@article {1997, title = {Contrastive Causation in Genetics and Physics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {90}, year = {2015}, pages = {93-113}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Bal, Inge} } @article {4443682, title = {The {\textquoteright}green cheese{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}red herring{\textquoteright} problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, year = {2015}, pages = {433-455}, author = {Weber, Erik and Gervais, Raoul and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {provijn2014bloody, title = {Bloody analogical reasoning}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {217{\textendash}232}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper I will study some of William Harvey’s applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic ‘action’ of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens’ contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian ‘natural philosophy interpretation’ of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_11}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {5673678, title = {Data-driven induction in scientific discovery: a critical assessment based on Kepler{\textquoteright}s discoveries}, booktitle = {Logic, reasoning, and rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {59{\textendash}76}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Motivated by the renewed interest in knowledge discovery from data (KDD) by the artificial intelligence community, this paper provides a critical assessment of the model of data-driven induction for scientific discovery. The most influential research program using this model is developed by the BACON team. Two of the main claims by this research program, the descriptive and constructive power of data-driven induction, are evaluated by means of two historical cases studies: the discovery of the sine law of refraction in optics and Kepler{\textquoteright}s third law of planetary motion. I will provide evidence that the data used by the BACON program{\textendash}-despite the claims being made{\textendash}-does not correspond with the historical data available to Kepler and his contemporaries. Secondly, it is shown that for the two cases the method by which the general law was arrived at did not involve data-driven induction. Finally, the value of the data-driven induction as a general model for scientific discovery is being questioned.

}, isbn = {9789401790109}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6\_4}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {4443651, title = {Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {45-57}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {4443818, title = {Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {79}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, month = {February}, pages = {1367{\textendash}1389}, abstract = {

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-{\`a}-vis functional explanations.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10670-014-9605-1}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {Wieland2014, title = {Internalism Does Entail Scepticism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, series = {Logic, Argumentation \& Reasoning}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {247-260}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philie’s solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.

}, keywords = {Internalism, Knowledge, Regress, Rule, Scepticism}, isbn = {978-94-017-9010-9}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_13}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {frans2014mechanistic, title = {Mechanistic Explanation and Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics}, journal = {Philosophia Mathematica}, volume = {22}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, pages = {231{\textendash}248}, abstract = {

Although there is a consensus among philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians that mathematical explanations exist, only a few authors have proposed accounts of explanation in mathematics. These accounts fit into the unificationist or top-down approach to explanation. We argue that these models can be complemented by a bottom-up approach to explanation in mathematics. We introduce the mechanistic model of explanation in science and discuss the possibility of using this model in mathematics, arguing that using it does not presuppose a Platonist view of mathematics and allows one to gain insight into why a theorem is true by answering what-if-things-had-been-different questions.

}, doi = {10.1093/philmat/nku003}, author = {Frans, Joachim and Weber, Erik} } @article {4265612, title = {The role of unification in micro-explanations of physical laws}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {79}, year = {2014}, pages = {41{\textendash}56}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of particular facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically about microexplanations of laws in physics. We investigate whether providing unificatory information has a surplus value in micro-explanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is information that provides ontological unification in the sense defined by Uskali M{\"a}ki. We argue that providing unificatory information may lead to explanations with more explanatory power (we use Jim Woodward’s concept of explanatory power for that) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Weber, Erik and Lefevere, Merel} } @article {3182109, title = {Causaliteit en de methodestrijd: naar een ge{\"\i}ntegreerd gebruik van kwalitatief en kwantitatief onderzoek in een praktisch geori{\"e}nteerde criminologie}, journal = {Panopticon}, volume = {34}, year = {2013}, pages = {115{\textendash}133}, abstract = {

In this article, we re-examine an old problem in criminology i.e the "battle of the methods". Even though the battle has become less explicit recently, it does have a contemporary named the incompatibility thesis in the field of mixed methods research in the social sciences. We look at this incompatibility thesis from the point of view of the philosophy of science, more precisely by discussing different forms of causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality are discussed. We argue that qualitative and quantitative methods each pursue a specific kind of knowledge, but that a functional integration of both is desirable. We conclude by referring to two main advantages of such integration, viz. the manipulation of causal relationships and extrapolation of research results in time and space.

