TY - JOUR T1 - Causation & Technical Problem Solving: An analysis of causal knowledge underlying proposed solutions for technical problems. Y1 - Submitted A1 - De Bal, Inge A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this paper we analyse the causal underpinnings of remedy claims found in technical problem solving instructions. For these claims to be successful, they need to be based on causal relations that hold in the world and that have certain properties. These required properties are the focus of our paper. We first introduce several examples from car- and bike repair manuals that demarcate our topic and function as illustrations throughout the paper. We then formulate three success criteria for problem solving manuals: the efficiency requirement, the no harm requirement and the maximal assistance ideal. These criteria determine the required strength and properties of the causal relation, and are used to frame our analysis. We start from theories of causation by Ronald Giere, Ellery Eells and John Mackie and develop a series of definitions to capture the properties of the aforementioned causal relations. We conclude that remedy claims need to be based on causal relations with the following property: positive causal factorhood with weak context-unanimity. Moreover, it is desirable to look for Mackie causes, viz. causes that are sufficient in maximally normal contexts. We finally show that our analysis is not limited to means of conveyance (this is the field in which our initial examples are located) by means of a case study from a different field (radio repair manuals).

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Contrastive Causation in Genetics and Physics JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2015 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Bal, Inge VL - 90 SP - 93-113 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The 'green cheese' and 'red herring' problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science JF - Logique et analyse Y1 - 2015 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Gervais, Raoul A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen SP - 433-455 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Withstanding Tensions: Scientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance Y1 - 2015 A1 - Straßer, Christian A1 - Šešelja, Dunja A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem ED - Ippoliti, Emiliano AB -

Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.

JA - Heuristic Reasoning T3 - Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics PB - Springer VL - 16 SP - 113–146 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Bloody analogical reasoning Y1 - 2014 A1 - Provijn, Dagmar ED - Weber, Erik ED - Wouters, Dietlinde ED - Meheus, Joke AB -

In this paper I will study some of William Harvey’s applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic ‘action’ of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens’ contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian ‘natural philosophy interpretation’ of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.

JA - Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality PB - Springer SP - 217–232 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The Concept of Disease and Our Responsibility for Children Y1 - 2014 A1 - De Vreese, Leen ED - Perring, Christian ED - Wells, Lloyd AB -

The author of this chapter argues that one’s understanding of the concept of what a disease is influences our way of behaving toward people we think of as diseased. The author asserts that our concept of disease is not non-committal and that an oversimplified approach can lead to non-critical reasoning which could have significant impact on children with diseases. The author develops a pluralistic approach to the concept of disease and uses ADHD as an example throughout the chapter.

JA - Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry PB - Oxford University Press SP - 35–55 SN - 9780199645756 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Data-driven induction in scientific discovery: a critical assessment based on Kepler's discoveries Y1 - 2014 A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht ED - Weber, Erik ED - Wouters, Dietlinde ED - Meheus, Joke AB -

Motivated by the renewed interest in knowledge discovery from data (KDD) by the artificial intelligence community, this paper provides a critical assessment of the model of data-driven induction for scientific discovery. The most influential research program using this model is developed by the BACON team. Two of the main claims by this research program, the descriptive and constructive power of data-driven induction, are evaluated by means of two historical cases studies: the discovery of the sine law of refraction in optics and Kepler’s third law of planetary motion. I will provide evidence that the data used by the BACON program–-despite the claims being made–-does not correspond with the historical data available to Kepler and his contemporaries. Secondly, it is shown that for the two cases the method by which the general law was arrived at did not involve data-driven induction. Finally, the value of the data-driven induction as a general model for scientific discovery is being questioned.

JA - Logic, reasoning, and rationality PB - Springer SP - 59–76 SN - 9789401790109 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences Y1 - 2014 A1 - Gervais, Raoul ED - Weber, Erik ED - Wouters, Dietlinde ED - Meheus, Joke JA - Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality PB - Springer SP - 45-57 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions JF - Erkenntnis Y1 - 2014 A1 - van Eck, Dingmar A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-à-vis functional explanations.

VL - 79 SP - 1367–1389 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Internalism Does Entail Scepticism Y1 - 2014 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem ED - Weber, Erik ED - Wouters, Dietlinde ED - Meheus, Joke KW - Internalism KW - Knowledge KW - Regress KW - Rule KW - Scepticism AB -

Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philie’s solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.

JA - Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality T3 - Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning PB - Springer Netherlands VL - 5 SP - 247-260 SN - 978-94-017-9010-9 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Mechanistic Explanation and Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics JF - Philosophia Mathematica Y1 - 2014 A1 - Frans, Joachim A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Although there is a consensus among philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians that mathematical explanations exist, only a few authors have proposed accounts of explanation in mathematics. These accounts fit into the unificationist or top-down approach to explanation. We argue that these models can be complemented by a bottom-up approach to explanation in mathematics. We introduce the mechanistic model of explanation in science and discuss the possibility of using this model in mathematics, arguing that using it does not presuppose a Platonist view of mathematics and allows one to gain insight into why a theorem is true by answering what-if-things-had-been-different questions.

VL - 22 SP - 231–248 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles JF - Synthese Y1 - 2014 A1 - Clarke, Brendan A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Williamson, Jon AB -

Mechanistic philosophy of science views a large part of scientific activity as engaged in modelling mechanisms. While science textbooks tend to offer qualitative models of mechanisms, there is increasing demand for models from which one can draw quantitative predictions and explanations. Casini et al. (Theoria 26(1):5–33, 2011) put forward the Recursive Bayesian Networks (RBN) formalism as well suited to this end. The RBN formalism is an extension of the standard Bayesian net formalism, an extension that allows for modelling the hierarchical nature of mechanisms. Like the standard Bayesian net formalism, it models causal relationships using directed acyclic graphs. Given this appeal to acyclicity, causal cycles pose a prima facie problem for the RBN approach. This paper argues that the problem is a significant one given the ubiquity of causal cycles in mechanisms, but that the problem can be solved by combining two sorts of solution strategy in a judicious way.

VL - 191 SP - 1651–1681 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry Y1 - 2014 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Galavotti, Maria Carla ED - Dieks, Dennis ED - Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. ED - Hartmann, Stephan ED - Uebel, Thomas ED - Weber, Marcel AB -

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism – different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry – namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the “genuine dialogue” or shape “the pluralistic attitude” Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.

