867415}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1101701091567}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {1043033, title = {From the second unknown to the symbolic equation}, booktitle = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {57{\textendash}102}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {The symbolic equation slowly emerged during the course of the sixteenth century as a new mathematical concept as well as a mathematical object on which new operations were made possible. Where historians have of ten pointed at Francois Vi{\`e}te as the father of symbolic algebra, we would like to emphasize the foundations on which Vi{\`e}te could base his logistica speciosa. The period between Cardanos Practica Arithmeticae of 1539 and Gosselins De arte magna of 1577 has been crucial in providing the necessary build ing blocks for the transformation of algebra from rules for problem solving to the study of equations. In this paper we argue that the socalled second unknown or the Regula quantitates steered the development of an adequate symbolism to deal with multiple unknowns and aggregates of equations. Dur ing this process the very concept of a symbolic equation emerged separate from previous notions of what we call coequal polynomials.
}, isbn = {9781848900172}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {1234635, title = {Fundamental questions and some new answers on philosophical, contextual and scientific {W}hewell: some reflections on recent {W}hewell scholarship and the progress made therein}, journal = {Perspectives on Science}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {242{\textendash}272}, issn = {10636145}, doi = {10.1162/posc.2010.18.2.242}, url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives\_on\_science/v018/18.2.ducheyne.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1064488, title = {How monist is heterodoxy?}, journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics}, volume = {34}, year = {2010}, pages = {793{\textendash}805}, abstract = {Some heterodox economists, most notably Tony Lawson, have come under suspicion of not being truepluralists, but strategic pluralists: their advocacy of pluralism is thought to be merely instrumental to ahidden monist agenda. This paper does not aim to judge the accused but rather to assess the accusations;the focus is on clarifying the notion of pluralism itself. First a paradox is found to lie at the core of scientific pluralism. Different responses to this paradox can be traced to different views on pluralismfound in the literature. The resulting classification allows an analysis of the current controversy amongpluralists and provides an understanding of the different aspects of the debate.
}, issn = {0309166X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bep057}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @incollection {944198, title = {How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?}, booktitle = {On Kuhn{\textquoteright}s Philosophy and its Legacy}, volume = {8}, year = {2010}, pages = {251{\textendash}282}, publisher = {CFCUL}, address = {Lisbon}, abstract = {Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such {\textquotedblleft}explanatory concepts{\textquotedblright} of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions {\textendash} Kuhn{\textquoteright}s, Thagard{\textquoteright}s, Chen{\textquoteright}s and Barker{\textquoteright}s, and Laudan{\textquoteright}s {\textendash} and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.
}, isbn = {9789898247124}, author = {Weber, Erik and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja}, editor = {Torres, Juan Manuel} } @article {734645, title = {Inconsistencyadaptive modal logics: on how to cope with modal inconsistency}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {12}, year = {2010}, pages = {31{\textendash}61}, abstract = {In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive logics, namely inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.
}, issn = {14253305}, url = {http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/pi.html}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Tanaka, Koji and Berto, Francesco and Mares, Edwin and Paoli, Francesco} } @article {DeLanghe2010, title = {Increasing returns in science: a model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278294}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @article {924352, title = {Metaphysical explanatory asymmetries}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {53}, number = {211}, year = {2010}, pages = {345{\textendash}365}, abstract = {The general view is that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric. For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is: is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by comparing them to analogous questions that have been investigated for scientific explanations. Three main asymmetry criteria have been proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unification, and (iii) explanatory dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphysical explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence criterion (in modified format) holds of them.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Weber, Erik} } @phdthesis {PhD_Rogier, title = {Models in Science: Essays on Scientific Virtues, Scientific Pluralism and the Distribution of Labour in Science}, year = {2010}, month = {April 19}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @conference {primiero2010multi, title = {A MultiModal Dependent Type Theory for Representing Data Accessibility in a Network.}, booktitle = {Electronic Proceedings of the Federated Logic Conference 2010 (Proof Systems for Program Logics Workshop)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Citeseer}, organization = {Citeseer}, abstract = {In this paper we present a multimodal polymorphic constructive type theory for a computational interpretation of programs equipped with locations for data accessibility in the context of distributed processing.
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {Urbaniak2010, title = {Neologicist nominalism}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {96}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {149173}, abstract = {The goal is to sketch a nominalist approach to mathematics which just like neologicism employs abstraction principles, but unlike neologicism is not committed to the idea that mathematical objects exist and does not insist that abstraction principles establish the reference of abstract terms. It is wellknown that neologicism runs into certain philosophical problems and faces the technical difficulty of finding appropriate acceptability criteria for abstraction principles. I will argue that a modal and iterative nominalist approach to abstraction principles circumvents those difficulties while still being able to put abstraction principles to a foundational use.
}, doi = {10.1007/s112250109279x}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @book {1042976, title = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {302}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, abstract = {This book presents a selection of peerreviewed papers which were presented on a conference organized in Ghent, Belgium, from 27 till 29 August, 2009. The conference was given the title Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early modern Science and Mathematics (PASR). For this book we selected papers which deal with the consequences for mathematics in particular, hence the omission of {\textquoteleft}science{\textquoteright} in the title of this book. Another selection, dealing with the understanding of nature and a broader range of topics, will appear in the journal Foundations of Science. The conference was sponsored by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) and Ghent University, which indirectly made this book possible. We also have to thank the other members of the programme committee Marco Panza, Chikara Sasaki, and Erik Weber and our keynote speakers Jens H{\o}yrup, Doug Jesseph, Eberhard Knobloch, Marco Panza, Mathias Schemmel and Michel Serfati. Five of their papers are included in this volume. Most of the papers benefited from valuable and sometimes substantive comments by our referees which must remain anonymous. Special thanks to Michael Barany who assisted in the editorial process.
}, isbn = {9781848900172}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {de_winter_pragmatic_2010, title = {A Pragmatic Account of Functions}, journal = {Ghent University, Ghent}, year = {2010}, abstract = {In this article, a pluralism of function concepts is defended on the basis of pragmatic considerations. It is shown that we use functional statements for a variety of explanatory purposes, and that each explanatory purpose asks for a specific notion of function. More specifically, I argue that the meaning of the statement the function of x is to depends on the explanationseeking question that this statement is supposed to answer, and that we cannot construct one ultimate notion of function that is appropriate in every explanatory context. Several explanationseeking questions are explicated, as well as the function concepts that can be used to answer them, resulting in a pragmatic framework for function concepts. This framework is applied to both the technical and the biological domain.
}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter__Functional_Explanation__DRAFT_24_.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @incollection {1029910, title = {The Reception of Ancient Indian Mathematics by Western Historians}, booktitle = {Ancient Indian Leaps into Mathematics}, year = {2010}, pages = {135{\textendash}152}, publisher = {Birkh{\"a}user Verlag}, abstract = {While there was an awareness of ancient Indian mathematics in the West since the sixteenth century, historians discuss the Indian mathematical tradition only after the publication of the first translations by Colebrooke in 1817. Its reception cannot be comprehended without accounting for the way that the new European mathematics was shaped by Renaissance humanist writings. We sketch this background and show with one case study on algebraic solutions to a linear problem how the understanding and appreciation of Indian mathematics was deeply influenced by the humanist prejudice that all higher intellectual culture, in particular all science, had risen from Greek soil.
}, isbn = {9780817646943}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Yadav, B.S. and Mohan, Man} } @incollection {767731, title = {On Relevance Conditions for Asserting Disjunctions}, booktitle = {The Logica Yearbook 2009}, year = {2010}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {1848900090}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pelis, Michal} } @article {1096460, title = {Report LRR10: Logic, reasoning and rationality}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {165{\textendash}166}, url = {http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol4/TheReasoner4(11).pdf}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Gauderis, Tjerk and Gervais, Raoul and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {urbaniak2010response, title = {Response to a Critic (Definability and Ontology)}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {45}, year = {2010}, pages = {255259}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {934535, title = {Settingup early computer programs: D. H. {L}ehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC computation}, journal = {Archive for Mathematical Logic}, volume = {49}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {123{\textendash}146}, abstract = {A complete reconstruction of Lehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC setup for computing the exponents of p modulo two is given. This program served as an early test program for the ENIAC (1946). The reconstruction illustrates the difficulties of early programmers to find a way between a man operated and a machine operated computation. These difficulties concern both the content level (the algorithm) and the formal level (the logic of sequencing operations).
}, issn = {14320665}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s0015300901698}, author = {Bullynck, Maarten and De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @article {de2010solvability, title = {Solvability of the halting and reachability problem for binary 2tag systems}, journal = {Fundamenta Informaticae}, volume = {99}, number = {4}, year = {2010}, pages = {435{\textendash}471}, abstract = {In this report we will provide a detailed proof of the solvability of the halting and reachability problem for 2symbolic tag systems with a shiftnumber v = 2.
}, doi = {10.3233/FI2010257}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {1064460, title = {Standards and the distribution of cognitive labour: A model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278{\textendash}294}, issn = {13670751}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzp058}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @booklet {pittphilsci5074, title = {The Status of Hypothesis and Theory}, year = {2010}, abstract = {Nowadays, it is a truism that hypotheses and theories play an essential role in scientific practice. This, however, was far from an obvious given in seventeenthcentury British natural philosophy. Different natural philosophers had different views on the role and status of hypotheses and theories, ranging from fierce promotion to bold rejection, and to both they ascribed varying meanings and connotations. The guiding idea of this chapter is that, in seventeenthcentury British natural philosophy, the terms ?hypothesis???hypothetical? and ?theory???theoretical? were imbedded in a semantic network of interconnected epistemological and methodological notions ? such as ?knowledge?, ?method?, ?probability?, ?certainty?, ?induction?, ?deduction?, ?experimental philosophy?, ?speculative philosophy?, and the like). As these semantic networks changed overtime, the meaning and significance of ?hypothesis? and ?theory? likewise shifted. Without pretence of completeness, this chapter highlights chronologically some of the defining moments in the semantic transformation of these two terms within the context of seventeenthcentury natural philosophy.
}, keywords = {Francis Bacon, history of naturalphilosophical methodology, Hypothesis, Isaac Newton., John Locke, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, speculative versus experimental seventeenthcentury natural philosophy, theory}, url = {http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/5074/}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {1217131, title = {The symbolic model for algebra: functions and mechanisms}, booktitle = {ModelBased Reasoning in Science and Technology}, volume = {314}, year = {2010}, pages = {519{\textendash}532}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {The symbolic mode of reasoning in algebra, as it emerged during the sixteenth century, can be considered as a form of modelbased reasoning. In this paper we will discuss the functions and mechanisms of this model and show how the model relates to its arithmetical basis. We will argue that the symbolic model was made possible by the epistemic justification of the basic operations of algebra as practiced within the abbaco tradition. We will also show that this form of modelbased reasoning facilitated the expansion of the number concept from Renaissance interpretations of number to the full notion of algebraic numbers.
}, isbn = {9783642152221}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9783642152238\_29}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Carnielli, Walter A. and Pizzi, Claudio} } @article {1234613, title = {Towards a fruitful formulation of {N}eedham{\textquoteright}s grand question}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2010}, pages = {9{\textendash}26}, abstract = {As it stands, Needhams Grand Question is simply too general and illposed to be answered in a meaningful way. In this paper it is argued that Needhams Grand Question, to wit Why did science emerge in the West and not in China?, can only be fruitfully pursued, (1) on the condition that one explicates the assumptions and conceptions involved in an informative and motivated way, and (2) on the condition that the question is concretized and finetuned by means of and in terms of a series of specific questions. In this paper, I attempt to reformulate Needhams Grand Question on the basis of a minimal conception of modern science. Next I will split up the Grand Question into a series of more specific, controllable and arguably more fruitful questions.
}, issn = {03798402}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/822.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {strasser2010towards, title = {Towards more conflicttolerant deontic logics by relaxing the interdefinability between obligations and permissions}, year = {2010}, abstract = {While conflicttolerant logics (CTDLs) usually allow for obligation obligation conflicts, they fall short of tolerating obligationpermission con flicts (OPconflicts) of the type OA \&\#8743; P\&\#172; A. Moreover, for the sake of conflicttolerance these logics usually do not validate the very intuitive principle (D), OA \&\#8835; PA. We demonstrate in this paper that by relaxing the interdefinability between obligations and permission PA =_{df} \&\#172;O\&\#172;A that is characteristic for most deontic logics, the logics get more conflicttolerant since they allow for OPconflicts. Moreover, this way they can be equipped with (D) without the need to sacrifice conflicttolerance. In this paper we offer a generic procedure that transforms a given CTDL into a logic that tolerates OPconflicts and validates (D).
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @article {981629, title = {{W}hewell{\textquoteright}s tidal researches: scientific practice and philosophical methodology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {41}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {26{\textendash}40}, abstract = {Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broadranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewells philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewells methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.
}, issn = {00393681}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {D:WS, title = {Waar stoppen?}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {102}, number = {3}, year = {2010}, pages = {196{\textendash}198}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {909568, title = {What About Interdisciplinarity Within Philosophy?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and Its Implications For Our Perspectives on the World}, year = {2010}, pages = {10{\textendash}25}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik} } @conference {812480, title = {Why social emergence? {D}iscussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics}, year = {2010}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer{\textquoteright}s use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.
}, isbn = {9789814295819}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @incollection {DeMey2010, title = {William {H}arvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.}, booktitle = {Fascinerend Leven. {M}arkante Figuren en Idee{\"e}n uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.}, year = {2010}, note = {In print
}, publisher = {Nieuwezijds}, address = {Amsterdam}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Van Speybroeck, Linda and Braeckman, Johan} } @article {DeVreese2010a, title = {Work in Progress in Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {9}, year = {2010}, pages = {141}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {666246, title = {The Abbaco Tradition (13001500): its role in the development of {E}uropean algebra}, journal = {Suuri Kaiseki Kenkyuujo koukyuuroku}, volume = {1625}, year = {2009}, pages = {23{\textendash}33}, abstract = {Abbaco algebra is a coherent tradition of algebraic problem solving mostly based in the merchant cities of fourteenth and fifteenthcentury Italy. This period is roughly situated between two important works dealing with algebra: the Liber Abbaci by Fibonacci (1202) and the Summa di Arithmetica et Geometria by Lucca Pacioli (1492). Such continuous tradition of mathematical practice was hardly known before the first transcriptions of extant manuscripts by Gino Arrighi from the 1960{\textquoteright}s and the groundbreaking work by Warren van Egmond (1980). After some decades of manuscript study and the recent assessment of Jens H{\o}yrup (2007) we now have a better understanding of this tradition. In this paper we provide an overview of the basic characteristics of the abbaco tradition and discuss the role it played towards the new symbolic algebra as it emerged in sixteenthcentury Europe. We argue that its influence on the sixteenth century has largely been ignored and that the new ars analytica from the French algebraists should be understood as establishing new foundations for the general practice of abbaco problem solving.
}, issn = {18802818}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {heeffer2009abbacus, title = {The Abbacus Tradition: the Missing Link between Arabic and Early Symbolic Algebra?}, year = {2009}, abstract = {Abbaco algebra is a coherent tradition of arithmetical and algebraic problem solving, mostly based in the merchant cities of fourteenth and fifteenthcentury Italy. This period is roughly situated between two impor tant works dealing with algebra: the Liber Abbaci by Fibonacci (1202) [5] and the Summa di Arithmetica et Geometria by Luca Pacioli (1492) [20]. Such continuous tradition of mathematical practice was hardly known be fore the first transcriptions of extant manuscripts by Gino Arrighi from the 1960{\textquoteright}s (most notably [1], [2], [3] and [4]) and the groundbreaking work by Warren van Egmond [28]. After some decades of manuscript study and the recent assessment of Jens H{\o}yrup [10] we now have a bet ter understanding of this tradition. Here we provide an overview of the basic characteristics of the abbaco tradition and discuss the role it played towards the new symbolic algebra as it emerged in sixteenthcentury Europe.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {D:paraty, title = {Adaptive Cn Logics}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {This paper solves an old problem: to devise decent inconsistencyadaptive logics that have the \C{n} logics as their lower limit. Two kinds of logics are presented. Those of the first kind offer a maximally consistent interpretation of the premise set in as far as this is possible in view of logical considerations. At the same time, they indicate at which points further choices may be made on extralogical grounds. The logics of the second kind allow one to introduce those choices in a defeasible way and handle them.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {862760, title = {Adaptive fuzzy logics for contextual hedge interpretation}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {333{\textendash}356}, abstract = {The article presents several adaptive fuzzy hedge logics. These logics are designed to perform a specific kind of hedge detection. Given a premise set Γ that represents a series of communicated statements, the logics can check whether some predicate occurring in Γ may be interpreted as being (implicitly) hedged by technically, strictly speaking or loosely speaking, or simply nonhedged. The logics take into account both the logical constraints of the premise set as well as conceptual information concerning the meaning of potentially hedged predicates (stored in the memory of the interpreter in question). The proof theory of the logics is nonmonotonic in order to enable the logics to deal with possible nonmonotonic interpretation dynamics (this is illustrated by means of several concrete proofs). All the adaptive fuzzy hedge logics are also sound and strongly complete with respect to their [0,1]semantics.
}, issn = {09258531}, doi = {10.1007/s108490099084y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s108490099084y}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan} } @conference {605786, title = {The Adaptive Logics Approach to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in {B}elgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {680484, title = {Adaptive Logics using the Minimal Abnormality strategy are \${\textbackslash}Pi\^{ }1\_1\$complex}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {167}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {93{\textendash}104}, abstract = {In this article complexity results for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are presented. It is proven here that the consequence set of some recursive premise sets is Pi(1)(1)complete. So, the complexity results in ( Horsten and Welch, Synthese 158: 41 60, 2007) are mistaken for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy.
}, issn = {00397857}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122900792915}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {528863, title = {Antitrinitarianism in {N}ewtons {G}eneral {S}cholium to the {P}rincipia}, journal = {European Journal of Science and Theology}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}11}, abstract = {Recent findings on Newton{\textquoteright}s heretical beliefs in the five draft versions of the General Scholium, which was added to the second edition of the Principia in 1713, are discussed here. We shall use these snapshots as a tool to gain understanding into the process of composition of the theological material from the General Scholium.
}, issn = {18410464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {urbaniak2009bogus, title = {Bogus singular terms and substitution salva denotatione}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {3}, number = {6}, year = {2009}, month = {June}, pages = {45}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {urbaniak2009capturing, title = {Capturing dynamic conceptual frames}, journal = {Logic Journal of {IGPL}}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {430{\textendash}455}, abstract = {The main focus of this paper is to develop an adaptive formal apparatus capable of capturing arguments conducted within a conceptual framework. I first explain one of the most recent theories of concepts developed by cognitivists, in which a crucial part is played by the notion of a dynamic frame. Next, I describe how a dynamic frame may be captured by a finite set of formulas and how a formalized adaptive framework for reasoning within a dynamic frame can be developed.
}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {594869, title = {Causal discovery and the problem of ignorance: an adaptive logic approach}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {188{\textendash}205}, abstract = {In this paper, I want to substantiate three related claims regarding causal discovery from nonexperimental data. Firstly, in scientific practice, the problem of ignorance is ubiquitous, persistent, and farreaching. Intuitively, the problem of ignorance bears upon the following situation. A set of random variables VV is studied but only partly tested for (conditional) independencies; i.e. for some variables A and B it is not known whether they are (conditionally) independent. Secondly, Judea Pearl{\textquoteright}s most meritorious and influential algorithm for causal discovery (the IC algorithm) cannot be applied in cases of ignorance. It presupposes that a full list of (conditional) independence relations is on hand and it would lead to unsatisfactory results when applied to partial lists. Finally, the problem of ignorance is successfully treated by means of ALIC, the adaptive logic for causal discovery presented in this paper.
}, issn = {15708683}, doi = {10.1016/j.jal.2007.11.004}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2007.11.004}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {924987, title = {Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {301{\textendash}320}, abstract = {Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
}, issn = {04954548}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.698}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {674351, title = {"Clear Moon, Frost soon". An introduction to the Study of Meteorological Practices in the Low Countries (15501850)}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Pieters, Eva}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {924906, title = {Concepts of causation in historiography}, journal = {Historical methods}, volume = {42}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {116{\textendash}128}, abstract = {Historians can use the concept of causation in a variety of ways. each of which is associated with different historiographical claims and different kinds of argumentation. The author shows that, contrary to the Usual view, historical narratives are causal (in a specific way), and microhistory can be seen as a response to a very specific causal problem of Braudelian macrohistory.
}, issn = {01615440}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {924897, title = {Conceptual analysis of causation and theoretical utility in everyday contexts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {206}, year = {2009}, pages = {177{\textendash}190}, abstract = {In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall{\textquoteright}s theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall{\textquoteright}s proposal is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation, traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up. However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive conceptual analysis can be useful.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @conference {810575, title = {A constructive modal semantics for contextual verification}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the First International Workshop on LogicBased Interpretation of Context: Modeling and Applications}, year = {2009}, publisher = {CEURWorkshop Proceedings}, organization = {CEURWorkshop Proceedings}, abstract = {This paper introduces a nonstandard semantics for a modal version of constructive KT for contextual (assumptionsbased) verification. The modal fragment expresses verifiability under extensions of contexts, enjoying adapted validity and (weak) monotonicity properties depending on satisfaction of the contextual data.
}, url = {http://sunsite.informatik.rwthaachen.de/Publications/CEURWS/Vol550/}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {677635, title = {De ontologische focus van sociaalwetenschappelijke verklaringen.}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {3{\textendash}22}, abstract = {The author presents a survey of different opinions about the ontological focus of social scientific explanations. The opinions discussed are: methodological collectivism, methodological individualism, methodological structurism, methodological physicalism, the sociobiological point of view, and explanatory pluralism. These approaches all provide an answer to the question On which ontological level(s) should social scientific explanations concentrate? Because all other forms of explanatory pluralism, as well as the nonpluralistic answers to this question, have certain problems, the author introduces a new form of explanatory pluralism that avoids these problems: contextrelated explanatory pluralism. Contextrelated explanatory pluralism makes a critical attitude (in the philosophy of science) compatible with a fluently developing and progressing science. This means that it is not only the most plausible guideline regarding the ontological focus of social scientific explanations, but also allows us to solve the conflict between Steve Fuller and Thomas Kuhn.
}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @article {Strasser2009, title = {A Deontic Logic Framework Allowing for Factual Detachment {\textendash} Appendix}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {This Appendix contains in part A the semantic characterization of logics CDPM.2d and CDPM.2e defined in [3]. Soundness and completeness are proven. In part B the logical framework presented in [3] is generalized such that it is able to deal with nested permissible contexts.
}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {drouet2009determinism, title = {Is determinism more favorable than indeterminism for the causal Markov condition?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {662{\textendash}675}, abstract = {The present text comments on Steel 2005, in which the author claims to extend from the deterministic to the general case, the result according to which the causal Markov condition is satisfied by systems with jointly independent exogenous variables. I show that Steels claim cannot be accepted unless one is prepared to abandon standard causal modeling terminology. Correlatively, I argue that the most fruitful aspect of Steel 2005 consists in a realist conception of error terms, and I show how this conception sheds new light on the relationship between determinism and the causal Markov condition.
}, doi = {10.1086/605797}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605797}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle} } @conference {678341, title = {Doing mathematics on the ENIAC. {V}on {N}eumann{\textquoteright}s and {L}ehmer{\textquoteright}s different visions}, booktitle = {Mathematical Practice and Development throughout History. Proceedings of the 18th Novembertagung on the History, Philosophy and Didactics of Mathematics}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Logos Verlag Berlin}, organization = {Logos Verlag Berlin}, abstract = {In this paper we will study the impact of the computer on math ematics and its practice from a historical point of view. We will look at what kind of mathematical problems were implemented on early electronic computing machines and how these implementations were perceived. By doing so, we want to stress that the computer was in fact, from its very beginning, conceived as a mathematical instru ment per se, thus situating the contemporary usage of the computer in mathematics in its proper historical background. We will focus on the work by two computer pioneers: Derrick H. Lehmer and John von Neumann. They were both involved with the ENIAC and had strong opinions about how these new machines might influence (theoretical and applied) mathematics.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Witzke, Ingo and Wilhelmus, E.} } @article {urbaniak2009doxastic, title = {Doxastic synonymy vs. logical equivalence}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {3}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {56}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {1019750, title = {Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {389{\textendash}400}, abstract = {I show why Michael Friedman{\textquoteright}s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigmchange as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigmchange on what I take to Friedman{\textquoteright}s own terms.
}, issn = {00318248}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {732259, title = {Epidemiology and causation}, journal = {Medicine, health care and philosophy}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {345{\textendash}353}, abstract = {Epidemiologists{\textquoteright} discussions on causation are not always very enlightening with regard to the notion of {\textquoteleft}cause{\textquoteright} in epidemiology. Epidemiologists rightly work from a sciencebased approach to causation in epidemiology, but largely disagree about the matter. Disagreement may be partly due to confusion of the question of useful concepts for causal inference in epidemiological practice with the question of the metaphysical presuppositions of causal concepts used in epidemiology. In other words, epidemiologists seem to confuse the practical results of epidemiological research at the population level with the metaphysical views about the reality of disease causation at the individual level in their writings on causation.
}, issn = {13867423}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1101900991840}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {Primiero2009a, title = {An epistemic logic for becoming informed}, journal = {Synthese (KRA Serie)}, volume = {167}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {363389}, abstract = {Various conceptual approaches to the notion of information can currently be traced in the literature in logic and formal epistemology. A main issue of disagreement is the attribution of truthfulness to informational data, the so called Veridicality Thesis (Floridi 2005). The notion of Epistemic Constructive Information (Primiero 2007) is one of those rejecting VT. The present paper develops a formal framework for ECI. It extends on the basic approach of Artemovs logic of proofs (Artemov 1994), representing an epistemic logic based on dependent justifications, where the definition of information relies on a strict distinction from factual truth. The definition obtained by comparison with a Normal Modal Logic translates a constructive logic for becoming informed: its distinction from the logic of being informedwhich internalizes truthfulnessis essential to a general evaluation of information with respect to truth. The formal disentanglement of these two logics, and the description of the modal version of the former as a weaker embedding into the latter, allows for a proper understanding of the Veridicality Thesis with respect to epistemic states defined in terms of information.
}, keywords = {Epistemic logic, Logic of justification, Modal logic, Philosophy of information}, issn = {00397857}, doi = {10.1007/s1122900894138}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122900894138}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {771936, title = {Epistemic Modalities}, booktitle = {Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic}, series = {Tributes}, volume = {9}, year = {2009}, pages = {207{\textendash}232}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {I present an analysis of the notion of epistemic modalities, based on an appropriate interpretation of two basic constructivist issues: verification and epistemic agency. Starting from an historical analysis of conditions for judgments, I analyze first the reading of necessity with respect to apodictic judgements, and then that of possibility with respect to hypothetical judgement. The analysis results in a formal treatment of rules for judgemental modal operators, whose aim is to preserve epistemic states corresponding to verified and unverified assumptions in contexts. In the conclusion, further tracks of research are indicated for designing a semantic framework and defining multiagents systems.
