Philosophy of Science

TitleDynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2009
AuthorsVan Dyck, M
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume76
Number5
Pagination389–400
ISSN0031-8248
Abstract

I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms.

Citation Key1019750
Download PDF (Author PDF)
PDF author (public):