JA - New directions in the philosophy of science PB - Springer SP - 104–119 SN - 9783319043814 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The Proof Is in the Process: A Preamble for a Philosophy of Computer-Assisted Mathematics Y1 - 2014 A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth ED - Galavotti, Maria Carla ED - Dieks, Dennis ED - Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. ED - Hartmann, Stephan ED - Uebel, Thomas ED - Weber, Marcel AB -

According to some well-known mathematicians well-versed in computer-assisted mathematics (CaM), “Computers are changing the way we are doing mathematics”. To what extent this is really true is still an open question. Indeed, even though some philosophers of math have taken up the challenge to think about CaM, it is unclear in what sense exactly a machine (can) affect(s) the so-called “queen of the sciences”. In fact, some have concluded that issues raised by the use of the computer in mathematics are not specific to the use of the computer per se. However, such findings seem precarious since a systematic study of computer-assisted mathematics is still lacking. In this paper I argue that in order to understand the impact of CaM, it is necessary to take more seriously the computer itself and how it is actually used in the process of doing mathematics. Within such an approach, one searches for characteristics that are specific to the use of the computer in mathematics. I will focus on a feature that is beyond any doubt inherently connected to the use of computing machinery, viz. mathematician-computer interactions. I will show how such interactions are fundamentally different from the usual interactions between mathematicians and non-human aids (a piece of paper, a blackboard etc) and how such interactions determine at least two more characteristics of CaM, viz. the significance of time and processes and the steady process of internalization of mathematical tools and knowledge into the machine. I will restrict myself to the use of the computer within so-called experimental mathematics since this is the main object of CaM within the philosophical literature.

JA - New Directions in the Philosophy of Science T3 - The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective PB - Springer VL - 5 SP - 15–33 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The role of unification in micro-explanations of physical laws JF - Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia Y1 - 2014 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Lefevere, Merel AB -

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of particular facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically about microexplanations of laws in physics. We investigate whether providing unificatory information has a surplus value in micro-explanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is information that provides ontological unification in the sense defined by Uskali Mäki. We argue that providing unificatory information may lead to explanations with more explanatory power (we use Jim Woodward’s concept of explanatory power for that) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations.

VL - 79 SP - 41–56 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Sceptical Rationality JF - Analytic Philosophy Y1 - 2014 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem VL - 55 SP - 222–238 ER - TY - Generic T1 - And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy. Y1 - 2013 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem PB - Ghent University U1 -

Erik Weber and Maarten Van Dyck

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, by Katja Maria Vogt (review). JF - Mind Y1 - 2013 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem VL - 122 SP - 1204–1207 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Causaliteit en de methodestrijd: naar een geïntegreerd gebruik van kwalitatief en kwantitatief onderzoek in een praktisch georiënteerde criminologie JF - Panopticon Y1 - 2013 A1 - Heylen, Ben A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this article, we re-examine an old problem in criminology i.e the "battle of the methods". Even though the battle has become less explicit recently, it does have a contemporary named the incompatibility thesis in the field of mixed methods research in the social sciences. We look at this incompatibility thesis from the point of view of the philosophy of science, more precisely by discussing different forms of causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality are discussed. We argue that qualitative and quantitative methods each pursue a specific kind of knowledge, but that a functional integration of both is desirable. We conclude by referring to two main advantages of such integration, viz. the manipulation of causal relationships and extrapolation of research results in time and space.

VL - 34 SP - 115–133 ER - TY - Generic T1 - How to Study Scientific Explanation? Y1 - 2013 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - De Vreese, Leen AB -

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.

JA - Scientific Explanation PB - Springer SP - 25–37 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The ICE-theory of technical functions JF - Metascience Y1 - 2013 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Reydon, Thomas A1 - Boon, Mieke A1 - Houkes, Wybo A1 - Vermaas, Pieter VL - 22 SP - 23–44 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Inferential explanations in biology JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences Y1 - 2013 A1 - Gervais, Raoul A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct- ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic expla- nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.

VL - 44 SP - 356–364 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Is Justification Dialectical? JF - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Y1 - 2013 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Much of present-day epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they ha ve in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in ord er to block the skeptic’s argument from disagreement. That is, they allow tha t one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it agains t challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in its most interesting format. In this paper I zoom i n on this debate, and fix further details of Lammenranta’s lead. Specifically , I will side with skepticism that justification is dialectical, yet o nly if certain conditions are in place.

VL - 3 SP - 182–201 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Oneindige regressieargumenten JF - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte Y1 - 2013 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Infinite regress arguments show up in many philosophical debates. But what actually is a regress argument? This article reviews two theories: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory. According to the Paradox Theory, regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the statement that discussions are settled only if there is an agreed-upon criterion to settle them). According to the Failure Theory, regress arguments can be used to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to solve an existentially or universally quantified problem (e.g. to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to settle all discussions, or that it fails to settle even one discussion). In the literature, the Paradox Theory is fairly well-developed, and this article shows that the Failure Theory can be supplied with similar tools.

VL - 105 SP - 1–14 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models JF - PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY Y1 - 2013 A1 - Gervais, Raoul A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver's continuum of how-possibly, to how-plausibly, to how-actually models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism's activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models.

VL - 26 SP - 139–152 ER - TY - BOOK T1 - Scientific explanation Y1 - 2013 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - De Vreese, Leen AB -

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.

PB - Springer SP - 93 SN - 9789400764453 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Strong and weak regress arguments JF - Logique & Analyse Y1 - 2013 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

In the literature, regress arguments often take one of two different forms: either they conclude that a given solution fails to solve any problem of a certain kind (the strong conclusion), or they conclude that a given solution fails to solve all problems of a certain kind (the weaker conclusion). This gives rise to a logical problem: do regresses entail the strong or the weaker conclusion, or none? In this paper I demonstrate that regress arguments can in fact take both forms, and clearly set out the logical difference between them. Throughout the paper, I confine myself to metaphysical examples from the early Russell. Only now that we know they are valid can we start to discuss whether they are sound.