}, isbn = {9781904987925}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Rahman, Shahid} } @article {818474, title = {On the epistemological foundations of the law of the lever}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {315{\textendash}318}, abstract = {In this paper I challenge Paolo Palmieris reading of the MachVailati debate on Archimedess proof of the law of the lever. I argue that the actual import of the debate concerns the possible epistemic (as opposed to merely pragmatic) role of mathematical arguments in empirical physics, and that construed in this light Vailati carries the upper hand. This claim is defended by showing that Archimedess proof of the law of the lever is not a way of appealing to a nonempirical source of information, but a way of explicating the mathematical structure that can represent the empirical information at our disposal in the most general way.
}, issn = {00393681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.001}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {674595, title = {Fitchstyle natural deduction for modal paralogics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {193{\textendash}218}, abstract = {In this paper, I will present a Fitch{\textendash}style natural deduction proof theory for modal paralogics (modal logics with gaps and/or gluts for negation). Besides the standard classical subproofs, the presented proof theory also contains modal subproofs, which express what would follow from a hypothesis, in case it would be true in some arbitrary world.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {733505, title = {The Flow of Influence: {F}rom {N}ewton to {L}ocke and Back}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {64}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {In this essay, the affinity between Locke{\textquoteright}s empiricism and Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy is scrutinized. Parallels are distinguished from influences. I argue, pace G.A.J. Rogers, that Newton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute space and time influenced Locke{\textquoteright}s Essay concerning Human Understanding (first edition: 1689, though bearing the year 1690 on its cover) from the second edition onwards. I also show that Newton used Lockean terminology in his criticism of Cartesianism. It is further argued that Locke{\textquoteright}s endorsement of corpuscularianism is merely methodological, i.e. he accepts it as a scientifically useful and psychologically intelligible paradigm, but not as a realist explanation of rerum natura. Like Newton, Locke was reluctant to accept the corpuscular theory of light. However, his reasons for doing so were different from those of Newton. This essay is divided into three parts: in the first, the stage is set by looking at the fundamentals of Locke{\textquoteright}s epistemology; in the second, several correspondences between Locke{\textquoteright}s and Newton{\textquoteright}s thought are explored and two cases of influence are argued for; and in the third, several arguments are provided for interpreting Locke{\textquoteright}s corpuscularianism as methodological.
}, issn = {03932516}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {JK:gdt, title = {GoalDirected Tableaux}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {241{\textendash}256}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {This paper contains a new format for analytic tableaux, called goaldirected tableaux. Their main interest lies in the fact that the search for a closed tableau proceeds in a highly constrained way. The goaldirected tableaux do not form a complete decision method for propositional classical logic (because they do not sustain Ex Falso Quodlibet). For consistent sets of premises, however, they lead to the same results as the usual analytic tableaux for classical logic.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {924908, title = {How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {23}, year = {2009}, pages = {277{\textendash}295}, abstract = {In a recent paper in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere=s theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences B on which Russo and Williamson focus B and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation (of Suppes, Eells and Humphreys) and show that they cannot account for the use of mechanistic evidence. I argue that these theories are also inferior to Giere{\textquoteright}s theory in other respects.
}, issn = {02698595}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {909570, title = {Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, Its Crisis and Challenge}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. {A} Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective}, year = {2009}, pages = {4{\textendash}9}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, isbn = {9789814295819}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @article {683771, title = {Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Of The Church{\textquoteright} Manuscript Description and Analysis of Bodmer Ms. in Geneva}, journal = {European journal of science and theology}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {25{\textendash}35}, abstract = {In this essay, a manuscript description and analysis of Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s manuscript {\textquoteright}Of the Church{\textquoteright} (Bodmer Ms., Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Switzerland) is provided.
}, issn = {18410464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Rusu, Iulian} } @article {1078347, title = {Kuhn and coherentist epistemology}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {322{\textendash}327}, abstract = {The paper challenges a recent attempt by JouniMatti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhns philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanens first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhns view on interparadigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) the weak notion of rationality, and that Kuukkanens argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhns argument against it is not ultimately empirical, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.
}, issn = {00393681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.003}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {Christiaens2009, title = {La m{\'e}tamorphose gra{\c c}e au cin{\`e}ma.}, booktitle = {La m{\'e}tamorphose: d{\'e}finition, formes et th{\`e}mes}, year = {2009}, publisher = {G{\'e}rard Monfort Editeur}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Tatham, AnneMarie and Bonnecase, Denis} } @article {weber2009laudation, title = {Laudatio Jens H{\o}yrup}, journal = {Sartoniana}, volume = {22}, year = {2009}, pages = {5{\textendash}7}, author = {Weber, Erik and Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Urbaniak2009b, title = {Leitgeb, {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}about{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}, {Y}ablo}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {239254}, abstract = {Leitgeb (2002) objects against the clarity of the debate about the alleged (non)circularity of Yablos paradox, arguing that there actually are at least two notions of selfreference and circularity at play.One, on which Yablos paradox is not circular, is defined via thereference of the constituents of a sentence, and another, on which the paradox is circular, is defined via syntactic mappings and fixedpoints. More importantly, Leitgeb argues that both definitions arent satisfactory and that before we can undertake a serious debate about the circularity of Yablos paradox we first need to clarify the notions involved. I will focus on Leitgebs criticism of the first definition^{1}and will argue that the problems arise not as much on the level of our definition of circularity as on the level of our definition of reference of sentences (aboutness). Leitgebs main worry is the failure of a requirement called Equivalence Condition, which says that if a formula is selfreferential, any formula logically equivalent to it should also be selfreferential. I will argue that preservation under logical equivalence is unreasonable with respect to selfreference,but is indeed needed with respect to aboutness. Since Leitgeb sown tentative notion of aboutness doesnt satisfy the requirement, I will suggest another approach which fixes this problem. I also explain why the intuitions that circularity should satisfy the equivalence condition are misled. Next, I argue that the new notion of aboutness is not susceptible to slingshot arguments. Finally, I compare it with Goodmans notion of absolute aboutness, emphasizing those features of Goodmans approach that make his notion inapplicable in the present discussion. ^{[1]I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who discussed earlier versions of this paper with me: Hannes Leitgeb, Jeffrey Ketland, Karl Georg Niebergall, Diderik Batens, Joke Meheus, Maarten Van Dyck, Stefan Wintein, Martin Bentzen, Christian Stra{\ss}er, Ghent Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science members, and the participants of PhDs in Logic workshop (Gent 2009)}
}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @book {689110, title = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Young Researchers Present their Work}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {663049, title = {Mainstream economics: searching where the light is}, journal = {JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {137{\textendash}150}, abstract = {The starting point of this paper is the question of how to explain mainstream economics{\textquoteright} great level of acceptance in the face of its poor empirical track record. An explanation is provided in terms of a combination of unification and, most importantly, inference to the best explanation. This paper asks whether the appeal of mainstream economics to inference to the best explanation is justified and as a consequence questions one of the main reasons for the dominance of mainstream economics today. The final section integrates the ideas from the previous sections into a general framework for explanatory pluralism.
}, issn = {01603477}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/PKE01603477320109}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {urbaniak2009kaye, title = {The Mathematics of Logic by Richard Kaye (review).}, journal = {Bulletin of Symbolic Logic}, volume = {15}, number = {02}, year = {2009}, pages = {216{\textendash}218}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @conference {678298, title = {Mathematics through mancomputer interaction. A study of the early years of computing.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {WaartvanGulik2009, title = {Menselijke rationaliteit en identiteit.}, booktitle = {Humanismen}, year = {2009}, pages = {163172}, publisher = {VUB Press}, abstract = {Wat volgt is een aanzet tot een zuiver beschrijvende analyse van de relatie tussen de ontwikkeling van de menselijke identiteit en de drie sociaal psychologische fenomenen xenofobie, etnocentrisme en tolerantie. Het werkkader voor deze analyse is een conceptueel, speculatief model van de menselijke rationaliteit.
}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Van den Bossche, M. and Vandemeulebroecke, R.} } @incollection {Urbaniak2009a, title = {Modal Logic and Philosophy. {A} case study.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {7983}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Rostalska, Agnieszka}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {678587, title = {On the Nature and Origin of Algebraic Symbolism}, booktitle = {New Perspectives on Mathematical Practices. Essays in Philosophy and History of Mathematics.}, year = {2009}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing}, isbn = {9789812812223}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/etextbook/6810/6810\_chap01.pdf}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {1234666, title = {Newtonianism in {L}ocke, {H}ume, and {R}eid, or: how far can one stretch a label?}, journal = {Enlightenment and Dissent  Special}, volume = {25}, year = {2009}, pages = {62{\textendash}105}, issn = {02627612}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {Ducheyne2009, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s Theology and the Flow of Influence}, booktitle = {Future Perspectives on {N}ewton Scholarship and the {N}ewtonian Legacy}, year = {2009}, pages = {3547}, publisher = {KVAB, Brussel}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {Primiero2009, title = {A note on constructive modalities for information}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {urbaniak2009note, title = {A note on identity and higherorder quantification.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Logic}, volume = {7}, year = {2009}, pages = {48{\textendash}55}, abstract = {It is a commonplace remark that the identity relation, even though not expressible in a firstorder language without identity with classical settheoretic semantics, can be dened in a language without identity, as soon as we admit secondorder, settheoretically interpreted quantiers binding predicate variables that range over all subsets of the domain. However, there are fairly simple and intuitive higherorder languages with settheoretic semantics (where the variables range over all subsets of the domain) in which the identity relation is not denable. The point is that the denability of identity in higherorder languages not only depends on what variables range over, but also is sensitive to how predication is construed.
}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {Urbaniak, title = {PhD{\textquoteright}s in Logic  report (with S. Wintein)}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {6{\textendash}7}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {primieroprioritized, title = {Prioritized Dynamic Retraction Function on Nonmonotonic Information Updates}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {443463}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {In this paper a model for updates on belief sets and retractions thereof is introduced using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core of the update retraction procedure is represented by abnormal expressions derivable in the language: they express updates with information con tradicting previously derived contents. The adaptive strategy aims at restricting the validity of these formulas by focusing at each decreasing degree on the update which is the most rational to retract in order to re store consistency as soon as possible. This work is related to the standard operations of retraction and withdrawal from the AGMparadigm and the eects of dynamic operations such as public announcement in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {drouet2009probabilistic, title = {Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {68{\textendash}72}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {812461, title = {The problem with(out) consensus: {T}he scientific consensus, deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism.}, booktitle = {The social sciences and democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {121{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {9780230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {734492, title = {Proceeding in abstraction: from concepts to types and the recent perspective on information}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {257{\textendash}282}, abstract = {This article presents an historical and conceptual overview on different approaches to logical abstraction. Two main trends concerning abstraction in the history of logic are highlighted, starting from the logical notions of concept and function. This analysis strictly relates to the philosophical discussion on the nature of abstract objects. I develop this issue further with respect to the procedure of abstraction involved by (typed) systems, focusing on the crucial change about meaning and predicability. In particular, the analysis of the nature of logical types in the context of Constructive Type Theory allows elucidation of the role of the previously introduced notions. Finally, the connection to the analysis of abstraction in computer science is drawn, and the methodological contribution provided by the notion of information is considered, showing its conceptual and technical relevance. Future research shall focus on the notion of information in distributed systems, analysing the paradigm of information hiding in dependent type theories.
}, issn = {01445340}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340902872630}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {Urbaniak2008, title = {Reasoning with dynamic conceptual frames.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {8489}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {Urbaniak2009, title = {Slingshot arguments: two versions}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {4{\textendash}5}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {924546, title = {Strategies: what{\textquoteright}s in a name?}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {287{\textendash}306}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {In this paper, I will show that Hintikkas notion of strategy can refer to proofheuristic reasoning as well as to methodological reasoning forms. Stating this distinction allows for a better understanding of the notion and for an easier way to tackle the problem of formalization. Contrary to Hintikkas opinion, heuristic reasoning can be implemented in formal proofs by means of goaldirected proof procedures. Methodological reasoning forms on the other hand can be formally represented by means of adaptive logics.
}, isbn = {9781904987789}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {ducheyne2009times, title = {The Times and Life of {J}ohn {T}h. {D}esaguliers (16831744): Newtonian and Freemason}, journal = {Revue belge de philologie et d{\textquoteright}histoire}, volume = {87}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {349{\textendash}363}, abstract = {Jean Theophile Desaguliers (16831744) (geboren : Desaguillers) was een centrale figuur in twee aan belang winnende stromingen : het Newtonianisme en de Vrijmetselarij. Desaguliers werd lid van de Royal Society en hij was een persoonlijke kennis van Isaac Newton. Hij schreef talrijke wetenschappelijke boeken en artikelen waarin hij de Newtoniaanse natuurfi losofi e verdedigde. Om deze reden was hij centraal voor de popularisering van het Newtonianisme. Terwijl hij in London verbleef, werd Desaguliers eveneens een cruciale fi guur binnen de Vrijmetselarij : in 1719 werd hij grootmeester van de Grootloge van Londen en hij was rechtstreeks betrokken in de totstandkoming van James Andersons The Constitutions of the Freemasons (1723).
}, doi = {10.3406/rbph.2009.7676}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2009treat, title = {To treat of the world: {P}aul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s ontology and epistemology and the circle of knowledge}, journal = {Journal of Documentation}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {223{\textendash}244}, abstract = {Purpose The purpose of this paper is to document how Paul Otlet, foundingfather of what is termed at present as information science, attempted to provide a complete image of the world (and reality in general) by establishing the scientific discipline he dubbed documentation. The paper also aims to focus on how Otlet represented human knowledge and reality in a systematic and unified way. Design/methodology/approach A close reading of Otlet{\textquoteright}s primary works and some of his personal archives was undertaken. Findings Most importantly, it is shown that Otlet{\textquoteright}s views on documentation were immersed in a cosmological, objectivist, humanitarian and ontological framework that is alien to contemporary information science. Correspondingly, his alleged affinity with positivism is reassessed. Originality/value The philosophical foundations of the origins of information science are highlighted. Indirectly, this paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on realism and antirealism in information science.
}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {D:shahid, title = {Towards a Dialogic Interpretation of Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things. Essays in Honour of {S}hahid {R}ahman}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}51}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {The main result presented in this paper concerns a dialogic or gametheoretical interpretation of dynamic proofs. Dynamic proofs in themselves do not form a demonstration of the derivability of their last formula from a given premise set. Apart from the proof, such a demonstration requires a specific metalevel argument. In a natural and appealing form, the metalevel argument is phrased in terms of the existence of a winning strategy for the proponent.\par The aforementioned point is presented in terms of an approach that is in a sense Hilbertian and antiTarskian: the characterization of logical inference in terms of types of proofs, rather than in terms of properties of the consequence relation.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {D{\'e}gremont, C{\'e}dric and Keiff, Laurent and R{\"u}ckert, Helge} } @conference {524726, title = {Trading off explanatory virtues}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {The paper draws on Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s casestudy of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.
}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Van Paemel, Geert} } @article {DC\&P:tdl, title = {On the Transparency of Defeasible Logics: Equivalent Premise Sets, Equivalence of Their Extensions, and Maximality of the Lower Limit}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {281{\textendash}304}, abstract = {For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms.
A related property of Tarski logics is that the extensions of equivalent premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets. This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion does.
We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic or identical to it. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets.
In this paper we apply two kinds of procedural semantics to the problem of privative modification. We do this for three reasons. The first reason is to launch a tough test case to gauge the degree of substantial agreement between a constructivist and a realist interpretation of a procedural semantics; the second is to extend MartinLof{\textquoteright}s Type Theory to privative modification, which is characteristic of natural language; the third reason is to sketch a positive characterization of privation.
}, isbn = {4915905373 C3004}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Jespersen, Bj{\o}rn}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @article {Ducheyne2009a, title = {Understanding (in) {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Argument for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {227258}, abstract = {In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical casestudy: understanding in Newtons theory of universal gravitation and Huygens reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists skills and intelligibilityenhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of this casestudy, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation.
}, keywords = {1713, 1726), Actio in distans, D. Dieks, Discours de la cause de la pesanteur (1690), H. de Regt, Huygens, Incommensurability, Newton, Principia (1687, Scientific understanding, Spherical vortex cosmology, Theoretical virtues, Universal gravitation}, issn = {09254560}, doi = {10.1007/s108380099096y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s108380099096y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {703844, title = {Understanding in political science: the plurality of epistemic interests}, booktitle = {Scientific Understanding. {P}hilosophical Perspectives}, year = {2009}, pages = {298{\textendash}313}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, isbn = {9780822943785}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Leonelli, Sabina and Eigner, Kai} } @incollection {924923, title = {Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {181{\textendash}194}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {9780230224391}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {812495, title = {Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet.}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}13}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {9780230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {981621, title = {Whewell, necessity and the inductive sciences: a philosophicalsystematic survey}, journal = {South African Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {333{\textendash}358}, abstract = {In this paper Whewell{\textquoteright}s concept of necessity is scrutinized and its historical development is outlined (ca. 18331860). Particular attention will be paid to how Whewell interpreted the laws of the inductive sciences as being necessary since the laws of nature are concretizations of the Fundamental Ideas which can be partially described by Axioms.
}, issn = {02580136}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {2009, title = {Why should I adopt pluralism?}, booktitle = {Economic Pluralism}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Routledge}, abstract = {If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.
}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Garnett, Rob and Olsen, Erik and Starr, Martha} } @article {680715, title = {Yes Fellows, Most Human Reasoning is Complex}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {166}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {113{\textendash}131}, abstract = {This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 4160). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.
}, issn = {00397857}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122900792684}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Verd{\'e}e, Peter and Meheus, Joke} } @conference {GiJ:aavc, title = {Adaptive arbitration by variant counting on commutative bases with weights}, booktitle = {Fusion 2008: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Fusion}, year = {2008}, publisher = {IEEE}, organization = {IEEE}, abstract = {In this paper a new logical arbitration protocol for fusion of inconsistent information is designed. It defines a selection of models of a premise set in a multimodal logic that uses the standard format of adaptive logics. The selected models are obtained by a counting procedure on the derivable data conflicting among the various sources. Peculiar of this approach is the definition of weights for commutative bases, in terms of the distinction between partially and fully supported information. The results obtained are compared to standard arbitration protocols and they extend previous work on the adaptive majority protocol.
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICIF.2008.4632371}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke} } @article {515799, title = {Betekenisverschuiving in het causaliteitsbegrip van Ernst Cassirer}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor filosofie}, volume = {70}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {733{\textendash}761}, abstract = {Cassirers conception of causation has until now been treated largely on the basis of Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. In this article, I argue that a characterisation of this sort can not be complete. There appear to be several apparent contradictions (of which I discuss three) when we compare the concept of causality in Determinism and Indeterminism with treatments of the concept in other works, especially those of mythical causation. We need a general view of Cassirers conception of causality to account for these contradictions. I offer such a view, which is partly universal (in as far as it refers to universals as time and space) and partly contextual (in as far as it refers, through the conception of the object, to principles that are specific to certain symbolic forms). Then, I discuss the differences and the resemblances between theoretical and mythical causation, and, within the theoretical world view, between the natural, cultural and biological sciences.
}, issn = {0040750X}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @conference {678254, title = {On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. {T}heoretical and experimental results.}, booktitle = {The complexity of simple programs}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Cork University Press}, organization = {Cork University Press}, abstract = {Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Woods, Damien and Neary, Turlough and Seda, Tony} } @article {393211, title = {Causal (mis)understanding and the search for scientific explanations: a case study from the history of medicine.}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences}, volume = {39}, year = {2008}, pages = {14{\textendash}24}, abstract = {In 1747, James Lind carried out an experiment which proved the usefulness of citrus fruit as a cure for scurvy. Nonetheless, he rejected the earlier hypothesis of Bachstrom that the absence of fresh fruit and vegetables was the only cause of the disease. I explain why it was rational for James Lind not to accept Bachstroms explanation. I argue that it was the urge for scientific understanding that guided Lind in his rejection and in the development of his alternative theory that humidity was the primary cause of the disease. Central in this process was the search for causal mechanisms which could provide understanding of how the disease developed and which fitted in with the knowledge of the time. Given that the relevant background knowledge and statistical methods were not yet available to Lind, he was right to prefer his own explanation to that of Bachstrom. Although his explanation turned out to be wrong, and Bachstroms right, from a historical point of view it offered deeper causal understanding of both the development of the disease and the preventive and curative effects of fresh vegetable food. This case study illustrates how the search for causal mechanisms can not only be enlightening, but also very misleading.
}, issn = {13698486}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {417858, title = {A conceptual analysis of early arabic algebra}, booktitle = {The unity of science in the arabic tradition : science, logic, epistemology and their interactions}, year = {2008}, pages = {89{\textendash}128}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {Arabic algebra derives its epistemic value not from proofs but from correctly performing calculations using coequal polynomials. This idea of mathematics as calculation had an important influence on the epistemological status of European mathematics until the seventeenth century. We analyze the basic concepts of early Arabic algebra such as the unknown and the equation and their subsequent changes within the Italian abacus tradition. We demonstrate that the use of these concepts has been problematic in several aspects. Early Arabic algebra reveals anomalies which can be attributed to the diversity of influences in which the aljabr practice flourished. We argue that the concept of a symbolic equation as it emerges in algebra textbooks around 1550 is fundamentally different from the equation as known in Arabic algebra.
}, isbn = {9781402084041}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/11276}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan} } @article {Ducheyne2008a, title = {Conference Report "Induction: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, {G}hent {U}niversity, 810 July 2008"}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {10}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {89}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {427052, title = {Confusion and bad arguments in the conceptual analysis of causation}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {51}, number = {201}, year = {2008}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {00245836}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {924965, title = {The debate between causal realism and causal constructivism: metaphilosophical reflections}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, year = {2008}, pages = {59{\textendash}71}, abstract = {In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {446322, title = {Deontologizing the debate on social explanations: a pragmatic approach based on epistemic interests.}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {423{\textendash}442}, abstract = {In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciencesrefining the conceptual tools of social scientistsand less philosophically ontological theories. Following this deontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winnertakesallapproach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.
}, issn = {01638548}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {683583, title = {Disjunctive realism about color}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, series = {Acta philosophica Fennica}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {193{\textendash}200}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, abstract = {Section 1: Analytical metaphysics and its methodology. Why the negations of false atomic propositions are true / Peter Simons {\textendash} The one over many / AnnaSofia Maurin {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s conception of supervenience / Markku Keina\unmatched{0308}nen {\textendash} {\textacutedbl}Mirage realism{\textacutedbl} or {\textacutedbl}Positivism in naturalism{\textquoteright}s clothing{\textacutedbl}? / Panu Raatikainen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s metaphysical realism / Sami Pihlstro\unmatched{0308}m. Section 2: Laws of nature, dispositions, and modality. Some remarks on the metaphysical status of laws of nature / Wim Christiaens {\textendash} Dispositions pace Armstrong / Robrecht Vanderbeeken {\textendash} Armstrong on the metaphysics of modality: two dilemmas / Anssi Korhonen. Section 3: Mind and epistemology. Disjunctive realism about color / Tim De May {\textendash} On Armstrong{\textquoteright}s philosophy of perception / S. Albert Kivinen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s epistemology / Markus Lammenranta.
}, isbn = {9519264663}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {397684, title = {Dispositions pace Armstrong.}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {127{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, isbn = {9789519264660}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @article {427773, title = {The Emergence of Symbolic Algebra as a Shift in Predominant Models}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {149{\textendash}161}, abstract = {Historians of science find it difficult to pinpoint to an exact period in which symbolic algebra came into existence. This can be explained partly because the historical process leading to this breakthrough in mathematics has been a complex and diffuse one. On the other hand, it might also be the case that in the early twentieth century, historians of mathematics over emphasized the achievements in algebraic procedures and underestimated the conceptual changes leading to symbolic algebra. This paper attempts to provide a more precise setting for the historical context in which this decisive step to symbolic reasoning took place. For that purpose we will consider algebraic problem solving as modelbased reasoning and symbolic representation as a model. This allows us to characterize the emergence of symbolic algebra as a shift from a geometrical to a symbolic mode of representation. The use of the symbolic as a model will be situated in the context of mercantilism where merchant activity of exchange has led to reciprocal relations between money and wealth.
}, issn = {12331821}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1069900891240}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {Ducheyne2008c, title = {Entry "{H}elmont, {J}ohannes ({J}oan) {B}aptista {V}an"}, booktitle = {New Dictionary of Scientific Biography}, volume = {III}, year = {2008}, pages = {277281}, publisher = {Thomson Gale}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Pilchak, Angela} } @incollection {VanBouwel2008, title = {Explanatory Pluralism.}, booktitle = {Pluralist Economics}, year = {2008}, pages = {151170}, publisher = {Zed Books}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Fullbrook, Edward} } @incollection {van2009fuzzy, title = {A Fuzzy Logic Approach to NonScalar Hedges}, booktitle = {Towards Mathematical Philosophy}, series = {Trends in Logic}, year = {2008}, pages = {233247}, publisher = {Kluwer}, abstract = {In (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 458508, 1973), George Lakoff proposes a fuzzy semantics for the nonscalar hedges technically, strictly speaking, and loosely speaking. These hedges are able to modify the meaning of a predicate. However, Lakoffs proposal is problematic. For example, his semantics only contains interpretations for hedged predicates using semantic information provided by selection functions. What kind of information these functions should provide for nonhedged predicates remains unspecified. This paper presents a solution for this deficit and other problems by means of a generic firstorder fuzzy logic FL_{h} . A wide range of fuzzy logics can be used as a basis for FL_{h} . Next to a fully specified semantics, this solution also incorporates a proof theory for reasoning with these hedges. FL_{h} makes use of a special set of selection functions. These functions collect the kind of information a reasoner can retrieve from concepts in his or her memory when interpreting a (non)hedged predicate. Despite this nonstandard element, FL_{h} remains a conservative modification of its underlying fuzzy logic.
}, doi = {10.1007/9781402090844_12}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Makinson, David and Wansing, Heinrich} } @article {444488, title = {Galileo and {H}uygens on free fall: Mathematical and methodological ifferences}, journal = {Dynamis}, volume = {28}, year = {2008}, pages = {243{\textendash}274}, abstract = {In this essay, I will scrutinize the differences between Galileo{\textquoteright}s and Huygens{\textquoteright}s demonstrations of free fall, which can be found respectively in the Discorsi and the Horologium, from a mathematical, representational and methodological perspective. I argue that more can be learnt from such an analysis than the thesis that Huygens restyled Galilean mechanics which is a communis opinio. I shall argue that the differences in their approach on free fall highlight a significantly different mathematical and methodological outlook.
