TY - JOUR T1 - What science is fair? Representations of science in a Dutch creationist campaign JF - Public Understanding of Science Y1 - Submitted A1 - Blancke, Stefaan A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

In the Netherlands, creationists have started up a civil initiative by which they demand “fair science”. This paper offers an analysis of this peculiar notion. Fair science depends on two representations of science, one as an unimpressive label, and one as an authority. Each of these representations hinges on a different conception of the authority of science: on the one hand, science is endowed with authority because it produces technology and is able to make reliable predictions. On the other hand, science’s authority is only a matter of reputation. To the extent that these two conceptions tap into representations of science and its authority among the larger public, the notion of fair science might prove to be a compelling rhetorical tool. Suggestions are made as to how the appeal of the notion can be reduced.

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Which Style of Reasoning to Choose in the Face of Conflicting Information? JF - Journal of Logic and Computation Y1 - 2016 A1 - Meheus, Joke A1 - Straßer, Christian A1 - Verdée, Peter AB -

In the context of non-monotonic reasoning different kinds of consequence relations are defined for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. Examples are consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premise set. The strong consequences are those formulas that follow by Classical Logic from every maximal consistent subset. The weak consequences follow from some maximal consistent subset. The free consequences follow from the set of formulas that belong to every maximal consistent subset. In this paper the question is discussed which of these consequence relations should be applied in which reasoning context. First the concerns that are expressed in the literature with respect to the usefulness of the weak consequences are addressed. Then it is argued that making weak inferences is sensible for some application contexts, provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is what adaptive logics offer. Finally, all this is illustrated by means of a very simple adaptive logic reconstruction of the free, strong, and weak consequences

VL - 26 SP - 361--380 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Withstanding Tensions: Scientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance Y1 - 2015 A1 - Straßer, Christian A1 - Šešelja, Dunja A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem ED - Ippoliti, Emiliano AB -

Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.

JA - Heuristic Reasoning T3 - Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics PB - Springer VL - 16 SP - 113–146 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - What Carroll’s tortoise actually proves JF - Ethical theory and moral practice Y1 - 2013 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.

VL - 16 SP - 983–997 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - What are mechanisms in social science? (review) JF - Metascience Y1 - 2012 A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

Why should we introduce the notion of ‘analytical sociology’ into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of ‘mechanism’? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences (1). Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation (3). Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of it

VL - 21 SP - 395-398 ER - TY - Generic T1 - What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? Exploring the contours of epistemic democracy Y1 - 2012 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht ED - Le Roy, Frederik ED - Stalpaert, Christel ED - Aerts, Diederik AB -

The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator’s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.

JA - Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science PB - Springer VL - 11 SP - 35–48 SN - 9789400720817 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Where the design argument goes wrong: auxiliary assumptions and unification JF - Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2011 A1 - Boudry, Maarten A1 - Leuridan, Bert AB -

Sober (2008) has reconstructed the biological design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, purporting to demonstrate that it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober’s restrictions on the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are clearly valid. Our account shows that the design argument fails, not because it is intrinsically untestable, but because it clashes with the empirical evidence and fails to satisfy certain theoretical desiderata (in particular, unification). Likewise, Sober’s critique of the arguments from imperfections and from evil against design is off the mark.

VL - 78 SP - 558–578 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661753 ER - TY - CONF T1 - Who guards the guardians/experts? Philosophers? T2 - 32e Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings Y1 - 2011 A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo JA - 32e Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag, Proceedings PB - Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Whewell's tidal researches: scientific practice and philosophical methodology JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A Y1 - 2010 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen AB -

Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.

VL - 41 SP - 26–40 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Waar stoppen? JF - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte Y1 - 2010 A1 - Batens, Diderik VL - 102 SP - 196–198 ER - TY - Generic T1 - What About Interdisciplinarity Within Philosophy? Y1 - 2010 A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht ED - Aerts, Diederik JA - Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and Its Implications For Our Perspectives on the World PB - World Scientific Publishing Company SP - 10–25 ER - TY - CONF T1 - Why social emergence? Discussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory T2 - Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics Y1 - 2010 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht ED - D'Hooghe, Bart AB -

Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer's use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.

JA - Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics PB - World Scientific Publishing Company SN - 9789814295819 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010 ER - TY - Generic T1 - William Harvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop. Y1 - 2010 A1 - De Mey, Tim A1 - Provijn, Dagmar ED - Van Speybroeck, Linda ED - Braeckman, Johan JA - Fascinerend Leven. Markante Figuren en Ideeën uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie. PB - Nieuwezijds CY - Amsterdam N1 -

In print

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Work in Progress in Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning JF - The Reasoner Y1 - 2010 A1 - De Vreese, Leen VL - 4 SP - 141 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet. Y1 - 2009 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Van Bouwel, Jeroen JA - The Social Sciences and Democracy T3 - The Social Sciences and Democracy PB - Palgrave Macmillan SP - 1–13 SN - 978-0230224391 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Whewell, necessity and the inductive sciences: a philosophical-systematic survey JF - South African Journal of Philosophy Y1 - 2009 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen AB -

In this paper Whewell's concept of necessity is scrutinized and its historical development is outlined (ca. 1833-1860). Particular attention will be paid to how Whewell interpreted the laws of the inductive sciences as being necessary since the laws of nature are concretizations of the Fundamental Ideas which can be partially described by Axioms.