VL - 56 SP - 439–461 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - What Carroll’s tortoise actually proves JF - Ethical theory and moral practice Y1 - 2013 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.

VL - 16 SP - 983–997 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Can economics become a purely experimental science? A comparative study Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Aerts, Diederik ED - Broekaert, Jan ED - D'Hooghe, Bart ED - Note, Nicole AB -

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

JA - Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world PB - World Scientific Publishing Company SN - 9789814383073 UR - http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Can Pyrrhonists act normally? JF - Philosophical Explorations Y1 - 2012 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following I take up this systematic query, and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus' ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to insure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life.

VL - 15 SP - 227–289 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Carving the world as we please JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2012 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Nelson Goodman defends the seemingly radical view that, in a certain sense, all facts depend on our perspective on the matter. We make the world, rather than merely find it. The aim of this contribution is three-fold: to make sense of Goodman’s metaphysical perspectivalism, clearly explain how it differs from other branches of perspectivalism (epistemic and semantic), and put two issues on the agenda that deserve renewed attention.

VL - 84 SP - 7–24 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Causality and explanation in the sciences JF - Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia Y1 - 2012 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Editors' introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at the University of Ghent in September 2011.

VL - 27 SP - 133–136 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted? JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Vreese, Leen AB -

In a paper "Causation in Context" (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.

VL - 84 SP - 123–148 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - De pyrronistische zaak JF - Tijdschrift voor Filosofie Y1 - 2012 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem VL - 74 SP - 523–532 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Het debat tussen 'groene spellers' en 'witte spellers' geëvalueerd vanuit een sociaal-epistemologische invalshoek JF - Ethiek & Maatschappij Y1 - 2012 A1 - Martens, Liesbeth A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In the Netherlands and Flanders, a debate on the Dutch spelling has been raging between, on the one hand, the ‘green spellers’, who follow the official ‘green spelling’, and, on the other hand, the protesting ‘white spellers’, who espouse an alternative spelling. In the present article, this debate will be approached from a socio-epistemological perspective. Using the theory of Helen Longino, we highlight how the debate between the parties has been conducted, and explain why it failed to become a fruitful debate, based on a critical discourse and by which both parties strive for objective knowledge. We also draw a few lessons for the future.

VL - 14 SP - 61–78 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Het doel van wetenschap: is er een derde weg tussen onbeperkt intentioneel realisme en strikt pragmatisme? Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Claes, Tom AB -

Ik onderscheid drie posities met betrekking tot het doel van wetenschap: onbeperkt intentioneel realisme, strikt pragmatisme en gesofistikeerd pragmatisme. Ik argumenteer dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme: ze komen beide neer op "anything goes." Dit betekent dat gesofistikeerd pragmatisme niet de gulden middenweg is die het op het eerste zicht lijkt te zijn.

JA - Door Denken en Doen. Essays bij het Werk van Ronald Commers PB - Academia Press SP - 243–253 SN - 9789038219431 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit? JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2012 A1 - Šešelja, Dunja A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegener’s theory was epistemically worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in &\#353;e&\#353;elja and Stra&\#223;er (accepted for publication). We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy

VL - 43 SP - 147–159 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories JF - PHILOSOPHICA Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Dyck, Maarten AB -

What happens if one applies the "evaluation methodology" of The Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the "problem solving methodology" of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers' methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan's methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutins to these problems.

VL - 86 SP - 83–99 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Regress Argument Reconstruction JF - Argumentation Y1 - 2012 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem KW - Argument KW - Charity KW - Infinite regress KW - Interpretation KW - Reconstruction AB -

If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.

VL - 26 SP - 489-503 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The role of unification in explanations of facts T2 - EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009 Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Lefevere, Merel ED - De Regt, Henk ED - Okasha, Samir ED - Hartmann, Stephan AB -

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

JA - EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009 PB - Springer CY - Amsterdam SP - 403-413 SN - 9789400724037 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Two Gaps in the Contextual Theory of Scientific Understanding JF - The Reasoner Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 6 SP - 130-131 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Two problems for the contextual theory of scienitfic understanding JF - The Reasoner Y1 - 2012 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this paper I argue that the contextual theory of scientific understanding as developed by Henk De Regt and Dennis Dieks (2005: “A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding”, Synthese 144, 137–170) and further developed by Henk De Regt (2009: “The Epistemic Value of Understanding”, Philosophy of Science 76: 585–597) is not contextual in one crucial respect: the meaning of understanding. I also argue that its scope needs to be restricted: it cannot be a theory of scientific understanding in general.

VL - 6 SP - 60–62 ER - TY - Generic T1 - An atlas for the social world: what should it (not) look like? Interdisciplinarity and pluralism in the social sciences Y1 - 2011 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Aerts, Diederik ED - D'Hooghe, Bart ED - Pinxten, Rik ED - Wallerstein, Immanuel AB -

Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in section 1, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in section 2, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory-, method-, metaphysics-, and question-driven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with actual proposals made by, inter alia, World-Systems Analysis, Critical Realism and Economics Imperialism. Building on the framework of explanatory pluralism I have been developing before, I will make a case for question-driven interdisciplinarity in section 3. My argument for question-driven interdisciplinarity will be illustrated in section 4 by discussing recent developments in economics (i.e., the debate between the orthodoxy and heterodox theories, the pleas for pluralism, and the impact of globalisation –and related institutional developments- on economics as a discipline). In conclusion, the contours of an adequate atlas for the social world should become clearer; when to use the different maps, how to activate the dialogue between social scientific disciplines in order to draw the different maps, and the risks of globalisation for social science (and adequate map making).

JA - Worldviews, Science and Us: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Worlds, Cultures and Society. T3 - Worldviews, science and us : interdisciplinary perspectives on worlds, cultures and society PB - World Scientific Publishing Company SP - 43–72 SN - 9789814355056 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The covering law model applied to dynamical cognitive science: a comment on Joel Walmsley JF - Minds and Machines Y1 - 2011 A1 - Gervais, Raoul A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim's deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley's approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.

VL - 21 SP - 33–39 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Explanation in the social sciences Y1 - 2011 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Jarvie, Ian ED - Zamora-Bonilla, Jesus AB -

This chapter gives an overview of the philosophical debates concerning explanation in the social sciences.