}, issn = {02119536}, doi = {10.4321/S021195362008000100011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {GP\&D:inter, title = {Graham {P}riest and {D}iderik {B}atens Interview Each Other}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {2}, number = {8}, year = {2008}, pages = {2{\textendash}4}, author = {Priest, Graham and Batens, Diderik} } @article {678369, title = {How to talk with a computer: an essay on computability and mancomputer conversations}, journal = {Off Topic: {U}bersetzen. {Z}eitschrift f{\"u}r Medienkunst der KHM}, volume = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {80{\textendash}89}, issn = {18675948}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {420317, title = {An introduction to wasan, native {J}apanese mathematics}, journal = {History and Pedagogy of Mathematics}, volume = {68}, year = {2008}, pages = {20{\textendash}24}, issn = {N/A}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/11413}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {432906, title = {J. B. {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}{D}e {T}empore{\textquoteright} as an influence on {I}saac {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute time}, journal = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie}, volume = {90}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {216{\textendash}228}, abstract = {Here, I shall argue that Van Helmont needs to be added to the list of sources on which Newton drew when formulating his doctrine of absolute time. This by no means implies that Van Helmont is the factual source of Newton{\textquoteright}s views on absolute time (I have found no clearcut evidence in support of this claim). It is by no means my aim to debunk the importance of the other sources, but rather to broaden them. Different authors help to explain different aspects of Newton{\textquoteright}s conception of absolute time.
}, issn = {00039101}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {441499, title = {JS {M}ill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction: From True Causes to Provisional Ones}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {361{\textendash}376}, abstract = {In this essay, my aim is twofold: to clarify how the late Mill conceived of the certainty of inductive generalisations and to offer a systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of Mill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction. I shall argue that Mill{\textquoteright}s views on the certainty of knowledge changed over time and that this change was accompanied by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results yielded by the Canons of Induction. The key message of the later editions of The System of Logic as conceived by the late Mill was no longer that by the Canons of Induction we can establish scientific certainty and true causes, but rather that the Canons are useful in establishing causal laws in a provisional way. Deduction is a game and induction a grievance. (Bagehot 1913, vol. 3, p. 37)
}, issn = {01445340}, doi = {10.1080/01445340802164377}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340802164377}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Bert, title = {Laws of Nature and Causality in the Special Sciences: A Philosophical and Formal Analysis}, year = {2008}, month = {March 13}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {urbaniak2008lesniewski, title = {Le{\'s}niewski and Russell{\textquoteright}s paradox: some problems}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {29}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {115{\textendash}146}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @phdthesis {PhD_Peter, title = {Logische Bewijsdynamieken voor de Formele Explicatie van Wetenschappelijke Probleemoplossingsprocessen}, year = {2008}, month = {April 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @conference {531125, title = {Mainstream economics: searching where the light is}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Association of Heterodox Economics}, year = {2008}, month = {July}, publisher = {Anglia Ruskin University}, organization = {Anglia Ruskin University}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {GiJ:mmac, title = {Majority Merging by Adaptive Counting}, journal = {Synthese (KRA Serie)}, volume = {165}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {203{\textendash}223}, abstract = {The present paper introduces a belief merging procedure by majority using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the logic ADM(c) (Adaptive Doxastic Merging by Counting) consists in the formulation of the conflicts arising from the belief bases of the agents involved in the procedure. A strategy is then defined both semantically and prooftheoretically which selects the consistent contents answering to a majority principle. The results obtained are proven to be equivalent to a standard majority operator for bases with partial support.
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122900893702}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {683245, title = {Middeleeuwse en Arabische Wijsbegeerte}, booktitle = {De rivier van Herakleitos: Een eigenzinnige visie op de wijsbegeere}, year = {2008}, pages = {93{\textendash}101}, publisher = {Houtekiet}, isbn = {978 90 8924 035 4}, url = {http://lib.ugent.be/catalog/pug01:683245}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Vermeersch, Etienne and Braeckman, Johan} } @article {primieromodel, title = {A model for processing updates with inconsistent information on propositional databases}, year = {2008}, institution = { College Publications}, abstract = {In the present paper a model for information update on propositional databases is formulated using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the update procedure is represented by the ab normal expressions of the language that formalize received information contradicting previous contents. The strategy dened to restrict abnor malities works by establishing, at each stage of the process, the most re cent and reliable information, updating constantly the base and removing older data.
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {428175, title = {Modeling sorites reasoning with adaptive fuzzy logic}, journal = {Fuzzy Sets and Systems}, volume = {159}, number = {14}, year = {2008}, pages = {1869{\textendash}1884}, abstract = {We present and discuss a new solution for reasoning with sorites series and their related paradoxes.We argue that a suitable logic for sorites series should be able to apply specific classical logic rules like modus ponens until and unless it becomes apparent that these applications generate unacceptable results. When the latter happens, the logic should be able to retract those applications of classical logic rules that are problematic. The formal core of our solution consists of several adaptive logics based on a {\L}ukasiewicz fuzzy logic extended with the Baaz △operator and a nonsingleton interval of designated values. The natural dynamics characteristic of adaptive logics allows these logics to perform necessary retractions in an intuitive and elegant manner. {\textcopyright} 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
}, issn = {01650114}, doi = {10.1016/j.fss.2008.01.001}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {ciuciura2008negations, title = {Negations in the adjunctive discursive logic}, journal = {Bulletin of the Section of Logic}, volume = {37}, number = {34}, year = {2008}, pages = {143{\textendash}160}, abstract = {In the logical literature, Discursive (or Discussive) Logic introduced by Stanis law Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski is seen as one of the earliest examples of the socalled paraconsistent logic. Nevertheless, there is some confusion over what discursive logic actually is. One of the possible sources of the confusion may be easily discerned; it comes from the fact that Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski published his two papers in Polish and their English translations appeared many years later.1 Up till 1999, no one but a Polish reader was able to read Ja{\textasciiacute}skowskis paper on the discursive conjunction and, consequently some authors took discursive logic to be a foremost example of a nonadjunctive logic. The situation became even more complicated when da Costa, Dubikajtis and Kotas presented an axiomatization with discursive connectives as primitive symbols. It turned out that a connective of the discursive conjunction they considered did not correspond to any of Ja{\textasciiacute}skowskis connectives. Thus, their axiomatization contained some axiom schemata that were not generally valid in Ja{\textasciiacute}skowskis logic. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the confusion surrounding the discursive logic. We will present a direct semantics and axiomatization of Ja{\textasciiacute}skowskis adjunctive discursive logic and show how to define and axiomatize two additional connectives of negation.
}, author = {Ciuciura, Janusz} } @conference {428001, title = {Negative numbers as an epistemic difficult concept. Some lessons from history.}, booktitle = {History and Pedagogy of Mathematics. Satellite Meeting of International Congress on Mathematical Education 11, 14  18 July 2008.}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Centro Cultural del M{\'e}xico Contemporan{\'e}o}, organization = {Centro Cultural del M{\'e}xico Contemporan{\'e}o}, abstract = {Historical studies on the development of mathematical concepts will serve mathematics teachers to relate their students difficulties in understanding to conceptual problems in the history of mathematics. We argue that one popular tool for teaching about numbers, the number line, may not be fit for early teaching of operations involving negative numbers. Our arguments are drawn from the many discussions on negative numbers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from philosophers and mathematicians as Arnauld, Leibniz, Wallis, Euler and dAlembert. Not only the division by negative numbers poses problems for the number line, but also the very idea of quantities smaller than nothing has been challenged. Drawing lessons from the history of mathematics we argue for the introduction of negative numbers in education within the context of symbolic operations.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Tzanakis, C.} } @incollection {683520, title = {Ockhams theorie van evidente kennis en het epistemologisch externalisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. {E}ssays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {227{\textendash}239}, publisher = {Academia Press}, isbn = {9789038212791}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @incollection {D:rescher, title = {On Possibilities and Thought Experiments}, booktitle = {Rescher Studies. {A} Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of {N}icholas {R}escher}, year = {2008}, pages = {29{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Ontos Verlag}, address = {Frankfurt}, abstract = {This paper concerns two related recent books by Nicholas Rescher, Imagining Irreality on possibilities and What If? on thought experiments. Apart from an expository part, the present contribution consist on the one hand of some proposed elaborations, especially of two technical points, and on the other hand of some discussion concerning points where I am in doubt about Rescher{\textquoteright}s precise stand and of some suggestions for further research.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Almeder, Robert} } @article {431737, title = {The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {298{\textendash}303}, issn = {00032638}, doi = {10.1111/j.14678284.2008.00756.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {415578, title = {A pragmatist defense of nonrelativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social science.}, journal = {History and theory}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, month = {May}, pages = {168{\textendash}182}, abstract = {Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Forland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for nonrelativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.
}, issn = {00182656}, doi = {10.1111/j.14682303.2008.00445.x}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {981623, title = {A preliminary study of the appropriation of {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in {B}ritain in chymistry, medicine and natural philosophy}, journal = {Ambix}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {122{\textendash}135}, abstract = {Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s work was of major importance in seventeenthcentury medicine, chymistry and natural philosophy. His work was a source of inspiration and mystery and an authoritas. His oeuvre was, together with that of many others, the culminating point of an ongoing process, starting in the Middle Ages, of turning medicine into a scientific discipline. In this essay, the appropriation, that is, the process of assimilation of an author{\textquoteright}s work by other scholars, of Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in England will be studied among chymists, physicians and natural philosophers (the distinctions between these three groups is primarily conceptual, but in practice hard to distinguish). Appropriation reminds us that the process of assimilating ideas of an author by contemporaries or later generations is not a passive activity, for scholars actively adapt and interpret them in new ways not initially envisaged by its original author.
}, issn = {00026980}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/174582308X255479}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {689055, title = {Protagoras en het kennistheoretisch relativisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. Essays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {181{\textendash}192}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent}, isbn = {9789038212791}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @conference {GiJ:qmpa, title = {Quasimerging and Purearbitration on Information for the family of Adaptive Logics ADM}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic and Intelligent Interaction}, year = {2008}, abstract = {The present paper introduces two new information merging protocols for the family of adaptive logics ADM, for which majority merging has been defined in [19]. The new adaptive operators re ect the negotiation processes of quasimerging and pure arbitration, known from the Integrity Constraints framework introduced in [13]. The Adaptive Variant Counting selection provides a result equivalent to the GMax family of merging operators: it selects a collective model for a multiset of belief bases based on the number of disagreements verified by the various models according to a leximax function. The Adaptive Minimax Counting selection is a quasimerging operator which applies a minimax function and it obtains a larger spectrum of possibilities than the previous selection: it simulates the behaviour of the Max family of operators from the Integrity Con straints framework, avoiding some of its counterintuitive results.
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Pacuit, Eric} } @incollection {Urbaniak2008a, title = {Reducing sets to modalities}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society}, volume = {XVI}, year = {2008}, pages = {359361}, publisher = {Department for Culture and Science of the Province of Lower Austria}, address = {Kirchberg am wechsel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}, editor = {Hieke, Alexander and Hannes, Leitgeb} } @article {1092888, title = {Regiomontanus and Chinese mathematics}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {87{\textendash}114}, abstract = {This paper critically assesses the claim by Gavin Menzies that Regiomontanus knew about the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) through the Sh{\`u} sh\={u} Ji\v{u} zh\={a}ng (SSJZ) written in 1247. Menzies uses this among many others arguments for his controversial theory that a large fleet of Chinese vessels visited Italy in the first half of the 15th century. We first refute that Regiomontanus used the method from the SSJZ. CRT problems appear in earlier European arithmetic and can be solved by the method of the Sun Zi, as did Fibonacci. Secondly, we provide evidence that remainder problems were treated within the European abbaco tradition independently of the CRT method. Finally, we discuss the role of recreational mathematics for the oral dissemination of subscientific knowledge.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @article {1985316, title = {Relataspecific relations: a response to Vallicella}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {509{\textendash}524}, abstract = {According to Vallicella{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley{\textquoteright}s Regress{\textquoteright} (2002), if relations are to relate their relata, some special operator must do the relating. No other options will do. In this paper we reject Vallicella{\textquoteright}s conclusion by considering an important option that becomes visible only if we hold onto a precise distinction between the following three featurepairs of relations: internality/externality, universality/particularity, relataspecificity/relataunspecificity. The conclusion we reach is that if external relations are to relate their relata, they must be relataspecific (and no special operator is needed). As it eschews unmereological complexes, this outcome is of relevance to defenders of the extensionality of composition.
}, issn = {00122017}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.17468361.2008.01167.x}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Betti, Arianna} } @article {weber2008reply, title = {Reply to Daniel Steel{\textquoteright}s With or Without Mechanisms}, journal = {Philosophy of the social sciences}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {267{\textendash}270}, abstract = {In this discussion note I clarify the motivation behind my original paper Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference and the Policy Relevance of Social Science. I argue that one of the tasks of philosophers of social science is to draw attention to methodological problems that are often forgotten or overlooked. Then I show that my original paper does not make the mistake or fallacy that Daniel Steel suggests in his comment on it.
}, doi = {10.1177/0048393108315559}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Ducheyne2008b, title = {Review of {F}lorian {E}beling{\textquoteright}s The Sectret History of Hermes}, journal = {Annals of Science}, volume = {66}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {294{\textendash}295}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {D:LiPoS, title = {The Role of Logic in Philosophy of Science}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {47{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London, New York}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Psillos, Stathis and Curd, Martin} } @article {1098767, title = {{\textquoteright}Since heaven has not yet destroyed this culture, what can the men of {K}uang do to me?{\textquoteright}: cosmological confucianism and the development of science}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2008}, pages = {27{\textendash}53}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Dessein, Bart}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Ducheyne2008, title = {Some Worries for J.D. {N}ortons Material Theory of Induction}, journal = {Philosophia Naturalis}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {37  46}, abstract = {In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to three potential worries for John D. Nortons material theory of induction (Norton, 2003). I attempt to show (1) that his principle argument is based on a false dichotomy, (2) that the idea that facts ultimately derive their license from matters of fact is debatable, and (3) that one of the core implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental reasons.
}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {436211, title = {Tag systems and Collatzlike functions}, journal = {Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {390}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {92{\textendash}101}, abstract = {Tag systems were invented by Emil Leon Post and proven recursively unsolvable by Marvin Minsky. These production systems have shown very useful in constructing small universal (Turing complete) systems for several different classes of computational systems, including Turing machines, and are thus important instruments for studying limits or boundaries of solvability and unsolvability. Although there are some results on tag systems and their limits of solvability and unsolvability, there are hardly any that consider both the shift number n, as well as the number of symbols {\textmu}. This paper aims to contribute to research on limits of solvability and unsolvability for tag systems, taking into account these two parameters. The main result is the reduction of the 3n + 1problem to a surprisingly small tag system. It indicates that the present unsolvability line defined in terms of {\textmu} and v for tag systems might be significantly decreased.
}, issn = {03043975}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/12954}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {heeffer2008text, title = {Text production, reproduction and appropriation within the abbaco tradition: a case study}, journal = {SCIAMVS}, volume = {9}, year = {2008}, pages = {101145}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Ducheyne2008d, title = {Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models}, journal = {Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {119127}, abstract = {Scientific models occupy centre stage in scientific practice. Correspondingly, in recent literature in the philosophy of science, scientific models have been a focus of research. However, little attention has been paid so far to the ontology of scientific models. In this essay, I attempt to clarify the issues involved in formulating an informatively rich ontology of scientific models. Although no fullblown theorycontaining all ontological issues involvedis provided, I make several distinctions and point to several characteristic properties exhibited by scientific models that are relevant for individuating scientific models.
}, keywords = {Abstraction, Idealisation, Ontology of scientific models}, issn = {14372053}, doi = {10.1007/s121330080026y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s121330080026y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {924886, title = {Unravelling the methodology of causal pluralism}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {73{\textendash}89}, abstract = {In this paper we try to bring some clarification in the recent debate on causal pluralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qua lify as a pluralistic theory of causation. We also show that there is currently no theory on the market which meets these criteria, and therefore no fullblown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and De Vreese, Leen} } @phdthesis {4333440, title = {Vage logica{\textquoteright}s, concepten en betekenistransformatoren.}, year = {2008}, month = {May 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, address = {Ghent}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan} } @conference {430672, title = {A weekend off: the first extensive numbertheoretical computation on the ENIAC}, booktitle = {Logic and Theory of Algorithms}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {The first extensive numbertheoretical computation run on the ENIAC, is reconstructed. The problem, computing the exponent of 2 modulo a prime, was set up on the ENIAC during a weekend in July 1946 by the numbertheorist D.H. Lehmer, with help from his wife Emma and John Mauchly. Important aspects of the ENIAC{\textquoteright}s design are presentedand the reconstruction of the implementation of the problem on the ENIAC is discussed in its salient points.
}, isbn = {9783540694052}, doi = {10.1007/9783540694076_19}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Bullynck, Maarten}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @article {924333, title = {What problem of universals}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, year = {2008}, pages = {7{\textendash}21}, abstract = {What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . More specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {445650, title = {Whewell{\textquoteright}s metaphorical usage of light and the ultimate reality underlying it}, journal = {Semiotica}, volume = {172}, number = {14}, year = {2008}, month = {November}, pages = {269{\textendash}278}, abstract = {In this article, I seek to study Whewell as writer of philosophical doctrines by focusing on his frequent usage of the metaphor of light, which symbolized (human) knowledge. It is my primary claim that Whewell choose to visually illustrate his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas, which are the bearers of ultimate reality and meaning in Whewell{\textquoteright}s epistemology, by means some key metaphors that made reference to light.
}, issn = {00371998}, doi = {10.1515/SEMI.2008.098}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {381663, title = {Abduction as a strategy for concept formation in mathematics: {C}ardano postulating a negative.}, booktitle = {Abduction and the process of scientific discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {179{\textendash}194}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da Universidade de Lisboa}, abstract = {When dealing with abductive reasoning in scientific discovery, historical case studies are focused mostly on the physical sciences, as with the discoveries of Kepler, Galilei and Newton. We will present a case study of abductive reasoning in early algebra. Two new concepts introduced by Cardano in his Ars Magna, imaginary numbers and a negative solution to a linear problem, can be explained as a result of a process of abduction. We will show that the first appearance of these new concepts fits very well Peirces original description of abductive reasoning. Abduction may be regarded as one important strategy for the formation of new concepts in mathematics.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @article {JDa:gda, title = {Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction through GoalDirected Proofs}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {22/3}, number = {60}, year = {2007}, pages = {295{\textendash}304}, abstract = {In this paper, we present a goaldirected proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Alisedas approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Alisedas algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goaldirected proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spinoff of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goaldirected procedure solves the problems we encountered in Alisedas algorithms.
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/12751}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {Ducheyne2007, title = {Abstraction vs. Idealization: A Conceptual Analysis.}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {910}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {380250, title = {An adaptive logic for relevant classical deduction}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {602{\textendash}612}, abstract = {In this paper, I will show that it is possible to delete Ex Falso Quodlibet from Classical Logic, without depriving it of any of its deductive powers. This is done by means of the ambiguity{\textendash}adaptive logic AALns, which is equivalent to dCR, the deductive version of Neil Tennant{\textquoteright}s CR.
}, issn = {15708683}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @incollection {J:ala, title = {Adaptive Logics for Abduction and the Explication of ExplanationSeeking Processes}, booktitle = {Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {97{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da U. de Lisboa}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {In this paper, I illustrate the main characteristics of abductive reasoning processes by means of an example from the history of the sciences. The example is taken from the history of chemistry and concerns a very small episode from Lavoisiers struggle with the air obtained from mercury oxide. Eventually, this struggle would lead to the discovery of oxygen. I also show that Lavoisiers reasoning process can be explicated by means of a particular formal logic, namely the adaptive logic LAr. An important property of LAr is that it not only nicely integrates deductive and abductive steps, but that it moreover has a decent proof theory. This proof theory is dynamic, but warrants that the conclusions derived at a given stage are justified in view of the insight in the premises at that stage. Another advantage of the presented logic is that, as compared to other existing systems for abductive reasoning, it is very close to natural reasoning.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @article {381569, title = {Algunas notas metodol{\'o}gicas sobre los experimentos de {J}.{B}. {V}an {H}elmont}, journal = {Azogue, Revista electr{\'o}nica dedicada al hist{\'o}rico cr{\'\i}tico de la alquimia}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {100{\textendash}107}, issn = {15758184}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {812549, title = {The ambiguity of unification in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {2e Congr{\`e}s de la Soci{\'e}t{\'e} de Philosophie des Sciences}, year = {2007}, abstract = {In the social sciences, the dream of unity often recurs. One of these contemporary unifying projects is economics imperialism. Its goal is to increase the degree of unification by applying rational choice theory beyond its original (economic) home in other territories like political science, sociology, anthropology, history, etc. In this paper, I want to evaluate the benefits and feasibility of this project from the perspective of explanatory pluralism and demonstrate the ambiguity of unification and unity. Revisiting debates concerning rational choice theory in feminist economics and historical sociology, I will delimit the benefits and shortcomings of economics imperialism and the idea of unification, making use of a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism {\textendash} based on the erotetic model of explanation {\textendash} elaborated in my earlier work (cf. Weber and Van Bouwel, 2002). A thorough analysis of these debates will result in a nuanced view on unification and unity, with on the one hand, a plea for taking the plurality of epistemic and nonepistemic interests in social scientific theories and explanation into account {\textendash} with the evident implications this has for the unity of science project {\textendash} but, on the other hand, an attempt to carve out a welldefined place for unification and the benefits it might bring to social science theory and explanation. This last exercise might take away the worries sometimes uttered by social scientists concerning the unificationist endeavour of economics imperialism.
}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {Weber2007, title = {Assessing the explanatory power of causal explanations.}, booktitle = {Rethinking Explanation}, year = {2007}, pages = {109{\textendash}118}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, isbn = {9781402055805}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Persson, J. and Ylikoski, Petri} } @conference {376586, title = {Belief Merging based on Adaptive Interaction}, booktitle = {A Meeting of the Minds, proceedings of the workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction}, year = {2007}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, isbn = {9781904987482}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Shier, Ju and Veltman, Frank} } @conference {376590, title = {On building abstract Terms in Typed Systems}, booktitle = {Logica 2006 Yearbook}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Filosofia Publisher}, organization = {Filosofia Publisher}, abstract = {This paper offers some historical and conceptual remarks on the philosophical and logical procedures of abstraction, based on an account of the notions of concept and function. In order to provide a complete analyis, one should start by considering Platos theory of Ideas, which provides the first interpretation of abstract terms in the history of philosophy. The nature of the most general Forms, the related problem of the knowledge thereof, their connection to existing (concrete) objects, are the essential features of the Platonic theory of knowledge and of his metaphysics. The Platonic approach is grounded on the principle of conceptual priority of Ideas over their partecipations, the Forms existing separeted from all the particulars: the former are interpreted as standard particulars to which other particulars conform. Nonetheless, my investigation will start rather by Aristotle, who held first the relation of predication to be the basis for defining abstraction: from this I will try to consider some important ideas for the notion of abstraction in Type Systems.
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Tomala, O and Honzik, R} } @article {vancausality, title = {Causality and conservation. Elements of the new metaphysics behind the mathematization of nature in the seventeenth century}, year = {2007}, institution = {VUB}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {386240, title = {The Concept of Causation in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Mechanical and Optical Work}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {16}, year = {2007}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newtons Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Halls second kind of atypical cau sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe nomena under study as cases of Halls typical causation. The underly ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani cist one.
}, issn = {14253305}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {371044, title = {Conceptual tools for causal analysis in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {Causality and probability in the sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {197{\textendash}213}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {1904987354}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @incollection {M:ConEmp, title = {Constructive Empiricism and the Argument from Underdetermination.}, booktitle = {Images of empiricism: Essays on science and stances, with a reply from {B}as van {F}raassen}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {It is argued that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Bas van Fraassen nowhere uses the argument from underdetermination in his argument for constructive empiricism. It is explained that van Fraassens use of the notion of empirical equivalence in The Scientific Image has been widely misunderstood. A reconstruction of the main arguments for constructive empiricism is offered, showing how the passages that have been taken to be part of an appeal to the argument from underdetermination should actually be interpreted.
}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Monton, Bradley} } @incollection {D:cg_fpsp, title = {Content Guidance in Formal Problem Solving Processes}, booktitle = {Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {121{\textendash}156}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da U. de Lisboa}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {In this paper, a formal framework to problemsolving processes is presented. The framework is not complete. Nevertheless, even its present sophistication allows one to see that it is promising.\par The framework demonstrably allows one to understand scientific change as contentguided. It will be argued that a formal framework is required in order to make definite and precise statements about the contentguided aspects of scientific problem solving.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @article {bb0d38ccf15f4c4eaa8ad14bcf81bd26, title = {Een maat en veel gewichten. Repliek op de proefvlucht van Buekens}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {99}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {211{\textendash}221}, issn = {00025275}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Van de Vijver, Gertrudis} } @article {vanderbeeken2007endorsing, title = {Endorsing a pluralism between continental and analytic philosophy}, journal = {The Global Spiral}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {45{\textendash}58}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {370073, title = {Father {H}enri {B}osmans (S.J.) A {B}elgian pioneer in the history of mathematics}, journal = {History and Pedagogy of Mathematics Newsletter}, volume = {65}, year = {2007}, pages = {12{\textendash}15}, issn = {N/A}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {373206, title = {Galton{\textquoteright}s blinding glasses: modern statistics hiding causal structure in early theories of inheritance.}, booktitle = {Causality and probability in the sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {243{\textendash}262}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {1904987354}, author = {Leuridan, Bert}, editor = {Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @article {ducheyne2007huygens, title = {Huygens{\textquoteright}s understanding of trajectory: Via media between {G}alileo and {N}ewton}, journal = {Historia scientiarum, International Journal of the History of Science Society of Japan}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {1{\textendash}19}, abstract = {In this essay, I shall argue that Huygens can be truly seen as the via media between Galileo and Newton as far as conceptualizing orbital motion is concerned. Contrary to Galileo (who endorsed a concept of circular inertia when dealing with orbital motion), Huygens subscribed to our modern idea of rectilinear motion. Huygens was unable to integrate adequately in his worldview of vortical mechanics. However, he was aware of the utter importance of studying nascent motions (as Joella G. Yoder has pointed out before) It will be shown that an adequate account of orbital motion required three necessary ingredients: (1) an adequate conceptual framework (rectilinear inertia), (2) a fruitful metaphysical outlook (the existence of voids) and an appropriate mathematical machinery (with a focus on nascent motion). All three components were successfully put to practice by Newton.
}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2007a, title = {"Ignorance is Bliss": On {B}ernard {N}ieuwentijt{\textquoteright}s {D}octrina {I}gnorantia and His Contribution to Our Understanding of Scientific Idealisation}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, pages = {699710}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {WaartvanGulik2007, title = {On the Implementation of Concept Structures in Fuzzy Logic.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007}, year = {2007}, abstract = {A procedure is presented which can modify a large number of fuzzy logics in such a way that the result integrates a logically meaningful representation of the family resemblance structure of fuzzy concepts. The most important aspect of this modification is the implementation of socalled concept matrices. The interpretation and construction of these new formal objects is based upon Fintan Costellos Diagnostic Evidence Model (2000), a contemporary cognitive scientific model of concept structure and concept combination. As a result, it becomes possible to formalize, explain and simulate new logical aspects of cognitive fuzziness such as meaning transformations by means of nonscalar hedges, and interpretational and inferential operations over nonintersective concept combinations.