}, issn = {0771-1409}, author = {Heylen, Ben and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {weber2013study, title = {How to Study Scientific Explanation?}, booktitle = {Scientific Explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {25{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3134040, title = {The ICE-theory of technical functions}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {23{\textendash}44}, issn = {0815-0796}, doi = {10.1007/s11016-012-9642-9}, author = {Weber, Erik and Reydon, Thomas and Boon, Mieke and Houkes, Wybo and Vermaas, Pieter} } @article {4118013, title = {Inferential explanations in biology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, volume = {44}, year = {2013}, pages = {356{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct- ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic expla- nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.

}, issn = {1369-8486}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {3086510, title = {Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {139{\textendash}152}, abstract = {

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver{\textquoteright}s continuum of how-possibly, to how-plausibly, to how-actually models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism{\textquoteright}s activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models.

}, issn = {0951-5089}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.633693}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @book {3259615, title = {Scientific explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {93}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.

}, isbn = {9789400764453}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {2020639, title = {Can economics become a purely experimental science? {A} comparative study}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world}, year = {2012}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

}, isbn = {9789814383073}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {2977907, title = {Causality and explanation in the sciences}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {133{\textendash}136}, abstract = {

Editors{\textquoteright} introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at the University of Ghent in September 2011.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik} } @article {2985552, title = {Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {123{\textendash}148}, abstract = {

In a paper "Causation in Context" (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies{\textquoteright} arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3145156, title = {Het debat tussen {\textquoteright}groene spellers{\textquoteright} en {\textquoteright}witte spellers{\textquoteright} ge{\"e}valueerd vanuit een sociaal-epistemologische invalshoek}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {14}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

In the Netherlands and Flanders, a debate on the Dutch spelling has been raging between, on the one hand, the ‘green spellers’, who follow the official ‘green spelling’, and, on the other hand, the protesting ‘white spellers’, who espouse an alternative spelling. In the present article, this debate will be approached from a socio-epistemological perspective. Using the theory of Helen Longino, we highlight how the debate between the parties has been conducted, and explain why it failed to become a fruitful debate, based on a critical discourse and by which both parties strive for objective knowledge. We also draw a few lessons for the future.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Martens, Liesbeth and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {2094355, title = {Het doel van wetenschap: is er een derde weg tussen onbeperkt intentioneel realisme en strikt pragmatisme?}, booktitle = {Door Denken en Doen. Essays bij het Werk van {R}onald {C}ommers}, year = {2012}, pages = {243{\textendash}253}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Ik onderscheid drie posities met betrekking tot het doel van wetenschap: onbeperkt intentioneel realisme, strikt pragmatisme en gesofistikeerd pragmatisme. Ik argumenteer dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme: ze komen beide neer op "anything goes." Dit betekent dat gesofistikeerd pragmatisme niet de gulden middenweg is die het op het eerste zicht lijkt te zijn.

}, isbn = {9789038219431}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @article {2079125, title = {Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit?}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {147{\textendash}159}, abstract = {

The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegener’s theory was epistemically worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in \&\#353;e\&\#353;elja and Stra\&\#223;er (accepted for publication). We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy

}, issn = {0039-3681}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.11.005}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Weber, Erik} } @article {3063631, title = {Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {83{\textendash}99}, abstract = {

What happens if one applies the "evaluation methodology" of The Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the "problem solving methodology" of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers{\textquoteright} methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan{\textquoteright}s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutins to these problems.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @proceedings {1856691, title = {The role of unification in explanations of facts}, journal = {EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009}, year = {2012}, pages = {403-413}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

}, isbn = {9789400724037}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4\_33}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Lefevere, Merel}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Okasha, Samir and Hartmann, Stephan} } @article {Weber2012, title = {Two Gaps in the Contextual Theory of Scientific Understanding}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {8}, year = {2012}, pages = {130-131}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {2079127, title = {Two problems for the contextual theory of scienitfic understanding}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {60{\textendash}62}, abstract = {

In this paper I argue that the contextual theory of scientific understanding as developed by Henk De Regt and Dennis Dieks (2005: “A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding”, Synthese 144, 137–170) and further developed by Henk De Regt (2009: “The Epistemic Value of Understanding”, Philosophy of Science 76: 585–597) is not contextual in one crucial respect: the meaning of understanding. I also argue that its scope needs to be restricted: it cannot be a theory of scientific understanding in general.

}, issn = {1757-0522}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {1855775, title = {The covering law model applied to dynamical cognitive science: a comment on Joel Walmsley}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim{\textquoteright}s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley{\textquoteright}s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.

}, issn = {0924-6495}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9216-9}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {1853233, title = {Explanation in the social sciences}, booktitle = {The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {632{\textendash}646}, publisher = {Sage Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This chapter gives an overview of the philosophical debates concerning explanation in the social sciences.

}, isbn = {9781847874009}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Jarvie, Ian and Zamora-Bonilla, Jesus} } @incollection {J:flash, title = {A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation}, year = {2011}, pages = {93{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {1223153, title = {The IARC and mechanistic evidence}, booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {91{\textendash}109}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC{\textquoteright}s carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.

}, isbn = {9780199574131}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik}, editor = {McKay Illari, Phyllis and Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @article {1890961, title = {Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction {\textendash} traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism {\textendash} can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {2020633, title = {Needham{\textquoteright}s grand question revisited: on the meaning and justification of causal claims in the history of {C}hinese science}, journal = {East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine}, volume = {33}, year = {2011}, pages = {13{\textendash}32}, abstract = {

The Needham Question (i.e. the question why modern science has not developed in Chinese civilization but only in Europe) has drawn a substantial amount of criticism. Despite its apparent innocuousness, influential sinologists have written devastating critiques of it. These criticisms fall into two main categories. The first denies the validity of the central concepts by means of which the question is formulated (e.g. {\textquoteright}science’ or {\textquoteright}civilization’). The second calls into question (1) the legitimacy of asking for explanations of absences (i.e. of events that did not occur), (2) the legitimacy of citing absences as explanations (i.e. citing negative facts in explanations), and (3) whether the Needham question can be answered, even if asking for explanations of absences and citing absences as explanations are both legitimate. In this article, we take into account the former criticism, in order to arrive at a new starting point: dividing the Needham Problem into its various sub-questions. We then tackle the latter criticism by calling upon the contemporary philosophy of causation. We will argue that, according to certain theories of causation, the subquestions under discussion can be answered, and we will clarify how they can be argued for.

}, issn = {1562-918X}, author = {De Saeger, David and Weber, Erik} } @article {weber2010causal, title = {Causal Methodology. A Comment on Nancy Cartwright{\textquoteright}s Hunting Causes and Using Them}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {318{\textendash}325}, doi = {10.1093/analys/anp045}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {1054981, title = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: theory and practice}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, volume = {31}, number = {5}, year = {2010}, pages = {371{\textendash}390}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

}, issn = {1386-7415}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9156-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {944198, title = {How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?}, booktitle = {On Kuhn{\textquoteright}s Philosophy and its Legacy}, volume = {8}, year = {2010}, pages = {251{\textendash}282}, publisher = {CFCUL}, address = {Lisbon}, abstract = {

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such {\textquotedblleft}explanatory concepts{\textquotedblright} of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions {\textendash} Kuhn{\textquoteright}s, Thagard{\textquoteright}s, Chen{\textquoteright}s and Barker{\textquoteright}s, and Laudan{\textquoteright}s {\textendash} and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.

}, isbn = {978-989-8247-12-4}, author = {Weber, Erik and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja}, editor = {Torres, Juan Manuel} } @article {924352, title = {Metaphysical explanatory asymmetries}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {53}, number = {211}, year = {2010}, pages = {345{\textendash}365}, abstract = {

The general view is that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric. For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is: is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by comparing them to analogous questions that have been investigated for scientific explanations. Three main asymmetry criteria have been proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unification, and (iii) explanatory dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphysical explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence criterion (in modified format) holds of them.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Weber, Erik} } @conference {605786, title = {The Adaptive Logics Approach to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in {B}elgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {924987, title = {Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {301{\textendash}320}, abstract = {

Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.698}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {674351, title = {"Clear Moon, Frost soon". An introduction to the Study of Meteorological Practices in the Low Countries (1550-1850)}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Pieters, Eva}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {924897, title = {Conceptual analysis of causation and theoretical utility in everyday contexts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {206}, year = {2009}, pages = {177{\textendash}190}, abstract = {

In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall{\textquoteright}s theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall{\textquoteright}s proposal is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation, traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up. However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive conceptual analysis can be useful.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {924908, title = {How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {23}, year = {2009}, pages = {277{\textendash}-295}, abstract = {

In a recent paper in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere=s theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences B on which Russo and Williamson focus B and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation (of Suppes, Eells and Humphreys) and show that they cannot account for the use of mechanistic evidence. I argue that these theories are also inferior to Giere{\textquoteright}s theory in other respects.