JA - The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences PB - Sage Publications CY - London SP - 632–646 SN - 9781847874009 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Filling a typical gap in a regress argument JF - Logique & Analyse Y1 - 2011 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

In the following we fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of its first premise.

VL - 54 SP - 589–597 ER - TY - Generic T1 - A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses Y1 - 2011 A1 - Meheus, Joke ED - Dieks, Dennis ED - Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. ED - Hartmann, Stephan ED - Uebel, Thomas ED - Weber, Erik JA - Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht SP - 93–108 ER - TY - Generic T1 - The IARC and mechanistic evidence Y1 - 2011 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Weber, Erik ED - McKay Illari, Phyllis ED - Russo, Federica ED - Williamson, Jon AB -

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC's carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.

JA - Causality in the Sciences PB - Oxford University Press SP - 91–109 SN - 9780199574131 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations JF - Journal for General Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2011 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Vreese, Leen AB -

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

VL - 42 SP - 33–46 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Needham's grand question revisited: on the meaning and justification of causal claims in the history of Chinese science JF - East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine Y1 - 2011 A1 - De Saeger, David A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

The Needham Question (i.e. the question why modern science has not developed in Chinese civilization but only in Europe) has drawn a substantial amount of criticism. Despite its apparent innocuousness, influential sinologists have written devastating critiques of it. These criticisms fall into two main categories. The first denies the validity of the central concepts by means of which the question is formulated (e.g. 'science’ or 'civilization’). The second calls into question (1) the legitimacy of asking for explanations of absences (i.e. of events that did not occur), (2) the legitimacy of citing absences as explanations (i.e. citing negative facts in explanations), and (3) whether the Needham question can be answered, even if asking for explanations of absences and citing absences as explanations are both legitimate. In this article, we take into account the former criticism, in order to arrive at a new starting point: dividing the Needham Problem into its various sub-questions. We then tackle the latter criticism by calling upon the contemporary philosophy of causation. We will argue that, according to certain theories of causation, the subquestions under discussion can be answered, and we will clarify how they can be argued for.

VL - 33 SP - 13–32 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Proto-regress argument schemas Y1 - 2011 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem JA - ISSA 2010 Proceedings PB - Ghent University. Department of Philosophy and moral sciences SP - 2000–2007 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Rules regresses Y1 - 2011 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as 'if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p'? Gluer and Wikforss (2009) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a 'dilemma of regress and idleness', as Gluer and Wikforss have dubbed it.

JA - AGPC 2010 Proceedings PB - Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences SP - 79–92 UR - http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc10/ ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Sceptic's Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress JF - Philosophical Papers Y1 - 2011 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, David Hume and Paul Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers' practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.

VL - 40 SP - 359–369 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Anti-positionalism's regress JF - Axiomathes Y1 - 2010 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a's preceding b and b's preceding a, and the identity of facts like a's preceding b and b's succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is Anti-Positionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, Anti-Positionalism falls prey to a regress argument which is to prove its failure. In the paper we spell out this worry, show that the worry is a serious one, and distinguish four possible strategies for Anti-Positionalism to deal with it.

VL - 20 SP - 479–493 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-010-9097-9 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Causal Methodology. A Comment on Nancy Cartwright's Hunting Causes and Using Them JF - Analysis Y1 - 2010 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 70 SP - 318–325 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: theory and practice JF - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics Y1 - 2010 A1 - De Vreese, Leen A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen AB -

Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

VL - 31 SP - 371–390 ER - TY - Generic T1 - How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions? Y1 - 2010 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Šešelja, Dunja ED - Torres, Juan Manuel AB -

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such “explanatory concepts” of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions – Kuhn's, Thagard's, Chen's and Barker's, and Laudan's – and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.

JA - On Kuhn's Philosophy and its Legacy PB - CFCUL CY - Lisbon VL - 8 SP - 251–282 SN - 978-989-8247-12-4 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Metaphysical explanatory asymmetries JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2010 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

The general view is that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric. For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is: is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by comparing them to analogous questions that have been investigated for scientific explanations. Three main asymmetry criteria have been proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unification, and (iii) explanatory dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphysical explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence criterion (in modified format) holds of them.

VL - 53 SP - 345–365 ER - TY - CONF T1 - The Adaptive Logics Approach to Abduction T2 - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008 Y1 - 2009 A1 - Lycke, Hans ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008 PB - {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België SN - 9789065690432 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts JF - Theoria Y1 - 2009 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen AB -

Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.

VL - 24 SP - 301–320 ER - TY - CONF T1 - "Clear Moon, Frost soon". An introduction to the Study of Meteorological Practices in the Low Countries (1550-1850) T2 - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008 Y1 - 2009 A1 - Pieters, Eva ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008 PB - {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België SN - 9789065690432 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Conceptual analysis of causation and theoretical utility in everyday contexts JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2009 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Vreese, Leen AB -

In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall's theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall's proposal is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation, traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up. However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive conceptual analysis can be useful.

VL - 52 SP - 177–190 ER - TY - CONF T1 - Doing mathematics on the ENIAC. Von Neumann's and Lehmer's different visions T2 - Mathematical Practice and Development throughout History. Proceedings of the 18th Novembertagung on the History, Philosophy and Didactics of Mathematics Y1 - 2009 A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth ED - Witzke, Ingo ED - Wilhelmus, E. AB -

In this paper we will study the impact of the computer on math- ematics and its practice from a historical point of view. We will look at what kind of mathematical problems were implemented on early electronic computing machines and how these implementations were perceived. By doing so, we want to stress that the computer was in fact, from its very beginning, conceived as a mathematical instru- ment per se, thus situating the contemporary usage of the computer in mathematics in its proper historical background. We will focus on the work by two computer pioneers: Derrick H. Lehmer and John von Neumann. They were both involved with the ENIAC and had strong opinions about how these new machines might influence (theoretical and applied) mathematics.

JA - Mathematical Practice and Development throughout History. Proceedings of the 18th Novembertagung on the History, Philosophy and Didactics of Mathematics PB - Logos Verlag Berlin ER - TY - JOUR T1 - How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence JF - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Y1 - 2009 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In a recent paper in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere=s theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences B on which Russo and Williamson focus B and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation (of Suppes, Eells and Humphreys) and show that they cannot account for the use of mechanistic evidence. I argue that these theories are also inferior to Giere's theory in other respects.