}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Vosniadou, S. and Kayser, D. and Athanassios, P.} } @article {362595, title = {Johannes {B}aptista {V}an {H}elmonts experimentele aanpak: een poging tot omschrijving}, journal = {Gewina, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Techniek}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}25}, issn = {0928303X}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {370857, title = {Learning concepts through the history of mathematics: the case of symbolic algebra.}, booktitle = {Philosophical dimensions in mathematics education}, year = {2007}, pages = {83{\textendash}103}, publisher = {Springer}, isbn = {9780387715711}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {381861, title = {Mathematics Education Through Lesson Study in the {A}sia{P}acific Region}, journal = {History and Pedagogy of Mathematics Newsletter}, volume = {66}, year = {2007}, pages = {4{\textendash}6}, issn = {N/A}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Primiero2007, title = {A modal language for contextual computations}, year = {2007}, month = {June}, abstract = {In this paper, we present a modal language for contextual computing, corresponding to the fragment of constructive ΚΤ with necessity and pos sibility operators. We interpret absolute and contextual computations as difierent modes of verifying the truth of propositions. The semantics of the language L cc interprets absolute computations by a direct verification function valid in every state; contextual computations are interpreted in terms of a verification function valid under unverified information. Modal ities are used to express extensions of contexts in order to dene local and global validity. This semantics has a (weak) monotonicity property, de pending on satisfaction of processes in contexts. In the corresponding axiomatic system cΚΤ_{⋄} a restricted version of the deduction theorem for globally valid formulas holds, soundness and completeness are proven and decidability is shown to hold for the necessitation fragment of the language by a restricted finite model property..
}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {531096, title = {Naar een Pluralistisch Model van Onderzoeksfinanciering in de Humane Wetenschappen}, booktitle = {Welke Universiteit Willen We (Niet)?}, year = {2007}, pages = {205{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {Het nieuwe Financieringsmodel voor het Hoger Onderwijs wordt vaak bekritiseerd vanuit argumentendie teruggaan op de eigenheid van de humane wetenschappen. Dit artikel poogt deze eigenheid preciezer teomschrijven en brengt de gevolgen voor de relatie tussen onderzoek en het tijdschriftenlandschap in kaart. Opbasis daarvan wordt de doelmatigheid betwist van het huidige voorstel, dat de effici{\"e}ntie van onderzoek wilverhogen door publicaties te wegen op basis van de tijdschriften waarin ze worden gepubliceerd. Dit betekentgeenszins dat een effici{\"e}ntere humane wetenschap onmogelijk is, alleen moet dat gebeuren op een manierwaarop haar pluralistische natuur niet wordt miskend. Hoe een dergelijk beleid er kan uitzien wordt daaromuitgewerkt in een aanzet naar een pluralististisch model van onderzoeksfinanciering in de humanewetenschappen.
}, isbn = {9789038211879}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/onderzoeksfinanciering.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Loobuyck, Patrick and Vanheeswijck, G. and Van Herck, W.} } @booklet {heeffer2007near, title = {Nearoptimal strategies for the game of Logik}, year = {2007}, abstract = {Logik is an interesting variation of the game of Mastermind. For the latter several strategies have been proposed. We present some computational results for existing and new strategies applied to Logik. Our results give some indication on the scalability and applicability of these strategies to similar games.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Heeffer, Harold} } @article {ducheyne2007noodzakelijkheid, title = {Noodzakelijkheid bij {W}illiam {W}hewell: De ontwikkeling Van een concept}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2007}, pages = {239{\textendash}265}, abstract = {The immense oeuvre of William Whewell (17941886), a Victorian monument by itself, has to some extent been treated in a stepmotherly fashion by philosophers and historiansof philosophy. This paper attempts to conceptually clarify Whewell{\textquoteright}s notion of necessity, which was a core notion in his philosophical project. The author also sketches in broad lines the historical development of this notion in Whewell{\textquoteright}s thinking and points tothe intertwinement between Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy and theology. Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophical work was deeply based on the history of science and his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas can be interpreted as an attempt to historicize Kant{\textquoteright}s transcendental categories.
}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {1895032, title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory}, booktitle = {6th PanEuropean conference on international relations, Proceedings}, year = {2007}, publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, abstract = {One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problemfocused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) coveringlaw model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.
}, url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20LangheSGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Hans, title = {Relevance in Reasoning: The Adaptive Logics Approach}, year = {2007}, month = {May 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {368285, title = {The relevance of a relevantly assertable disjunction for material implication}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {36}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {339{\textendash}366}, abstract = {In this paper Grice{\textquoteright}s requirements for assertability are imposed on the disjunction of Classical Logic. Defining material implication in terms of negation and disjunction supplemented by assertability conditions, results in the disappearance of the most important paradoxes of material implication. The resulting consequence relation displays a very strong resemblance to Schurz{\textquoteright}s conclusionrelevant consequence relation
}, issn = {00223611}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {386236, title = {Social mechanisms, causal inference, and the policy relevance of social science}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {348{\textendash}359}, abstract = {The paper has two aims. First, to show that we need social mechanisms to establish the policy relevance of causal claims, even if it is possible to build a good argument for those claims without knowledge of mechanisms. Second, to show that although social scientists can, in principle, do without social mechanisms when they argue for causal claims, in reality scientific practice contexts where they do not need mechanisms are very rare.
}, issn = {00483931}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {Christiaens2007, title = {Some notes on {A}erts{\textquoteright} interpretation of the {E}{P}{R}paradox and the violation of {B}ellinequalities}, booktitle = {Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality, Probability and Axiomatics}, year = {2007}, pages = {250{\textendash}286}, publisher = {World Scientific}, author = {Christiaens, Wim and Czachor, Marek}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Durt, Thomas} } @conference {384497, title = {Study of limits of solvability in tag systems}, booktitle = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {In this paper we will give an outline of the proof of the solvability of the halting and reachability problem for 2symbolic tag systems with a deletion number v = 2. This result will be situated in a more general context of research on limits of solvability in tag systems.
}, isbn = {9783540745921}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Durand Lose, J and Margenstern, M} } @article {427293, title = {Supervenience: Its logic and its inferential role in classical genetics}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {50}, number = {198}, year = {2007}, pages = {147{\textendash}171}, abstract = {Supervenience is mostly conceived of as a purely philosophical concept. Nevertheless, I will argue, it played an important and very fruitful inferential role in classical genetics. Gregor Mendel assumed that phenotypic traits supervene on underlying factors, and this assumption allowed him to successfully predict and explain the phenotypical regularities he had experimentally discovered. Therefore it is interesting to explicate how we reason about supervenience relations. I will tackle the following two questions. Firstly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found for inferring supervenience claims from data? Secondly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found to empirically test supervenience claims? I will answer these questions within the framework of the adaptive logics programme.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {382923, title = {The tacit appropriation of {H}indu algebra in renaissance practical arithmetic}, journal = {Ganita Bharati}, volume = {29}, number = {12}, year = {2007}, pages = {1{\textendash}60}, issn = {09700307}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {531119, title = {Is there no alternative?}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, pages = {101{\textendash}111}, issn = {13730975}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/alternative.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @conference {Urbaniak2007, title = {Time Travel and Conditional Logics}, booktitle = {Logica 2007 Yearbook}, year = {2007}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @phdthesis {PhD_Liesbeth, title = {Tracing Unsolvability. A Mathematical, Historical and Philosophical Analysis with a Special Focus on Tag Systems}, year = {2007}, month = {May 23}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {D:universal, title = {A Universal Logic Approach to Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logica Universalis}, volume = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {221242}, abstract = {In this paper, adaptive logics are studied from the viewpoint of universal logic (in the sense of the study of common structures of logics). The common structure of a large set of adaptive logics is described. It is shown that this structure determines the proof theory as well as the semantics of the adaptive logics, and moreover that most properties of the logics can be proved by relying solely on the structure, viz. without invoking any specific properties of the logics themselves.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @book {371040, title = {Wetenschapsfilosofie.}, year = {2007}, pages = {238 p.}, publisher = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, organization = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, isbn = {9789023243120}, author = {Horsten, Leon and Douven, Igor and Weber, Erik} } @article {DJDa:signed, title = {An Adaptive Characterization of Signed Systems for Paraconsistent Reasoning}, year = {2006}, abstract = {In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from \cite{B\&S:sspr} in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {J:AJ, title = {An Adaptive Logic Based on {J}a{\'s}kowski{\textquoteright}s Approach to Paraconsistency}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {35}, year = {2006}, pages = {539{\textendash}567}, abstract = {In this paper, I present the modal adaptive logic AJ ^{r} (based on S5) as well as the discussive logic D^{r}2 that is defined from it. D^{r}_{2} is a (nonmonotonic) alternative for Jaskowskis paraconsistent system D 2 . Like D 2 , D^{r}_{2} validates all singlepremise rules of Classical Logic. However, for formulas that behave consistently, D_{2} moreover validates all multiplepremise rules of Classical Logic. Importantly, and unlike in the case of D_{2} , this does not require the introduction of discussive connectives. It is argued that this has clear advantages with respect to one of the main application contexts of discussive logics, namely the interpretation of discussions.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @phdthesis {PhD_Maarten, title = {An Archaeology of Galileo{\textquoteright}s Science}, year = {2006}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {358125, title = {Are there ontological explanations?}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {277{\textendash}283}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {There is a huge philosophical literature on scientific explanation, and no one seriously denies that the sciences explain in one way or another. But what about ontology? I will argue that ontological laws and ontological theories can explain. And I will point at the differences between ontological explanations and their scientific counterparts.
}, isbn = {9042021306}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {Ducheyne2006, title = {The Argument(s) for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {11}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {419447}, abstract = {In this paper an analysis of Newtons argument for universal gravitation is provided. In the past, the complexity of the argument has not been fully appreciated. Recent authors like George E. Smith and William L. Harper have done a far better job. Nevertheless, a thorough account of the argument is still lacking. Both authors seem to stress the importance of only one methodological component. Smith stresses the procedure of approximative deductions backedup by the laws of motion. Harper stresses systematic dependencies between theoretical parameters and phenomena. I will argue that Newton used a variety of different inferential strategies: causal parsimony considerations, deductions, demonstrative inductions, abductions and thoughtexperiments. Each of these strategies is part of Newtons famous argument.
}, keywords = {argumentative pluralism, Newton, Principia, Universal gravitation}, issn = {12331821}, doi = {10.1007/s1069900531899}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1069900531899}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {352773, title = {Ascribing contemporary scientific concepts to past thinkers: towards a framework for handling matters more precisely}, journal = {Scientia Poetica}, volume = {10}, year = {2006}, pages = {274{\textendash}290}, issn = {14315041}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Christiaens2006a, title = {Basic Ontology and the Ontology of the Phenomenological Life World: A Proposal}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {11}, number = {3}, year = {2006}, pages = {249274}, abstract = {The condition of explicit theoretically discursive cognitive performance, as it culminates in scientific activity, is, I claim, the life world. I contrast life world and scientific world and argue that the latter arises from the first and that contrary to the prevailing views the scientific world (actually, worlds, since the classical world is substantially different from the quantum world) finds its completion in the life world and not the other way around. In other words: the closure we used to search in a complete and comprehensive scientific description of all aspects of experience by referring it back to underlying atoms, genes and other scientific objects and the covering laws ruling them, should be sought in a reintegrating and occasionally dissolving of the abstract scientific model in the selforganizational fluidity and superpositionlike indeterminateness and nonlocality of the life world: We have to acknowledge the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon (MerleauPonty in his The Phenomenology of Perception).
}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, process ontology}, issn = {12331821}, doi = {10.1007/s106990045909y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s106990045909y}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @conference {376594, title = {Belief Revision in Constructive Type Theory}, booktitle = {Logica 2005 Yearbook}, year = {2006}, publisher = {Filosofia Publisher}, organization = {Filosofia Publisher}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Bilkova, M and Tomala, O} } @incollection {397692, title = {Can intentional and functional explanations of actions coexist?}, booktitle = {Philosophical Antropology}, year = {2006}, pages = {135{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Philosophical Society of Turkey}, abstract = {Do functional explanations eclipse the intentionality of human actions? Put differently, do intentional and functional explanations of actions conflict with each other? In this paper, I want to argue that both sorts of explanation, if conceived in a proper way, are compatible instruments. First, I will make a distinction between three kinds of explanatory pluralism of actions: a pluralism of theories of actions, a pluralism of sorts of explanations of actions, and a pluralism of methods for the explanation of actions. Intentional and functional explanations are sorts, not theories or methods, of explanation. Next, I will briefly distinguish intentional and functional explanations: intentional explanations refer to the beliefs and desires of an agent, and functional explanations refer to the function of a motive of an action (etiological functions), or to the function of a result of an action (system functions). Finally, I discuss possible conflicts between both sorts of explanation. In cases where real conflicts between functional and intentional explanations do arise, this is due to the lack of sufficient information or the misinterpretation of information of one or both explanations. Hence, such conflicts are not conflicts between sorts of explanations
}, isbn = {9757748404}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Voss, Stephen} } @article {732209, title = {Causal pluralism and scientific knowledge: an underexposed problem}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {77}, year = {2006}, pages = {125{\textendash}150}, abstract = {Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology is heavily underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemologicalmethodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its own and to demonstrate how epistemological methodological causal pluralism differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend epistemological methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within singular domains.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {340414, title = {Closing the circle: An analysis of {E}mil {P}ost{\textquoteright}s early work}, journal = {Bulletin of symbolic logic}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {267{\textendash}289}, abstract = {In 1931 Kurt G{\"o}del published his incompleteness results, and some years later Church and Turing showed that the decision problem for certain systems of symbolic logic has a negative solution. However, already in 1921 the young logician Emil Post worked on similar problems which resulted in what he called an anticipation of these results. For several reasons though he did not submit these results to a journal until 1941. This failure to be the first, did not discourage him: his contributions to mathematical logic and its foundations should not be underestimated. It is the purpose of this article to show that an interest in the early work of Emil Post should be motivated not only by this historical fact, but also by the fact that Posts approach and method differs substantially from those offered by G{\"o}del, Turing and Church. In this paper it will be shown how this method evolved in his early work and how it finally led him to his results.
}, issn = {10798986}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {365927, title = {De idee van emergentie in de sociologie: perspectieven en problemen}, journal = {Tijdschrijft voor sociologie}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {337{\textendash}350}, issn = {0777883X}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {D:vddiag, title = {A Diagrammatic Proof Search Procedure as Part of a Formal Approach to Problem Solving}, booktitle = {Model Based Reasoning in Science and Engineering. {C}ognitive Science, Epistemology, Logic}, year = {2006}, pages = {265{\textendash}284}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, abstract = {This paper aims at describing a goaldirected and diagrammatic method for proof search. The method (and one of the logics obtained by it) is particularly interesting in the context of formal problem solving. A typical property is that it consists of attempts to justify socalled bottom boxes by means of premise elements (diagrammatic elements obtained from premises) and logical elements. Premises are not preprocessed, whence most premises lead to a variety of premise elements.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo} } @incollection {J:Jerzy, title = {Discussive Adaptive Logics: {H}andling Internal and External Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, series = {Pozna{\'n} Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {211223}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {334986, title = {The division of labour in the social sciences versus the politics of metaphysics. {Q}uestioning Critical Realism{\textquoteright}s interdisciplinarity}, journal = {Graduate Journal of Social Science}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {32{\textendash}39}, abstract = {Some scholars claim that Critical Realism promises well for the unification of the social sciences, e.g., Unifying social science: A critical realist approach in this volume. I will first show briefly how Critical Realism might unify social science. Secondly, I focus on the relation between the ontology and methodology of Critical Realism, and unveil the politics of metaphysics. Subsequently, it is argued that the division of labour between social scientific disciplines should not be metaphysicsdriven, but rather questiondriven. In conclusion, I will therefore defend a questiondriven pluralism as a guide for interdisciplinarity.
}, issn = {15723763}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {DeMol2006, title = {Facing the Computer. Some techniques to understand technique.}, booktitle = {Computers and Philosophy, an International Conference}, year = {2006}, month = {May}, publisher = {EOARD}, organization = {EOARD}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Schmidt, C. T. A.} } @article {JD:cogsci, title = {A Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {221{\textendash}236}, abstract = {This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.
}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/5210}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Batens, Diderik} } @article {345101, title = {Galileo{\textquoteright}s interventionist notion of "cause"}, journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas}, volume = {67}, number = {3}, year = {2006}, pages = {443{\textendash}464}, abstract = {In this essay, I shall argue that Galileo introduced a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality was an interventionist notion, according to which causal relations can be discovered by actively exploring and manipulating natural processes. The presence of this conception can be seen from Galileo{\textquoteright}s explanation of floating bodies and his theory of the tides. I shall point to the similarity between Galileo{\textquoteright}s notion of "cause" and recent interventionist accounts of causation in the philosophy of science (especially James Woodward{\textquoteright}s).
}, issn = {00225037}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {415528, title = {Gravitating towards stability: {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s AristotelianArchimedean synthesis}, journal = {History of science}, volume = {44}, number = {146}, year = {2006}, pages = {373{\textendash}407}, issn = {00732753}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10929}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {VanBouwel2006, title = {The idea of social mechanisms in social scientific explanations.}, booktitle = {Progress in Social Psychology Research}, series = {Advances in social psychology research}, year = {2006}, pages = {83{\textendash}95}, publisher = {Nova Science}, isbn = {1594546584}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Arlsdale, John Z.} } @article {683834, title = {Imagination{\textquoteright}s Grip on Science}, journal = {Metaphilosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {222{\textendash}239}, abstract = {In part because {\textacutedbl}imagination{\textacutedbl} is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.
}, issn = {00261068}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {683842, title = {Kuhn{\textquoteright}s paradox of thought experiments resolved}, journal = {The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {111{\textendash}125}, issn = {19443676}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {Christiaens2006, title = {Lichamelijkheid en cinema volgens een {A}posteliaanse ontologie}, journal = {Esthetica. Tijdschrift voor kunst en filosofie}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {1{\textendash}8}, abstract = {In 1998 verschenen twee opmerkelijke films, Saving Private Ryan van Steven Spielberg en The Thin Red Line van Terrence Malick. De overeenkomsten tussen deze producties zijn oppervlakkig: ze gaan beide over de Tweede Wereldoorlog en het zijn allebei grote Hollywoodproducties. De verschillen daarentegen zijn diepgaand en nodigen uit tot nadenken over de aard van film. Ik zal eerst enkele verschillen en contrasten tussen genoemde films schetsen, bij wijze van inleiding tot de themas ontologie, cinema en lichamelijkheid. Daarna komen in (2) de volgende onderwerpen aan de orde: (2.1) film is het tot stand komen van een lichamelijkheid binnen onze eigen lichamelijkheid; en voorts (2.2) lichamelijkheid is een ontologisch proces. De ontologie waarbinnen ik werk is gebaseerd op de inzichten van Leo Apostel. In dit deel zal ik daarom ook de centrale aspecten van de Aposteliaanse ontologie beschrijven. Ik zal verder (3.) een verband leggen tussen de cinema van Malick en de Aposteliaanse ontologie. Op basis van deze ontologie maak ik in (4.) een onderscheid tussen films zoals Saving Private Ryan, waarin het ontologische (de lichamelijkheid) impliciet gehouden wordt, en films zoals The Thin Red Line die dat niet doen.
}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {heeffer2006logic, title = {The logic of disguise: {D}escartes{\textquoteright} discovery of the Sine Law}, journal = {Historia scientiarum. International Journal of the History of Science Society of Japan}, volume = {16}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {144{\textendash}165}, abstract = {The discovery of the sine law of refraction by Decartes has been a source of controversy since its first publication in 1637. Scholars describe Descartes demonstration of the law as inadequate and implausible or see in his proof an attempt to cover up plagiarism. Most of this critique stems from a lack of understanding the Cartesian theory of explanation. Descartes aims in the Discourse to find undoubtable knowledge that serves as a basis for his natural philosophy. In his Principles of Philosophy he deduces from his metaphysics several laws of nature and additional rules. However, for the explanation on physical phenomena, Descartes adopts a method different from the one proposed in his Discourse. This paper discusses the logical structure of the demonstration and provides an analysis of the premises and conclusions used in the derivation of the sine law. It is argued that Descartess explanation of refraction is a continuation of the perspectivists tradition and, ironically, Fermats account of 1662 is better application of the Cartesian method.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {D:induct1a, title = {On a Logic of Induction}, journal = {Logic and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {IV}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, note = {(Corrected version of \cite{D:induct1}.)}, pages = {3{\textendash}32}, abstract = {In this paper, I present a simple and straightforward logic of induction: a consequence relation characterized by a proof theory and a semantics. This system will be called LI. The premises will be restricted to, on the one hand, a set of empirical data and, on the other hand, a set of background generalizations. Among the consequences will be generalizations as well as singular statements, some of which may serve as predictions and explanations.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {demathematics, title = {Mathematics and Pictures. Some popular examples}, year = {2006}, abstract = {Mathematics is a science that is traditionally known as a highly abstract discipline. Due to its apparent possibility of deducing abstract formulas without the necessity of backlinking to the outside reality, pure mathematics status is often experienced as being isolated from and superior to the dubious reality and our evenly ambiguous perception of it. Despite this attitude, several examples can be given of the usefulness of this backlinking. Moreover, since the commercialisation of the computer, new possibilities for mathematical research became available. These possibilities though can only be reached through experimenting. One of the aspects of this experimental approach to mathematics is the use of computer generated images. On the one hand they are used as testing instruments, on the other hand they are necessary tools for certain mathematical theories to be possible  as the outside reality is the object of observation of a physicist, computer generated images are the reality to be observed and perceived by the mathematician.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @conference {353364, title = {The Methodological Relevance of the History of Mathematics for Mathematics Education}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Conference on 21st Century Information Technology in Mathematics Education}, year = {2006}, abstract = {Mathematics education benefits from an integration of the history of mathematics within the mathematics curriculum. We provide three basic arguments for such integration. The first is epistemological and addresses a contextual view on mathematical knowledge. The second concerns the phylogenic aspects of the development of mathematics. Conceptual difficulties with teaching children mathematics often correspond with historical periods of conceptual crisis in mathematics. A third, historical argument, draws on the vast repository of experience in mathematics education. We provide examples for each of these arguments from the history of algebra.
}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Dhompongsa, G and Bhatti , F and Kitson , Q} } @incollection {D:nds, title = {Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology.}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {185{\textendash}209}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {Inconsistencyadaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {326144, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s ontotheology versus {D}escartes{\textquoteright}s and {L}eibniz{\textquoteright}s: or on the relevance of unificatory tendencies in the secularizationprocess}, journal = {Theology and Science}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {71{\textendash}85}, issn = {14746700}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {urbaniak2006ontological, title = {On Ontological Functors of {L}esniewski{\textquoteright}s Elementary Ontology}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {40}, year = {2006}, pages = {15{\textendash}43}, abstract = {We present an algorithm which allows to define any possible sentenceformative functor of Le\&\#347;niewski{\textquoteright}s Elemen tary Ontology (LEO), arguments of which belong to the category of names. Other results are: a recursive method of listing possible functors, a method of indicating the number of possible nplace ontological functors, and a sketch of a proof that LEO is function ally complete with respect to {\&\#8743;,\&\#172;, \&\#8704;, \&\#949;}
}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {345102, title = {Optical versus Mechanical Models: Newton{\textquoteright}s "Failure" to Construct an Optical Theory}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {49}, number = {194}, year = {2006}, pages = {199{\textendash}223}, abstract = {In this essay, I take up both Shapiros and Hakfoorts suggestion that Newton tried to apply the same method he used in the Principia (first edition: 1687) to The Opticks (first edition: 1704). Why did Newtons method, which was apparently so successful in the realm of mechanics, fail when applied to optics? I shall argue that both empirical as well as methodological aspects are needed to explain Newtons failure. Newtons repugnance to introduce hypotheses in published texts forced him to explore, in the demonstrative part of science, a conceptually poor framework. Such framework has limited inferential power, i.e. the set of consequences which can be deduced from it is limited. This will be contrasted with the Principia where a richer conceptual framework was at hand and its deduced effects could by confirmed by experiment. The conceptual framework in the Principia allowed Newton to a priori deduce the celestial motions. As I have argued elsewhere, a priori deducing the phenomena under investigation was one of Newtons most central methodological ideals. In this essay, I shall attempt to explain why a priori deduction of phenomena was impossible in optics.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {361180, title = {The origin of the problems in {E}uler{\textquoteright}s {A}lgebra}, journal = {Bulletin of the Belgian Mathematical Society  Simon Stevin}, volume = {13}, number = {5}, year = {2006}, pages = {949{\textendash}952}, issn = {13701444}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @phdthesis {PhD_Leen, title = {Pluralisme versus Monisme in het Filosofische Debat over Causaliteit. Naar een Zinvolle Pluralistische Benadering van Causaliteit als Theoretisch Kader voor de Explicatie van Causaal Redeneren.}, year = {2006}, month = {October 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @booklet {de2006post, title = {Post{\textquoteright}s machine}, year = {2006}, abstract = {In 1936 Turing gave his answer to the question What is a computable number? by constructing his now wellknown Turing machines as formalisations of the actions of a human computor. Less wellknown is the almost synchronously published result by Emil Leon Post, in which a quasiidentical mechanism was developed for similar purposes. In 1979 these Post toy machines were described in a little booklet, called Posts machine by the Russian mathematician Uspensky. The purpose of this text was to advance abstract concepts as algorithm and programming for school children. In discussing this booklet in relation to the historical text it is based on, the author wants to show how this kind of ideas cannot only help to teach school children some of the basics of computer science, but furthermore contribute to a training in formal thinking.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {353368, title = {R{\'e}cr{\'e}ations math{\'e}matiques (1624): a study on its authorship, sources and influence}, journal = {Gibeci{\`e}re}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {77{\textendash}167}, abstract = {In 1624 a small octavo was published in the French university town Pont{\`a}Mousson. It was the first time a reference was made to recreational mathematics in the title of a book. This work is pivotal in the history of science and mathematics. It brings together two sixteenthcentury traditions, mercantile arithmetic and natural magic, and creates two new ones: recreational mathematics and popular science. The booklet did not abound in new ideas. Several of the recreational problems treated, can be traced back to Babylonian, Greek and Hindu sources and the infatuation with mechanical contrivances dates from Hero of Alexandria. But the fact that the book stands on the crossroad of traditions, its popularity with the natural philosophers of the seventeenth century and its complex history makes it a grateful subject for study. Some of the complexities about the numerous editions and confusing claims about its authorship will be clarified. The authors direct sources will be exposed. The arithmetical and combinatorial problems were copied from Bachet, problems on practical geometry from Jean Errard. Salomon de Caus was the source of inspiration for problems on perspective, mechanical devices and fountains. Several problems were recipies by Alexis of Piemont from the classic book by Ruscelli. The book was influencial on early seventeenthcentury natural philosophers such as Descartes, Mersenne and Leibniz.
}, issn = {15588149}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {337658, title = {Reid{\textquoteright}s adaptation and radicalization of Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy.}, journal = {History of European Ideas}, volume = {32}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {173{\textendash}189}, abstract = {For Thomas Reid, Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s scientific methodology in natural philosophy was a source of inspiration for philosophical methodology in general. I shall look at how Reid adapted Newton{\textquoteright}s views on methodology in natural philosophy. We shall see that Reid radicalized Newton{\textquoteright}s methodology (especially his view on causal explanation) and, thereby, begins to pave the way for the positivist movement, of which the origin is traditionally associated with the Frenchman Auguste Comte. In the Reidian adaptation of Newtonianism, we can already notice the beginnings of the anticausal trend that would become so popular in the age of positivism.