VL - 28 SP - 333–358 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Why should I adopt pluralism? Y1 - 2009 A1 - De Langhe, Rogier ED - Garnett, Rob ED - Olsen, Erik ED - Starr, Martha AB -

If the most perplexing thing in the world is a lack of theory, the second mostperplexing must be an abundance of it. This contribution clarifies the notion of pluralism byintroducing an often neglected but crucial distinction between different levels at whichpluralism can be situated. It intends to provide a framework for scholars dealing with thequestion how to manage the divergence of views they are confronted with.

JA - Economic Pluralism PB - Routledge ER - TY - CONF T1 - A week-end off: the first extensive number-theoretical computation on the ENIAC T2 - Logic and Theory of Algorithms Y1 - 2008 A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth A1 - Bullynck, Maarten ED - Beckmann, Arnold ED - Dimitracopoulos, Costas ED - Löwe, Benedikt AB -

The first extensive number-theoretical computation run on the ENIAC, is reconstructed. The problem, computing the exponent of 2 modulo a prime, was set up on the ENIAC during a week-end in July 1946 by the number-theorist D.H. Lehmer, with help from his wife Emma and John Mauchly. Important aspects of the ENIAC's design are presented-and the reconstruction of the implementation of the problem on the ENIAC is discussed in its salient points.

JA - Logic and Theory of Algorithms PB - Springer Verlag SN - 978-3-540-69405-2 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - What problem of universals JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2008 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . More specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.

VL - 81 SP - 7–21 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Whewell's metaphorical usage of light and the ultimate reality underlying it JF - Semiotica Y1 - 2008 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen AB -

In this article, I seek to study Whewell as writer of philosophical doctrines by focusing on his frequent usage of the metaphor of light, which symbolized (human) knowledge. It is my primary claim that Whewell choose to visually illustrate his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas, which are the bearers of ultimate reality and meaning in Whewell's epistemology, by means some key metaphors that made reference to light.

VL - 172 SP - 269–278 ER - TY - BOOK T1 - Wetenschapsfilosofie. Y1 - 2007 A1 - Horsten, Leon A1 - Douven, Igor A1 - Weber, Erik PB - Koninklijke Van Gorcum SP - 238 p. SN - 978-90-232-4312-0 ER - TY - Generic T1 - A World of Experiences, an Adequate Language, and Self-Reference Revised Y1 - 2006 A1 - Vanackere, Guido ED - Malinowski, Jacek ED - Pietruszczak, Andrzej AB -

The paper presents a new, intuitive formal language, L E , that fits in with a world view in which experiences are central entities. It is shown how classical logic and an "objective making" adaptive logic can be applied to formulas of L E . The latter logic sheds an interesting light on the creation of theories about "the objective world". The paper also contains a small comment on sentences that are not translatable in L E . In the last section, I revise self-referring sentences by means of their translations in L E.

JA - Essays in Logic and Ontology PB - Rodopi VL - 91 SP - 243–256 ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Weighing Falling Bodies. Galileo's Thought Experiment in the Development of his Dynamical Thinking. Y1 - 2005 A1 - Van Dyck, Maarten JA - Unpublished ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Wie rookt gaat sneller dood en betaalt dus meer: Over het belang van oorzaak-gevolg-relaties in verzekeren en de moeilijkheid bij het onderzoeken ervan JF - Ethiek en Maatschappij Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Smokers die sooner and therefore pay more. On the importance of cause-effect- relations in insurance and the difficulties researching them. For insurers, a correct knowledge of causes are important. An insurance companies who failes to adequatly assess the causes of particular risks will loose its market position due to wrong price setting. In this paper, I discuss possible methods determine the causes of risks, as well as problems and imperfections of those methods.

VL - 8 SP - 58–69 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. On the contribution of critical realism to the social scientific explanatory practice JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2003 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen VL - 71 SP - 81–98 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive. Y1 - 2002 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Clercq, Kristof ED - Meheus, Joke JA - Inconsistency in science PB - Kluwer SP - 165–184 SN - 1-4020-0630-6 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - World Models and Inconsistencies. JF - Foundations of Science Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Christiaens, Wim AB -

A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.

VL - 3 SP - 285–311 ER - TY - Generic T1 - What, if anything, is an experiment in mathematics? Y1 - 1998 A1 - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul ED - Anapolitanos, Dionysios ED - Baltas, Aristides ED - Tsinorema, Stavroula JA - Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science PB - Rowman & Littlefield SP - 172–182 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Wetenschap en religie: zo verzoenbaar als men maar wil. JF - Mores Y1 - 1997 A1 - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul VL - 42 SP - 381-388 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Wetenschappelijke ontdekking en creativiteit. Een poging tot theorievorming op basis van een conceptuele, methodologische en logische studie Y1 - 1997 A1 - Meheus, Joke PB - Universiteit Gent (Belgium) U1 -

Diderik Batens

ER - TY - Generic T1 - Waarom Wesley Salmons causaal-mechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat Y1 - 1994 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul ED - Cornelis, Gustaaf C JA - Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. Acta 16de Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag PB - VUB Press SP - 81-86 SN - 9789054870845 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Wetenschappelijke verklaringen en subjectief verwacht nut Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - van Dooren, Wim ED - Hoff, Tineke JA - Actueel Filosoferen PB - Eburon CY - Delft SP - 53-60 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Wetenschap en Vrijzinnige Waarden Y1 - 1986 A1 - Batens, Diderik JA - De specificiteit van Vrijzinnig Humanistische Waarden PB - UPV SP - 1–14 ER -