VL - 23 SP - 277–-295 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Laudatio Jens Høyrup JF - Sartoniana Y1 - 2009 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht VL - 22 SP - 5–7 ER - TY - BOOK T1 - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Young Researchers Present their Work Y1 - 2009 ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten SN - 9789065690432 ER - TY - CONF T1 - Mathematics through man-computer interaction. A study of the early years of computing. T2 - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008 Y1 - 2009 A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008 PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten SN - 9789065690432 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Modal Logic and Philosophy. A case study. Y1 - 2009 A1 - Urbaniak, Rafal A1 - Rostalska, Agnieszka ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008 PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België CY - Brussel SP - 79-83 ER - TY - CONF T1 - A note on constructive modalities for information T2 - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008 Y1 - 2009 A1 - Primiero, Giuseppe ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008 PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België CY - Brussel ER - TY - Generic T1 - Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality Y1 - 2009 A1 - Drouet, Isabelle ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008 PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België CY - Brussel SP - 68–72 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Reasoning with dynamic conceptual frames. Y1 - 2009 A1 - Urbaniak, Rafal ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Vanpaemel, Geert JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008 PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België CY - Brussel SP - 84-89 ER - TY - CONF T1 - Trading off explanatory virtues T2 - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days Y1 - 2009 A1 - De Langhe, Rogier ED - Weber, Erik ED - Libert, Thierry ED - Marage, Pierre ED - Van Paemel, Geert AB -

The paper draws on Graham Allison’s case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.

JA - Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days PB - {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België ER - TY - Generic T1 - Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy Y1 - 2009 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Van Bouwel, Jeroen JA - The Social Sciences and Democracy PB - Palgrave Macmillan SP - 181–194 SN - 9780230224391 ER - TY - CONF T1 - On the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems. Theoretical and experimental results. T2 - The complexity of simple programs Y1 - 2008 A1 - De Mol, Liesbeth ED - Woods, Damien ED - Neary, Turlough ED - Seda, Tony AB -

Several older and more recent results on the boundaries of solvability and unsolvability in tag systems are surveyed. Emphasis will be put on the significance of computer experiments in research on very small tag systems.

JA - The complexity of simple programs PB - Cork University Press ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Confusion and bad arguments in the conceptual analysis of causation JF - Logique et analyse Y1 - 2008 A1 - De Vreese, Leen A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 51 SP - 81–99 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The debate between causal realism and causal constructivism: metaphilosophical reflections JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2008 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.

VL - 81 SP - 59–71 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - De-ontologizing the debate on social explanations: a pragmatic approach based on epistemic interests. JF - Human Studies Y1 - 2008 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences-refining the conceptual tools of social scientists-and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.

VL - 31 SP - 423–442 ER - TY - Generic T1 - A Fuzzy Logic Approach to Non-Scalar Hedges Y1 - 2008 A1 - van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan ED - Makinson, David ED - Wansing, Heinrich AB -

In (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 458–508, 1973), George Lakoff proposes a fuzzy semantics for the non-scalar hedges technically, strictly speaking, and loosely speaking. These hedges are able to modify the meaning of a predicate. However, Lakoff’s proposal is problematic. For example, his semantics only contains interpretations for hedged predicates using semantic information provided by selection functions. What kind of information these functions should provide for non-hedged predicates remains unspecified. This paper presents a solution for this deficit and other problems by means of a generic first-order fuzzy logic FLh . A wide range of fuzzy logics can be used as a basis for FLh . Next to a fully specified semantics, this solution also incorporates a proof theory for reasoning with these hedges. FLh makes use of a special set of selection functions. These functions collect the kind of information a reasoner can retrieve from concepts in his or her memory when interpreting a (non-)hedged predicate. Despite this non-standard element, FLh remains a conservative modification of its underlying fuzzy logic.

JA - Towards Mathematical Philosophy T3 - Trends in Logic PB - Kluwer SP - 233-247 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy JF - Analysis Y1 - 2008 A1 - Leuridan, Bert A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Dyck, Maarten VL - 68 SP - 298–303 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A pragmatist defense of non-relativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social science. JF - History and theory Y1 - 2008 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Forland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.

VL - 47 SP - 168–182 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Protagoras en het kennistheoretisch relativisme Y1 - 2008 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Praet, Danny JA - Us and Them. Essays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van Herman De Ley PB - Academia Press CY - Gent SP - 181–192 SN - 9789038212791 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Regiomontanus and Chinese mathematics JF - PHILOSOPHICA Y1 - 2008 A1 - Heeffer, Albrecht ED - Weber, Erik AB -

This paper critically assesses the claim by Gavin Menzies that Regiomontanus knew about the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) through the Shù sh\={u} Ji\v{u} zh\={a}ng (SSJZ) written in 1247. Menzies uses this among many others arguments for his controversial theory that a large fleet of Chinese vessels visited Italy in the first half of the 15th century. We first refute that Regiomontanus used the method from the SSJZ. CRT problems appear in earlier European arithmetic and can be solved by the method of the Sun Zi, as did Fibonacci. Secondly, we pro-vide evidence that remainder problems were treated within the European abbaco tradition independently of the CRT method. Finally, we discuss the role of recre-ational mathematics for the oral dissemination of sub-scientific knowledge.

VL - 82 SP - 87–114 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Relata-specific relations: a response to Vallicella JF - Dialectica Y1 - 2008 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem A1 - Betti, Arianna AB -

According to Vallicella's 'Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley's Regress' (2002), if relations are to relate their relata, some special operator must do the relating. No other options will do. In this paper we reject Vallicella's conclusion by considering an important option that becomes visible only if we hold onto a precise distinction between the following three feature-pairs of relations: internality/externality, universality/particularity, relata-specificity/relata-unspecificity. The conclusion we reach is that if external relations are to relate their relata, they must be relata-specific (and no special operator is needed). As it eschews unmereological complexes, this outcome is of relevance to defenders of the extensionality of composition.