}, issn = {01916599}, doi = {10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2006.02.001}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Urbaniak2006, title = {On representing 2We propose an intuitive understanding of the statement: an axiom (or: an axiomatic basis) determines the meaning of the only specific constant occurring in it. We introduce some basic semantics for functors of the category ^{s}{\textfractionsolidus}_{n,n} of Le{\textasciiacute}sniewskis Ontology. Using these results weprove that the popular claim that the axioms of Ontology determine themeaning of the primitive constants is false.
}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {detheory, title = {Theory and Experiment in the work of {A}lonzo {C}hurch and {E}mil {P}ost}, journal = {unpublished}, year = {2006}, abstract = {While most mathematicians would probably agree that experimentation together with an empirical attitude both understood in their most general sense can be important methods of mathematical discovery, this is often obscured in the final presentation of the results for the sake of mathematical elegance. In this paper it will be shown how this method has played a significant role in the work of two major contributors to the rather abstract discipline called mathematical logic, namely Alonzo Church and Emil Post.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @phdthesis {PhD_Albrecht, title = {Van Precepten tot Vergelijkingen. De Conceptuele Ontwikkeling van Symbolische Algebra in de Zestiende Eeuw}, year = {2006}, month = {February 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @phdthesis {PhD_Steffen, title = {Virtuosi at Work: HistoricalPhilosophical Essays on Causality and Methodology in the Natural Philosophy of Galileo, Huyghens and Newton}, year = {2006}, month = {March 1}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {vanackere2006world, title = {A World of Experiences, an Adequate Language, and SelfReference Revised}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, volume = {91}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {243{\textendash}256}, publisher = {Rodopi}, abstract = {The paper presents a new, intuitive formal language, L E , that fits in with a world view in which experiences are central entities. It is shown how classical logic and an "objective making" adaptive logic can be applied to formulas of L E . The latter logic sheds an interesting light on the creation of theories about "the objective world". The paper also contains a small comment on sentences that are not translatable in L E . In the last section, I revise selfreferring sentences by means of their translations in L E.
}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @phdthesis {PhD_Lieven, title = {Adaptieve Inductielogica{\textquoteright}s. Theory en Praktijk van het Inductief Redeneren}, year = {2005}, month = {November 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Haesaert, Lieven} } @conference {322369, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Compassionate Relevantism}, booktitle = {Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications}, year = {2005}, publisher = {CENTRIA}, organization = {CENTRIA}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pereira, Luis Moniz and Wheeler, Gregory} } @incollection {C:bioApo, title = {Biografie van Leo Apostel}, booktitle = {Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek}, year = {2005}, pages = {2334}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {ELe:scurvy, title = {The Causes and Cures of Scurvy. {H}ow Modern was {J}ames {L}ind{\textquoteright}s Methodology?}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {55{\textendash}67}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {Ducheyne2005, title = {The Challenges for EarlyModern Philosophy: Editorial Introduction.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {510}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {334981, title = {Coping with inconsistencies: {E}xamples from the social sciences}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {89{\textendash}101}, abstract = {In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his pathbreaking theory.
}, issn = {14253305}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Liza, title = {De Disjunctie. AdaptiefLogische Formalisering van een aantal Griceaanse Implicaturen}, year = {2005}, month = {September 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {Ducheyne2005a, title = {De Inductione: where {B}acon{\textquoteright}s Idea of Induction meets {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Practice of it.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {115128}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {J:ep\&aal, title = {Empirical Progress and Ampliative Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers. Vol. 1}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {83}, year = {2005}, pages = {193{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Festa, Roberto and Aliseda, Atocha and Peijnenburg, Jeanne} } @article {Verhoeven2005, title = {On the Exclusivity Implicature of {\textquoteleft}{O}r{\textquoteright} or on the Meaning of Eating Strawberries}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {1924}, abstract = {This paper is a contribution to the program of constructing formal representations of pragmatic aspects of human reasoning. We propose a formalization within the framework of Adaptive Logics of the exclusivity implicature governing the connective or.Keywords: exclusivity implicature, Adaptive Logics.
}, keywords = {Adaptive Logics, exclusivity implicature}, issn = {00393215}, doi = {10.1007/s1122500527678}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s1122500527678}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza and Horsten, Leon} } @article {334983, title = {Forms of causal explanation}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2005}, pages = {437{\textendash}454}, issn = {12331821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {386239, title = {The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {33}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}16}, abstract = {This paper deals with the "functions of intentional explanations" of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. "contrastive" and "descriptive", which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (coveringlaw) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.
}, issn = {10538348}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {524788, title = {Graham Allisons modellen voor de analyse van internationale betrekkingen: een pluralistische kritiek}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {8}, number = {2}, year = {2005}, pages = {64{\textendash}77}, abstract = {A call for epistemic pluralism is credible only when showing enough pluralism itself. Graham Allisons three conceptual models made such a call, but do his models differ enough? Based on a fundamental theoretical analysis, disentangling the ontological and methodological aspects of Allisons models, I conclude they do not. Subsequently, arguing that additional diversity is necessary and not an impossible endeavour, I construct a fourth model based on Alexander Wendts Social Theory of International Politics. This model is fundamentally different from Allisons models, and in combination with them a more convincing case for epistemic pluralism.
}, issn = {13730975}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {334982, title = {Heeft er iemand een wetenschapsbeleid gezien? {O}ver wetenschap, democratie en de onderzoeksagenda}, journal = {Samenleving en politiek}, volume = {12}, number = {8}, year = {2005}, pages = {12{\textendash}18}, issn = {13720740}, url = {http://www.stichtinggerritkreveld.be/ECMS\_CLIENT/configuration/pages/artikel.php?aid=307}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {386241, title = {INUS Conditions}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science}, volume = {2}, year = {2005}, pages = {955{\textendash}958}, publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons}, isbn = {0470860804}, author = {Horsten, Leon and Weber, Erik} } @article {354192, title = {Joan {B}aptiste {V}an {H}elmont and the question of experimental modernism}, journal = {Physis: Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza}, volume = {43}, year = {2005}, pages = {305{\textendash}332}, abstract = {In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Joan Baptista Van Helmonts (15791644) style of experimenting as modern. Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmonts precise contribution to experimental practice has been. I will argue after having analysed some of Van Helmonts experiments such as his tree experiment, ice experiment, and thermoscope experiment that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and, ultimately, in relatively closed physical systems such as, paradigmatically, the vessel, globe, or sphere [vas, globus, sphera]). After having reviewed some alternative options, I shall argue that Van Helmonts usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification is the feature that best characterizes his contributions to modern experimentation.
}, issn = {00319414}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @book {371039, title = {Kennis ontrafeld: {v}ijftien hedendaagse filosofen over wetenschap, ethiek en metafysica.}, year = {2005}, pages = {155 p.}, publisher = {Garant}, organization = {Garant}, isbn = {9044117815}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {ducheyne2005lessons, title = {Lessons from {G}alileo: The pragmatic model of shared characteristics of scientific representation}, journal = {Philosophia naturalis}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {214{\textendash}234}, abstract = {In this paper I will defend a new account of scientific representation. I will begin by looking at the benefits and drawbacks of two recent accounts on scientific representation: Hughes DDI account and Su{\'a}rez inferential account. Next I use some of Galileos models in the Discorsi as a heuristic tool for a better account of scientific representation. Next I will present my model. The main idea of my account, which I refer to as the pragmatic model of shared characteristics (PMSC), is that a model represents, if and only if, (1) a person accepts that there is a set of shared characteristics between the model and its target; (2) this set has the inferential power to generate results which can be tested empirically; (3) and the corresponding test(s) of these results is/are in agreement with our data and the specific cognitive goals we have in mind.
}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {300874, title = {Mathematical models in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Principia: a new view of the {\textquoteright}{N}ewtonian Style{\textquoteright}.}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}19}, abstract = {In this essay I argue against I. Bernard Cohens influential account of Newtons methodology in the Principia: the Newtonian Style. The crux of Cohens account is the successive adaptation of mental constructs through comparisons with nature. In Cohens view there is a direct dynamic between the mental constructs and physical systems. I argue that his account is essentially hypotheticaldeductive, which is at odds with Newtons rejection of the hypotheticaldeductive method. An adequate account of Newtons methodology needs to show how Newtons method proceeds differently from the hypotheticaldeductive method. In the constructive part I argue for my own account, which is model based: it focuses on how Newton constructed his models in Book I of the Principia. I will show that Newton understood Book I as an exercise in determining the mathematical consequences of certain force functions. The growing complexity of Newtons models is a result of exploring increasingly complex force functions (intratheoretical dynamics) rather than a successive comparison with nature (extratheoretical dynamics). Nature did not enter the scene here. This intratheoretical dynamics is related to the autonomy of the models.
}, issn = {02698595}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {340350, title = {Microexplanations of laws.}, booktitle = {Structures in Scientific Cognition. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers}, year = {2005}, pages = {177{\textendash}186}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {After a brief introduction to Kuipers{\textquoteright} views on explanations of laws we argue that microexplanations of laws can have two formats: they work either by aggregation and transformation (as Kuipers suggests) or by means of function ascriptions (Kuipers neglects this possibility). We compare both types from an epistemic point of view (which information is needed to construct the explanation?) and from a meansend perspective (do both types serve the same purposes? are they equally good?).
}, isbn = {9042016485}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Preester, Helena} } @article {ducheyne2005newton, title = {Newtons notion and practice of unification}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {36}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {In this paper I deal with a neglected topic with respect to unification in Newtons Principia. I will clarify Newtons notion (as can be found in Newtons utterances on unification) and practice of unification (its actual occurrence in his scientific work). In order to do so, I will use the recent theories on unification as tools of analysis (Kitcher, Salmon and Schurz). I will argue, after showing that neither Kitchers nor Schurzs account aptly capture Newtons notion and practice of unification, that Salmons later work is a good starting point for analysing this notion and its practice in the Principia. Finally, I will supplement Salmons account in order to answer the question at stake.
}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.12.004}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {321509, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s training in the {A}ristotelian textbook tradition: From effects to causes and back}, journal = {History of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {141}, year = {2005}, pages = {217{\textendash}237}, issn = {00732753}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {415526, title = {The paradox of conceptual novelty and {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s use of experiments}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {72}, number = {5}, year = {2005}, pages = {864{\textendash}875}, abstract = {Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyr{\'e}s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileos work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileos conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileos use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileos pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileos experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.
}, issn = {00318248}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10928}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {ducheyne2005paul, title = {Paul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s theory of knowledge and linguistic objectivism}, journal = {Knowledge Organization}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {110{\textendash}116}, abstract = {In this paper, I point to the importance of an often neglected objectivist strand in Paul Otlet{\textquoteright}s (18681944) thinking: his linguistic objectivism. Linguistic objectivism consists in the view that linguistic atoms uniquely correspond to certain discrete and welldefined elements in the world and further combinations of these linguistic atoms can objectively capture "the order of the world". This analysis tempers some of the past claims on the influence of positivism on Otlet.
}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {D:pcfdial, title = {A Procedural Criterion for Final Derivability in InconsistencyAdaptive Logics}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {221{\textendash}250}, abstract = {This paper concerns a (prospective) goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the inconsistencyadaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, the procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a \emph{criterion} for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @phdthesis {PhD_Dagmar, title = {Prospectieve Dynamiek. Filosofische en Technische Onderbouwing van Doelgerichte Bewijzen en Bewijsheuristieken}, year = {2005}, month = {March 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {683494, title = {Remodeling the past}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {10}, year = {2005}, pages = {47{\textendash}66}, abstract = {In some of the papers in which she develops and defends the mental modelview of thought experiments in physics, Nersessian expresses the belief that her account has implications for thought experiments in other domains as well. In this paper, I argue, firstly, that counterfactual reasoning has a legitimate place in historical inquiry, and secondly, that the mental model view can account for such "alternative histories". I proceed as follows. Firstly, I review the main accounts of thought experiments in physics and point at some explanatory advantages of the mental model view. Subsequently, I argue that historians cannot dispense with counterfactual reasoning altogether and qualify a number of principled objections against the explicit use of alternative histories for theoretical purposes. Finally, I show that the mental model view can account for such thought experiments in history.
}, issn = {15728471}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {326990, title = {Review of {I}. {B}ernard {C}ohen and {G}eorge {E}. {S}mith ({E}{D}s.), The {C}ambridge companion to {N}ewton}, journal = {PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {506{\textendash}508}, issn = {00318248}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {324419, title = {Secularizerende Tendenzen in {I}saac {N}ewtons Ontotheologie}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {98}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {18{\textendash}33}, issn = {00025275}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {360923, title = {Socratic proofs and paraconsistency: a case study}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {80}, number = {23}, year = {2005}, pages = {431{\textendash}466}, abstract = {This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens{\textquoteright} weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Sch{\"u}tte{\textquoteright}s maximally paraconsistent logic Fv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.
}, issn = {00393215}, author = {Vanackere, Guido and Wisniewski, Andzrej and Leszczynska, Dorota} } @article {332160, title = {Study of fractals derived from {I}{F}{S}fractals by metric procedures}, journal = {Fractals. {C}omplex Geometry, Patterns, and Scaling in Nature and Society}, volume = {13}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {237{\textendash}244}, abstract = {It is a wellknown fact that when visualizing an IFSattractor through the chaos game, it is possible that the first points mapped will come closer to but stay visibly different from the attractor. This simple fact will be analyzed in more detail, through visualizations of different aspects of this convergence process. It will be shown that, in applying on every point in a 2Dplane the same sequence of mappings and coloring each point according to convergence distance, neighboring points form structures which resemble the attractor itself. Further, it is in this way possible to generate boundaries of the attractor that vary between small and coarsegrained. Using these results, it will be shown that it is possible to, starting with an IFSattractor, construct fractals of which this IFSattractor is a subset.
}, issn = {0218348X}, doi = {10.1142/S0218348X05002878}, url = {http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0218348X05002878}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {322177, title = {Tales of the Unexpected: IncongruityResolution in Joke Comprehension, Scientific Discovery and Thought Experimentation}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {69{\textendash}88}, abstract = {Some scholars suspect that thought experiments have something in common with jokes. Moreover, Thomas Kuhn has suggested that what happens to someone who thinks through a thought experiment is very similar to what happens to a man, like Lavoisier, who must assimilate the result of a new unexpected experimental discovery (1964: 321). In this paper, I pinpoint the presumed commonalities. I identify, more specifically, what cognitive linguists call incongruityresolution as the problemsolving process not only involved in humor comprehension, but in scientific discovery and thought experimentation as well
}, issn = {14253305}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {D:explanat, title = {The Theory of the Process of Explanation Generalized to Include the Inconsistent Case}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {143}, year = {2005}, note = {doi:10.1007/s1122900531143}, pages = {63{\textendash}88}, abstract = {This paper proposes a generalization of the theory of the process of explanation to include consistent as well as inconsistent situations. The generalization is strong, for example in the sense that, if the background theory and the initial conditions are consistent, it leads to precisely the same results as the theory from the lead paper \cite{H\&H:tpe}. The paper presupposes (and refers to arguments for the view that) inconsistencies constitute problems and that scientists try to resolve them.
}, doi = {10.1007/s1122900531143}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {van2005towards, title = {Towards a framework for pluralisms in economics}, journal = {PostAutistic Economics Review}, volume = {30}, year = {2005}, pages = {24{\textendash}27}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {vanweighing, title = {Weighing Falling Bodies. {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s Thought Experiment in the Development of his Dynamical Thinking.}, year = {2005}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {371043, title = {Wie rookt gaat sneller dood en betaalt dus meer: {O}ver het belang van oorzaakgevolgrelaties in verzekeren en de moeilijkheid bij het onderzoeken ervan}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {58{\textendash}69}, abstract = {Smokers die sooner and therefore pay more. On the importance of causeeffect relations in insurance and the difficulties researching them. For insurers, a correct knowledge of causes are important. An insurance companies who failes to adequatly assess the causes of particular risks will loose its market position due to wrong price setting. In this paper, I discuss possible methods determine the causes of risks, as well as problems and imperfections of those methods.
}, issn = {13730975}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {J:al_iid, title = {Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and Deduction}, booktitle = {Induction and Deduction in the Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {93{\textendash}120}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Stadler, Friedrich} } @article {LeE:aalcd, title = {Applications of the Adaptive Logic for Causal Discovery}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {33{\textendash}51}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {D:ind_vpl7, title = {The Basic Inductive Schema, Inductive Truisms, and the ResearchGuiding Capacities of the Logic of Inductive Generalization}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {53{\textendash}84}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is threefold. First, the sometimes slightly messy application of the conditional rule RC of the logic of inductive general ization is clari{\O}ed by reducing this rule to a socalled basic schema BS. Next, some common truisms about inductive generalization are shown to be mistaken, but are also shown to be valid in special cases. Finally, and most importantly, it is shown that applications of the adaptive logic of inductive generalization to sets of data, possibly in the presence of background knowledge, invokes certain empirical tests and certain theo retically justi{\O}ed defeasible conjectures, which in a sensible way increase one{\textquoteright}s empirical and theoretical knowledge about a given domain.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {Vanackere2004, title = {Boekbespreking: "Jan Albert van Laar. The Dialectic of Ambiguity. A Contribution to the Study of Argumentation".}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing}, volume = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {248{\textendash}251}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {324232, title = {Cassirer{\textquoteright}s critical idealism: a comment on {T}homas {M}ormann.}, booktitle = {Laws and Models in Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {161{\textendash}171}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {0954300661}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Gillies, D.} } @conference {383110, title = {Computer Generated Images as Mathematical Tools}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Conference and Exhibition on Generative Art}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Since the commercialisation of the computer, it became possible to visualise certain aspects of mathematics that were not possible to visualise before because of the complexity or the size of the datasets involved. Some of these computer generated images even have become the icons of certain mathematical theories like for example fractal geometry. One of the advantages of these visualisations is the fact that in using them, certain properties that involve complexity can be immediately shown. This possibility will be discussed through experiments done by the author.
}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @conference {382092, title = {The consequences of scientific pluralism for science policy}, booktitle = {Proceedings of V Jornadas Latinoamericanas de estudios sociales de la ciencia y de la tecnolog{\'\i}a}, year = {2004}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {322173, title = {De maat van het mogelijke: gedachteexperimenten en verbeelding}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {96}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {28{\textendash}39}, issn = {00025275}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {JDa:ddp_cc, title = {Direct Dynamic Proofs for Classical Compatibility}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {305{\textendash}317}, abstract = {In this paper, we present a goaldirected proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Alisedas approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Alisedas algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goaldirected proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spinoff of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goaldirected procedure solves the problems we encountered in Alisedas algorithms.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {307815, title = {Explanatory pluralism in economics: {A}gainst the mainstream?}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {299{\textendash}315}, abstract = {Recent pleas for more heterodoxy in explaining economic action have been defending a pluralism for economics. In this article, I analyse these defences by scrutinizing the pluralistic qualities in the work of one of the major voices of heterodoxy, Tony Lawson. This scrutiny will focus on Lawson{\textquoteright}s alternatives concerning ontology and explanation to mainstream economics. Subsequently, I will raise some doubts about Lawson{\textquoteright}s pluralism, and identify questions that will have to be addressed by heterodox economists in order to maintain the claim of pluralism.
}, issn = {13869795}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {307814, title = {Imperialistische tendensen in de economiebeoefening en politieke wetenschappen. {O}ver heterodoxie en pluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen}, journal = {Ethiek \& maatschappij}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {32{\textendash}45}, issn = {13730975}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {397669, title = {Introduction: beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {197{\textendash}201}, issn = {13869795}, doi = {10.1080/1386979042000258303}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Cuypers, Stefaan} } @phdthesis {PhD_Guido, title = {Logica en het Waardevolle in de Wereld. De Rol van Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s bij de Constructie van Theorie{\"e}n}, year = {2004}, month = {May 12}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @phdthesis {PhD_Kristof, title = {Logica in Communicatie. Bijdragen vanuit Vraaglogica en {\textquoteright}Belief Revision{\textquoteright}, Steunend op Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s}, year = {2004}, month = {September 3}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof} } @incollection {DeMey2004, title = {Mere Logical Possibility: A Bridge too Far}, booktitle = {Modal Epistemology}, year = {2004}, pages = {5362}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @book {322175, title = {Modal epistemology.}, year = {2004}, pages = {106 p.}, publisher = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, isbn = {N/A}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @article {397668, title = {Models of intentional explanation.}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {233{\textendash}247}, abstract = {The controversy about intentional explanation of action concerns how these explanations work. What kind of model allows us to capture the dependency or relevance relation between the explanans, i.e. the beliefs and desires of the agent, and the explanandum, i.e. the action? In this paper, I argue that the causal mechanical model can do the job. Causal mechanical intentional explanations consist in a reference to the mechanisms of practical reasoning of the agent that motivated the agent to act, i.e. to a causally relevant set of beliefs and desires. Moreover, the causal mechanical model can provide in efficient and unproblematic applications, unlike action explanations using ceteris paribus laws or counterfactuals. The drawback of the latter models of explanation is their modal requirement: the explanans must mention or implies sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the explanandum. Such a requirement is too strong when it comes to intentional explanation of action.
}, issn = {13869795}, doi = {10.1080/1386979042000258330}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {Vanderbeeken2004, title = {Naar een pluralisme van verklaringen in mens en natuurwetenschappen}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {6069}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {D:eial, title = {The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology}, booktitle = {Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {459{\textendash}485}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Symons, John and Gabbay, Dov M. and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {haesaert2004non, title = {A nonprobabilistic Approach to Inductive Prediction}, year = {2004}, abstract = {The underlying idea behind the adaptive logics of inductive generalization is that most inductive reasoning can be explicated by simple qualitative means. Therefore, those classical models are selected that are as uniform as possible with respect to a certain set of (empirical) data. This led to the question if the same idea of uniformity can be applied if no generalizations are derivable. It is clear that in this case one may be still interested to make some direct inductive predictions. The main problem with this kind of prediction is that we lack a decision theory for it. In the present paper we make some proposals to deal with this problem. Our purpose here is to get more control over the difficult aspects of inductive prediction. In order to do so, we will not proceed in a probabilistic context, but we will apply the idea of minimizing the abnormalities in uniform models, an idea that derives from the adaptive logic programm. 1 Aim of this paper In our [1], we have presented some adaptive logics for induction based on Classical Logic (henceforth: CL). The underlying idea of these adaptive logics of induction is that most inductive reasoning does not proceed in terms of probabilities, and cannot be explicated in terms of probabilities, but can be explicated by rather simple qualitative means. In that paper we presented for example the adaptive logic for inductive generalization IL +m: from a set of data and (possibly falsified) background knowledge, inductive generalizations are derived 1. In the same paper we also
}, author = {Haesaert, Lieven} } @article {307817, title = {Questioning structurism as a new standard for social scientific explanations}, journal = {Graduate Journal of Social Science}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, year = {2004}, pages = {204{\textendash}226}, abstract = {As the literature on Critical Realism in the social sciences is growing, it is about time to analyse whether a new, acceptable standard for social scientific explanations is being introduced. In order to do so, I will discuss the work of Christopher Lloyd, who analysed contributions of social scientists that rely on (what he called) a structurist ontology and a structurist methodology, and advocated a third option in the methodological debate between individualism and holism. I will suggest modifications to three points of Lloyd{\textquoteright}s analysis, without abandoning Lloyd{\textquoteright}s intuitions completely. Firstly, the intuitions of the structurist ontology can be made explicit in a different way, without loosing the individualsociety dualism. Secondly, opting for a structurist ontology does not necessarily imply opting for a structurist methodology. Ontology and methodology are related, but not as strongly as Lloyd supposes. Thirdly, the idea of a complete explanation, present in the structurist methodology, confuses causation and explanation while denying the pragmatics of explanation. A broader spectrum of explanatory forms can be defended. Criticizing Lloyd on these three points will lead me to the defence of an explanatory pluralism, which I relate to a minimal ontology. The intention of this reconceptualisation of structurism (and related Critical Realist applications) is to broaden possible perspectives on the explanatory praxis of the social scientist, and to question the reunification of the social sciences. It will also stipulate which form of interdisciplinarity is preferable for the social sciences.
}, issn = {15723763}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {DK:cluns, title = {A Rich Paraconsistent Extension of Full Positive Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, note = {Appeared 2005}, pages = {227{\textendash}257}, abstract = {In the present paper we devise and study the most natural predicative extension of Sch{\"u}tte{\textquoteright}s maximally paraconsistent logic. With some of its large fragments, this logic, \sys{CLuNs}, forms the most popular family of paraconsistent logics. Devising the system involves some entanglements, and the system itself raises several interesting questions. As the system and fragments were studied by other authors, we restrict our attention to results that we have not seen in press.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof} } @article {322466, title = {Sieving Out Relevant and Efficient Questions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {189{\textendash}216}, abstract = {Wisniewksis erotetic logic provides us with two slightly different semantic explications of the intuitive concept of a question arises from a set of declarative premises. Unfortunately, Wisniewskis erotetic concepts suffer from the drawback that they allow for the raising of irrelevant and inefficient questions. The aim of this paper is to show that raising such questions can be avoided by changing the underlying logic. Several closely related logical approaches which enable us to eliminate irrelevant and inefficient questions, are presented.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:al_antw, title = {Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s. {E}en precieze benadering van vertrouwde maar door logici verwaarloosde redeneervormen}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {95}, year = {2003}, pages = {174{\textendash}189}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {Urbaniak2003, title = {Analysis of Kotarbinski{\textquoteright}s reistic reasonings}, journal = {{Logiczne Podstawy Rozumowa{\'n}}, volume = {3}, year = {2003}, pages = {62{\textendash}81}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {291501, title = {Change in individuals without a name. {C}ontextual indicators \& the free changeadaptive logic}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11}, year = {2003}, pages = {213{\textendash}230}, abstract = {Proof theory and semantics of an adaptive logic that deals adequately with change in individuals with or without a name are presented. New logical constants are introduced, viz. indicators. Within a given context they function as names, predicates and quantifiers at the same time. The thus extended language (of classical logic) has a big expressive power and solvespartly the (classical) nonlogical presuppositions with respect to the existence of individuals. Nevertheless, from a purely logical point of view, the here pre  sented logic requires nothing but a very intuitive selection of classical models of the premises, viz. the minimally abnormal ones.
}, issn = {14253305}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {291051, title = {Changing one{\textquoteright}s position in discussions  Some adaptive approaches}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {277{\textendash}297}, abstract = {This paper contains different approaches to solve the problem how to construct the ultimate position out of ones interventions in a discussion after possibly one or more position changes. In all approaches it is the aim to come as close as possible to human reasoning. Therefore all logics are adaptive logics. The first logic is an extension of an adaptive translation into S5 of the RescherManor mechanisms. The second one is a dynamic proof theory based on a technique using indices. In the end a satisfactory solution is given by a dynamic proof theory expressing the idea of prioritized compatibility, i.e. compatibility step by step
}, issn = {14253305}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:gluts, title = {Criteria Causing Inconsistencies. {G}eneral Gluts as Opposed to Negation Gluts}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {5{\textendash}37}, abstract = {This paper studies the question: how should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare the approaches underlying several inconsistencyadaptive logics. I consider the Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations as well as adaptive logics defined from CLuN, CLuNs, LP, AN, and AL. The adaptive systems defined from CLuN appear to be superior to the others. They isolate inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises.
