THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY

TitleThe status of functional explanation in psychology: reduction and mechanistic explanation
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2013
AuthorsGervais, R, de Jong, HLooren
JournalTHEORY & PSYCHOLOGY
Volume23
Pagination145–163
ISSN0959-3543
Abstract

The validity of functional explanations as they are commonly used in psychology has recently come under attack. Kim’s supervenience argument purports to prove that higher-level generalizations have no causal powers of their own, and hence are explanatorily irrelevant. In a nutshell, the supervenience argument forces us to either embrace epiphenomenalism of higher- level properties, or accept Kim’s specific brand of reductionism. However, with the current emphasis on mechanistic explanations, the literature on explanation in psychology has undergone some drastic changes. It could be argued, therefore, that Kim’s argument targets an outdated concept of functional explanations. In any case, these developments warrant a reassessment of the implications of his argument, which is the purpose of the present paper. First, we argue that the metaphysics behind the supervenience argument is incompatible with that of mechanisms. Second, we argue that Kim’s proposed brand of reductionism does not accurately describe the explanatory practices of cognitive science.

DOI10.1177/0959354312453093
Citation Key3171382