VL - 62 SP - 509–524 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01167.x ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Reply to Daniel Steel's “With or Without Mechanisms” JF - Philosophy of the social sciences Y1 - 2008 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this discussion note I clarify the motivation behind my original paper “Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference and the Policy Relevance of Social Science.” I argue that one of the tasks of philosophers of social science is to draw attention to methodological problems that are often forgotten or overlooked. Then I show that my original paper does not make the mistake or fallacy that Daniel Steel suggests in his comment on it.

VL - 38 SP - 267–270 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - 'Since heaven has not yet destroyed this culture, what can the men of Kuang do to me?': cosmological confucianism and the development of science JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2008 A1 - Dessein, Bart ED - Weber, Erik VL - 82 SP - 27–53 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - What problem of universals JF - Philosophica Y1 - 2008 A1 - Wieland, Jan Willem AB -

What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . More specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.

VL - 81 SP - 7–21 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Assessing the explanatory power of causal explanations. Y1 - 2007 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen ED - Persson, J. ED - Ylikoski, Petri JA - Rethinking Explanation PB - Kluwer Academic Publishers CY - Dordrecht SP - 109–118 SN - 978-1-4020-5580-5 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Concept of Causation in Newton's Mechanical and Optical Work JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy Y1 - 2007 A1 - Ducheyne, Steffen A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau- sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in- terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe- nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly- ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani- cist one.

VL - 16 SP - 265–288 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Conceptual tools for causal analysis in the social sciences. Y1 - 2007 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Russo, Federica ED - Williamson, Jon JA - Causality and probability in the sciences PB - College Publications CY - London SP - 197–213 SN - 1904987354 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Galton's blinding glasses: modern statistics hiding causal structure in early theories of inheritance. Y1 - 2007 A1 - Leuridan, Bert ED - Russo, Federica ED - Williamson, Jon JA - Causality and probability in the sciences PB - College Publications SP - 243–262 SN - 1-904987-35-4 ER - TY - CONF T1 - A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory T2 - 6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings Y1 - 2007 A1 - De Langhe, Rogier A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen AB -

One of the main problems scientists –physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison’s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his ‘conceptual models’ remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison’s use of Hempel’s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.

JA - 6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings PB - The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR UR - http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De%20Langhe-SGIR%20Rogier%20De%20Langhe%20-%20Erik%20Weber%20-%20Jeroen%20Van%20Bouwel.pdf ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Social mechanisms, causal inference, and the policy relevance of social science JF - Philosophy of the Social Sciences Y1 - 2007 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

The paper has two aims. First, to show that we need social mechanisms to establish the policy relevance of causal claims, even if it is possible to build a good argument for those claims without knowledge of mechanisms. Second, to show that although social scientists can, in principle, do without social mechanisms when they argue for causal claims, in reality scientific practice contexts where they do not need mechanisms are very rare.

VL - 37 SP - 348–359 ER - TY - BOOK T1 - Wetenschapsfilosofie. Y1 - 2007 A1 - Horsten, Leon A1 - Douven, Igor A1 - Weber, Erik PB - Koninklijke Van Gorcum SP - 238 p. SN - 978-90-232-4312-0 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Are there ontological explanations? Y1 - 2006 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Malinowski, Jacek ED - Pietruszczak, Andrzej AB -

There is a huge philosophical literature on scientific explanation, and no one seriously denies that the sciences explain in one way or another. But what about ontology? I will argue that ontological laws and ontological theories can explain. And I will point at the differences between ontological explanations and their scientific counterparts.

JA - Essays in Logic and Ontology PB - Rodopi CY - Amsterdam/New York VL - 91 SP - 277–283 SN - 9042021306 ER - TY - CONF T1 - An Adaptive Logic for Compassionate Relevantism T2 - Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications Y1 - 2005 A1 - Lycke, Hans ED - Pereira, Luis Moniz ED - Wheeler, Gregory JA - Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications PB - CENTRIA ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Causes and Cures of Scurvy. How Modern was James Lind's Methodology? JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Vreese, Leen VL - 14 SP - 55–67 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Coping with inconsistencies: Examples from the social sciences JF - Logic and logical philosophy Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen AB -

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.

VL - 14 SP - 89–101 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Forms of causal explanation JF - Foundations of science Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht VL - 10 SP - 437–454 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions JF - Behavior and Philosophy Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht AB -

This paper deals with the "functions of intentional explanations" of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. "contrastive" and "descriptive", which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.

VL - 33 SP - 1–16 ER - TY - Generic T1 - INUS Conditions Y1 - 2005 A1 - Horsten, Leon A1 - Weber, Erik JA - Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science PB - John Wiley & Sons VL - 2 SP - 955–958 SN - 0470860804 ER - TY - BOOK T1 - Kennis ontrafeld: vijftien hedendaagse filosofen over wetenschap, ethiek en metafysica. Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik PB - Garant SP - 155 p. SN - 90-441-1781-5 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Micro-explanations of laws. Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Preester, Helena AB -

After a brief introduction to Kuipers' views on explanations of laws we argue that micro-explanations of laws can have two formats: they work either by aggregation and transformation (as Kuipers suggests) or by means of function ascriptions (Kuipers neglects this possibility). We compare both types from an epistemic point of view (which information is needed to construct the explanation?) and from a means-end perspective (do both types serve the same purposes? are they equally good?).

JA - Structures in Scientific Cognition. Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers PB - Rodopi CY - Amsterdam/New York SP - 177–186 SN - 9042016485 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Socratic proofs and paraconsistency: a case study JF - Studia Logica Y1 - 2005 A1 - Vanackere, Guido A1 - Wisniewski, Andzrej A1 - Leszczynska, Dorota AB -

This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens' weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Schütte's maximally paraconsistent logic Fv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.

VL - 80 SP - 431–466 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Wie rookt gaat sneller dood en betaalt dus meer: Over het belang van oorzaak-gevolg-relaties in verzekeren en de moeilijkheid bij het onderzoeken ervan JF - Ethiek en Maatschappij Y1 - 2005 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Smokers die sooner and therefore pay more. On the importance of cause-effect- relations in insurance and the difficulties researching them. For insurers, a correct knowledge of causes are important. An insurance companies who failes to adequatly assess the causes of particular risks will loose its market position due to wrong price setting. In this paper, I discuss possible methods determine the causes of risks, as well as problems and imperfections of those methods.