Nevertheless, the systems based on CLuN introduce an asymmetry between negated and nonnegated formulas that seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the problem, the epistemological presuppositions of CLuN, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all other logical constants. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the study of the properties of these systems.
While this resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for CLuN.
It is often assumed that thought experiments are either experiments or arguments. In this paper, I argue that this disjunction is not an exclusive one and that we can only account for the demonstrative force or evidential significance of thought experiments by conceiving of them as both experiments and arguments. First, I distinguish between three related, but nevertheless distinct problems that thought experiments in physics pose. In this context, I also show that the choice between an experiment view and an argument view on the nature of thought experiments pops up in connection with two of those problems: (1) the problem of the source of thoughtexperimental knowledge and (2) the problem of the evidential significance of thought experiments. Subsequently, I argue that as far as the issue of evidential significance is concerned, we should at least recognise that thought experiments have a dual structure: an experimentlike set up and an. argumentlike winding up. Then I introduce Hans Radder{\textquoteright}s conceptual framework for the analysis of "real" experiments and I apply it to thought experimet:J.ts. Finally, I argue that Radder{\textquoteright}s distinction between the aspects of {\textquoteright}theoretical description or interpretation" and "material realization" allows us to move on from the recognition of the dual structure of thought experiments to a fullblown dual nature view of them.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @phdthesis {PhD_Robrecht, title = {Een Pluralisme van Verklaringen van Acties}, year = {2003}, month = {March 14}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {Christiaens2003, title = {The EPRExperiment and Free Process Theory}, booktitle = {Process Theories. {C}rossDisciplinary Studies on Dynamic Categories}, year = {2003}, pages = {267284}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {As part of the creationdiscovery interpretation of quantum mechanics Diederik Aerts presented a setting with macroscopical coincidence experiments designed to exhibit significant conceptual analogies between portions of stuff and quantum compound entities in a singlet state in EinsteinPodolskyRosen/Bellexperiments (EPRexperiments). One important claim of the creationdiscovery view is that the singlet state describes an entity that does not have a definite position in space and thus does not exist in space. Free Process Theory is a recent proposal by Johanna Seibt of an integrated ontology, i.e., of an ontology suitable for the interpretation of theories of the macrophysical and microphysical domain (quantum field theory). The framework of free process theory allows us to show systematically the relevant analogies and disanalogies between Aerts experiment and EPRexperiments. From free process ontology it also follows quite naturally that the quantum compound entity described by the singlet state does not exist in space.
}, isbn = {9781402017513}, doi = {10.1007/9789400710443_11}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9789400710443_11}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Seibt, Johanna} } @conference {403803, title = {Explaining laws by reduction}, booktitle = {Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {Scientific explanations have been intensively studied by philosophers of science during the last five decades. Explanations of laws did not receive as much attention as explanations of particular facts. In this article, I present a model for one type of explanations of laws: reductions of laws to phenomena at a microlevel. Examples of such reductions can be found in the natural sciences (the ideal gas law is probably the most famous example here) and in the social sciences (e.g., reduction of macroeconomic laws to the behaviour of individual economic agents).
}, isbn = {140201645X}, doi = {10.1007/9789401726122_9}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Rojsczak, A and Cachro, J and Kurczewski, G} } @article {386237, title = {Explanation and thought experiments in history.}, journal = {History and Theory}, volume = {42}, year = {2003}, pages = {28{\textendash}38}, abstract = {Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and contrasts. Then, we pinpoint the functions thought experiments fulfill in arriving at weighted explanations of contrasts
}, issn = {00182656}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:faps, title = {A Formal Approach to Problem Solving}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {15{\textendash}26}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {322172, title = {Hoe geschiedenis tot lering strekt}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {6}, year = {2003}, pages = {47{\textendash}54}, abstract = {How History Can Teach Us Counterfactual questions (hypothetical questions of which the premises contradict the historical facts) are not often explicitly used in historical research to identify causes of particular facts. The methodology of thought experiments offers nevertheless important opportunities to contemporary historiography. One could even ask oneself if historical research is possible at all without so called what if questions. Just like analogies, thought experiments are necessary to complete the mental process which interpretes causes and effects of human behaviour in history. Therefore, counterfactual thought experiments can easily be traced in the construction of historical explanations.
}, issn = {13730975}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {J:i\&ds, title = {Inconsistencies and the Dynamics of Science}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {129{\textendash}148}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {217593, title = {Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law: a qualitative computational model.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {93{\textendash}102}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, abstract = {Computational models offer an excellent tool for the study and analysis of scientific discovery processes. The study of failures provides an insight into the history and philosophy of science as valuable as the study of successful discoveries. Using a computational model I analyzed Keplers approach in formulating a quantitative law for refraction. Although Kepler ultimately failed in discovering the sine law, the model shows that his basic hypothesis as well as his approach by geometrical reasoning was a correct one. This went largely unnoticed by commentators on the history of optics. Based on this analysis I provide new evidence that Descartes and Snell found in Keplers main hypothesis everything needed to deduce the sine law by pure geometrical reasoning. Our computational model is based on geometrical knowledge as contrasted with previous quantitative approaches. It has been implemented as a Prolog program.
}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {287734, title = {Nonspatiality and EPRexperiments according to the creationdiscovery view}, journal = {Foundations of Physics Letters}, volume = {16}, number = {4}, year = {2003}, month = {August}, pages = {379{\textendash}387}, abstract = {The creationdiscovery interpretation of the EPRexperiments, developed by D. Aerts, draws our attention on the role of spacetime in our description of the physical world: the EPRexperiments give us reason to believe that quantum entities do not always exist in space. This interpretation of the quantum description would explain the peculiar correlations obtained in these experiments as arising from the most obvious candidate for a common cause, the entity described by the singlet state. The absence of unique and determinate localization as a criterium for individuation is met by a new physical ontology. We use it to obtain a better understanding of the interaction between quantum individuals and spacetime.
}, issn = {08949875}, doi = {10.1023/A:1025317910387}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {christiaens2003note, title = {A note concerning the place of contradictions in the ontologies of constitution}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {67{\textendash}72}, abstract = {In this first section we start with defining the notions of inconsistency and paraconsistency, we give an example of an inconsistency and clarify what according to us is the basic problem with respect to the occurrence of inconsistencies. We are then in a position to state the aim of this paper
}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {J:parcomp, title = {Paraconsistent Compatibility}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {251{\textendash}287}, abstract = {In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent compatibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are compatible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical compatibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsistent compatibility cannot be defined with respect to a monotonic paraconsistent logic, but only with respect to an inconsistencyadaptive logic. The paper contains modal versions of two wellstudied inconsistencyadaptive logics. These modal versions form the basis for the logics for paraconsistent compatibility, but are also interesting with respect to other applications.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {D:ppp_cl, title = {A Paraconsistent Proof Procedure Based on Classical Logic}, year = {2003}, abstract = {Apparently Ex Falso Quodlibet (or Explosion) cannot be isolated within CL (Classical Logic); if Explosion has to go, then so have other inference rules, for example either Addition or Disjunctive Syllogism. This cer tainly holds according to the standard abstract view on logic. However, as I shall show, it does not hold if a logic is defined by a procedurea set of instructions to obtain a proof (if there is one) of a given conclusion from a given premise set. In this paper I present a procedure pCL{\textexclamdown} that defines a logic CL{\textexclamdown}a function assigning a consequence set to any premise set. Anything deriv able by CL from a consistent premise set {\textexclamdown} is derivable from {\textexclamdown} by CL{\textexclamdown}. If {\textexclamdown} is (CL)inconsistent, pCL{\textexclamdown} enables one to demonstrate this (by de riving a contradiction from {\textexclamdown}). The logic CL{\textexclamdown} validates applications of Disjunctive Syllogism as well as applications of Addition. Nevertheless, this logic is paraconsistent as well as (in a specific sense) relevant. pCL{\textexclamdown} derives from an intuitively attractive proof search procedure. A characteristic semantics for CL{\textexclamdown} will be presented and the central prop erties of the logic will be mentioned. CL{\textexclamdown} shows that (and clarifies how) adherents of CL may obtain nontrivial consequence sets for inconsistent theories.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {597466, title = {A Procedure for Generating (Conditional) Answers in a GoalDirected Way}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {57{\textendash}63}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, abstract = {Two evolutionary games : collective action and prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilema / Jakson Alves de Aquino {\textendash} A formal approach to problem solving / Diderik Batens {\textendash} Application of mathematics and underdetermination / Ota\unmatched{0301}vio Bueno {\textendash} A framework for combining defeasible argumentation with labeled deduction / Carlos Iva\unmatched{0301}n Chesn\unmatched{0303}evar and Guillermo Ricardo Simari {\textendash} A procedure for generating (conditional) answers in a goaldirected way / Kristof De Clerq and Rob Vanderbeken {\textendash} Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning : a model for research programmes / Claudio Delrieux {\textendash} Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law : a quantitative computational model / Albrecht Heeffer {\textendash} Default models of rationality / Silvia Lerner {\textendash} Most inferences are defeasible / Jose\unmatched{0301} Carlos Loureiro Ralha and Ce\unmatched{0301}lia Ghedini Rahla {\textendash} Reasoning through doing : epistemic mediators in scientific reasoning / Lorenzo Magnani {\textendash} Do we need paraconsistency in commonsense reasoning? / Joke Meheus {\textendash} Descartes, a methodical elimination of paradoxes for (de)ontology building / Jean Sallantin ... [et al.] {\textendash} Measuring coherence using LPmodels / Carlos A. Oller {\textendash} What are multiagent systems trying to accomplish? Towards pragmatic gametheoretical agenda / AhtiVeikko Pietarinen {\textendash} Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility / Dagmar Provijn {\textendash} Semantic computations of truth, based on associations already learned / Patrick Suppes and JeanYves Be\unmatched{0301}ziau {\textendash} On the sense of eating strawberries, or, On the exclusivity implcature fo {\textquoteright}or{\textquoteright} / Liza Verhoeven and Leon Horsten {\textendash} A note on epistemology and logical afrificial intelligence / Gregory R. Wheeler and Lui\unmatched{0301}s Moniz Pereira.
}, isbn = {9879281896}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {319505, title = {Proof Theories for Some Prioritized Consequence Relations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {325{\textendash}344}, abstract = {Handling a possibly inconsistent prioritized belief base can be done in terms of consistent subsets. Humans do not compute consistent subsets, they just start reasoning and when confronted with incon sistencies in the course of their reasoning, they may adjust their interpretation of the information. In logics this behaviour corresponds to the mechanisms of dynamic proof theories. The aim of this paper is to transform known consequence relations for inconsistent prioritized belief bases in terms of consistent subsets, into dynamic proof theories that are a more faithful representation of human reasoning processes.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {324230, title = {The roles of one thought experiment in interpreting quantum mechanics: {W}erner {H}eisenberg meets {T}homas {K}uhn}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {72}, year = {2003}, pages = {79{\textendash}103}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {LeE:ssce, title = {Searching for Singular Causal Explanations: a formal analysis}, year = {2003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {DJDaL:diag, title = {Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {39{\textendash}65}, abstract = {A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:RMs, title = {A Strengthening of the {R}escher{\textendash}{M}anor Consequence Relations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {289{\textendash}313}, abstract = {The flat Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations{\textendash}the Free, Strong, Weak, CBased, and Argued consequence relation{\textendash}are defined in terms of the classical consequences of the maximal consistent subsets of (possibly) inconsistent sets of premises. If the premises are inconsistent, the Free, Strong and CBased consequence sets are consistent and the Argued consequence set avoids explicit inconsistencies (such as A and \ A).
The five consequence relations may be applied to discussive situations as intended by Jaskowski{\textendash}the comparison with Jaskowski{\textquoteright}s D2 is instructive. The method followed by Joke Meheus to extend D2 to an adaptive logic, may also be applied to the Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations. It leads to an extension of the Free, Strong, Weak, and CBased consequence relations. The extended consequence sets are consistent and closed under Classical Logic. Applying the method to the Argued consequence relation leads to a different consequence relation, not an extension. Neither the Argued consequence relation nor its extension appear very interesting in the present application context.
Promotor: Erik Weber
}, month = {March 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {klijn2003using, title = {Using classical resolution method to check derivability for some propositional paralogics and adaptive logics.}, year = {2003}, abstract = {In this article it will be shown how results from [2] can be used to decide wether, for a range of propositional paralogics and adaptive logics L, A1 , ..., An \#L B is derivable by means of a resolution method for C1 , ..., Cn D, where C1 , ..., Cn and D are the translations of the original premisses and the conclusion respectively from L into CL. This method simplifies the use of automated deduction for nonclassical logics, since the framework for these logics can be put "on top of" any existing resolution method for classical logic. This theoretical framework has been implemented in a computer program. The URL where this program is available will be given. This approach, moreover, makes it easier to compare the derivability of well formed formulas from sets of premisses between the implemented range of logics. The resulting computer program can thus be seen as an useful tool for research in logics.
}, author = {Klijn, Alex} } @article {VanKerkhove2003, title = {VaguenessAdaptive Logic: {A} Pragmatical Approach to Sorites Paradoxes}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, year = {2003}, pages = {383411}, abstract = {This paper defends a pragmatical approach to vagueness. The vaguenessadaptive logic VAL is a good reconstruction of and an excellent, instrument for human reasoning processes in which vague predicates are involved. Apart from its prooftheory and semantics, a Soritestreating model based on it is presented, disarming the paradox. The paper opens perspectives with respect to the construction of theories by means of vague predicates.
}, keywords = {adaptive logic, construction of scientific theories, paraconsistent logic, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, Sorites paradox, vagueness}, issn = {00393215}, doi = {10.1023/B:STUD.0000009567.21578.0a}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B\%3ASTUD.0000009567.21578.0a}, author = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Vanackere, Guido} } @article {219578, title = {Verklaringspluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen}, journal = {Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis {R}evue belge dhistoire}, volume = {33}, number = {1{\textendash}2}, year = {2003}, pages = {303{\textendash}311}, issn = {00350869}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Jeroen, title = {Verklaringspluralisme in de Sociale Wetenschappen. Een Wetenschapsfilosofische Verdediging met Toepassingen in de Geschiedbeoefening, de Theorie van Internationale Relaties en de Economische Wetenschappen}, year = {2003}, month = {January 31}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {219576, title = {When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. {O}n the contribution of critical realism to the social scientific explanatory practice}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {71}, year = {2003}, pages = {81{\textendash}98}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {J:alpt, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Pragmatic Truth}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {167{\textendash}185}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {This paper presents the new adaptive logic APT. APT has the peculiar property that it enables one to interpret a (possibly inconsistent) theory Gamma {\textquoteright}as pragmatically as possible{\textquoteright}. The aim is to capture the idea of a partial structure (in the sense of da Costa and associates) that adequately models a (possibly inconsistent) set of beliefs Gamma. What this comes to is that APT localizes the {\textquoteright}consistent core{\textquoteright} of Gamma, and that it delivers all sentences that are compatible with this core. For the core itself, APT is just as rich as Classical Logic. APT is defined from a modal adaptive logic APV that is based itself on two other adaptive logics. I present the semantics of all three systems, as well as their dynamic proof theory. The dynamic proof theory for APV is unusual (even within the adaptive logic programme) in that it incorporates two different kinds of dynamics.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {JLMDa:abd, title = {Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of LogicBased Approaches to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of ModelBased Reasoning}, year = {2002}, pages = {39{\textendash}71}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logicbased approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.
We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, CP1 and CP2. CP1 enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. CP2 moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to CP1 and CP2 that are better suited for noncreative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.
It was shown in \cite{D:unific} that the flat Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations{\textendash}the Free, Strong, Argued, CBased, and Weak consequence relation{\textendash}are all characterized by special applications of inconsistencyadaptive logics defined from the paraconsistent logic CLuN. As as result, these consequence relations are provided with a dynamic proof theory. In the present paper we show that the detour via an inconsistencyadaptive logic is not necessary. We present a direct dynamic proof theory, formulated in the language of Classical Logic, and prove its adequacy.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Vermeir, Timothy} } @article {152619, title = {Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {30}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}59}, abstract = {If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possiblecausal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring toa situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) byreferring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes adisposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositionalexplanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. Thedispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs
}, issn = {10538348}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Weber, Erik} } @conference {152513, title = {Een adaptieve logica voor het beschrijven van inductie}, booktitle = {Handelingen van de 24ste {N}ederlands{V}laamse Filosofiedag: Filosofie en Empirie}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, organization = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, author = {Haesaert, Lieven} } @phdthesis {PhD_Brenda, title = {Epistemologie}, year = {2002}, month = {September 6}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Casteleyn, Brenda} } @conference {provijn2002er, title = {Is er een diepe kloof tussen de heuristiek en de inferentieregels van een bewijstheorie? Een poging tot integratie.}, booktitle = {Handelingen van de 24ste {N}ederlands{V}laamse Filosofiedag: Filosofie en Empirie}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, organization = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, abstract = {In dit artikel wens ik in te gaan tegen het diepe onderscheid dat Hintikka voorstelt tussen de definitory en strategic rules van een bewijstheorie. Ik doe dit door een integratie voor te stellen tussen de inferentieregels en de heuristiek van het formeel systeem Pc uit dat toelaat doelgerichte en efficifiente bewijzen te maken.
}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {319503, title = {Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {45}, number = {179{\textendash}180}, year = {2002}, pages = {299{\textendash}307}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Weber, Erik and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {Vermeir_fromwffs, title = {From Wffs to Clauses: Transforming Wffs in Clauses Without Loss of Meaning}, year = {2002}, abstract = {This paper is the rst step into the research of inconsistencyadaptive logic programming. It will be shown here that a mapping can be dened for well formed formulas to logic programming clauses in a paraconsistent environment, and without loss of information. Furthermore, this mapping is a purely mechanical procedure that can be implemented with ease on a computer.
}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy} } @conference {152575, title = {How to obtain elegant Fitchstyle proofs from Goal directed ones.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourtheenth BelgiumNetherlands Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2002}, year = {2002}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Blockeel, H. and Denecker, M.} } @incollection {D:defprog, title = {In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {129{\textendash}150}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:clau2, title = {Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. {C}lausius{\textquoteright}s Remarkable Derivation of {C}arnot{\textquoteright}s Theorem}, booktitle = {History of Modern Physics. {A}cta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Brepols}, address = {Turnhout (Belgium)}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Krach, Helghe and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {152589, title = {Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, series = {Origins}, volume = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhns own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.
}, isbn = {1402006306}, doi = {10.1007/9789401700856_3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/9789401700856_3}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {vermeir2002inconsistency, title = {An InconsistencyAdaptive Proof Procedure for Logic Programming}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {323340}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {It is the goal of this paper to de ne a paraconsistent proof procedure that has the best of two mechanisms, in casu logic programming and inconsistencyadaptive logics. From logic programming we will maintain the ease of computing, and from adaptive logics their paraconsistency, dynamics and nonmonotonicity. This will be done by combining the notion of competitor from logic programming together with the conditionallity that is common in all adaptive proofs.
}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {152512, title = {Isaac Newton on space and time: metaphysician or not?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2002}, pages = {77{\textendash}114}, abstract = {But whereas we can blame Bohr, Schrodinger and Einstein for our problems, Newton has only God to blame for his. (Tamny, 1979: 58). After all, if Newton does not believe in the reality of space and time themselves, over and above the material inhabitants of them, who does? (Sklar, 1990: 68).
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {VanBouwel2002a, title = {The Living Apart Together Relationship between Causation and Explanation. {A} comment on {J}ean {L}achappelle.}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {32}, number = {4}, year = {2002}, pages = {560569}, doi = {10.1177/004839302237837}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {402962, title = {A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of ModelBased Reasoning}, volume = {25}, year = {2002}, pages = {21{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {In this paper, I will present an adaptive logic that grasps the way we analyze metaphors. Metaphors are powerful tools to generate new scientific ideas. Therefore, it is important to have a good theory on what metaphors are and how they function. The first question we have to answer when we want to develop such a theory is obviously {\textacutedbl}what metaphors are{\textacutedbl}. Philosophy of language can offer some interesting ideas but most views do not allow for a cognitive function of metaphors. One of the sparse views that does allow for it is interactionism. The basic version, however, has some serious shortcomings that need solving when we want to use this theory. First of all the terminology is too vague. Furthermore, the description of the reasoning process we use when we analyze a metaphor, only works for very simple examples. The logic I will present, ALM, is based on a broadened version of this view. A logical approach of metaphors allows us to gain a profound insight in the way we analyze metaphors. The analysis of metaphors is a dynamical reasoning process. When we want to capture this process in a logical system, we need a logic that is capable of grasping that specific type of dynamics. An adaptive logic seems to be the best choice. Therefore, I shall present an adaptive logic that grasps the analysis of metaphors.
}, isbn = {1402007124}, author = {D{\textquoteright}Hanis, Isabel}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Nersessian, Nancy and Pizzi, Claudio} } @incollection {Amo2002, title = {A Logical Framework for Integrating Inconsistent Information in Multiple Databases}, booktitle = {Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {2284}, year = {2002}, pages = {6784}, publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, abstract = {When integrating data coming from multiple different sources we are faced with the possibility of inconsistency in databases. In this paper, we use one of the paraconsistent logics introduced in [9,7] (LFI1) as a logical framework to model possibly inconsistent database instances obtained by integrating different sources.We propose a method based on the sound and complete tableau proof system of LFI1 to treat both the integration process and the evolution of the integrated database submitted to users updates. In order to treat the integrated database evolution, we introduce a kind of generalized database context, the evolutionary databases, which are databases having the capability of storing and manipulating inconsistent information and, at the same time, allowing integrity constraints to change in time. We argue that our approach is sufficiently general and can be applied in most circumstances where inconsistency may arise in databases.
}, isbn = {9783540432203}, doi = {10.1007/3540457585_5}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3540457585_5}, author = {de Amo, Sandra and Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Eiter, Thomas and Schewe, KlausDieter} } @incollection {402884, title = {Ontological causes of inconsistency and a changeadaptive, logical solution}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, volume = {228}, year = {2002}, pages = {151{\textendash}166}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, abstract = {This paper reveals an implicit ontological assumption that is presupposed in common thought. This assumption results in the fact that people usually do not make any distinction between {\textquoteright}the object a{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}the object a at a given moment{\textquoteright}. This laziness causes many inconsistencies. Several attempts to solve these inconsistencies are studied, and the most natural one is elaborated, namely the one obtained by applying Classical Logic to an ontological correct domain. This solution has a drawback with respect to communication, which is solved by the changeadaptive logic CAL2. This nonmonotonic, paraconsistent logic, belongs to the family of ambiguityadaptive logics. It has the special characteristic that it solves inconsistencies by the introduction of more precise names for objects, more exactly names that refer to objects at a moment. The dynamics of the logic captures the change in objects. CAL2 has a nice proof theory, and an intuitive semantics. Interesting results and applications are commented upon, for instance those making use of the notion {\textquoteright}periods of invariance{\textquoteright}. Of course, the philosophical background is discussed.
}, isbn = {0824708059}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {D:pdmdp, title = {On a Partial Decision Method for Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {P{C}{L} 2002. Paraconsistent Computational Logic}, volume = {95}, year = {2002}, note = {Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at \texttt{http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html}
}, pages = {91{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Roskilde University}, abstract = {This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, it forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.
}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0207090}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Dekker, Hendrik and Villadsen, Jorgen and Waragai, Toshiharu} } @incollection {DeMey2002, title = {Qualia, spectruminversie en filosofische zombies.}, booktitle = {Het bewustzijn in de fysische wereld: Filosofische essays over materialisme en fenomenaal bewustzijn}, year = {2002}, pages = {171194}, publisher = {Peeters}, address = {Leuven}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {J. Leilich, P. Reynaert and Veldeman, J.} } @article {VanBouwel2002, title = {Remote Causes, Bad Explanations?}, journal = {The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, volume = {32}, year = {2002}, pages = {437449}, doi = {10.1111/14685914.00197}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {D:scaial, title = {Some Computational Aspects of InconsistencyAdaptive logics}, journal = {CLE ePrints}, volume = {2}, number = {7}, year = {2002}, pages = {15~pp.}, abstract = {This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propo sitional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. The procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability and may easily be generalized for the propositional fragment of all at adaptive logics. The aim is to articulate a procedure that, if extended to the predicative level, provides criteria for final derivability.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:camp, title = {On some Remarkable Relations between Paraconsistent Logics, Modal Logics, and Ambiguity Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {275{\textendash}293}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {This paper concerns some connections between paraconsistent logics, modal logics (mainly S5), and Ambiguity Logic AL (Classical Logic applied to a language in which all letters are indexed and in which quantifiers over such indices are present). S5 may be defined from AL.
Three kinds of connections are illustrated. First, a paraconsistent logic A is presented that has the same expressive power as S5. Next, I consider the definition of paraconsistent logics from S5 and AL. Such definition is shown to work for some logics, for example Priest{\textquoteright}s LP. Other paraconsistent logics appear to withstand such definition, typically those that contain a detachable material implication. Finally, I show that some paraconsistent logics and inconsistencyadaptive logics serve exactly the same purpose as some modal logics and ampliative adaptive logics based on S5. However, they serve this purpose along very different roads and the logics cannot be defined from one another.
The paper intends to open lines of research rather than pursuing them to the end. It also contains a poor person{\textquoteright}s semantics for S5 as well as a description of the simple but useful and powerful AL.
Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a microexplanation. They defend a microreductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P, O and Tcontrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing microexplanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a microexplanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels social, psychological, biological, etc. which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.
}, issn = {02662671}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {152486, title = {Thought experiments, conceivability arguments and conceptual blending}, journal = {Odense Working Papers in Language and Communication}, volume = {24}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, issn = {09067612}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {152661, title = {Unification and explanation  {A} comment on {H}alonen and {H}intikka, and {S}churz.}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {131}, number = {1}, year = {2002}, pages = {145{\textendash}154}, abstract = {In this article we criticize two recent articles that examine the relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand, claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanation is unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem: explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation (e.g., causal explanation) are required; and none of these kinds is more fundamental.
}, issn = {00397857}, doi = {10.1023/A:1015005529380}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {152663, title = {Why the logic of explanation is inconsistencyadaptive.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in science}, year = {2002}, pages = {165{\textendash}184}, publisher = {Kluwer}, isbn = {1402006306}, doi = {10.1007/9789401700856_10}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {EM:cle, title = {Adaptive Logic and Covering Law Explanations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, pages = {237{\textendash}254}, abstract = {In his theory of explanation Hempel introduced two basic types of covering law explanations for particular events: deductivenomological and inductivestatistical. In this article we argue that there is more than one reason why adaptive logics provide the right tools for analyzing the argument patterns involved in these covering law explanations. To this end we claim that in the case of inconsistent knowledge systems, neither classical logic, nor a paraconsistent logic suffice to capture the right class of permissible arguments that can make up a deductivenomological explanation, whereas an adaptive logic gives just the right results. The arguments behind inductivestatistical explanations face the wellknown problem of inductive ambiguities, which Hempel tried to solve by his requirement of maximal specifity. We show how this requirement can be nicely incorporated in a logic for these arguments, again using an adaptive logic (which we describe in some detail).
