TY - JOUR T1 - From one to many: generalisation and evidence in failure analysis. Y1 - Submitted A1 - De Bal, Inge AB -

In this paper, I use cases and reasoning from failure analysis (a part of engineering
science which deals with artefact failure and its causes) to draw attention to a relatively
unstudied problem of knowledge generalisation: when we are focusing on creating new
things; designing new artefacts and technologies. Using three cases from failure
analysis practice, I present a two-fold mechanism-based procedure to determine when
generalisations to non-existing artefacts are warranted. This procedure builds on (1)
Cartwright's notion of capacities (2) literature on mechanisms and (3) Steel's
comparative process tracing, developed for the biomedical sciences. I will show that,
while they provide guidance, these literatures and concepts are not enough to grasp
how we use information from current artefacts and failures to create new things - we
will need a lot more specific information and adequate ways to present it. The account
developed in this paper is relevant for both philosophers and failure analysts. For
philosophers, it can provide input for a theory of evidence. For failure analysts, it allows
them to present stronger arguments for their recommendations by making the required
evidence explicit. My account can furthermore provide inspiration for similar inferences
in other innovation contexts such as pharmacology.

ER - TY - Generic T1 - The Feasibility of Modeling Hypothetical Reasoning by Formal Logics. Including an Overview of Adaptive Logics for Singular Fact Abduction Y1 - In Press A1 - Gauderis, Tjerk ED - Magnani, Lorenzo ED - Bertolotti, Tommaso JA - Handbook of Model-Based Science PB - Springer ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Formalism. The success(es) of a failure Y1 - In Press A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth ED - Moktefi, A. ED - Moretti, A. ED - Schang, Fabian JA - Let's be logical PB - College publications ER - TY - Generic T1 - Free Choice Permission in STIT Y1 - 2017 A1 - Van De Putte, Frederik JA - Logica Yearbook 2016 PB - College Publications SP - 289--303 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A framework for inter-level explanations: Outlines for a new explanatory pluralism. JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A Y1 - 2014 A1 - Gervais, Raoul AB -

According to explanatory pluralism, the appropriate explanatory level is determined by pragmatic factors, and there are no general exclusion or preference rules concerning higher- or lower-level explanations. While I agree with the latter claim, I will argue that the former is in need of revision. In particular, I will argue that by distinguishing cases of two explanations being descriptions of one underlying causal process, and two explanations being descriptions of two distinct causal processes, it becomes clear that the grain size of an explanation is in fact determined by the interplay of various pragmatic and non-pragmatic factors. Within these constraints, positive guidelines can be developed to direct us to the appropriate explanatory level. This gives us the outlines for a general framework for classifying various types of relations between explanations on different levels. After making a comparison between this new framework and standard explanatory pluralism, I end by suggesting some ways in which the framework could be further developed.

VL - 48 SP - 1–9 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions JF - Erkenntnis Y1 - 2014 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-à-vis functional explanations.

VL - 79 SP - 1367–1389 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Fraud in academic medical research: lessons from Flanders, Belgium JF - The reasoner Y1 - 2013 A1 - De Winter, Jan A1 - Kosolosky, Laszlo AB -

A scientific survey on fraud in academic medical research in Flanders , of which the results were recently published in popular science magazine Eos, has caused tumult in the Flemish academic community. The reason is that these results suggest that scientific fraud (which could indirectly cause ill health and death among patients) is not as rare as earlier estimates indicate . Malpractices are primarily attributed to the pressure to publish. In this piece , we elaborate on the content of the study and pave the way for reform.

VL - 7 SP - 2 UR - http://thereasoner.org/ ER - TY - Generic T1 - A formal approach to vague expressions with indexicals T2 - Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 9 (LENLS 9-2012) Y1 - 2012 A1 - Martens, Liesbeth A1 - Primiero, Giuseppe AB -

In this paper, we offer a formal approach to the scantily investigated problem of vague expressions with indexicals, in particular including the spatial indexical `here' and the temporal indexical `now'. We present two versions of an adaptive fuzzy logic extended with an indexical, formally expressed by a modifier as a function that applies to predicative formulas. In the first version, such an operator is applied to non-vague predicates. The modified formulas may have a fuzzy truth value and fit into a Sorites paradox. We use adaptive fuzzy logics as a reasoning tool to address such a paradox. The modifier enables us to off er an adequate explication of the dynamic reasoning process. In the second version, a different result is obtained for an indexical applied to a formula with a possibly vague predicate, where the resulting modified formula has a crisp value and does not add up to a Sorites paradox.

JA - Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 9 (LENLS 9-2012) PB - Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence SP - 37-51 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A formal explication of the search for explanations: the adaptive logics approach to abductive reasoning JF - Logic Journal of IGPL Y1 - 2012 A1 - Lycke, Hans AB -

Most logic–based approaches characterize abduction as a kind of backwards deduction plus additional conditions, which means that a number of conditions is specified that enable one to decide whether or not a particular abductive inference is sound (one of those conditions may e.g. be that abductive consequences have to be compatible with the background theory). Despite the fact that these approaches succeed in specifying which formulas count as valid consequences of abductive inference steps, they do not explicate the way people actually reason by means of abductive inferences. This is most clearly shown by the absence of a decent proof theory. Instead, search procedures are provided that enable one to determine the right abductive consequences. However, these do not by far resemble human reasoning. In order to explicate abductive reasoning more realistically, an alternative approach will be provided in this article, namely, one that is based on the adaptive logics programme. Proof theoretically, this approach interprets the argumentation schema affirming the consequent (AC: A ⊃ B, B ⊢ A) as a defeasible rule of inference. This comes down to the fact that the abductive consequences obtained by means of AC are accepted only for as long as certain conditions are satis.ed—e.g. as long as their negation has not been derived from the background theory. In the end, only the unproblematic applications of AC are retained, while the problematic ones are rejected. In this way, the adaptive logics approach to abduction succeeds to provide a more realistic explication of the way people reason by means of abductive inferences. Moreover, as multiple abduction processes will be characterized, this article may be considered as the first step in the direction of a general formal approach to abduction based on the adaptive logics programme.

VL - 20 SP - 497–516 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia: the presence and the otherness of the past JF - Rethinking history Y1 - 2012 A1 - Froeyman, Anton AB -

This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I give an in-depth comparison and analysis of the theories of Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, in which I highlight their most important resemblances and differences. What both have in common is their notion of the presence of the past as a 'presence in absence'. They differ, however, with respect to the character of this past and the role representation plays in making it present. Second, I also argue that for both Ankersmit and Runia, the presence of the past is always the present of our past, which excludes the experience of the otherness of the past, and which opens both theories to the criticisms of being self-centered and nationalistic.

VL - 16 SP - 393–415 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Filling a typical gap in a regress argument JF - Logique & Analyse Y1 - 2011 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

In the following we fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of its first premise.

VL - 54 SP - 589–597 ER - TY - Generic T1 - A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses Y1 - 2011 A1 - Meheus, Joke ED - Dieks, Dennis ED - Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. ED - Hartmann, Stephan ED - Uebel, Thomas ED - Weber, Erik JA - Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht SP - 93–108 ER - TY - Generic T1 - From problem solving to the teaching of algebra: the genesis of the algebra textbook T2 - 11th international IHPST and 6th Greek history, philosophy and science teaching joint conference, Proceedings Y1 - 2011 A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht ED - Seroglou, Fanny ED - Koulountzos, Vassilis ED - Siatras, Anastasios JA - 11th international IHPST and 6th Greek history, philosophy and science teaching joint conference, Proceedings PB - Epikentro Publications SP - 344-347 SN - 9789604583256 ER - TY - Generic T1 - From the second unknown to the symbolic equation Y1 - 2010 A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht ED - Heeffer, Albrecht ED - Van Dyck, Maarten AB -

The symbolic equation slowly emerged during the course of the sixteenth century as a new mathematical concept as well as a mathematical object on which new operations were made possible. Where historians have of- ten pointed at Francois Viète as the father of symbolic algebra, we would like to emphasize the foundations on which Viète could base his logistica speciosa. The period between Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae of 1539 and Gosselin’s De arte magna of 1577 has been crucial in providing the necessary build- ing blocks for the transformation of algebra from rules for problem solving to the study of equations. In this paper we argue that the so-called “second unknown” or the Regula quantitates steered the development of an adequate symbolism to deal with multiple unknowns and aggregates of equations. Dur- ing this process the very concept of a symbolic equation emerged separate from previous notions of what we call “co-equal polynomials”.

JA - Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics PB - College Publications VL - 26 SP - 57–102 SN - 978-1-84890-017-2 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Fundamental questions and some new answers on philosophical, contextual and scientific Whewell: some reflections on recent Whewell scholarship and the progress made therein JF - Perspectives on Science Y1 - 2010 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen VL - 18 SP - 242–272 UR - http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives\_on\_science/v018/18.2.ducheyne.pdf ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Fitch-style natural deduction for modal paralogics JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2009 A1 - Lycke, Hans AB -

In this paper, I will present a Fitch–style natural deduction proof theory for modal paralogics (modal logics with gaps and/or gluts for negation). Besides the standard classical subproofs, the presented proof theory also contains modal subproofs, which express what would follow from a hypothesis, in case it would be true in some arbitrary world.

VL - 207 SP - 193–218 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Flow of Influence: From Newton to Locke … and Back JF - Rivista di storia della filosofia Y1 - 2009 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen AB -

In this essay, the affinity between Locke's empiricism and Newton's natural philosophy is scrutinized. Parallels are distinguished from influences. I argue, pace G.A.J. Rogers, that Newton's doctrine of absolute space and time influenced Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (first edition: 1689, though bearing the year 1690 on its cover) from the second edition onwards. I also show that Newton used Lockean terminology in his criticism of Cartesianism. It is further argued that Locke's endorsement of corpuscularianism is merely methodological, i.e. he accepts it as a scientifically useful and psychologically intelligible paradigm, but not as a realist explanation of rerum natura. Like Newton, Locke was reluctant to accept the corpuscular theory of light. However, his reasons for doing so were different from those of Newton. This essay is divided into three parts: in the first, the stage is set by looking at the fundamentals of Locke's epistemology; in the second, several correspondences between Locke's and Newton's thought are explored and two cases of influence are argued for; and in the third, several arguments are provided for interpreting Locke's corpuscularianism as methodological.

VL - 64 SP - 265–288 ER - TY - Generic T1 - A Fuzzy Logic Approach to Non-Scalar Hedges Y1 - 2008 A1 - van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan ED - Makinson, David ED - Wansing, Heinrich AB -

In (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 458–508, 1973), George Lakoff proposes a fuzzy semantics for the non-scalar hedges technically, strictly speaking, and loosely speaking. These hedges are able to modify the meaning of a predicate. However, Lakoff’s proposal is problematic. For example, his semantics only contains interpretations for hedged predicates using semantic information provided by selection functions. What kind of information these functions should provide for non-hedged predicates remains unspecified. This paper presents a solution for this deficit and other problems by means of a generic first-order fuzzy logic FLh . A wide range of fuzzy logics can be used as a basis for FLh . Next to a fully specified semantics, this solution also incorporates a proof theory for reasoning with these hedges. FLh makes use of a special set of selection functions. These functions collect the kind of information a reasoner can retrieve from concepts in his or her memory when interpreting a (non-)hedged predicate. Despite this non-standard element, FLh remains a conservative modification of its underlying fuzzy logic.

JA - Towards Mathematical Philosophy T3 - Trends in Logic PB - Kluwer SP - 233-247 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Father Henri Bosmans (S.J.) A Belgian pioneer in the history of mathematics JF - History and Pedagogy of Mathematics Newsletter Y1 - 2007 A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht VL - 65 SP - 12–15 ER - TY - CONF T1 - Facing the Computer. Some techniques to understand technique. T2 - Computers and Philosophy, an International Conference Y1 - 2006 A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth ED - Schmidt, C. T. A. JA - Computers and Philosophy, an International Conference PB - EOARD ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning JF - Logic Journal of the IGPL Y1 - 2006 A1 - Meheus, Joke A1 - Batens, Diderik AB -

This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.

VL - 14 SP - 221–236 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Forms of causal explanation JF - Foundations of science Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht VL - 10 SP - 437–454 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions JF - Behavior and Philosophy Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht AB -

This paper deals with the "functions of intentional explanations" of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. "contrastive" and "descriptive", which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.

VL - 33 SP - 1–16 ER - TY - Generic T1 - A Formal Approach to Problem Solving Y1 - 2003 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - Delrieux, Claudio ED - Legris, Javier JA - Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning PB - Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS CY - Bahia Blanca, Argentinia SP - 15–26 ER - TY - RPRT T1 - From Wffs to Clauses: Transforming Wffs in Clauses Without Loss of Meaning Y1 - 2002 A1 - Vermeir, Timothy AB -

This paper is the rst step into the research of inconsistency-adaptive logic programming. It will be shown here that a mapping can be dened for well formed formulas to logic programming clauses in a paraconsistent environment, and without loss of information. Furthermore, this mapping is a purely mechanical procedure that can be implemented with ease on a computer.

ER - TY - BOOK T1 - Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic T2 - Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic Y1 - 2000 ED - Batens, Diderik ED - Mortensen, Chris ED - Priest, Graham ED - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul JA - Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic PB - Research Studies Press CY - Baldock, UK ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Provijn, Dagmar AB -

Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.

VL - 42 SP - 161–180 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics Y1 - 1996 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - van Benthem, Johan ED - Van Eemeren, F. H. ED - Grootendorst, R. ED - Veltman, Frank AB -

This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.

JA - Logic and Argumentation PB - North-Holland SP - 241–254 ER -