VL - 8 SP - 58–69 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Applications of the Adaptive Logic for Causal Discovery JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2004 A1 - De Vreese, Leen A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 47 SP - 33–51 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Cassirer's critical idealism: a comment on Thomas Mormann. Y1 - 2004 A1 - Van Dyck, Maarten A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Gillies, D. JA - Laws and Models in Science PB - King's College Publications CY - London SP - 161–171 SN - 0954300661 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Mere Logical Possibility: A Bridge too Far Y1 - 2004 A1 - De Mey, Tim ED - Weber, Erik ED - De Mey, Tim JA - Modal Epistemology PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België SP - 53-62 ER - TY - BOOK T1 - Modal epistemology. Y1 - 2004 ED - Weber, Erik ED - De Mey, Tim PB - {Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgië SP - 106 p. SN - N/A ER - TY - CONF T1 - Explaining laws by reduction T2 - Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science Y1 - 2003 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Rojsczak, A ED - Cachro, J ED - Kurczewski, G AB -

Scientific explanations have been intensively studied by philosophers of science during the last five decades. Explanations of laws did not receive as much attention as explanations of particular facts. In this article, I present a model for one type of explanations of laws: reductions of laws to phenomena at a micro-level. Examples of such reductions can be found in the natural sciences (the ideal gas law is probably the most famous example here) and in the social sciences (e.g., reduction of macroeconomic laws to the behaviour of individual economic agents).

JA - Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht SN - 140201645X ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Explanation and thought experiments in history. JF - History and Theory Y1 - 2003 A1 - De Mey, Tim A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and contrasts. Then, we pinpoint the functions thought experiments fulfill in arriving at weighted explanations of contrasts

VL - 42 SP - 28–38 ER - TY - RPRT T1 - Searching for Singular Causal Explanations: a formal analysis Y1 - 2003 A1 - De Vreese, Leen A1 - Weber, Erik ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Dispositional Explanations of Behavior. JF - Behavior and Philosophy Y1 - 2002 A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possiblecausal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring toa situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) byreferring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes adisposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositionalexplanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. Thedispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs

VL - 30 SP - 43–59 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2002 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Verhoeven, Liza VL - 45 SP - 299–307 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The Living Apart Together Relationship between Causation and Explanation. A comment on Jean Lachappelle. JF - Philosophy of the Social Sciences Y1 - 2002 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 32 SP - 560-569 ER - TY - Generic T1 - On a Partial Decision Method for Dynamic Proofs Y1 - 2002 A1 - Batens, Diderik ED - Dekker, Hendrik ED - Villadsen, Jorgen ED - Waragai, Toshiharu AB -

This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, it forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

JA - PCL 2002. Paraconsistent Computational Logic PB - Roskilde University VL - 95 SP - 91–108 UR - http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0207090 N1 -

Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at \texttt{http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html}

ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Remote Causes, Bad Explanations? JF - The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour Y1 - 2002 A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 32 SP - 437-449 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Symposium on Explanation and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts? JF - Economics and Philosophy Y1 - 2002 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Bouwel, Jeroen AB -

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

VL - 18 SP - 259–275 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Unification and explanation - A comment on Halonen and Hintikka, and Schurz. JF - Synthese Y1 - 2002 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Dyck, Maarten AB -

In this article we criticize two recent articles that examine the relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand, claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanation is unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem: explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation (e.g., causal explanation) are required; and none of these kinds is more fundamental.

VL - 131 SP - 145–154 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive. Y1 - 2002 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - De Clercq, Kristof ED - Meheus, Joke JA - Inconsistency in science PB - Kluwer SP - 165–184 SN - 1-4020-0630-6 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Adaptive Logic and Covering Law Explanations JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 2001 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Van Dyck, Maarten AB -

In his theory of explanation Hempel introduced two basic types of covering law explanations for particular events: deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical. In this article we argue that there is more than one reason why adaptive logics provide the right tools for analyzing the argument patterns involved in these covering law explanations. To this end we claim that in the case of inconsistent knowledge systems, neither classical logic, nor a paraconsistent logic suffice to capture the right class of permissible arguments that can make up a deductive-nomological explanation, whereas an adaptive logic gives just the right results. The arguments behind inductive-statistical explanations face the well-known problem of inductive ambiguities, which Hempel tried to solve by his requirement of maximal specifity. We show how this requirement can be nicely incorporated in a logic for these arguments, again using an adaptive logic (which we describe in some detail).

VL - 44 SP - 237–254 ER - TY - Generic T1 - A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions Y1 - 2001 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Vanderbeeken, Robrecht ED - Blasius, Jörg ED - Hox, J. ED - de Leeuw, E. ED - Schmidt, P. JA - Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium T3 - Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology PB - Leske & Budrich CY - Keulen ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Provijn, Dagmar AB -

Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.

VL - 42 SP - 161–180 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Introduction. JF - FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 3 SP - 231–234 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Oorlog en vrede in wetenschapsland Y1 - 1999 A1 - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul ED - Walraves, Else ED - Stuy, Johan JA - Denken als Openheid. Liber Amicorum Hubert Dethier PB - VUB SP - 153-160 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Rationality in the Discovery of Empirical Laws JF - Foundations of Science Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

In this paper I argue against the traditional viewthat in discovery processes there is no place forrational decisions. First I argue that some historicalprocesses in which an empirical law was developed,were rational. Second, I identify some of themethodological rules that we can follow in order to berational when constructing an empirical law. Finally,I argue that people who deny that scientific discoverycan be rational do not understand the nature ofmethodological rules.

VL - 4 SP - 355–368 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Scientific revolutions, rationality and creativity JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 64 SP - 109–128 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Unification: what is it, how do we reach and why do we want it? JF - Synthese Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value.

VL - 118 SP - 479–499 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - World Models and Inconsistencies. JF - Foundations of Science Y1 - 1999 A1 - Weber, Erik A1 - Christiaens, Wim AB -

A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.

