@article {DeLanghe2014, title = {A unified model of the division of cognitive labor.}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {81}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {444{\textendash}459}, abstract = {

Current theories of the division of cognitive labor are confined to the {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}context of justification{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}, assuming exogenous theories. But new theories are made from the same labor that is used for developing existing theories, and if none of this labor is ever allocated to create new alternatives, then scientific progress is impossible. A unified model is proposed in which theories are no longer given but a function of the division of labor in the model itself. The interactions of individuals balancing the exploitation of existing theories and the exploration of new theories results in a robust cyclical pattern.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {Beirlaen2012, title = {Understanding Human Agency, by {E}rasmus {M}ayr (review; in Dutch)}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {383-385}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {3126287, title = {A unifying framework for reasoning about normative conflicts}, booktitle = {The logica yearbook 2011}, year = {2012}, pages = {1{\textendash}14}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

First, two context-dependent desiderata are presented for devising calculi of deontic logic that can consistently accommodate normative conflicts. Conflict-tolerant deontic logics (CTDLs) can be evaluated by their treatment of the trade-off between these desiderata. Next, it is argued that CTDLs defined within the standard format for adaptive logics are particularly good at overcoming this trade-off.

}, isbn = {9781848900714}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Pelis, Michal and Puncochar, Vit} } @article {Ducheyne2009a, title = {Understanding (in) {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Argument for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {227-258}, abstract = {

In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’ reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation.

}, keywords = {1713, 1726), Actio in distans, D. Dieks, Discours de la cause de la pesanteur (1690), H. de Regt, Huygens, Incommensurability, Newton, Principia (1687, Scientific understanding, Spherical vortex cosmology, Theoretical virtues, Universal gravitation}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {10.1007/s10838-009-9096-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9096-y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {703844, title = {Understanding in political science: the plurality of epistemic interests}, booktitle = {Scientific Understanding. {P}hilosophical Perspectives}, year = {2009}, pages = {298{\textendash}313}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, isbn = {9780822943785}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Leonelli, Sabina and Eigner, Kai} } @article {924886, title = {Unravelling the methodology of causal pluralism}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {73{\textendash}89}, abstract = {

In this paper we try to bring some clarification in the recent debate on causal pluralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qua lify as a pluralistic theory of causation. We also show that there is currently no theory on the market which meets these criteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {D:universal, title = {A Universal Logic Approach to Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logica Universalis}, volume = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {221-242}, abstract = {

In this paper, adaptive logics are studied from the viewpoint of universal logic (in the sense of the study of common structures of logics). The common structure of a large set of adaptive logics is described. It is shown that this structure determines the proof theory as well as the semantics of the adaptive logics, and moreover that most properties of the logics can be proved by relying solely on the structure, viz. without invoking any specific properties of the logics themselves.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {klijn2003using, title = {Using classical resolution method to check derivability for some propositional paralogics and adaptive logics.}, year = {2003}, abstract = {

In this article it will be shown how results from [2] can be used to decide wether, for a range of propositional paralogics and adaptive logics L, A1 , ..., An \#L B is derivable by means of a resolution method for C1 , ..., Cn D, where C1 , ..., Cn and D are the translations of the original premisses and the conclusion respectively from L into CL. This method simplifies the use of automated deduction for non-classical logics, since the framework for these logics can be put "on top of" any existing resolution method for classical logic. This theoretical framework has been implemented in a computer program. The URL where this program is available will be given. This approach, moreover, makes it easier to compare the derivability of well formed formulas from sets of premisses between the implemented range of logics. The resulting computer program can thus be seen as an useful tool for research in logics.

}, author = {Klijn, Alex} } @article {152661, title = {Unification and explanation - {A} comment on {H}alonen and {H}intikka, and {S}churz.}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {131}, number = {1}, year = {2002}, pages = {145{\textendash}154}, abstract = {

In this article we criticize two recent articles that examine the relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand, claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanation is unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem: explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation (e.g., causal explanation) are required; and none of these kinds is more fundamental.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {10.1023/A:1015005529380}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {D:uaal, title = {A Universally Abnormality-Adaptive Logic}, journal = {Logical Investigations}, volume = {8}, year = {2001}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {256{\textendash}265}, address = {Moscow, {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}NAUKA{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}}, abstract = {

The present paper presents a logic that allows for the abnormal behaviour of any logical constant and for the ambiguous behaviour of any non-logical constant, but nevertheless offers an interpretation of the premises that is as normal as possible.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {d2001use, title = {The use of metaphors in scientific development: a logical approach}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {215{\textendash}235}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that the use of multiple metaphors plays an important part in scientific reasoning. It is more powerful in generating new ideas than the use of single metaphors. The aim of this paper is twofold. First I will argue, by means of some historical examples, that the combination of metaphors adds a very specific type of dynamics, that makes them more powerful than single metaphors. Secondly, I will discuss an adaptive logic that grasps the use of multiple metaphors and that increases our insight in the reasoning process.

}, author = {D’Hanis, Isabel} } @article {109727, title = {Unification: what is it, how do we reach and why do we want it?}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {118}, number = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {479{\textendash}499}, abstract = {

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005134205471}, author = {Weber, Erik} }