PHILOSOPHIA

TitleThe ontology of causal process theories
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2012
AuthorsFroeyman, A
JournalPHILOSOPHIA
Volume40
Number3
Pagination523–538
ISSN0048-3893
Abstract

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of ˝causal process˝ does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe's theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon's Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair's phsyicalist reduction of causation.

URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9329-2
Citation Key2977237
Download PDF (Author PDF)
PDF author (public):