}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {J:alqe, title = {Adaptive logics for question evocation}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, pages = {135{\textendash}164}, abstract = {In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for Wisniewki{\textquoteright}s notion of question evocation. The first is based on an erotetic extension of Classical Logic, the second on an erotetic extension of S5. For both logics, I present the semantics and the dynamic proof theory. The latter is especially important in view of the fact that question evocation is a nonmonotonic relation for which there is no positive test. Thanks to its dynamical character, the proof theory moreover solves the logical omniscience problem to which Wisniewski{\textquoteright}s static definition of question evocation leads.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {291776, title = {All premises are equal, but some are more equal than others.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, pages = {165{\textendash}188}, abstract = {This paper proposes two adaptive approaches to inconsistent prioritized belief bases. Both approaches rely on a selection mechanism, that is not applied to the premises as they stand, but to the consequence sets of the belief levels. One is based on classical compatibility, the other on the modal logic T of Feys. For both approaches the two main strategies of inconsistency adaptive logics are formulated: the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy. All four systems are compared and found useful.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:dyndisc, title = {Aspects of the Dynamics of Discussions and Logics Handling Them}, year = {2001}, abstract = {Although we are all familiar with discussions, spelling out their dynamics in a precise way involves many tough logical problems. This paper reports on a set of logical tools that are useful in this respect. Some concern the arguments produced in a discussion, possibly as a result of interventions of different participants, and the many forms of explicit and implicit agreement that are required to understand what is going on. Others concern the changing positions of participants. Nearly all of the tools are adaptive logics.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {DLn:induct2, title = {On Classical Adaptive Logics of Induction}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, pages = {255{\textendash}290}, abstract = {This paper concerns the inference of inductive generalizations and of predictions derived from them. It improves on the adaptive logic of induction from \emph{On a Logic of Induction} (Batens, Logic and Philosophy of Science, IV, 1, 2006, pp. 332) by presenting logics that are formulated strictly according to the usual adaptive standards. It moreover extends that paper with respect to background knowledge.
We present logics that handle inductive generalizations as well as logics that handle prioritized background knowledge of three kinds: background generalizations, pragmatic background generalizations (the instances of which may be invoked even after the generalizations are falsified), and background theories. All logics may be combined into a single system.
Promotor: Diderik Batens
}, month = {January 19}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {D:Rpijl, title = {A Dynamic Characterization of the Pure Logic of Relevant Implication}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {30}, year = {2001}, pages = {267280}, abstract = {This paper spells out a dynamic proof format for the pure logic of relevant implication. (A proof is dynamic if a formula derived at some stage need not be derived at a later stage.) The paper illustrates three interesting points. (i)\ A set of properties that characterizes an inference relation on the (very natural) dynamic proof interpretation, need not characterize the same inference relation (or even any inference relation) on the usual settheoretical interpretation. (ii)\ A proof format may display an internal dynamics (defeasible conclusions) in the absence of an external dynamics (nonmonotonicity). (iii)\ A monotonic logic may have a nonmonotonic characterization.
Keywords: dynamic proofs, relevant implication, nonmonotonicity.
We summarize here the main arguments, basic research lines, and results on the foundations of the logics of formal inconsistency. These involve, in particular, some classes of wellknown paraconsistent systems. We also present their semantical interpretations by way of possibletranslations semantics and their applications to human reasoning and machine reasoning.
}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o} } @article {D:gcal, title = {A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, note = {Appeared 2003}, pages = {45{\textendash}68}, abstract = {This paper contains a unified characterization of adaptive logics. The general structure is presented in the simplest possible guise, both for flat and prioritized adaptive logics. The latter are presented as a special case of combined adaptive logics. The aim of the paper is to provide the general framework underlying several other papers in this volume and to prepare the unified metatheory of adaptive logics.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {DJ:lpe, title = {On the Logic and Pragmatics of the Process of Explanation}, booktitle = {Explanatory Connections. {E}lectronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen}, year = {2001}, note = {22\ pp.
}, publisher = {University of Helsinki}, abstract = {In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an \emph{explanandum} and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain.
}, url = {http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/matti/}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Kiikeri, Mika and Ylikoski, Petri} } @proceedings {caleiro2001non, title = {Nontruthfunctional fibred semantics}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, volume = {2}, year = {2001}, pages = {841{\textendash}847}, publisher = {CSREA Press}, abstract = {Until recently, truthfunctionality has been considered essential to the mechanism for combining logics known as fibring. Following the first efforts towards extending fibred semantics to logics with nontruth functional operators, this paper aims to clarify the subject at the light of ideas borrowed from the theory of general logics as institutions and the novel notion of nontruthfunctional room. Besides introducing the relevant concepts and constructions, the paper presents a detailed worked example combining classical firstorder logic with the paraconsistent propositional system C_{1}, for which a meaningful semantics is obtained. The possibility of extending this technique to build rstorder versions of further logics of formal inconsistency is also discussed.
}, author = {Caleiro, Carlos and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @article {D:zinleven, title = {Over de zin van het leven en de zingevende functie van wereldbeelden}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {226}, year = {2001}, pages = {41{\textendash}63}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {weber2001pragmatic, title = {A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions}, booktitle = {Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium}, series = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Leske \& Budrich}, address = {Keulen}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Blasius, J{\"o}rg and Hox, J. and de Leeuw, E. and Schmidt, P.} } @article {291578, title = {Preferences as inconsistencyresolvers: an Inconsistencyadaptive Tool}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2001}, pages = {47{\textendash}63}, issn = {14253305}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {DDa:vd1, title = {Pushing the Search Paths in the Proofs. {A} Study in Proof Heuristics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, pages = {113{\textendash}134}, abstract = {Introducing techniques deriving from dynamic proofs in proofs for propositional classical logic is shown to lead to a proof format that enables one to push search paths into the proofs themselves. The resulting goal directed proof format is shown to provide a decision method for A_{1}, ..., A_{n} B and a positive test for A.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {Klijn2001, title = {Robots en Onderwijs.}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {28}, year = {2001}, pages = {249263}, author = {Klijn, Alex} } @article {291580, title = {The role of ambiguities in the construction of collective theories.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, pages = {189{\textendash}214}, abstract = {The paper presents a formal model for theory development, based on a very intuitive ambiguityadaptive logic. Apart from its simplicity, the model has some interesting features. (i) It allows for the construction of theories that cannot rely on observational data. (ii) It allows to construct a theory starting from zero, and using a small set of predicates. (iii) The model establishes that there is no real difference between the construction of scientific theories and the development of everyday knowledge.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {322170, title = {Secondary qualities in retrospect}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {68}, year = {2001}, pages = {41{\textendash}59}, abstract = {Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primarysecondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntosh{\textquoteright}s analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different primarysecondary quality distinctions to Boyle and Locke. On the other hand, he forbears to attribute a particular primarysecondary quality distinction to them, which, at least in the case of Boyle, differs genuinely from his main distinction between the mechanical affections of matter and all of matter{\textquoteright}s other qualities.
}, issn = {03798402}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @article {DJ:tabl2, title = {Shortcuts and Dynamic Marking in the Tableau Method for Adaptive logics}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {69}, year = {2001}, pages = {221{\textendash}248}, abstract = {Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In \cite{DJ:tabl1}, we presented a tableau method for two inconsistencyadaptive logics. In the present paper, we first describe these methods (without repeating the metatheoretic proofs). Next, we present several ways to increase the efficiency of the methods. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision{\textendash}the conclusion follows or does not follow{\textendash}in a very economical way.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @proceedings {carnielli_tableau_2001, title = {Tableau systems for logics of formal inconsistency}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, year = {2001}, pages = {848852}, publisher = {{CSREA} Press, Athens {GA}, {USA}}, abstract = {The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) are logics that allow to explicitly formalize the concepts of consistency and inconsistency by means of formulas of their language. Contradictoriness, on the other hand, can always be expressed in any logic, provided its language includes a symbol for negation. Besides being able to represent the distinction between contradiction and inconsistency, LFIs are nonexplosive logics, in the sense that a contradiction does not entail arbitrary statements, but yet are gently explosive, in the sense that, adjoining the additional requirement of consistency, then contradictoriness do cause explosion. Several logics can be seen as LFIs, among them the great majority of paraconsistent systems developed under the Brazilian and Polish tradition. We present here tableau systems for some important LFIs: bC, Ci and LFI1.
}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @incollection {carnielli2001taxonomy, title = {A taxonomy of Csystems}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2001}, pages = {194}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {A thorough investigation of the foundations of paraconsistent logics. Relations between logical principles are formally studied, a novel notion of consistency is introduced, the logics of formal inconsistency, and the subclasses of Csystems and dCsystems are defined and studied. An enormous variety of paraconsistent logics in the literature is shown to constitute Csystems.
}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E.} } @article {christiaens2001universe, title = {This Universe Is the {\textquoteleft}Best{\textquoteright} of All Possible Worlds. {A} Tentative Reconstruction of the Metaphysical System of Leo Apostel}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2001}, pages = {115146}, abstract = {After presenting Apostels views on scientific realism, I present definitions of the concepts of ontology and metaphysics. I then proceed to develop Apostels basic ontology and his metaphysics. Apostel proposed a particular understanding of existence based on his views on causation. He also developed a view of the universe as a causal selfexplaining system. I discuss and illustrate three kinds of what he calls metaphysical deductions that aim to deliver such a view of the universe. The most important one is the Leibnizian variational method, that should allow us to deduce the existing universe as the best of all possible worlds.
}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {D:uaal, title = {A Universally AbnormalityAdaptive Logic}, journal = {Logical Investigations}, volume = {8}, year = {2001}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {256{\textendash}265}, address = {Moscow, {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}NAUKA{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}}, abstract = {The present paper presents a logic that allows for the abnormal behaviour of any logical constant and for the ambiguous behaviour of any nonlogical constant, but nevertheless offers an interpretation of the premises that is as normal as possible.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {d2001use, title = {The use of metaphors in scientific development: a logical approach}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173175}, year = {2001}, pages = {215{\textendash}235}, abstract = {In this paper, I argue that the use of multiple metaphors plays an important part in scientific reasoning. It is more powerful in generating new ideas than the use of single metaphors. The aim of this paper is twofold. First I will argue, by means of some historical examples, that the combination of metaphors adds a very specific type of dynamics, that makes them more powerful than single metaphors. Secondly, I will discuss an adaptive logic that grasps the use of multiple metaphors and that increases our insight in the reasoning process.
}, author = {DHanis, Isabel} } @article {J:psic, title = {On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent Constraints}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2000}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters when solving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meet these difficulties we need an inconsistencyadaptive logic that enables one to derive as many (interesting) consequences as possible, but that at the same time allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I show that the inconsistencyadaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {DJ:compat, title = {The Adaptive Logic of Compatibility}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {66}, year = {2000}, pages = {327{\textendash}348}, abstract = {This paper describes the adaptive logic of compatibility and its dynamic proof theory. The results derive from insights in inconsistencyadaptive logic, but are themselves very simple and philosophically unobjectionable. In the absence of a positive test, dynamic proof theories lead, in the long run, to correct results and, in the short run, sometimes to final decisions but always to sensible estimates. The paper contains a new and natural kind of semantics for S5 from which it follows that a specific subset of the standard worldsmodels is characteristic for S5.
Keywords: compatibility, adaptive logic, ampliative reasoning, S5semantics.
It may perhaps sound strange if not bizarre to suggest that metaphors and analogies could and should play a role in the practice of mathematics, let alone to claim that they are essential in presentday mathematics. Yet, that will be precisely the claim I will defend in this paper. I do insist that presentday mathematics is the domain of investigation I have in mind. From a historical perspective, and as an example, no one seems to doubt that mathematics one way or another must have arisen out of a specific set of practices, usually referred to as counting and measuring, and that mathematical concepts are metaphorically related to these practices. That view of the matter, however, does not necessarily say anything about the situation today and, indeed, in most cases it does not.
}, doi = {10.1007/9789401594424_7}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Hallyn, Fernand} } @incollection {Christiaens2000, title = {De eenheid van de inhoud}, booktitle = {Natuurfilosofie. Voorbereidend werk voor een op de fysica gebaseerde ontologie}, year = {2000}, pages = {935}, publisher = {VUB}, abstract = {In deze tekst richten we onze aandacht niet zozeer op het inleiding van manuscripten Natuurfilosofie en Oorsprong. Veelmeer belichten we de belangrijkste bouwstenen van Apostels project voor een metafysica en proberen we enkele centrale noties te verhelderen. Met de titel {\textquoteright}de eenheid van de inhoud{\textquoteright} wordt reed gewezen op het coherente onderbouwde idee{\"e}ngoed van Apostel. We zullen zien dat het begrip causaliteit als een rode draad doorheen Apostels filosofie loopt. We gaan er dan ook iets uitvoeriger op in. We kunnen hier evenwel niet uitgebreid ingaan op alle aspecten die we ter sprake brengen, maar zullen geregeld verwijzen naar publicaties in de voetnoten. We hopen op deze manier ge{\"\i}nteresseerden een instrument in handen te geven dat toelaat dieper in te gaan op de filosofie van Apostel.
}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Apostel, Leo} } @article {D:tolerance, title = {On the epistemological justification of pluralism and tolerance}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {65}, number = {1}, year = {2000}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {33{\textendash}54}, address = {Ghent}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {J:ana, title = {An Extremely Rich Paraconsistent Logic and the Adaptive Logic Based on It}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {189{\textendash}201}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @book {D\&CMGPJpVB, title = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, series = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, organization = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {134996, title = {H{L}2, an inconsistencyadaptive and inconsistencyresolving logic for general statements that might have exceptions}, journal = {Journal of Applied NonClassical Logics}, volume = {10}, number = {34}, year = {2000}, pages = {317{\textendash}338}, abstract = {The present paper offers a new approach to nonmonotonic logics and their reconstruction in terms of inconsistencyadaptive logics. By applying a special technique, universally quantified formulas are assigned instances that, given the paraconsistent framework, do not cause triviality even if they conflict with knowledge deriving from other sources. From the special instances, the usual instances may be derived conditionally, viz. provided they are not contradicted by statements derived with a higher preference ranking.
}, issn = {11663081}, doi = {10.1080/11663081.2000.10511002}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {121604, title = {Human(istisch)e wiskunde of de mogelijkheid van een alternatieve wiskunde.}, booktitle = {De toekomst van het heden : zijn we op weg naar een menselijker samenleving?}, year = {2000}, pages = {127{\textendash}140}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, isbn = {9074174051}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {Vermeir_inconsistencyadaptivearithmetic, title = {Inconsistencyadaptive Arithmetic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {167168}, year = {2000}, pages = {221241}, abstract = {In this article, it is shown that inconsistent arithmetic, as proposed by Jean Paul Van Bendegem and Graham Priest, does not have all the properties they claim the system has. The search for a system of inconsistent arithmetic that does have the intended properties, will lead us through different axiomatizations and different logics, the final result being inconsistencyadaptive arithmetic.
}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy} } @article {D:minmod, title = {Minimally abnormal models in some adaptive logics}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {125}, year = {2000}, pages = {5{\textendash}18}, abstract = {In an adaptive logic APL, based on a (monotonic) nonstandard logic PL, the consequences of can be defined in terms of a selection of the PLmodels of . An important property of the adaptive logics ACLuN1, ACLuN2, ACLuNs1, and ACLuNs2 logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this is justified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). The property fails for Priest{\textquoteright}s LP^{m} because of its way of measuring the degree of abnormality of a model is incoherent{\textendash}correcting this delivers the property.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:clash, title = {Rich inconsistencyadaptive logics. {T}he clash between heuristic efficiency and realistic reconstruction}, booktitle = {Logique en perspective. {M}{\'e}langes offerts {\`a} {P}aul {G}ochet}, year = {2000}, pages = {513{\textendash}543}, publisher = {{\'E}ditions OUSIA}, address = {Brussels}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Grillet, Eric and Beets, Fran{\c c}ois} } @incollection {D:survial, title = {A Survey of InconsistencyAdaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {49{\textendash}73}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, abstract = {This paper offers a systematic review of some central philosophical and technical results on adaptive logics. Quite a few of the results are still in print or forthcoming.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {DJ:tabl1, title = {A Tableau Method for InconsistencyAdaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods}, series = {Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence}, volume = {1847}, year = {2000}, pages = {127{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {We present a tableau method for inconsistencyadaptive logics and illustrate it in terms of the two best studied systems. The method is new in that adaptive logics require a more complex structure of the tableaus and of some rules and conditions. As there is no positive test for derivability in inconsistencyadaptive logics, the tableau method is important for providing criteria for derivability.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dyckhoff, Roy} } @article {D:unific, title = {Towards the Unification of Inconsistency Handling Mechanisms}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2000}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {5{\textendash}31}, abstract = {It is shown that the (flat) consequence relations defined from the RescherManor Mechanism (that is: in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premises) are all inconsistencyadaptive logics combined with a specific interpretation schema for the premises. Each of the adaptive logics is obtained by applying a suitable adaptive strategy to the paraconsistent logic CLuN.
This result provides all those consequence relations with a (dynamic) proof theory and with a static (as well as a dynamic) semantics.
In this paper I present two new strategies for inconsistency adaptive logics: the reliable sufficient information strategyof ACLuN3 and the minimally abnormal sufficient information strategyof ACLuN4. I give proof theory and semantics for both ACLuN3 and ACLuN4. I also com pare them with the wellknown inconsistencyadaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2.
}, issn = {14253305}, doi = {10.12775/LLP.2000.004}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof} } @article {J:clau3, title = {Clausius{\textquoteright} discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. {A} paradigm of reasoning from inconsistencies}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {63}, year = {1999}, pages = {89{\textendash}117}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {D:cps, title = {Contextual Problem Solving and Adaptive Logics In Creative Processes}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, note = {Appeared 2001}, pages = {7{\textendash}31}, abstract = {Creativity is commonly seen as beyond the scope of rationality. In the present paper, it is argued that available insights in epistemology and available results in logic enable us to incorporate creativity within an independently sensible view on human rationality.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {135002, title = {The creative growth of mathematics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {63}, year = {1999}, pages = {119{\textendash}152}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {J:d\&aal, title = {Deductive and Ampliative Adaptive Logics as Tools in the Study of Creativity}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {4}, year = {1999}, pages = {325{\textendash}336}, abstract = {In this paper, I argue that logic has an important role to play in the methodological study of creativity. I also argue, however, that only special kinds of logic enable one to understand the reasoning involved in creative processes. I show that deductive and ampliative adaptive logics are appropriate tools in this respect.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {J:earlypos, title = {The early positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, pages = {81{\textendash}108}, abstract = {In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the "positivists" (logical positivists and their immediate forerunners) have been criticised for their (alleged) neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the {\textquoteright}friends of discovery{\textquoteright} seem to have forgotten. Contrary to what is generally accepted, I shall also show that there is no reason at all why the positivists should have ignored discovery.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {DK\&N, title = {Embedding and Interpolation for Some Paralogics. {T}he Propositional Case}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {33}, year = {1999}, pages = {29{\textendash}44}, abstract = {We consider the very weak paracomplete and paraconsistent logics that are obtained by a straightforward weakening of Classical Logic, as well as some of their maximal extensions that are a fragment of Classical Logic. We prove (for the propositional case) that these logics may be faithfully embedded in Classical Logic (as well as in each other), and that the interpolation theorem obtains for them.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Kurtonina, Natasha} } @article {J:eaip, title = {Erotetic arguments from inconsistent premises}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165166}, year = {1999}, pages = {49{\textendash}80}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to generalize two basic concepts of Wisniewski{\textquoteright}s theory of questions, namely question evocation and question generation, to the inconsistent case. For both concepts, I shall present three alternative definitions. Each of these is based on a prioritized adaptive logic. I shall show that, for the consistent case, each of the alternative definitions leads to the same results as the original ones, and that, for inconsistent case, no other changes are introduced than those required for the sensible handling of inconsistencies. I shall also show that, in the generalized case, a new kind of question evocation can be defined (here called stong evocation). I shall demonstrate that if a question is strongly evoked by some inconsistent set of premmises, then each of its direct answers provides guidance on how the inconsistencies should be resolved.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {EDa:diag, title = {A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165166}, year = {1999}, pages = {161{\textendash}180}, abstract = {Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: nonexplanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of nonexplanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that nonexplanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.
After a general description of adaptive logics and their intended applications, I study the proof theory and semantics of two closely related predicative inconsistencyadaptive logics, ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. To this end, I first describe their monotonic basis: the paraconsistent logic CLuN obtained by dropping the consistency requirement from classical logic. The propositional fragments of these inconsistencyadaptive logics have been studied elsewhere. The predicative versions involve several interesting difficulties that lead to new results.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Or{\l}owska, Ewa} } @article {109726, title = {Introduction.}, journal = {FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {231{\textendash}234}, issn = {12331821}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D:l\&om, title = {Linguistic and Ontological Measures for Comparing the Inconsistent Parts of Models}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165166}, year = {1999}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {5{\textendash}33}, abstract = {Adaptive logics depend essentially on measures for the degree of abnormality of models. The linguistic approach to such measures compares the sets of abnormal, e.g., inconsistent wffs verified by the models. The ontological approach compares models in terms of {\textquoteleft}structural{\textquoteright} properties that do not depend on the way in which the language is interpreted in the model.
While the linguistic approach has not been questioned up to now, present proposals for an ontological approach are affected by several weaknesses. The present paper argues for the attractiveness of an ontological approach and elaborates on the challenge to adequately define it. The final outcome is rather negative: the only sensible definition attained leads to a logic that does not seem to have any suitable application contexts.
Ambiguityadaptive logics offer a natural and rich formal solution to (possibly) inconsistent theories. Three views on ambiguities result in three different, intuitively correct ambiguityadaptive logics with interesting applications. We present their semantics and proof theory, and illustrate that ambiguityadaptive logics form an excellent alternative to paraconsistent logics that focus on the characteristics of the logical constants.
}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {J:mbr, title = {ModelBased Reasoning in Creative Processes}, booktitle = {ModelBased Reasoning in Scientific Discovery}, year = {1999}, pages = {199{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Kluwer/Plenum}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {Combining a contextual approach to problem solving with results on some recently developed (nonstandard) logics, I present in this paper a general frame for the methodological study of modelbased reasoning in creative processes. I argue that modelbased reasoning does not require that we turn away from logic. I also argue, however, that in order to better understand and evaluate creative processes that involve modelbased reasoning, and in order to formulate guidelines for them, we urgently need to extend the existing variety of logics.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Nersessian, Nancy and Thagard, Paul} } @incollection {VanBendegem1999, title = {Oorlog en vrede in wetenschapsland}, booktitle = {Denken als Openheid. {L}iber Amicorum {H}ubert {D}ethier}, year = {1999}, pages = {153160}, publisher = {VUB}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Walraves, Else and Stuy, Johan} } @article {D:pwv, title = {Paraconsistency and its Relation to Worldviews}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {259{\textendash}283}, abstract = {The paper highlights the import of the paraconsistent movement, list some motivations for its origin, and distinguishes some stands with respect to paraconsistency. It then discusses some sources of inconsistency that are specific for worldviews, and the import of the paraconsistent turn for the worldviews enterprise.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:ra, title = {Radicaal Athe{\"\i}sme}, booktitle = {Wat met {G}od?}, year = {1999}, pages = {129{\textendash}162}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} } @article {386238, title = {Rationality in the Discovery of Empirical Laws}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {4}, year = {1999}, pages = {355{\textendash}368}, abstract = {In this paper I argue against the traditional viewthat in discovery processes there is no place forrational decisions. First I argue that some historicalprocesses in which an empirical law was developed,were rational. Second, I identify some of themethodological rules that we can follow in order to berational when constructing an empirical law. Finally,I argue that people who deny that scientific discoverycan be rational do not understand the nature ofmethodological rules.
}, issn = {12331821}, doi = {10.1023/A:1009600614510}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {135139, title = {Scientific revolutions, rationality and creativity}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, pages = {109{\textendash}128}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {109727, title = {Unification: what is it, how do we reach and why do we want it?}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {118}, number = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {479{\textendash}499}, abstract = {This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value.
}, issn = {00397857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005134205471}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {109728, title = {World Models and Inconsistencies.}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {285{\textendash}311}, abstract = {A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.
}, issn = {12331821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Christiaens, Wim} } @article {D:CL0, title = {Zero Logic Adding Up to Classical Logic}, journal = {Logical Studies}, volume = {2}, year = {1999}, note = {(Electronic Journal: {\small\texttt{http://www.logic.ru/LogStud/02/LS2.html}})}, pages = {15}, abstract = {The present paper presents a logic that allows for the abnormal behaviour of any logical constant and for the ambiguous behaviour of any nonlogical constant, but nevertheless offers an interpretation of the premises that is as normal as possible. If the premises have classical models, the logic assigns them the same consequence set as Classical Logic.
The semantics of the logic is presented, the dynamic proof theory is hinted at, and some comments are added on the philosophical significance of the result.
Distinguant trois fonctions pratiques de la croyance causale : l{\textquoteright}affirmation de buts, la r{\'e}solution des probl{\`e}mes li{\'e}s {\`a} l{\textquoteright}action et la construction des probl{\`e}mes de d{\'e}cision, l{\textquoteright}A. montre que le premier implique {\`a} lui seul cinq conceptions diff{\`e}rentes de la croyance causale concernant : 1) les mouvements du corps; 2) les interactions causales; 3) la capacit{\'e} de certains objets {\`a} pr{\`e}server certaines caract{\'e}ristiques; 4) la causation structurale; 5) les influences causales permanentes. L{\textquoteright}A. cherche une m{\'e}thode {\`e}pist{\'e}mologique fiable (Salmon, Mackie) pour v{\'e}rifier et justifier la connaissance causale que nous pouvons avoir de ces cinq versions de la croyance causale
}, issn = {03780880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {135140, title = {Prudential Arguments in the Realism Debate.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {41}, number = {164}, year = {1998}, pages = {301{\textendash}312}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {van1998schoonheid, title = {Schoonheid in de wiskunde: Birkhoff Revisited}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {60}, year = {1998}, pages = {106{\textendash}130}, abstract = {Everyone is familiar with the measure of beauty that has been proposed by Birkhoff, the famous formula M = O/C. Although I show that the formula in its original form cannot be maintained, I present a reinterpretation that adapts the formula for measuring the beauty of mathematical proofs. However, this type of measure is not the only aesthetic element in mathematics. There exists a {\textquoteright}romantic{\textquoteright} side as well, to use the term introduced by Fran{\c c}ois Le Lionnais. Thus, a more complex proposal of mathematical beauty is presented. Finally and as a consequence, I argue against the dichotomy that associates science, including mathematics, with the beauty of simplicity and that associates the arts with the beauty of complexity. As an example, the work of Oulipo, Raymond Queneau in particular, is briefly presented.