}, issn = {0269-8595}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {weber2009laudation, title = {Laudatio Jens H{\o}yrup}, journal = {Sartoniana}, volume = {22}, year = {2009}, pages = {5{\textendash}7}, author = {Weber, Erik and Heeffer, Albrecht} } @book {689110, title = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Young Researchers Present their Work}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {678298, title = {Mathematics through man-computer interaction. A study of the early years of computing.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {Urbaniak2009a, title = {Modal Logic and Philosophy. {A} case study.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {79-83}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Rostalska, Agnieszka}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {Primiero2009, title = {A note on constructive modalities for information}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {drouet2009probabilistic, title = {Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {68{\textendash}72}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {Urbaniak2008, title = {Reasoning with dynamic conceptual frames.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {84-89}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @conference {524726, title = {Trading off explanatory virtues}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

The paper draws on Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s case-study of the Cuban Missile Crisis in which three different accounts are constructed from three different explanatory models, each situated at a different level of analysis. First, it is shown that each model produces genuine explanations which could not have been arrived at from one of the other accounts. With this prima facie case for pluralism in hand, the indispensability of the different models is then accounted for by linking the relevance of each model to different explanatory contexts.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Van Paemel, Geert} } @incollection {924923, title = {Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {181{\textendash}194}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {9780230224391}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {427052, title = {Confusion and bad arguments in the conceptual analysis of causation}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {51}, number = {201}, year = {2008}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {924965, title = {The debate between causal realism and causal constructivism: metaphilosophical reflections}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, year = {2008}, pages = {59{\textendash}71}, abstract = {

In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {446322, title = {De-ontologizing the debate on social explanations: a pragmatic approach based on epistemic interests.}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {423{\textendash}442}, abstract = {

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences-refining the conceptual tools of social scientists-and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.

}, issn = {0163-8548}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {431737, title = {The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {298{\textendash}303}, issn = {0003-2638}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00756.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {415578, title = {A pragmatist defense of non-relativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social science.}, journal = {History and theory}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, month = {May}, pages = {168{\textendash}182}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Forland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.

}, issn = {0018-2656}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00445.x}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {689055, title = {Protagoras en het kennistheoretisch relativisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. Essays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {181{\textendash}192}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent}, isbn = {9789038212791}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @article {1092888, title = {Regiomontanus and Chinese mathematics}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {87{\textendash}114}, abstract = {

This paper critically assesses the claim by Gavin Menzies that Regiomontanus knew about the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) through the Sh{\`u} sh\={u} Ji\v{u} zh\={a}ng (SSJZ) written in 1247. Menzies uses this among many others arguments for his controversial theory that a large fleet of Chinese vessels visited Italy in the first half of the 15th century. We first refute that Regiomontanus used the method from the SSJZ. CRT problems appear in earlier European arithmetic and can be solved by the method of the Sun Zi, as did Fibonacci. Secondly, we pro-vide evidence that remainder problems were treated within the European abbaco tradition independently of the CRT method. Finally, we discuss the role of recre-ational mathematics for the oral dissemination of sub-scientific knowledge.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @article {weber2008reply, title = {Reply to Daniel Steel{\textquoteright}s “With or Without Mechanisms”}, journal = {Philosophy of the social sciences}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {267{\textendash}270}, abstract = {

In this discussion note I clarify the motivation behind my original paper “Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference and the Policy Relevance of Social Science.” I argue that one of the tasks of philosophers of social science is to draw attention to methodological problems that are often forgotten or overlooked. Then I show that my original paper does not make the mistake or fallacy that Daniel Steel suggests in his comment on it.