VL - 3 SP - 285–311 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Bespreking van Jean Paul van Bendegem: Tot in der Eindigheid JF - Ethiek & Maatschappij Y1 - 1998 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 1 SP - 128–130 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Editorial Preface. JF - Logique et analyse Y1 - 1998 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 41 SP - 269–270 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The practical function and epistemology of causal beliefs JF - Communication & Cognition : Monographies Y1 - 1998 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Distinguant trois fonctions pratiques de la croyance causale : l'affirmation de buts, la résolution des problèmes liés à l'action et la construction des problèmes de décision, l'A. montre que le premier implique à lui seul cinq conceptions diffèrentes de la croyance causale concernant : 1) les mouvements du corps; 2) les interactions causales; 3) la capacité de certains objets à prèserver certaines caractéristiques; 4) la causation structurale; 5) les influences causales permanentes. L'A. cherche une méthode èpistémologique fiable (Salmon, Mackie) pour vérifier et justifier la connaissance causale que nous pouvons avoir de ces cinq versions de la croyance causale

VL - 31 SP - 297–324 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Prudential Arguments in the Realism Debate. JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1998 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 41 SP - 301–312 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Scientific explanation and the interrogative model of inquiry Y1 - 1997 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Sintonen, M JA - Knowledge and inquiry : essays on Jaakko Hintikka's epistemology and philosophy of science T3 - Poznan Studies PB - Rodopi VL - 51 SP - 239–259 SN - 9789042000803 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Comment construit-on une explication déductive-nomologique? JF - Dialectica Y1 - 1996 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

Comment devons-nous appliquer notre savoir scientifique (lois de la nature, théries, etc.) pour qu'il contribue à mieux comprendre les phénomènes (événements particuliers, regularité, etc.) que nous observons? Le modèle déductif-nomologique d'explication scientifique, dans lequel Carl Hempel construit le concept d'explication déductive-nomologique, ne procure pas une réponse complète à cette question. Un des problèmes est que Hempel nous dit ce que nous devons construire quand nous voulons comprendre un phéomène (une explication déductive-nomologique), mais ne nous dit pas comment une explication de ce type est construite. Afin de réoudre ce problème, une méthode pour construire des explications déductives-nomologiques est développée.

VL - 50 SP - 183–204 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Default Reasoning in the Correction of Falsified System Descriptions JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1996 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 37 SP - 13–22 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Explaining, understanding and scientific theories JF - Erkenntnis (Dordrecht) Y1 - 1996 A1 - Weber, Erik AB -

One of the functions of scientific knowledge is to provide the theories and laws we need in order to understand the world. My article deals with the epistemic aspect of understanding, i.e., with understanding as unification. The aim is to explicate what we have to do in order to make our scientific knowledge contribute to an increase of the degree to which the particular events we have observed, fit into our world-picture. The analysis contains two parts. First I define the concept of scientific epistemic explanation. Explanations of these type are the appropriate instruments for increasing the degree of unification of the particular events we have observed. In the second, largest part of the article I analyze the construction process of scientific epistemic explanations, focusing on the application of scientific theories.

VL - 44 SP - 1–23 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Some problems for Kitcher's unification account of explanation JF - Communication & Cognition : Monographies Y1 - 1996 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 29 SP - 441–456 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Realism and scientific explanations Y1 - 1995 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Cortois, Paul JA - The Many Problems of Realism PB - Tilburg University Press SP - 43–57 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Review of R. Franck (red.) 'Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L'explication causale dans les sciences humaines' (Lyon, Institut Interdisciplinaire d'Etudes Epistémologiques) JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1995 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 54 SP - 145–146 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Scientific Arguments and Scientific Prediction. Y1 - 1995 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Van Eemeren, F. H. ED - Grootendorst, R. ED - Blair, J. ED - Willart, C. JA - Special Fields and Cases. Proceedings on the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation PB - SicSat VL - IV SP - 377-387 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Explanation, understanding and why-questions Y1 - 1994 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Halleux, Robert ED - Bernés, Anne-Cathérine JA - Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen PB - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België SP - 83-94 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Socialisatie, sociale controle en sociologische verklaringen van menselijke handelingen. JF - TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN Y1 - 1994 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 38 SP - 61–68 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Waarom Wesley Salmons causaal-mechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat Y1 - 1994 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Van Bendegem, Jean Paul ED - Cornelis, Gustaaf C JA - Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. Acta 16de Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag PB - VUB Press SP - 81-86 SN - 9789054870845 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Het construeren van wetenschappelijke verklaringen Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Raymaekers, Bart JA - Gehelen en fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie PB - Universitaire Pers SP - 261-265 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The indirect practical functions of explanations JF - PHILOSOPHICA (GENT) Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 51 SP - 105–124 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Introduction JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 51 SP - 5–7 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Review of Werner Callebaut, 'Taking the naturalistic turn' (University of Chicago Press) JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 53 SP - 123–124 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Wetenschappelijke verklaringen en subjectief verwacht nut Y1 - 1993 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - van Dooren, Wim ED - Hoff, Tineke JA - Actueel Filosoferen PB - Eburon CY - Delft SP - 53-60 ER - TY - Generic T1 - Aspecten van ontdekking en creativiteit Y1 - 1992 A1 - Batens, Diderik A1 - Meheus, Joke A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Raymaekers, Bart JA - Gehelen en Fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie PB - Universitaire Pers SP - 59 ER - TY - Generic T1 - De verklarende kracht van statistische hypothesen Y1 - 1992 A1 - Weber, Erik ED - Commers, Ronald JA - Acta Filosofiedag 1990 PB - Ebduron CY - Delft SP - 53-56 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Models of explanation: an evaluation of their fruitfulness JF - COMMUNICATION & COGNITION : MONOGRAPHIES Y1 - 1992 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 25 SP - 339–352 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Scientific Explanation JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1992 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 49 SP - 148–154 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Phenomenological Laws and their Application to Scientific Epistemic Explanation Problems JF - Logique et Analyse Y1 - 1990 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 33 SP - 175–189 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - De asymmetrie van wetenschappelijke verklaringen JF - Algemeen nederlands tijdschrijft voor wijsbegeerte Y1 - 1989 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 81 SP - 47–58 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - Scientific explanation, necessity and contingency JF - PHILOSOPHICA (GENT) Y1 - 1989 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 44 SP - 81–99 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - A causal approach to explanations JF - Logique et analyse Y1 - 1987 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 30 SP - 51–68 ER - TY - JOUR T1 - The transformation of cognitive values into methodological rules JF - Philosophica Y1 - 1987 A1 - Weber, Erik VL - 40 SP - 151–164 ER -