}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {von1998if, title = {What, if anything, is an experiment in mathematics?}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science}, year = {1998}, pages = {172{\textendash}182}, publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Anapolitanos, Dionysios and Baltas, Aristides and Tsinorema, Stavroula} } @article {VanBendegem1998, title = {Zeker lezen: logica.}, journal = {Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij en Wetenschap}, volume = {38}, year = {1998}, pages = {6869}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {109693, title = {Ambiguityadaptive logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {159}, year = {1997}, pages = {261{\textendash}280}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {Kurtonina:1997:BTL:595833.595898, title = {Bisimulations for Temporal Logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, year = {1997}, pages = {403{\textendash}425}, abstract = {We define bisimulations for temporal logic with Since and Until. This new notion is compared to existing notions of bisimulations, and then used to develop the basic model theory of temporal logic with Since and Until. Our results concern both invariance and definability. We conclude with a brief discussion of the wider applicability of our ideas.
}, keywords = {definability, expressive power, modal and temporal logic, model theory}, issn = {09258531}, doi = {10.1023/A:1008223921944}, author = {Kurtonina, Natasha and De Rijke, Maarten} } @incollection {D:vrijzhum, title = {Grondslagen van het vrijzinnig humanisme. {E}en kennistheoretisch pleidooi}, booktitle = {Grondslagen Vrijzinnig Humanisme}, year = {1997}, pages = {75{\textendash}104}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} } @article {D:i\&b, title = {Inconsistencies and Beyond. {A} LogicalPhilosophical Discussion}, journal = {Revue Internationale de Philosophie}, volume = {200}, year = {1997}, pages = {259{\textendash}273}, abstract = {The paper starts off by epistemological arguments for the need of paraconsistent logics. Next it is argued that some contexts require that one allows for other abnormalities, next to or instead of inconsistencies. The feasibility of such moves is defended in terms of a contextual epistemology. Finally, adaptive logics are defended as means to interpret theories {\textquoteleft}as normally as possible{\textquoteright}, even if they contain some abnormalities.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {VanBendegem1997, title = {L.E.J. Brouwer.}, journal = {Kritisch Denkerslexicon}, volume = {23}, year = {1997}, pages = {114}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {DJ:gw, title = {Over het (vermeende) conflict tussen godsgeloof en de wetenschappen}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {42}, year = {1997}, pages = {401{\textendash}415}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {267462, title = {Scientific explanation and the interrogative model of inquiry}, booktitle = {Knowledge and inquiry : essays on Jaakko Hintikka{\textquoteright}s epistemology and philosophy of science}, series = {Poznan Studies}, volume = {51}, year = {1997}, pages = {239{\textendash}259}, publisher = {Rodopi}, isbn = {9789042000803}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Sintonen, M} } @article {184851, title = {Simulating without negation.}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, year = {1997}, pages = {501{\textendash}522}, abstract = {Although negationfree languages are widely used in logic and computer science, relatively little is known about their expressive power. To address this issue we consider kinds of nonsymmetric bisimulations called directed simulations, and use these to analyse the expressive power and model theory of negationfree modal and temporal languages. We first use them to obtain preservation, safety and definability results for a simple negationfree modal language. We then obtain analogous results for stronger negationfree languages. Finally, we extend our methods to deal with languages with nonBoolean negation. Keywords: Expressive power, modal logic, negationfree languages.
}, issn = {0955792X}, author = {Kurtonina, Natasha and De Rijke, Maarten} } @incollection {VanBendegem1997c, title = {Twee grote verhalen over wetenschap (voor allen en voor niemand).}, booktitle = {Ik \& het verhaal}, year = {1997}, pages = {107130}, publisher = {Uitgaven Woord en Argument}, address = {Hasselt}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Vandormael, Jan} } @incollection {VanBendegem1997b, title = {Vrijzinnig (?) humanisme (?) in een moderne (?) wereld.}, booktitle = {Grondslagen Vrijzinnig Humanisme}, year = {1997}, pages = {149169}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} } @article {VanBendegem1997a, title = {Wetenschap en religie: zo verzoenbaar als men maar wil.}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {42}, year = {1997}, pages = {381388}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @phdthesis {J:thesis, title = {Wetenschappelijke ontdekking en creativiteit. {E}en poging tot theorievorming op basis van een conceptuele, methodologische en logische studie}, year = {1997}, month = {March 12}, publisher = {Universiteit Gent (Belgium)}, type = {phd}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @book {D:ag, title = {Antropin{\`e} Gnos{\`e}. Mia Ekkl{\`e}s{\`e} gia mia Chr{\`e}sim{\`e} Ortologikot{\`e}ta}, year = {1996}, publisher = {Crete University Press}, organization = {Crete University Press}, address = {Athens/Eracleion}, abstract = {Greek translation of "Menselijke Kennis" (Diderik Batens, Garant, 1992).
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {weber1996comment, title = {Comment construiton une explication d{\'e}ductivenomologique?}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {50}, number = {3}, year = {1996}, pages = {183{\textendash}204}, abstract = {Comment devonsnous appliquer notre savoir scientifique (lois de la nature, th{\'e}ries, etc.) pour qu{\textquoteright}il contribue {\`a} mieux comprendre les ph{\'e}nom{\`e}nes ({\'e}v{\'e}nements particuliers, regularit{\'e}, etc.) que nous observons? Le mod{\`e}le d{\'e}ductifnomologique d{\textquoteright}explication scientifique, dans lequel Carl Hempel construit le concept d{\textquoteright}explication d{\'e}ductivenomologique, ne procure pas une r{\'e}ponse compl{\`e}te {\`a} cette question. Un des probl{\`e}mes est que Hempel nous dit ce que nous devons construire quand nous voulons comprendre un ph{\'e}om{\`e}ne (une explication d{\'e}ductivenomologique), mais ne nous dit pas comment une explication de ce type est construite. Afin de r{\'e}oudre ce probl{\`e}me, une m{\'e}thode pour construire des explications d{\'e}ductivesnomologiques est d{\'e}velopp{\'e}e.
}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {257908, title = {Default Reasoning in the Correction of Falsified System Descriptions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1996}, pages = {13{\textendash}22}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:in10fg, title = {Een ontroerend intens streven naar kennis, naar beleving en naar de eenheid van beide}, booktitle = {Leo Apostel. {T}ien filosofen getuigen}, year = {1996}, pages = {135{\textendash}157}, publisher = {Hadewijch}, address = {Antwerpen/Baarn}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {257907, title = {Explaining, understanding and scientific theories}, journal = {Erkenntnis (Dordrecht)}, volume = {44}, year = {1996}, pages = {1{\textendash}23}, abstract = {One of the functions of scientific knowledge is to provide the theories and laws we need in order to understand the world. My article deals with the epistemic aspect of understanding, i.e., with understanding as unification. The aim is to explicate what we have to do in order to make our scientific knowledge contribute to an increase of the degree to which the particular events we have observed, fit into our worldpicture. The analysis contains two parts. First I define the concept of scientific epistemic explanation. Explanations of these type are the appropriate instruments for increasing the degree of unification of the particular events we have observed. In the second, largest part of the article I analyze the construction process of scientific epistemic explanations, focusing on the application of scientific theories.
}, issn = {15728420}, doi = {10.1007/BF00172851}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:ftal, title = {Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics}, booktitle = {Logic and Argumentation}, year = {1996}, pages = {241{\textendash}254}, publisher = {NorthHolland}, abstract = {This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Veltman, Frank} } @incollection {DJ:real, title = {Inworld realism vs. reflective realism.}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {35{\textendash}53}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} } @book {D:tfg, title = {Leo Apostel. {T}ien filosofen getuigen}, series = {Leo Apostel. {T}ien filosofen getuigen}, year = {1996}, publisher = {Hadewijch}, organization = {Hadewijch}, address = {Antwerpen/Baarn}, editor = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {257816, title = {Mathematical Experiments and Mathematical Pictures}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {203{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} } @incollection {257818, title = {Ook het oneindige is ons werk}, booktitle = {Leo Apostel. Tien filosofen getuigen}, year = {1996}, pages = {119{\textendash}134}, publisher = {Hadewijch}, address = {Antwerpen/Baarn}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {257909, title = {Some problems for {K}itcher{\textquoteright}s unification account of explanation}, journal = {Communication \& Cognition : Monographies}, volume = {29}, year = {1996}, pages = {441{\textendash}456}, issn = {03780880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {JD:steering, title = {Steering Problem Solving Between Cliff Incoherence and Cliff Solitude}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {58}, year = {1996}, note = {Appeared 1998}, pages = {153{\textendash}187}, abstract = {Starting from Nickles{\textquoteright} constraintinclusion model, we present five challenges that any rational problem solving model should meet, but that seem to lead to an inextricable riddle. We then introduce the contextual model and show, step by step, that it meets all the challenges and resolves the riddle. This results in a strong argument for the concept of rationality that underlies the model.
}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Batens, Diderik} } @article {van1996strange, title = {The strange case of the missing body of mathematics}, journal = {Semiotica}, volume = {112}, number = {34}, year = {1996}, pages = {403{\textendash}413}, abstract = {La notion d{\textquoteright}infini est analys{\'e}e en comparant les math{\'e}matiques et la th{\'e}ologie car les math{\'e}maticiens ont pendant longtemps per{\c c}u une relation entre la notion infinie math{\'e}matique et la notion d{\textquoteright}infinit{\'e} de Dieu
}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {257814, title = {Strict finitism as a viable alternative in the foundations of mathematics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1996}, pages = {23{\textendash}40}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {D:blocks, title = {Blocks. {T}he clue to dynamic aspects of logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {38}, number = {150151152}, year = {1995}, note = {Appeared 1997}, pages = {285{\textendash}328}, abstract = {The present paper introduces a new approach to formal logic. The block approach is especially useful to grasp dynamic aspects of reasoning, including formal reasoning, that fall beyond the reach of the usual approaches. A block language, the block analysis of proofs, and semantic systems in terms of blocks are articulated. The approach is first applied to classical logic (including proof heuristics). It is used to solve two important problems for adaptive logics (that have a dynamic proof theory). Some further applications are discussed, including meaning change.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {van1995defence, title = {In defence of discrete space and time}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {38}, number = {150151152}, year = {1995}, pages = {127150}, abstract = {In this paper several arguments are discussed and evaluated concerning the possibility of discrete space and time.
}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {J:np, title = {Nieuwe perspectieven voor het begrijpen en bevorderen van creativiteit}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {40}, year = {1995}, pages = {164{\textendash}178}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {248905, title = {Realism and scientific explanations}, booktitle = {The Many Problems of Realism}, year = {1995}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Tilburg University Press}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Cortois, Paul} } @article {WE_Rf, title = {Review of {R}. {F}ranck (red.) {\textquoteright}{F}autil chercher aux causes une raison? {L}{\textquoteright}explication causale dans les sciences humaines{\textquoteright} ({L}yon, {I}nstitut {I}nterdisciplinaire d{\textquoteright}{E}tudes {E}pist{\'e}mologiques)}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {54}, year = {1995}, pages = {145{\textendash}146}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {Weber1995, title = {Scientific Arguments and Scientific Prediction.}, booktitle = {Special Fields and Cases. Proceedings on the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation}, volume = {IV}, year = {1995}, pages = {377387}, publisher = {SicSat}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Blair, J. and Willart, C.} } @incollection {D:alaoetb, title = {Adaptieve logica{\textquoteright}s: een aanzet om elkaar te begrijpen}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {13{\textendash}19}, publisher = {VUBPers}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @incollection {D:determinisme, title = {Determinisme en indeterminisme}, booktitle = {Verwijdering of ontmoeting?}, year = {1994}, pages = {183{\textendash}202}, publisher = {Pelckmans}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Verbeure, Frans and Apostel, Leo} } @incollection {J:nvfb, title = {Elk wetenschapper zijn onderzoeksprogramma?}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}67}, publisher = {VUBPers}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @incollection {241637, title = {Explanation, understanding and whyquestions}, booktitle = {Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen}, year = {1994}, pages = {8394}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Halleux, Robert and Bern{\'e}s, AnneCath{\'e}rine} } @article {D:ialfnm, title = {InconsistencyAdaptive Logics and the Foundation of NonMonotonic Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1994}, note = {Appeared 1996}, pages = {57{\textendash}94}, abstract = {This paper contains the reconstruction of (what I shall call) mixed nonmonotonic logics as a combination of a deductive and a preferential component. The first leads from the premises to a possibly inconsistent consequence set; the second weeds out the inconsistencies. Among the candidates for the deductive component inconsistencyadaptive logics prove most suitable. The ensuing preferential component is formulated in terms of models and is itself split into two parts: (i) a transparent, purely logical procedure leads from a set of inconsistent models to a set of associated consistent models and (ii) the choice between the latter relies on the preferences. The real fight between mixed nonmonotonic logics should concentrate on this last aspect. The outlined approach has a broader domain of application than mixed nonmonotonic logics.
}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {VanMeirvenne1994, title = {Indexed InconsistencyAdaptive Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1994}, pages = {4155}, author = {Van Meirvenne, Joachim} } @article {241629, title = {Socialisatie, sociale controle en sociologische verklaringen van menselijke handelingen.}, journal = {TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN}, volume = {38}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}68}, issn = {00407615}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D\&PC:tep, title = {The twoenvelope paradox: the infinite case}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {54}, year = {1994}, pages = {46{\textendash}49}, author = {Castel, Paul and Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {241638, title = {Waarom {W}esley {S}almons causaalmechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {8186}, publisher = {VUB Press}, isbn = {9789054870845}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Cornelis, Gustaaf C} } @article {J:clau1, title = {Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of {C}lausius}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {36}, number = {143144}, year = {1993}, pages = {359{\textendash}389}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {D:ialddl, title = {De inconsistentieadaptieve logica {D}{D}{L}}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {39{\textendash}45}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {J:nvfd, title = {De rationaliteit van persoonlijke inperkingen}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {33{\textendash}38}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {241634, title = {Het construeren van wetenschappelijke verklaringen}, booktitle = {Gehelen en fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1993}, pages = {261265}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @article {241633, title = {The indirect practical functions of explanations}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, year = {1993}, pages = {105{\textendash}124}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {WE_In, title = {Introduction}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, year = {1993}, pages = {5{\textendash}7}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {J:ocwm, title = {Ontdekking en creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek}, booktitle = {Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen}, year = {1993}, pages = {41{\textendash}52}, publisher = {Nationaal Comit{\'e} voor Logica, Geschiedenis en Filosofie van de Wetenschappen}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Halleux, Robert and Bern{\'e}s, AnneCath{\'e}rine} } @incollection {D:o\&cvcka, title = {Onze huidige kijk op ontdekking en creativiteit vereist een {\textquoteleft}contextuele{\textquoteright} kennistheoretische aanpak}, booktitle = {Gehelen en fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1993}, pages = {265{\textendash}267}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @incollection {J:nvfl, title = {Recente ontwikkelingen in onze opvatting over creativiteit}, booktitle = {Gehelen en fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1993}, pages = {259{\textendash}261}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @article {WE_Rc, title = {Review of Werner Callebaut, {\textquoteright}Taking the naturalistic turn{\textquoteright} ({U}niversity of {C}hicago {P}ress)}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {53}, year = {1993}, pages = {123{\textendash}124}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {241636, title = {Wetenschappelijke verklaringen en subjectief verwacht nut}, booktitle = {Actueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {5360}, publisher = {Eburon}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {DJE:aoc, title = {Aspecten van ontdekking en creativiteit}, booktitle = {Gehelen en Fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1992}, month = {Leuven, September}, pages = {59}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @incollection {219925, title = {De verklarende kracht van statistische hypothesen}, booktitle = {Acta Filosofiedag 1990}, year = {1992}, pages = {5356}, publisher = {Ebduron}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Commers, Ronald} } @incollection {D:hier, title = {Do we need a hierarchical model of science?}, booktitle = {Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations. {E}ssays in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1992}, pages = {199{\textendash}215}, publisher = {University of California Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Earman, John} } @book {D:logica, title = {Logicaboek. {P}raktijk en theorie van het redeneren}, year = {1992}, publisher = {Garant}, organization = {Garant}, address = {Antwerpen/Apeldoorn}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @book {D:mk, title = {Menselijke kennis. {P}leidooi voor een bruikbare rationaliteit}, year = {1992}, publisher = {Garant}, organization = {Garant}, address = {Antwerpen/Apeldoorn}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {241630, title = {Models of explanation: an evaluation of their fruitfulness}, journal = {COMMUNICATION \& COGNITION : MONOGRAPHIES}, volume = {25}, year = {1992}, pages = {339{\textendash}352}, issn = {03780880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D:p\&rl, title = {Paraconsistente en relevante logica{\textquoteright}s}, journal = {Wijsgerig perspectief op maatschappij en wetenschap}, volume = {32/2}, year = {1992}, pages = {53{\textendash}59}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {Weber1992, title = {Scientific Explanation}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {49}, year = {1992}, pages = {148{\textendash}154}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D:globpara, title = {Against Global Paraconsistency}, journal = {Studies in Soviet Thought}, volume = {39}, year = {1990}, pages = {209{\textendash}229}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {241631, title = {Phenomenological Laws and their Application to Scientific Epistemic Explanation Problems}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {33}, number = {129130}, year = {1990}, pages = {175{\textendash}189}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {4172217, title = {De asymmetrie van wetenschappelijke verklaringen}, journal = {Algemeen nederlands tijdschrijft voor wijsbegeerte}, volume = {81}, year = {1989}, pages = {47{\textendash}58}, issn = {00025275}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:dyn, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistent Logic. {E}ssays on the Inconsistent}, year = {1989}, pages = {187{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Philosophica Verlag}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Priest, Graham and Routley, Richard and Norman, Jean} } @incollection {D:plc, title = {Een pleidooi voor lokale consistentie}, booktitle = {Congresbundel Filosofiedag Antwerpen 1988}, year = {1989}, pages = {41{\textendash}46}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Berghs, H. and Thys, W.} } @incollection {D:goedel, title = {Kurt {G}{\"o}del en de wetenschappelijke zekerheid}, booktitle = {Nieuwe visies in de wetenschap}, year = {1989}, pages = {43{\textendash}66}, publisher = {Acco}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Kint, J.} } @incollection {D:ladl, title = {Leo {A}postel on Dialectical Logic}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of {L}eo {A}postel, vol. 2: {D}escriptive and Critical Essays}, year = {1989}, pages = {24{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Communication and Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Vandamme, Fernand and Pinxten, Rik} } @article {D:nhpc1, title = {Natural Heuristics for Proof Construction. {P}art {I}: Classical Propositional Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {32}, number = {127128}, year = {1989}, note = {Appeared 1992}, pages = {337{\textendash}363}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:kloof, title = {Over de kloof tussen feit en norm, bekeken vanuit de hedendaagse wetenschapsfilosofie}, booktitle = {Dwarsdenken. Omtrent {J}aap {K}ruithof}, year = {1989}, pages = {165{\textendash}177}, publisher = {EPO}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van den Enden, Hugo} } @article {3063666, title = {Scientific explanation, necessity and contingency}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)}, volume = {44}, year = {1989}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @book {DJp:t\&e, title = {Theory and Experiment. {R}ecent Insights and New Perspectives on Their Relation}, year = {1988}, publisher = {Reidel}, organization = {Reidel}, address = {Dordrecht}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {D:as, title = {Action science and the reunification of the social sciences and epistemology}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {40}, year = {1987}, pages = {109{\textendash}134}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {4164554, title = {A causal approach to explanations}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {30}, number = {117118}, year = {1987}, pages = {51{\textendash}68}, issn = {00245836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:catm\&k, title = {A contextual approach to meaning and knowledge}, booktitle = {Science and Society}, year = {1987}, pages = {84{\textendash}110}, publisher = {VUBUitgaven}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Gosselin, M. and Demeyere, F.} } @article {D:riwdt, title = {Relevant Implication and the Weak Deduction Theorem}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {46}, year = {1987}, pages = {239{\textendash}245}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:sks, title = {The structure of our knowledge system}, booktitle = {Communication and Cognition. {A}pplied Epistemology}, year = {1987}, pages = {101}, publisher = {Communication and Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {3063662, title = {The transformation of cognitive values into methodological rules}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {40}, year = {1987}, pages = {151{\textendash}164}, issn = {03798402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:twoenrich, title = {Two semantically motivated enrichments of relevant logics}, booktitle = {Essays in Philosophical Logic}, year = {1987}, pages = {65{\textendash}74}, publisher = {Jagiellonian University Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Perzanowski, Jerzy} } @incollection {D:cwm, title = {Creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek}, booktitle = {Liber Amicorum J.L. Broeckx}, year = {1986}, pages = {29{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Grafisch Bureau M \& Team}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Hen, Ferdinand J. and Riessauw, AnneMarie and Sabbe, Herman} } @article {D:ddfl, title = {Dialectical dynamics within formal logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {29}, number = {114}, year = {1986}, pages = {161{\textendash}173}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:rrl, title = {Rich relevant logics based on a simple type of semantics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {29}, number = {116}, year = {1986}, pages = {437{\textendash}457}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:rssm\&l, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, booktitle = {Reason, Emotion and Music. {T}owards a Common Structure for Arts, Sciences and Philosophies, Based on a Conceptual Framework for the Description of Music}, year = {1986}, note = {Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}
}, pages = {127{\textendash}143}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Apostel, Leo and Sabbe, Herman and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D:rssm\&lcc, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {19}, year = {1986}, note = {Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}}, pages = {135{\textendash}151}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:expert, title = {Static and dynamic paraconsistent logics and their use in expert systems}, journal = {CCAI}, volume = {3}, year = {1986}, pages = {33{\textendash}50}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:w\&vw, title = {Wetenschap en Vrijzinnige Waarden}, booktitle = {De specificiteit van Vrijzinnig Humanistische Waarden}, year = {1986}, pages = {1{\textendash}14}, publisher = {UPV}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:tool, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics as a Tool to Deal with and Partly Eliminate Unexpected Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {The Logic of Discovery and the Logic of Discourse}, year = {1985}, pages = {263{\textendash}271}, publisher = {Plenum Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Hintikka, Jaakko and Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {D:mad, title = {Meaning, Acceptance, and Dialectics}, booktitle = {Change and Progress in Modern Science}, year = {1985}, pages = {333{\textendash}360}, publisher = {Reidel}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Pitt, J. C.} } @article {DJp:rd\&cl, title = {Relevant derivability and classical derivability in {F}itchstyle and axiomatic formulations of relevant logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {28}, number = {109}, year = {1985}, pages = {21{\textendash}31}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {D:incomm, title = {Incommensurability is not a threat to the rationality of science or to the antidogmatic tradition}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {32}, year = {1983}, pages = {117{\textendash}132}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:bridge, title = {A bridge between twovalued and manyvalued semantic systems: ntuple semantics}, journal = {Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on MultipleValued Logic}, volume = {IEEE}, year = {1982}, pages = {Los Angeles, 318{\textendash}322}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D\&AA, title = {Russell{\textquoteright}s Set versus the Universal Set in Paraconsistent Set Theory}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {25}, number = {98}, year = {1982}, pages = {121{\textendash}133}, author = {Arruda, Ayda I. and Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:prps, title = {Progress, rationality and the philosophy of science}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor de studie van de Verlichting en het Vrije denken}, volume = {8{\textendash}9}, year = {1981}, pages = {83{\textendash}102}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:cpm, title = {A completenessproof method for extensions of the implicational fragment of the propositional calculus}, journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {1980}, pages = {509{\textendash}517}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:pepl, title = {Paraconsistent extensional propositional logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {23}, number = {9091}, year = {1980}, pages = {195{\textendash}234}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {LA\&D\&a, title = {An empirical investigation on scientific observation}, booktitle = {Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy}, year = {1979}, pages = {3{\textendash}36}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Apostel, Leo and Batens, Diderik and Breusegem, Erwin and De Coninck, Jan and De Waele, Danny and Pinxten, Rik and Swings, Jean and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Vandamme, Fernand}, editor = {Callebaut, Werner and De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D:r\&er, title = {Rationality and ethical rationality}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {22}, year = {1978}, pages = {23{\textendash}45}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:bavw, title = {Bijna alle{\textendash}veel{\textendash}weinig}, booktitle = {Contactgroepen Humane en Politieke Wetenschappen}, year = {1977}, pages = {6{\textendash}14}, publisher = {NFWO}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:ind, title = {Inductie}, booktitle = {Standaard Encyclopedia voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs}, year = {1977}, pages = {180}, publisher = {Standaard}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Block, A. and Ten Have, T.T. and De Keyser, C.C.} } @incollection {D:_inf, title = {Inferentie}, booktitle = {Standaard Encyclopedie voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs}, year = {1977}, pages = {382{\textendash}383}, publisher = {Standaard}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Block, A. and Ten Have, T.T. and De Keyser, C.C.} } @article {D:otom:sc, title = {Outline of a theory of meaning: semantical and contextual}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {19}, year = {1977}, pages = {137{\textendash}154}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:v\&mr, title = {Verisimilitude and meaning relations}, booktitle = {CC77. International Workshop on the Cognitive Viewpoint}, year = {1977}, pages = {321{\textendash}328}, publisher = {Ghent University}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Poriau, M. and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D:scloa, title = {Some contributions to the logic of action}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {9}, year = {1976}, pages = {347{\textendash}376}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:srrs\&v, title = {Some remarks on the relations between science and values}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {17}, year = {1976}, pages = {13{\textendash}46}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:d\&ci, title = {Deduction and contextual information}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {8}, year = {1975}, pages = {243{\textendash}277}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @book {D:studies, title = {Studies in the Logic of Induction and in the Logic of Explanation. {C}ontaining a New Theory of Meaning Relations}, series = {Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, Rijksuniversiteit Gent}, volume = {161}, year = {1975}, publisher = {De Tempel}, organization = {De Tempel}, address = {Brugge}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:r\&j, title = {Rationality and justification}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {14}, year = {1974}, pages = {83{\textendash}103}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:rofidk, title = {De rol van ontische factoren in de kennisverzameling}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {6}, year = {1973}, pages = {51{\textendash}69}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:NRctt, title = {Nicholas {R}escher{\textquoteright}s coherence theory of truth}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {16}, number = {6363}, year = {1973}, pages = {393{\textendash}411}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:poc, title = {The paradoxes of confirmation}, journal = {Revue internationale de philosophie}, volume = {95{\textendash}96}, year = {1971}, pages = {101{\textendash}118}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:KLrir, title = {Some objections to {K}eith {L}ehrer{\textquoteright}s rule {IR}}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {22}, year = {1971}, pages = {357{\textendash}362}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:il, title = {Inductieve logica. {E}en inleiding tot enkele basisproblemen}, journal = {Communicatie en Cognitie}, volume = {3}, year = {1969}, pages = {128{\textendash}154}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:svzcil, title = {Over de stand van zaken in de {C}arnapiaanse inductieve logica}, journal = {Communicatie en Cognitie}, volume = {6}, year = {1969}, pages = {29{\textendash}57}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:cpd, title = {Some proposals for the solution of the {C}arnap{P}opper discussion on {\textquoteleft}inductive logic{\textquoteright}}, journal = {Studia Philosophica Gandensia}, volume = {6}, year = {1968}, pages = {5{\textendash}25}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }