@incollection {provijn2014bloody, title = {Bloody analogical reasoning}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {217{\textendash}232}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper I will study some of William Harvey’s applications of analogies in the Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis and the Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus. I will show that Harvey applied analogies in many different ways and that some contributed to the discovery of the characteristic ‘action’ of the heart and pulse and even to the discovery of the blood circulation. The discovery process will be approached as a problem solving process as described in Batens’ contextual model. The focus on constraints allows to see Harvey both as a modern because of his extensive use of experimental results and as strongly influenced by an Aristotelian ‘natural philosophy interpretation’ of anatomy and physiology as, for instance, propagated by Fabricius of Aquapendente.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_11}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {3139252, title = {The generation of abductive explanations from inconsistent theories}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {400{\textendash}416}, abstract = {

In this article I will show how the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the {\textquoteright}inconsistency-adaptive{\textquoteright} logic CLuN(r)from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250) called pCLuN(r) allows for generating sensible abductive explanations from finite inconsistent theories. Before this is shown, I give a more general account on how goal-directed proof procedures contribute to the study of abduction as backward reasoning. Between these two parts, I describe the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the {\textquoteright}inconsistency-adaptive{\textquoteright} logic CLuNr from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250).

}, issn = {1367-0751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzq056}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @incollection {DeMey2010, title = {William {H}arvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.}, booktitle = {Fascinerend Leven. {M}arkante Figuren en Idee{\"e}n uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.}, year = {2010}, note = {

In print

}, publisher = {Nieuwezijds}, address = {Amsterdam}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Van Speybroeck, Linda and Braeckman, Johan} } @incollection {924546, title = {Strategies: what{\textquoteright}s in a name?}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {287{\textendash}306}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will show that Hintikka’s notion of ‘strategy’ can refer to proof-heuristic reasoning as well as to methodological reasoning forms. Stating this distinction allows for a better understanding of the notion and for an easier way to tackle the problem of formalization. Contrary to Hintikka’s opinion, heuristic reasoning can be implemented in formal proofs by means of goal-directed proof procedures. Methodological reasoning forms on the other hand can be formally represented by means of adaptive logics.

}, isbn = {9781904987789}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {JDa:gda, title = {Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction through Goal-Directed Proofs}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {22/3}, number = {60}, year = {2007}, pages = {295{\textendash}304}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/12751}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {DJDa:signed, title = {An Adaptive Characterization of Signed Systems for Paraconsistent Reasoning}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from \cite{B\&S:sspr} in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @phdthesis {PhD_Dagmar, title = {Prospectieve Dynamiek. Filosofische en Technische Onderbouwing van Doelgerichte Bewijzen en Bewijsheuristieken}, year = {2005}, month = {March 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {JDa:ddp_cc, title = {Direct Dynamic Proofs for Classical Compatibility}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {305{\textendash}317}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @incollection {290835, title = {Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {179{\textendash}187}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, isbn = {987-9281-89-6}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {DJDaL:diag, title = {Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {39{\textendash}65}, abstract = {

A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar and Verhoeven, Liza} } @incollection {JLMDa:abd, title = {Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, year = {2002}, pages = {39{\textendash}71}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.
We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, CP1 and CP2. CP1 enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. CP2 moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to CP1 and CP2 that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Verhoeven, Liza and Van Dyck, Maarten and Provijn, Dagmar} } @conference {provijn2002er, title = {Is er een diepe kloof tussen de heuristiek en de inferentieregels van een bewijstheorie? Een poging tot integratie.}, booktitle = {Handelingen van de 24ste {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag: Filosofie en Empirie}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, organization = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In dit artikel wens ik in te gaan tegen het diepe onderscheid dat Hintikka voorstelt tussen de ‘definitory’ -en ‘strategic rules’ van een bewijstheorie. Ik doe dit door een integratie voor te stellen tussen de inferentieregels en de heuristiek van het formeel systeem Pc uit dat toelaat doelgerichte en efficifiente bewijzen te maken.

}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @conference {152575, title = {How to obtain elegant Fitch-style proofs from Goal directed ones.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourtheenth Belgium-Netherlands Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2002}, year = {2002}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Blockeel, H. and Denecker, M.} } @article {DDa:vd1, title = {Pushing the Search Paths in the Proofs. {A} Study in Proof Heuristics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {113{\textendash}134}, abstract = {

Introducing techniques deriving from dynamic proofs in proofs for propositional classical logic is shown to lead to a proof format that enables one to push search paths into the proofs themselves. The resulting goal directed proof format is shown to provide a decision method for A1, ..., An vdash B and a positive test for Gamma vdash A.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {EDa:diag, title = {A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, pages = {161{\textendash}180}, abstract = {

Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Provijn, Dagmar} }