}, doi = {10.1177/0048393108315559}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {1098767, title = {{\textquoteright}Since heaven has not yet destroyed this culture, what can the men of {K}uang do to me?{\textquoteright}: cosmological confucianism and the development of science}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2008}, pages = {27{\textendash}53}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Dessein, Bart}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {Weber2007, title = {Assessing the explanatory power of causal explanations.}, booktitle = {Rethinking Explanation}, year = {2007}, pages = {109{\textendash}118}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, isbn = {978-1-4020-5580-5}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Persson, J. and Ylikoski, Petri} } @article {386240, title = {The Concept of Causation in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Mechanical and Optical Work}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {16}, year = {2007}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau- sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in- terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe- nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly- ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani- cist one.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {371044, title = {Conceptual tools for causal analysis in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {Causality and probability in the sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {197{\textendash}213}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {1904987354}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @conference {1895032, title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory}, booktitle = {6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings}, year = {2007}, publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, abstract = {

One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.

}, url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20Langhe-SGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20-\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20-\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {386236, title = {Social mechanisms, causal inference, and the policy relevance of social science}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {348{\textendash}359}, abstract = {

The paper has two aims. First, to show that we need social mechanisms to establish the policy relevance of causal claims, even if it is possible to build a good argument for those claims without knowledge of mechanisms. Second, to show that although social scientists can, in principle, do without social mechanisms when they argue for causal claims, in reality scientific practice contexts where they do not need mechanisms are very rare.

}, issn = {0048-3931}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @book {371040, title = {Wetenschapsfilosofie.}, year = {2007}, pages = {238 p.}, publisher = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, organization = {Koninklijke Van Gorcum}, isbn = {978-90-232-4312-0}, author = {Horsten, Leon and Douven, Igor and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {358125, title = {Are there ontological explanations?}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {277{\textendash}283}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {

There is a huge philosophical literature on scientific explanation, and no one seriously denies that the sciences explain in one way or another. But what about ontology? I will argue that ontological laws and ontological theories can explain. And I will point at the differences between ontological explanations and their scientific counterparts.

}, isbn = {9042021306}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {ELe:scurvy, title = {The Causes and Cures of Scurvy. {H}ow Modern was {J}ames {L}ind{\textquoteright}s Methodology?}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {55{\textendash}67}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {334981, title = {Coping with inconsistencies: {E}xamples from the social sciences}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {89{\textendash}101}, abstract = {

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {334983, title = {Forms of causal explanation}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2005}, pages = {437{\textendash}454}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {386239, title = {The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {33}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}16}, abstract = {

This paper deals with the "functions of intentional explanations" of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. "contrastive" and "descriptive", which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {386241, title = {INUS Conditions}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science}, volume = {2}, year = {2005}, pages = {955{\textendash}958}, publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons}, isbn = {0470860804}, author = {Horsten, Leon and Weber, Erik} } @book {371039, title = {Kennis ontrafeld: {v}ijftien hedendaagse filosofen over wetenschap, ethiek en metafysica.}, year = {2005}, pages = {155 p.}, publisher = {Garant}, organization = {Garant}, isbn = {90-441-1781-5}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {340350, title = {Micro-explanations of laws.}, booktitle = {Structures in Scientific Cognition. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers}, year = {2005}, pages = {177{\textendash}186}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {

After a brief introduction to Kuipers{\textquoteright} views on explanations of laws we argue that micro-explanations of laws can have two formats: they work either by aggregation and transformation (as Kuipers suggests) or by means of function ascriptions (Kuipers neglects this possibility). We compare both types from an epistemic point of view (which information is needed to construct the explanation?) and from a means-end perspective (do both types serve the same purposes? are they equally good?).

}, isbn = {9042016485}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Preester, Helena} } @article {371043, title = {Wie rookt gaat sneller dood en betaalt dus meer: {O}ver het belang van oorzaak-gevolg-relaties in verzekeren en de moeilijkheid bij het onderzoeken ervan}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {58{\textendash}69}, abstract = {

Smokers die sooner and therefore pay more. On the importance of cause-effect- relations in insurance and the difficulties researching them. For insurers, a correct knowledge of causes are important. An insurance companies who failes to adequatly assess the causes of particular risks will loose its market position due to wrong price setting. In this paper, I discuss possible methods determine the causes of risks, as well as problems and imperfections of those methods.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {LeE:aalcd, title = {Applications of the Adaptive Logic for Causal Discovery}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {33{\textendash}51}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {324232, title = {Cassirer{\textquoteright}s critical idealism: a comment on {T}homas {M}ormann.}, booktitle = {Laws and Models in Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {161{\textendash}171}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {0954300661}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Gillies, D.} } @incollection {DeMey2004, title = {Mere Logical Possibility: A Bridge too Far}, booktitle = {Modal Epistemology}, year = {2004}, pages = {53-62}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @book {322175, title = {Modal epistemology.}, year = {2004}, pages = {106 p.}, publisher = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, isbn = {N/A}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @conference {403803, title = {Explaining laws by reduction}, booktitle = {Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Scientific explanations have been intensively studied by philosophers of science during the last five decades. Explanations of laws did not receive as much attention as explanations of particular facts. In this article, I present a model for one type of explanations of laws: reductions of laws to phenomena at a micro-level. Examples of such reductions can be found in the natural sciences (the ideal gas law is probably the most famous example here) and in the social sciences (e.g., reduction of macroeconomic laws to the behaviour of individual economic agents).

}, isbn = {140201645X}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-2612-2_9}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Rojsczak, A and Cachro, J and Kurczewski, G} } @article {386237, title = {Explanation and thought experiments in history.}, journal = {History and Theory}, volume = {42}, year = {2003}, pages = {28{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and contrasts. Then, we pinpoint the functions thought experiments fulfill in arriving at weighted explanations of contrasts

}, issn = {0018-2656}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Weber, Erik} } @article {LeE:ssce, title = {Searching for Singular Causal Explanations: a formal analysis}, year = {2003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {152619, title = {Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {30}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possiblecausal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring toa situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) byreferring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes adisposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositionalexplanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. Thedispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Weber, Erik} } @article {319503, title = {Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {45}, number = {179{\textendash}180}, year = {2002}, pages = {299{\textendash}307}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {VanBouwel2002a, title = {The Living Apart Together Relationship between Causation and Explanation. {A} comment on {J}ean {L}achappelle.}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {32}, number = {4}, year = {2002}, pages = {560-569}, doi = {10.1177/004839302237837}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {VanBouwel2002, title = {Remote Causes, Bad Explanations?}, journal = {The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, volume = {32}, year = {2002}, pages = {437-449}, doi = {10.1111/1468-5914.00197}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {152660, title = {Symposium on Explanation and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts?}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {259{\textendash}275}, abstract = {

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

}, issn = {0266-2671}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {152661, title = {Unification and explanation - {A} comment on {H}alonen and {H}intikka, and {S}churz.}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {131}, number = {1}, year = {2002}, pages = {145{\textendash}154}, abstract = {

In this article we criticize two recent articles that examine the relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand, claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanation is unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem: explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation (e.g., causal explanation) are required; and none of these kinds is more fundamental.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {10.1023/A:1015005529380}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {152663, title = {Why the logic of explanation is inconsistency-adaptive.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in science}, year = {2002}, pages = {165{\textendash}184}, publisher = {Kluwer}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_10}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {EM:cle, title = {Adaptive Logic and Covering Law Explanations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {237{\textendash}254}, abstract = {

In his theory of explanation Hempel introduced two basic types of covering law explanations for particular events: deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical. In this article we argue that there is more than one reason why adaptive logics provide the right tools for analyzing the argument patterns involved in these covering law explanations. To this end we claim that in the case of inconsistent knowledge systems, neither classical logic, nor a paraconsistent logic suffice to capture the right class of permissible arguments that can make up a deductive-nomological explanation, whereas an adaptive logic gives just the right results. The arguments behind inductive-statistical explanations face the well-known problem of inductive ambiguities, which Hempel tried to solve by his requirement of maximal specifity. We show how this requirement can be nicely incorporated in a logic for these arguments, again using an adaptive logic (which we describe in some detail).

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {weber2001pragmatic, title = {A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions}, booktitle = {Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium}, series = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Leske \& Budrich}, address = {Keulen}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Blasius, J{\"o}rg and Hox, J. and de Leeuw, E. and Schmidt, P.} } @article {EDa:diag, title = {A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, pages = {161{\textendash}180}, abstract = {

Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {109726, title = {Introduction.}, journal = {FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {231{\textendash}234}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {386238, title = {Rationality in the Discovery of Empirical Laws}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {4}, year = {1999}, pages = {355{\textendash}368}, abstract = {

In this paper I argue against the traditional viewthat in discovery processes there is no place forrational decisions. First I argue that some historicalprocesses in which an empirical law was developed,were rational. Second, I identify some of themethodological rules that we can follow in order to berational when constructing an empirical law. Finally,I argue that people who deny that scientific discoverycan be rational do not understand the nature ofmethodological rules.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {10.1023/A:1009600614510}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {135139, title = {Scientific revolutions, rationality and creativity}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, pages = {109{\textendash}128}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {109727, title = {Unification: what is it, how do we reach and why do we want it?}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {118}, number = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {479{\textendash}499}, abstract = {

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005134205471}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {109728, title = {World Models and Inconsistencies.}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {285{\textendash}311}, abstract = {

A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Christiaens, Wim} } @article {WE_Rj, title = {Bespreking van {J}ean {P}aul van {B}endegem: Tot in der Eindigheid}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, year = {1998}, pages = {128{\textendash}130}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {135143, title = {Editorial Preface.}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {41}, number = {164}, year = {1998}, pages = {269{\textendash}270}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {276844, title = {The practical function and epistemology of causal beliefs}, journal = {Communication \& Cognition : Monographies}, volume = {31}, year = {1998}, pages = {297{\textendash}324}, abstract = {

Distinguant trois fonctions pratiques de la croyance causale : l{\textquoteright}affirmation de buts, la r{\'e}solution des probl{\`e}mes li{\'e}s {\`a} l{\textquoteright}action et la construction des probl{\`e}mes de d{\'e}cision, l{\textquoteright}A. montre que le premier implique {\`a} lui seul cinq conceptions diff{\`e}rentes de la croyance causale concernant : 1) les mouvements du corps; 2) les interactions causales; 3) la capacit{\'e} de certains objets {\`a} pr{\`e}server certaines caract{\'e}ristiques; 4) la causation structurale; 5) les influences causales permanentes. L{\textquoteright}A. cherche une m{\'e}thode {\`e}pist{\'e}mologique fiable (Salmon, Mackie) pour v{\'e}rifier et justifier la connaissance causale que nous pouvons avoir de ces cinq versions de la croyance causale

}, issn = {0378-0880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {135140, title = {Prudential Arguments in the Realism Debate.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {41}, number = {164}, year = {1998}, pages = {301{\textendash}312}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {267462, title = {Scientific explanation and the interrogative model of inquiry}, booktitle = {Knowledge and inquiry : essays on Jaakko Hintikka{\textquoteright}s epistemology and philosophy of science}, series = {Poznan Studies}, volume = {51}, year = {1997}, pages = {239{\textendash}259}, publisher = {Rodopi}, isbn = {9789042000803}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Sintonen, M} } @article {weber1996comment, title = {Comment construit-on une explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique?}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {50}, number = {3}, year = {1996}, pages = {183{\textendash}204}, abstract = {

Comment devons-nous appliquer notre savoir scientifique (lois de la nature, th{\'e}ries, etc.) pour qu{\textquoteright}il contribue {\`a} mieux comprendre les ph{\'e}nom{\`e}nes ({\'e}v{\'e}nements particuliers, regularit{\'e}, etc.) que nous observons? Le mod{\`e}le d{\'e}ductif-nomologique d{\textquoteright}explication scientifique, dans lequel Carl Hempel construit le concept d{\textquoteright}explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique, ne procure pas une r{\'e}ponse compl{\`e}te {\`a} cette question. Un des probl{\`e}mes est que Hempel nous dit ce que nous devons construire quand nous voulons comprendre un ph{\'e}om{\`e}ne (une explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique), mais ne nous dit pas comment une explication de ce type est construite. Afin de r{\'e}oudre ce probl{\`e}me, une m{\'e}thode pour construire des explications d{\'e}ductives-nomologiques est d{\'e}velopp{\'e}e.

}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {257908, title = {Default Reasoning in the Correction of Falsified System Descriptions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1996}, pages = {13{\textendash}22}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {257907, title = {Explaining, understanding and scientific theories}, journal = {Erkenntnis (Dordrecht)}, volume = {44}, year = {1996}, pages = {1{\textendash}23}, abstract = {

One of the functions of scientific knowledge is to provide the theories and laws we need in order to understand the world. My article deals with the epistemic aspect of understanding, i.e., with understanding as unification. The aim is to explicate what we have to do in order to make our scientific knowledge contribute to an increase of the degree to which the particular events we have observed, fit into our world-picture. The analysis contains two parts. First I define the concept of scientific epistemic explanation. Explanations of these type are the appropriate instruments for increasing the degree of unification of the particular events we have observed. In the second, largest part of the article I analyze the construction process of scientific epistemic explanations, focusing on the application of scientific theories.

}, issn = {1572-8420}, doi = {10.1007/BF00172851}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {257909, title = {Some problems for {K}itcher{\textquoteright}s unification account of explanation}, journal = {Communication \& Cognition : Monographies}, volume = {29}, year = {1996}, pages = {441{\textendash}456}, issn = {0378-0880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {248905, title = {Realism and scientific explanations}, booktitle = {The Many Problems of Realism}, year = {1995}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Tilburg University Press}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Cortois, Paul} } @article {WE_Rf, title = {Review of {R}. {F}ranck (red.) {\textquoteright}{F}aut-il chercher aux causes une raison? {L}{\textquoteright}explication causale dans les sciences humaines{\textquoteright} ({L}yon, {I}nstitut {I}nterdisciplinaire d{\textquoteright}{E}tudes {E}pist{\'e}mologiques)}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {54}, year = {1995}, pages = {145{\textendash}146}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {Weber1995, title = {Scientific Arguments and Scientific Prediction.}, booktitle = {Special Fields and Cases. Proceedings on the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation}, volume = {IV}, year = {1995}, pages = {377-387}, publisher = {SicSat}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Blair, J. and Willart, C.} } @incollection {241637, title = {Explanation, understanding and why-questions}, booktitle = {Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen}, year = {1994}, pages = {83-94}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Halleux, Robert and Bern{\'e}s, Anne-Cath{\'e}rine} } @article {241629, title = {Socialisatie, sociale controle en sociologische verklaringen van menselijke handelingen.}, journal = {TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN}, volume = {38}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}68}, issn = {0040-7615}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {241638, title = {Waarom {W}esley {S}almons causaal-mechanische model van verklaring niet volstaat}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {81-86}, publisher = {VUB Press}, isbn = {9789054870845}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Cornelis, Gustaaf C} } @incollection {241634, title = {Het construeren van wetenschappelijke verklaringen}, booktitle = {Gehelen en fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1993}, pages = {261-265}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @article {241633, title = {The indirect practical functions of explanations}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, year = {1993}, pages = {105{\textendash}124}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {WE_In, title = {Introduction}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, year = {1993}, pages = {5{\textendash}7}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {WE_Rc, title = {Review of Werner Callebaut, {\textquoteright}Taking the naturalistic turn{\textquoteright} ({U}niversity of {C}hicago {P}ress)}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {53}, year = {1993}, pages = {123{\textendash}124}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {241636, title = {Wetenschappelijke verklaringen en subjectief verwacht nut}, booktitle = {Actueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {53-60}, publisher = {Eburon}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {DJE:aoc, title = {Aspecten van ontdekking en creativiteit}, booktitle = {Gehelen en Fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1992}, month = {Leuven, September}, pages = {59}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @incollection {219925, title = {De verklarende kracht van statistische hypothesen}, booktitle = {Acta Filosofiedag 1990}, year = {1992}, pages = {53-56}, publisher = {Ebduron}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Commers, Ronald} } @article {241630, title = {Models of explanation: an evaluation of their fruitfulness}, journal = {COMMUNICATION \& COGNITION : MONOGRAPHIES}, volume = {25}, year = {1992}, pages = {339{\textendash}352}, issn = {0378-0880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Weber1992, title = {Scientific Explanation}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {49}, year = {1992}, pages = {148{\textendash}154}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {241631, title = {Phenomenological Laws and their Application to Scientific Epistemic Explanation Problems}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {33}, number = {129-130}, year = {1990}, pages = {175{\textendash}189}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {4172217, title = {De asymmetrie van wetenschappelijke verklaringen}, journal = {Algemeen nederlands tijdschrijft voor wijsbegeerte}, volume = {81}, year = {1989}, pages = {47{\textendash}58}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {3063666, title = {Scientific explanation, necessity and contingency}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)}, volume = {44}, year = {1989}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {4164554, title = {A causal approach to explanations}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {30}, number = {117-118}, year = {1987}, pages = {51{\textendash}68}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {3063662, title = {The transformation of cognitive values into methodological rules}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {40}, year = {1987}, pages = {151{\textendash}164}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} }